Punjab-Haryana High Court
Neha Sharma vs State Of Punjab And Anr on 3 February, 2025
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:015291
CRM-M No.6151 of 2019 (O&M) 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
290
CRM-M No.6151 of 2019 (O&M)
Date of decision: 03.02.2025
Neha Sharma
....Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and another
....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR
Present: Mr. Sunil Chadha, Sr. Advocate
with Ms. Sonia Monga, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Mr. Sandeep Kumar, DAG, Punjab.
Mr. Sunny K. Singla, Advocate
for respondent No.2.
HARPREET SINGH BRAR J. (Oral)
1. Prayer in this petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is for
quashing of FIR No.239 dated 25.11.2015 registered under Sections
406, 420 and 120-B IPC at Police Station Civil Lines, Patiala, District
Patiala, as well as all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom.
2. Briefly, the son of respondent No.2, namely, Chandan
Sharma, was married to petitioner Neha Sharma on 07.10.2013. It was
second marriage between them. According to the son of respondent
No.2, after marriage, they lived together only for 20 days. Thereafter,
Neha Sharma left for Australia on 27.10.2013 with a promise to her
husband Chandan Sharma to call him to Australia in due course of time
on completion of necessary formalities. However, non-fulfillment of
promise by Neha Sharma earned annoyance of her husband Chandan
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Sharma, who resultantly, filed a divorce petition under Section 13 of the
Hindu Marriage Act on 27.05.2015. Six months thereafter, respondent
No.2 father of Chandan Sharma lodged the instant FIR against the
petitioner, levelling allegations that they had fraudulently charged
Rs.15.00 lakh from him on the pretext of settling his son Chandan
Sharma in Australia after marriage with Neha Sharma. But they did not
fulfill their promise and raised further demand of Rs.25.00 lakh to settle
the son of respondent No.2 in Australia.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner inter alia contends that
the petitioner has been falsely implicated due to matrimonial discord
between the petitioner and her husband, who is son of respondent No.2.
The entire story put forth in the FIR by respondent No.2 is concocted
and false, just to take revenge from the petitioner as she is not willing to
live with son of respondent No.2 on account of their temperamental
differences, because Chandan Sharma, son of respondent No.2 earlier
also was deported from Australia for committing family violence with
his first wife, namely, Ashu Sharda, permanently settled there. Further
when the husband of the petitioner filed a petition against the petitioner
seeking divorce, he has not pleaded or alleged about payment of
Rs.15.00 lacs made by his father i.e. respondent No.2 to the mother and
brother of the petitioner and in the entire pleadings in the divorce
petition, there is no allegation with regard to any demand of money.
Further it was a second marriage between the petitioner and son of
respondent No.2 and the story put forth that respondent No.2 has agreed
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to pay Rs.15.00 lacs to the mother and brother of the petitioner is too
far-fetched and unbelievable. There is no documentary proof with
regard to the source of the alleged amount for delivery of the same to
the petitioner. Further learned Senior counsel for the petitioners placed
reliance on "Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. and Ors vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Anr.", AIR 2024 SC 4531, and submits that the FIR
(supra) cannot be registered under Sections 406 and 420 IPC as both the
offences are anti-thesis to each other and lastly, learned Senior counsel
for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment passed by the Coordinate
Bench of this Court in CRM-M No.1168 of 2016, titled as "Ramesh
Kumari and another vs State of Punjab and another", decided on
25.11.2018 (Annexure P-5), wherein the mother and brother of the
petitioner have approached this Court seeking quashing of the FIR
(supra) and the same was allowed and the FIR qua the similarly situated
co-accused namely Ramesh Kumari and Vishal Sharma, stands quashed
and further respondent No.2 was a serving official and he used his
official position to get this false FIR registered against the petitioner and
her family members.
4. On the other hand, learned State counsel assisted by
learned counsel for respondent No.2 opposes the prayer made by the
petitioner on the ground that the present petition is pre-mature and the
investigating agency is yet to conclude the investigation and the
petitioner remained absconding and she was declared as proclaimed
offender, however, learned State counsel could not controvert the fact
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that the order vide which the petitioner was declared proclaimed
offender has been set-aside by the Coordinate Bench of this Court on
28.11.2024 passed in CRM-M No.55577 of 2024, titled as "Neha
Sharma vs State of Punjab and another", and the FIR (supra) qua the
co-accused namely Ramesh Kumari and Vishal Sharma, has already
been quashed by this Court.
5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and from the
perusal of the record, it transpires that the matrimonial dispute ensued
between the petitioner and her husband due to temperamental
differences and the son of respondent No.2, has filed a petition seeking
divorce from the petitioner (Annexure P-2). A perusal of the divorce
petition (Annexure P-2) indicates that not even a whisper has been made
against the petitioner with regard to demand of alleged payment of
Rs.15.00 lacs and further the divorce petition was filed on 27.05.2015
whereas the FIR (supra) was registered later on, on 25.11.2015 and the
factual ingredients to invoke the provisions of Section 420 IPC i.e.
intention to cheat from the very inception is not attracted.
6. A two Judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "State
of Haryana vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal" AIR 1992 SC 604, speaking through
Justice Ratnavel Pandian, held as follows:
"107. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
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reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
1. Where the allegations made in the First
Information Report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the First Information
Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted
by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate
as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
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5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the
Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
(emphasis supplied)
7. A two Judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
"Gulam Mustafa vs. State of Karnataka and another", 2023(3) RCR
(Criminal) 182, speaking through Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah, held
as follows:
"27. This Court, in S.W. Palanitkar vs. State of Bihar,
(2002) 1 SCC 24, held:
"... whereas while exercising power under
section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 the High Court has to look
at the object and purpose for which such power is
conferred on it under the said provision. Exercise of
inherent power is available to the High Court to give
effect to any order under Cr.P.C., or to prevent abuse
of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the
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ends of justice. This being the position, exercise of
power under section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 should be
consistent with the scope and ambit of the same in
the light of the decisions aforementioned. In
appropriate cases, to prevent judicial process from
being an instrument of oppression or harassment in
the hands of frustrated or vindictive litigants,
exercise of inherent power is not only desirable but
necessary also, so that the judicial forum of court
may not be allowed to be utilized for any oblique
motive. When a person approaches the High Court
under section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 to quash the very
issue of process, the High Court on the facts and
circumstances of a case has to exercise the powers
with circumspection as stated above to really serve
the purpose and object for which they are
conferred."(emphasis supplied)
28. In State of Karnataka vs. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89,
it was decided:
"6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code
in a case of this nature is the exception and not the
rule. The section does not confer any new powers on
the High Court. It only saves the inherent power
which the Court possessed before the enactment of
the Code. It envisages three circumstances under
which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised,
namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code,
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii)
to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither
possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule
which would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with
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procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly
arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart
from express provisions of law which are necessary
for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed
upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds
expression in the section which merely recognizes
and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts.
All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the
absence of any express provision, as inherent in their
constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do
the right and to undo a wrong in course of
administration of justice on the principle quando lex
aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine
quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a
person anything it gives him that without which it
cannot exist). While exercising powers under the
section, the court does not function as a court of
appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the
section though wide has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down
in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone courts exist. Authority
of the court exists for advancement of justice and if
any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to
produce injustice, the court has power to prevent
abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to
allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the
powers court would be justified to quash any
proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it
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amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing
of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends
of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the
complaint, the court may examine the question of
fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is
permissible to look into the materials to assess what
the complainant has alleged and whether any offence
is made out even if the allegations are accepted in
toto." (emphasis supplied)
30. The law on the subject was also examined in Parbatbhai
Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641. In Habib Abdullah
Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779, it was opined:
"inherent power in a matter of quashment of FIR has
to be exercised sparingly and with caution and when
and only when such exercise is justified by the test
specifically laid down in the provision itself There is
no denial of the fact that the power under
section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 is very wide but it needs no
special emphasis to state that conferment of wide
power requires the Court to be more cautious. It
casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the
Court." (emphasis supplied)
8. The question whether the petition can be quashed under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. without the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. arose
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of "Ajay Mitra vs. State of
M.P.& Ors.", 2003 (3) SCC 11, wherein the Hon'ble Court held that the
inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., 1973 for quashing of an FIR
has not been absolutely excluded where a report under Section 173
Cr.P.C., 1973 is not filed. The power conferred under Section 482
Cr.P.C., has to be exercised with great caution. To enumerate, if the bare
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perusal of FIR do not disclose commission of any offence or
commission of a non-cognizable offence wherein police does not have
jurisdiction to investigate the said offences, in such case the petition
could be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. without the report of
Section 173 Cr.P.C., 1973. Additionally, if the offence disclosed in the
FIR is punishable by a term of 03 years or less, or if the FIR has been
registered in violation of any judicial order, the petition may also be
quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. without the need for a report under
Section 173 Cr.P.C., 1973. It is pertinent to mention that the power has
to be exercised the inherent power of Section 482 Cr.P.C., would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of the said case and it cannot be stated
in absolute terms that in all cases where the above said issues arise that
the FIR has to be quashed.
9. The prime question before the a two-Judge Bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahmood Ali vs. State of U.P.
(SC),2023 CriLJ 3896 speaking though Justice J.B. Pardiwala,held that:
"...while invoking the inherent power under Section 482
Crpc for quashing the FIR or criminal proceedings
whereby the proceedings initiated are frivolous or
instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance,
in such cases Court owes a duty to minutely and cautiously
look into the contents of FIR. Once the complainant
decides to wreak personal vengeance, the complainant
would ensure the averments made in the FIR disclose
alleged offence and there is no room for any discrepancies.
Therefore, apart from looking into the averments made in
the FIR, the Court owes a duty to look into other emerging
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circumstances and material collected in the investigation
leading to the initiation/registration of the case."
10. A two-Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC
522, a Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can
assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between
consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and
appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails
to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an
FIR. The Court held:-
"5....Authority of the court exists for advancement of
justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority
so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent
such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice
and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers
court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds
that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings would
otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is
disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the
question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be
quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to
assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any
offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in
toto.
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11. Further, a two-Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Kishan Singh dead through LR's vs. Gurpal Singh, 2010
(3) SCC (Crl) 1091, speaking through Justice B.S. Chauhan, held that:
"For quashing any proceedings, the Court ought to
carefully scrutinize the facts before it as the frustrated
litigant who failed before the civil court may initiate the
criminal proceedings with malafide intention merely to
wreak personal vengeance. Chagrined and frustrated
litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their
frustrations by invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal
court. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly with
ulterior motive to spite the other party because of a
personal rancour and to enmesh the other party in long
and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a
view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law."
12. After considering the arguments and reviewing the record,
this Court finds that the FIR registered against the petitioner does not
prima facie disclose a cognizable offence, particularly under Sections
406, 420, and 120-B IPC. The allegations appear to be part of a
matrimonial dispute stemming from temperamental differences between
the petitioner and her husband, as evidenced from the divorce petition
filed earlier, which does not include any mention of the alleged payment
of Rs.15 lakh or any other fraudulent activity. This Court also notes that
the FIR (supra) was registered several months after the divorce petition
was filed and lacks the requisite ingredients to support the charge of
cheating or criminal breach of trust. In light of these factors and the
legal principles laid down in various judgments, including those of the
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Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed hereinbefore, this Court is of the
considered opinion that continuing the criminal proceedings would
amount to an abuse of process of law.
13. Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and the FIR
No.239 dated 25.11.2015 registered under Sections 406, 420 and 120-B
IPC at Police Station Civil Lines, Patiala, District Patiala, and all other
subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the
petitioner.
(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
JUDGE
03.02.2025
yakub
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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