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Charan Gir vs State Of Punjab And Another
2025 Latest Caselaw 6142 P&H

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 6142 P&H
Judgement Date : 11 December, 2025

[Cites 5, Cited by 0]

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Charan Gir vs State Of Punjab And Another on 11 December, 2025

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
                       CHANDIGARH




147                                                 CRM-M-69923-2025 (O&M)
                                                  Date of decision: 11.12.2025
                                                Date of Uploading: 11.12.2025

Charan Gir
                                                                  ....Petitioner(s)
                                          V/s
State of Punjab and another
                                                                  ....Respondent(s)

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL

Present:     Mr. Dhiraj Jindal, Advocate for the petitioner.

                                   *****
SUMEET GOEL, J. (Oral)

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 528 of BNSS,

2023, preferred by the petitioner impugning the order dated 19.03.2024

(Annexure P-3) passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sangrur, to

the extent, that the execution of sentence and order appealed against has

been suspended qua petitioner (herein) subject to depositing of 20% of the

amount of compensation. The relevant portion of the impugned order reads

thus:

"Heard. Along with main appeal, an application under section 389 Cr.P.C for suspending the sentence of imprisonment and releasing the applicant on bail during the pendency of the appeal has also been filed. Heard. Appellant/accused has been convicted and sentenced for the offence under Section 138 of N.L. Act. The appellant has been sentenced to undergo R.1. for the period not exceeding three years. As the disposal of the appeal is likely to take time, hence the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant/accused is suspended till the decision of the appeal, subject to furnishing the bail bonds in the sum of Rs.50000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court/Duty Magistrate within a period of 15 days from today. Accused is directed to appear before the Court on each and every date of hearing. Bail bonds after acceptance and attestation shall be transmitted to this Court.

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Perusal of the judgment dated 20.02.2024 further reveals that the accused is directed pay compensation to the tune of Rs.4,50,000/- to the complainant. Therefore, in the light of the amended provision of Section 148 of the NI Act and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal appeal Nos.917-944 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Criminal) Nos. 4948-2975/2019 Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S.Deswal Versus Virender Gandhi decided on 29.05.2019, the appellant is directed to deposit 20% of the total amount of compensation awarded by the trial Court within 60 days from today.

If the accused fails to pay the 20% of total compensation amount within the stipulated period, the order of suspension shall automatically stands vacated.

Let, notice of the appeal be issued to the respondent for 03.09.2024."

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner

is not in a position to deposit the said amount of 20% of the compensation

amount as awarded by the trial Court on account of financial difficulty.

Learned counsel has further argued that due and requisite opportunity was

not afforded to the petitioner before passing of the impugned order dated

19.03.2024 wherein condition for deposit of 20% of the amount of the

compensation has been stipulated by the learned Sessions Court. Learned

counsel has further iterated that imposition of such condition of deposit of

20% of the amount of compensation as awarded by the learned trial

Magistrate would effectively amount to taking away the right of appeal of

the petitioner. Thus, it has been submitted that the impugned order be

quashed, to the extent, that a condition of deposit of 20% of the amount of

compensation as awarded by the trial Court, has been imposed.

3. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the

paper-book.

4. Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, introduced

through the 2018 amendment, empowers appellate courts to mandate the

deposit of at least 20% of the fine or compensation amount by the accused as

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CRM-M-69923-2025 Page |3

a condition for hearing an appeal against a conviction in cheque dishonour

cases under Section 138. This provision aims to address the prolonged

litigation faced by complainants and mitigate delays in receiving

compensation, ensuring a balance between the accused person's right to

appeal and the complainant's right to speedy justice. The amount deposited

can be released to the complainant, reflecting the legislative intent to provide

timely relief and deter frivolous appeals.

At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer herein to a

judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as Jamboo Bhandari

vs. M.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors. 2023 (10)

SCC 446; relevant whereof reads as under:

"6. What is held by this Court is that a purposive interpretation should be made of Section 148 of the N.I. Act. Hence, normally, Appellate Court will be justified in imposing the condition of deposit as provided in Section 148. However, in a case where the Appellate Court is satisfied that the condition of deposit of 20% will be unjust or imposing such a condition will amount to deprivation of the right of appeal of the appellant, exception can be made for the reasons specifically recorded.

7. Therefore, when Appellate Court considers the prayer under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. of an accused who has been convicted for offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, it is always open for the Appellate Court to consider whether it is an exceptional case which warrants grant of suspension of sentence without imposing the condition of deposit of 20% of the fine/compensation amount. As stated earlier, if the Appellate Court comes to the conclusion that it is an exceptional case, the reasons for coming to the said conclusion must be recorded.

8. The submission of the learned counsel appearing for the original complainant is that neither before the Sessions Court nor before the High Court, there was a plea made by the appellants that an exception may be made in these cases and the requirement of deposit or minimum 20% of the amount be dispensed with. He submits that if such a prayer was not made by the appellants, there were no reasons for the Courts to consider the said plea.

9. We disagree with the above submission. When an accused applies under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. for suspension of sentence, he

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normally applies for grant of relief of suspension of sentence without any condition. Therefore, when a blanket order is sought by the appellants, the Court has to consider whether the case falls in exception or not."

5. The convict bears the onus of demonstrating exceptional

circumstances to persuade the appellate court to waive the mandatory

deposit of compensation under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments

Act. Considering the legislative intent behind the provision, which seeks to

expedite justice and alleviate the complainant's hardship due to prolonged

litigation, it is generally appropriate for the appellate court to impose this

condition when an appeal is filed against a conviction under Section 138.

Such a requirement ensures that the complainant is not unjustly deprived of

compensation while safeguarding the appellate process from frivolous or

dilatory tactics. Under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the

requirement to deposit the compensation amount as a condition for appeal is

generally mandatory, emphasizing its status as a rule.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment titled as Muskan

Enterprises & Anr. Vs. The State of Punjab 2024 INSC 1046, has held

thus:

"xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx. While there can be no gainsaying that

normally the discretion of the Appellate Court should lean towards

requiring a deposit to be made with the quantum of such deposit

depending upon the factual situation in every individual case, more so

because an order under challenge does not bear the mark of invalidity on

its forehead, retention of the power of such court not to order any deposit

in a given case (which in its view and for the recorded reasons is

exceptional) and calling for exercise of the discretion to not order deposit,

has to be conceded. xxxxxxxxxxxxxx."

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Ergo, the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in cases of Jamboo Bhandari (supra) and Muskan

Enterprises (supra) enunciates that the appellate Court holds the discretion

to waive this condition only in exceptional circumstances. Such

circumstances must be demonstrated through compelling and substantiated

material provided by the appellant-convict. Absent such cogent material, it

would be in appropriate for appellate Court to impose such condition. This

approach ensures adherence to the legislative intent, discouraging frivolous

appeals and protecting the interests of the complainant.

5.1. Applying the ratio decidendi of the judgments in the case of

Jamboo Bhandari case (supra) and Muskan Enterprises (supra), no ground

is made out to quash/modify the condition imposed vide the impugned order

whereby the petitioner has been directed to deposit 20% of the amount of the

compensation as awarded by the learned trial Magistrate. The ground

pleaded by the petitioner that he is facing financial difficulty cannot be said

to be a ground sufficient enough for carving out an exception from the

mandate contained in Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

It also cannot be said, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, that

imposition of the condition of deposit of 20% of the amount of

compensation as awarded by the learned trial Magistrate can be said to be

unjust or would amount to effectively taking away the right of appeal of

petitioner. Thus, the impugned order does not suffer from any infirmity nay

legal infirmity calling for any interference by this Court. Accordingly, the

petition in hand is dismissed.

6. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed off.

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7. Nothing said hereinabove shall be deemed to be an expression

of opinion upon merits of the appeal pending before the learned Sessions

Court.





                                                   (SUMEET GOEL)
December 11, 2025                                      JUDGE
Naveen



           Whether speaking/reasoned:                Yes/No
           Whether reportable:                       Yes/No




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