Mohinder Singhg And Ors vs Nirmal Singh And Ors
2025 Latest Caselaw 6028 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Mohinder Singhg And Ors vs Nirmal Singh And Ors on 3 December, 2025

           CR-8379-2025 (O&M)                                                                    -1-



                               IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                                            AT CHANDIGARH
                                                  -.-
                                                      CR
                                                      CR-8379-2025 (O&M)
                                                      Decided on ::-03.12.2025

           Mohinder Singh and Others                                          ....Petitioners

                                                       VERSUS

           Nirmal Singh and Others                                          ....Respondents

           CORAM : HON'BLE MS.
                           M JUSTICE MANDEEP PANNU

           Present:            Mr. Akshay Jindal, Sr. Advocate with
                               Mr. Tushar Kush, Advocate and
                               Mr. Amyia Malhotra,
                                          Malhotra Advocate for the petitioner
                                                                    petitioners.

                  Mr. Ravinder Malik, Sr. Advocate with
                  Mr. Garvit Mittal, Advocate and
                  Mr. Ritender Rathee, for respondent No.1/caveator
                                                      No.1/caveator.
                                             -.-
           MANDEEP PANNU J.

           1.                  Present revision petition has been filed under Article 227 of the

           Constitution of India for setting aside the order dated 19.05.2025, whereby the

           learned Civil Judge, Junior Division Ambala dismissed the application filed by the

           under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC.

           Brief Facts

2. The plaintiffs have filed the present suit for declaration and permanent

injunction, alleging that the sale deed bearing No. 3448 dated 22.11.2023, executed

by defendants No. 3 and 4 in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2 with respect to land

measuring ing 12 kanals 19 marlas comprised in various Khewat/Khasra numbers

situated in Village Mateheri Sekhon, Tehsil and District Ambala, along with the

mutation sanctioned on its basis, is illegal, null, void and not binding upon them. It

is pleaded that the entire entire land originally belonged to earlier owners, who had

CR-8379-2025 (O&M) -2-

carved out different plots for raising shops and developing a commercial site along

the main Ambala-Hissar Ambala Hissar Road. The plots were of different sizes, and at the time of

carving out the colony, land in front of the plots/shops was left undisputedly for

parking of vehicles of plot-holders plot holders as well as the general public visiting the

commercial centre. The plaintiffs aver that they had purchased their respective

plots/constructed shops from earlier owners through through registered sale deeds executed

approximately twelve years ago, at which time the price paid by them included the

cost of the parking area also. The site plan forming part of their sale deeds clearly

reflects a 100-foot foot-wide wide open parking area shown by letters ABCD, whereas the

shops constructed by the plaintiffs are shown by letters CDEF.

3. It is further pleaded that ever since their purchase, the plaintiffs have

been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the entire commercial centre,

including the shops, plots, houses (where applicable), and the parking space shown

in the plan, and have been using the same without any hindrance from anyone. The

plaintiffs assert that defendants No.3 and 4 are neither owners nor were ever in

possession of the parking parking area, and therefore had no right or authority to execute

any sale deed in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2. According to the plaintiffs,

defendants No.33 and 4 had themselves purchased certain portions of the land long

ago for their own use, but the parking parking space had always remained a common area

belonging to the plot/shop owners, and had also been reflected as vacant land in

the site plans attached with the plaintiffs' own title documents. It is emp emphasised hasised

that the defendants No.1 No.1 and 2 have no right, tit title le or interest in the commercial

centre except for whatever independent land they may have purchased separately.

CR-8379-2025 (O&M) -3-

4. The plaintiffs further aver that in the last week ooff December 2023,

defendants No.11 and 2, along with some companions, came to the site arm armed ed with

weapons and attempted to forcibly take possession of the parking space in front of

the shops. Due to timely intervention of the plaintiffs, the police and some

respectable members of the village, the defendants failed in their attempt and were

compelled elled to leave, though they openly threatened the plaintiffs that they would

dispossess them whenever they found an opportunity. The plaintiffs then

approached the defendants through village elders, whereupon defendants No. 1 and

2 disclosed that they had purchased the land from defendants No. 3 and 4 vide the

impugned sale deed dated 22.11.2023. The plaintiffs informed them that

defendants No. 3 and 4 were neither owners of the disputed parking area nor

competent to sell it, and that the sale deed in favou favourr of defendants No. 1 and 2 was

invalid and void ab initio.

initio

5. It is pleaded that the development of the commercial centre, including

the layout of plots and the demarcated parking area, is clearly reflected in the sale

deeds, site plans, Aksh Shajra and other documents placed on record by the

plaintiffs. They have also filed copies of various complaints submitted to the

Superintendent of Police, Ambala and the Station House Officer, Police Station

Naggal, as well as copies of relevant receipts. The plaint plaintiffs iffs also rely upon

multiple sale deeds executed by previous owners in their favour, copies of

Jamabandis for different years, Intkaal registers, plotting plans of the area, and

other material to show the nature of the commercial site and the existence of the

common parking area. According to the plaintiffs, if the defendants are not

restrained, the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury because the commercial

CR-8379-2025 (O&M) -4-

value of their shops would be destroyed in the absence of a proper parking facility,

which was the essential feature of the planned commercial centre. They assert that

the defendants' acts have cast a cloud over the plaintiffs' title and rights, and

therefore a declaration from the Court is necessary.

6. The defendants, however, have contested the suit and the application

under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC by filing a detailed written statement. According

to defendants No. 1 and 2, the property in dispute is validly owned and possessed

by them pursuant to the registered sale deed No. 3448 dated 22.11.2 22.11.2023 023 executed

by defendants No. 3 and 4 for a valuable consideration of ₹64,87,500/-.. They

further ther submit that defendants No.3 No.3 had purchased the land earlier vide sale deed

No. 5332/1 dated 19.12.2013, and defendant No.4 had pu purchased rchased land vide sale

deed No.5100 5100 dated 16.12.2013, and thus defendants No. 3 and 4 were themselves

lawful owners of the land in question. Defendants No. 1 and 2 state that after

purchasing the property from defendants No. 3 and 4, they have become full and

lawful owners with the right right to enjoy and use the land as they deem fit, without

interference from any person.

7. The defendants deny the claim of the plaintiffs of any common

parking area existing on the land purchased by them, asserting that the so so-called called

parking place shown in the plaintiffs' plan is not part of the plaintiffs' plots or sale

deeds, and that the plaintiffs have no concern with the land which is now

exclusively owned and possessed by defendants No.1 and 2. They allege that the

plaintiffs have illegally tried to interfere interfere with their possession and are falsely

showing the disputed land as parking. The defendants also contend that the

plaintiffs have already constructed their shops on their respective plots and have no

CR-8379-2025 (O&M) -5-

right over any additional land or passage, althou although gh the defendants had expressed

their willingness to grant a passage of 20-25 20 25 feet for ingress and egress to the

plaintiffs' shops as a matter of convenience. They maintain that the plaintiffs have

filed a false and frivolous suit to harass them.

8. The trial trial Court, after considering the pleadings, documents and

arguments of both sides, held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie

case for grant of temporary injunction. The Court noted that the plaintiffs' primary

challenge was to the sale deed deed dated 22.11.2023 on the ground that defendants No.

3 and 4 were not the owners of the suit land and had no authority to tran transfer sfer the

same to defendants No.1 No.1 and 2. However, on examining the impugned sale deed

along with the earlier sale deeds of 2013 relied relied upon by the defendants, the Court Cou

observed that defendants No.3 No.3 and 4 had themselves acquired title to the land

under valid registered documents, which had never been challenged by the

plaintiffs. No material was placed on record record to show that defendan defendants No.3 3 and 4

were divested of their rights at any point of time or that the land sold under the

impugned deed was different from what they had previously purchased. The trial

Court therefore found no prima facie basis to hold that defendants No. 3 and 4

lacked authority, title or competence to execute the sale deed in favour of

defendants No. 1 and 2.

9. The Court also dealt with the plaintiffs' plea that the parking area in

front of their shops was common land and that its value was included in the price pric

of their plots. It held that the recitals in the sale deeds regarding availability of

parking do not create any legally enforceable right in rem, especially in the

absence of any registered easement or document establishing exclusive rights over

CR-8379-2025 (O&M) -6-

the said area. The plaintiffs had not produced any title document showing that the

alleged parking space formed part of their purchased land. Rather, the plaintiffs'

claim appeared to rest only on assertions and apprehensions which could be

adjudicated only upon detailed detailed evidence during trial.

10. A significant consideration weighed by the trial Court was the

plaintiffs' own conduct. It noticed that several plaintiffs and their family members

had, even after the filing of the present suit, entered into registered transactions

involving the same property with defendants No. 1 and 2, and these sale deeds had

neither been denied nor challenged. The Court held that such conduct prima facie

reflected acquiescence in the ownership of defendants No. 1 and 2 and was

inconsistent istent with the plaintiffs' present stand. The trial Court further took note of

earlier civil proceedings for partition (Civil Suit No. 681/2015) in which the

plaintiffs themselves had not disputed the proprietary rights of defendant Sudesh

(predecessor of defendants No. 1 & 2), and had taken a stand that partition had

already taken place and all co-sharers co sharers were in possession of their respective shares.

The Court found that this earlier stand ran contrary to the plaintiffs' current plea

that defendants No. 3 and 4 had no share or authority in the suit property.

11. On the question of irreparable loss, the Court held that the plaintiffs

failed to show that the sale deed or the impugned transactions had caused any

direct interference with their enjoyment of their their existing plots or shops, and that

their grievances were based more on future apprehensions, which cannot justify

injunctive relief. The Court also found that the balance of convenience did not lie

in favour of the plaintiffs, especially when multiple registered sale deeds had

CR-8379-2025 (O&M) -7-

already been executed and acted upon, and third third-party party rights may have come into

existence.

12. Overall, the trial Court concluded that the plaintiffs had not satisfied

any of the three essential requirements, requirements prima facie case, ba balance lance of convenience or

irreparable injury, injury and accordingly dismissed the application under Order 39 Rule

1 and 2 CPC.

13. The First Appellate Court upheld the dismissal of the injunction

application by observing that the trial court had exercised its dis discretion cretion soundly

and in accordance with settled legal principles. The appellate court noted that

although the plaintiffs challenged the sale deed dated 22.11.

22.11.2023 2023 executed by

defendants No.3 and 4 in favour of defendants No.1 and 2, they had never

questionedd the earlier sale deeds through which defendants No.3 and 4 had

themselves acquired title. The Court found no material to show that defendants No.

3 and 4 sold anything beyond their share or that they had lost title prior to

executing the impugned sale deed.

deed. It was emphasised that the plaintiffs were

themselves owners of only 3 kanals 10 marlas out of the total land of 37 kanals 14

marlas and therefore could not claim injunctive control over a much larger area

under the pretext of a "parking area".

14. Thee appellate court also noted that the plaintiffs' reliance on recitals

in their sale deeds regarding parking could not create any enforceable right against

third parties, especially in the absence of any sanctioned layout plan or statutory

recognition of a reserved parking area. The court observed that several plaintiffs

had purchased chased land from defendants No.1 No.1 and 2 even after the filing of the suit,

which clearly demonstrated acceptance of their title and undermined the plea that

CR-8379-2025 (O&M) -8-

the defendants' ownership was fraudulent or void. It further held that injunction

could not be granted against a co-sharer, co sharer, nor could any easement or reservation be

imposed unilaterally by one co-sharer co sharer upon another without partition or mutual

consent.

15. The appellate court also rejected the reliance placed on the judgment

in the earlier partition suit (CS No. 681/2015), holding that the findings therein did

not establish exclusive demarcation of shares and were based merely on the recitals

of sale deeds, not on any sanctioned partition.

partition. It concluded that no better title could

be transferred by the plaintiffs' vendors than what they themselves possessed, and

that the challenge raised by the present appellants was inconsistent with their own

earlier stands. Holding that the trial court's court's order was reasoned, balanced and

founded upon correct application of law governing temporary injunctions, the

appellate court dismissed the appeal.

Arguments of the Petitioner Before This Court

16. Before this Court, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that

both courts below failed to appreciate that defendants No. 3 and 4 were not in

possession of any identifiable portion of land and therefore could not have

transferred possession to defendants defendants No. 1 and 2. It is argued that the plaintiffs

have been in continuous use of the parking area and excess portion ever since the

purchase of their plots in 2011-2013, 2011 2013, as reflected in the site plans and photographs

appended with the plaint. It is further further urged that the sale during the pendency of the

litigation was void and could not affect the existing possession of the plaintiffs,

and that the earlier judgment dated 18.10.2023 in the partition suit was not

appreciated in proper perspective by the courts courts below.

CR-8379-2025 (O&M) -9-

17. Learned counsel submitted that the purpose of filing the suit would be

defeated if the respondents were allowed to alter the nature of the property by

raising construction on the area being used for common parking. Reliance was

placed on the judgment in Mohan Lal v. Preet Kumar 2008(3) LandLR 41 to

argue that even a co-sharer co sharer in possession can be restrained if the intended act is

prejudicial to the rights of other co-sharers.

co sharers. It was argued that the plaintiffs'

livelihood is linked with the commercial viability of their shops and that refusal of

injunction njunction may lead to multiplicity of proceedings.

Arguments of the Respondents Before This Court

18. Conversely, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted

that the petition is devoid of merit as both courts below have returned concurrent

findings ndings after exhaustive examination of facts and law. It is argued that the

petitioners have no title or documentary basis to assert that the disputed portion

constitutes a reserved parking area, and that mere recitals in their sale deeds cannot

bind third parties or curtail the rights of defendants No. 3 and 4, who were

undisputed co-sharers.

sharers.

19. It is further submitted that several plaintiffs themselves pur purchased chased

land from defendants No.1 No.1 and 2 after filing of the suit, thereby acknowledging

their ownership hip and fatally weakening their present plea that the impugned sale

deed is void. The respondents also argued that no easement, reservation or right of

common user can be imposed unilaterally by one co co-sharer sharer on another without a

sanctioned partition or mutual mutual agreement. The alleged apprehension of

dispossession was stated to be imaginary, as the plaintiffs remain in possession of

their plots and shops.

CR-8379-2025 (O&M) -10-

20. Learned counsel also contended that the scope of revisional

jurisdiction is narrow and does not permit perm re-appreciation appreciation of evidence unless the

impugned orders suffer from jurisdictional error, perversity or patent illegality, illegality

which, according to them, is wholly absent in the present case.

Findings of This Court

21. Having considered the material placed on record and the submissions

advanced, this Court is of the view that no ground is made out to warrant

interference in revisional jurisdiction. The concurrent orders of the trial court and

the First Appellate Court demonstrate application of mind to all rrelevant elevant aspects,

including the nature of the plaintiffs' claim, the title flowing from the earlier sale

deeds, and the conduct of the parties. The primary challenge raised by the

petitioners is directed against the competence of defendants No. 3 and 4 to eexecute xecute

the sale deed dated 22.11.2023. However, the foundational sale deeds under which

defendants No. 3 and 4 derived their title remain unchallenged and unassailed. In

the absence of any material to show divestment of their rights, the plea of lack of

competence mpetence cannot be accepted even prima facie.

22. The he petitioners' claim of a reserved parking area equally lacks

substantiation. No approved layout plan, government sanction, or statutory

document has been produced to demonstrate that such land was earma earmarked rked as

common parking in a manner enforceable against third parties. The buyers' own

sale deed recitals may regulate their inter se rights, but they cannot operate to fetter

the rights of non-signatories, non signatories, particularly where the property remains joint and

unpartitioned. The plaintiffs' reliance on long usage is also insufficient to create an

enforceable right in the absence of material indicative of a settled legal entitlement.

CR-8379-2025 (O&M) -11-

23. This Court also finds that the apprehension of dispossession or

obstruction of access, as projected by the petitioners, is speculative at this stage.

The plaintiffs continue to remain in possession of their respective plots and shops,

and no material has been produced to show any immediate or irreversible threat to

their rights warranting arranting interlocutory protection. The balance of convenience also

does not favour granting injunction, as doing so would effectively restrain co-

co

sharers from managing their own property and may upset transactions already

concluded.

24. In revisional jurisdiction, jurisdiction, this Court is not expected to substitute its

own view unless the subordinate courts' decisions suffer from manifest illegality

or perversity. The orders under challenge reflect neither. Rather, they demonstrate

a correct appreciation of the factual factual matrix and settled principles governing grant

of temporary injunction. On a holistic view of the matter, this Court finds no

infirmity in the concurrent findings warranting interference.

25. Accordingly, the revision petition is found to be devoid of merit and is

hereby dismissed.

26. Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

           December 03, 2025                            (MANDEEP PANNU)
           tripti                                            JUDGE
                  Whether speaking/non-speaking
                          speaking/non speaking : Speaking
                  Whether reportable             : Yes/No