[Cites 10, Cited by 0]

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Sanjeev Kumar vs State Of Haryana And Others on 9 December, 2025

                                    CRWP-10858-2024 (O&M)
                                                               1




                               IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT
                                              CHANDIGARH

                                                                   CRWP-10858-2024 (O&M)
                                                                     Reserved on : 21.11.2025
                                                                    Decided on : 09.12.2025

                     Sanjeev Kumar
                                                                                      ..... Petitioner

                                                       VERSUS

                     State of Haryana & Ors.

                                                                                  ..... Respondents

                     CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURYA PARTAP SINGH

                     Argued by : Mr. Rahul Deswal, Advocate for the petitioner.

                                  Mr. Arun Kumar Gujjar, AAG Haryana.

                                                         *****
                     SURYA PARTAP SINGH, J.

1. A direction to the respondents in the form of a writ in the nature

of mandamus, has been sought by the petitioner and a prayer has been made

that the order dated 06.08.2024, passed by the respondent No.1, hereinafter

being referred to as 'impugned order' only, whereby prayer for premature

release of the petitioner has been rejected, be quashed.

2. The pith and substance of the factual matrix emerging from

record is that the petitioner was sent to stand trial by SHO Police Station

Uklana, for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 302, 120B

and 34 of Indian Penal Code and Section 25 & 27 of Arms Act. The

abovementioned trial culminated into conviction of the petitioner by virtue

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of judgment dated 27.05.2004. As a result of abovementioned verdict, after

hearing the petitioner on the point of quantum of sentence, vide order dated

31.05.2004, he along with his co-accused was awarded death penalty. When

the abovementioned sentence was awarded to the petitioner, a reference was

made by the learned Court of Sessions to this Court, for confirmation of

sentence, whereas the petitioner and the co-convict filed a criminal appeal.

The abovementioned proceedings were decided by this Court on 12.04.2005

and by virtue of judgment dated 12.04.2005, the murder reference was

declined and the sentence awarded to the petitioner was commuted into life

imprisonment.

3. Against the judgment of this Court dated 12.04.2005, three

appeals were filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, i.e. one

appeal by the State of Haryana, second appeal by complainant-Ram Singh

and third one by both the convicts (including petitioner). The

abovementioned three appeals were decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court

of India by virtue of judgment dated 12.02.2007 and vide abovementioned

judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India upheld the judgment of

conviction passed by the learned trial Court. However, by reversing the

finding recorded by this Court, converted the sentence of life imprisonment

into death sentence. Against the abovementioned judgment dated

15.02.2007, the review petition was preferred by the petitioner and co-

convict, but the abovementioned review petition did not find favour before

the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, and on 23.08.2007 the same was

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dismissed. Even the mercy petition came to be dismissed by Hon'ble

Governor on 23.10.2007 and subsequent mercy petition under Article 72 of

the Constitution of India by his Excellency the President of India, vide order

dated 05.07.2013.

4. It is relevant to mention here that after the rejection of mercy

petition, a writ petition was filed by the present petitioner and in the

abovementioned writ petition, vide judgment dated 21.01.2014, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court of India commuted the death sentence awarded to the

petitioner into a sentence for life imprisonment.

5. In the present petition, it has been pleaded by the petitioner that

his conviction by the learned trial Court came into being on 31.05.2004, and

that at that point of time, the premature release policy dated 12.04.2002,

hereinafter being referred to as the 'policy' only, was applicable for the

convicts. According to petitioner, with regard to commission of heinous

offence, the convicts, whose death sentence was commuted to life

imprisonment, were entitled to be considered for premature release on

completion of 20 years of actual sentence and 25 years of total sentence with

remission. While referring to abovementioned policy, the petitioner has

alleged that he has already undergone actual sentence of more than 20 years

and total sentence with remission of more than 25 years and 09 months.

6. As per petitioner, according to abovementioned policy, he is

entitled for premature release and that as per policy, the matter with regard

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to premature release of petitioner was required to be placed before the

Hon'ble Governor for orders under Article 161 of the Constitution of India,

and that the abovementioned order, i.e. the impugned order dated 06.08.2024

has been conveyed by the then Additional Chief Secretary to Government of

Haryana on the recommendation of State Level Committee. According to

petitioner, the case of petitioner for premature release has been rejected with

a further direction that he shall remain in jail till his last breathe.

7. Aggrieved of the abovementioned order, it has been pleaded by

the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed in utter violation of

the applicable policy, i.e. premature release policy dated 12.04.2002, and the

relevant laws propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, vis-à-vis

this Court, on various occasions. Hence, the present petition.

8. Heard.

9. While assailing the impugned order, the learned counsel for the

petitioner has contended that there is no denial of this fact that the total

period of actual sentence, undergone by the petitioner as per custody

certificate placed on record by the respondents-State, is more than 23 years

and 10 months and the total custody period, including remission, of more

than 28 years and 10 months.

10. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, once the

abovementioned policy is applicable to the petitioner, he has a right to be

released from custody. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner

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has referred to the law propounded by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in

the case of 'Maru Ram V/s Union of India' 1981(1) SCC 107. The learned

counsel for the petitioner while referring to the contents of impugned order

has further contended that the State Level Committee considered the case of

petitioner for remission, when the actual sentence and total sentence

undergone by the petitioner were as under:-

Years Months Days

11. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, although in the

impugned order it has been observed that the policy of premature release

dated 12.04.2002 is applicable in the instant case, yet, while referring to five

jail offences committed by the petitioner, it has been observed that the

conduct of the petitioner was not satisfactory inside the jail, and that the

petitioner had not shown any sign of reformation.

12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that

the impugned order is defective in view of the fact that one of the grounds

for declining the benefit of premature release to the petitioner has been that

the death sentence awarded to the petitioner was converted to life

imprisonment not on merit, but because the same was converted on the

ground of delay in deciding the mercy petition. According to learned counsel

for the petitioner, once a verdict has been rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court of India, the State Level Committee was not competent to comment on

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the background in which the commutation of death sentence had taken place.

According to learned counsel for the petitioner, the abovementioned

reference in the order is not only unwarranted, but illegal also, as the State

Level Committee has tried to interpret the verdict of Hon'ble Supreme Court

of India, for which it had no authority/jurisdiction.

13. It has been further contended by learned counsel for the

petitioner that the impugned order is defective in view of this fact also that

not only the background in which the commutation of death sentence had

taken place, has been commented upon, but also the contents of evidence.

With regard to above, the learned counsel for the petitioner has specifically

referred to the contents of impugned order, wherein it has been mentioned

that there was a judicial confession and suicide note with regard to

involvement of petitioner in the commission of crime. As per learned

counsel for the petitioner, it has also been observed that the abovementioned

act of the petitioner showed that the murders were meticulously executed by

the petitioner while having even the future plans in mind. According to

learned counsel for the petitioner, all the abovementioned aspects have

already been considered by the learned trial Court, vis-à-vis this Court, and

that once the death sentence has been commuted by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court of India, the State Level Committee has got no right to discuss the

evidence placed before the Court, and then arrived at a conclusion with

regard to quality of evidence placed before the Court during the course of

trial.

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14. In addition to above, it has also been contended by learned

counsel for the petitioner that the competent authority while passing the

impugned order has also transgressed into the jurisdiction of the Court while

passing an order to the effect that the petitioner shall remain in jail till his

last breathe. With regard to above, it has been contended by learned counsel

for the petitioner that awarding of sentence is the sole prerogative of the

Court and it is for the Court only to decide what type of sentence has to be

awarded to a convict. As per learned counsel for the petitioner, the

competent authority while dealing with a case for premature release has no

jurisdiction at all either to enlarge the sentence awarded to a convict by a

Court, or to reduce it.

15. As per learned counsel for the petitioner, the only jurisdiction

vested in the competent authority is to decide as to whether the case of the

convict comes within the parameters prescribed under the policy or not. In

support of his arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied

upon the principle propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of

'Home Secretary (Prison) & Ors. V/s H. Nilofer Nisha', 2020 (14) SCC 161,

'Rajkumar V/s The State of Uttar Pradesh' 2024 (9) SCC 598, 'Rashidul

Jafar @Chota V/s State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.' 2022 (8) SCR 475, 'State

of Haryana & Ors. V/s Jagdish', AIR 2010 SC 1690 and by this Court in the

cases of 'Gurbax Singh V/s State of Haryana', 1994 (3) RCR (Criminal) 342

and 'Kamal Kant Tiwari V/s State of Punjab & Ors.', 2014(2) RCR

(Criminal) 940.

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16. Per contra, the learned State Counsel, while representing all the

respondents and defending the impugned order, has contended that first and

foremost fact to be taken into consideration, while considering the right of a

convict for premature release, is that the premature release is a concession

accorded by the State Government and a convict, who is guilty of

commission of heinous crime, cannot claim it as a matter of right. The

learned State Counsel has further contended that the impugned order in itself

makes it abundantly clear that a right policy was applied while passing the

impugned order, i.e. the policy for premature release dated 12.04.2002, and

that decision in the impugned order has been taken strictly in accordance

with the contents of abovementioned policy. According to learned State

Counsel since the case of the petitioner does not comply with the parameters

prescribed under the abovementioned policy, his request for premature

release was bound to be declined, and that the competent authority, by virtue

of impugned order, has taken a right decision.

17. During the course of arguments, the learned State Counsel has

highlighted the fact that the petitioner is a person, who did not show any sign

of reformation or remorse, and that the impugned order itself shows that he

committed five misconduct/jail offences during his custody period. As per

learned State Counsel, even the opinion of the successor Court of learned

trial Court was obtained with regard to desirability of petitioner for

premature release, and that the learned Presiding Officer on 06.05.2024 had

opined against the petitioner. As per learned State Counsel, it is not the sole

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opinion of the State Level Committee, which has considered the misconduct

of the petitioner to be grave enough to deny the right of premature release,

but also the learned trial Court. According to learned State Counsel in the

given fact situation, this plea of the petitioner that his case for premature

release has been wrongly declined, is not sustainable.

18. In addition to above, the learned State Counsel has also

contended that in the impugned order, the reference of writ petition, filed

before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India on the ground of delay in

deciding the mercy petition, and the discussion of evidence which was

placed before the learned trial Court, finds mention because the competent

authority while passing the impugned order had applied its mind not only

with regard to the parameters enshrined under the abovementioned policy,

but also with regard to background in which the crime was committed. As

per learned State Counsel in order to assess as to whether the crime

committed by the petitioner is heinous in nature, it was necessary for the

competent authority to look into the background in which the offence was

committed, the manner of commission of offence and also material placed

before the Court with regard to commission of offence exposing the mindset

of the petitioner at the time of commission of offence.

19. In view of abovementioned arguments, it has been contended

by learned State Counsel that there is no illegality or perversity in the

impugned order, and therefore, scope is there for indulgence or interference

in the abovementioned order. While claiming that the present petition has

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got no merit, the learned State Counsel urged for dismissal of present

petition. In support of his arguments, the learned State Counsel has relied

upon the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India

in the case of 'Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik V/s State of Maharashtra',

(2019) 12 SCC 460.

20. The record has been perused carefully.

21. As far as the instant case is concerned, with regard to period of

sentence already undergone by the petitioner, Clause 2(aa), 2(iii), 2(a)(vii)

and 2(a)(viii) are relevant, which are reproduced below:-

2(aa) Convicts whose death sentence Their cases may be has been commuted to life considered after completion imprisonment and convicts who of 20 years actual sentence have been imprisoned for life and 25 years total sentence having committed a heinous with remissions. crime such as:-

2(iii) Murder of more than two persons 2(a)(vii) Murder of a child under the age of Their cases may be 14 years. considered after completion of 14 years actual sentence including undertrial period 2(a)(viii) Murder of a woman provided that the total period of such sentence including remissions is not less than 20 years.

22. If the abovementioned standard enshrined in the policy is taken

into consideration, it leads to the conclusion that the petitioner, who had

already served an actual sentence for a period of more than 20 years and

total sentence for a period of more than 25 years, duly complies with the

abovementioned parameters.

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23. In the present case, at the very outset it is relevant to mention

here that the competent authority, while taking a decision with regard to the

case of petition for premature release, has observed that following five jail

offences have been committed by the petitioner during his confinement in

the jail:-

"(i) On 07.02.2005 said convict misbehaved with Night Watchman (CNW). Forgiven by the Superintendent Jail.

(ii) On 18.10.2008 said convict along with his other companions inmates planned to come out from the Central Jail, Ambala after digging a tunnel. In this regard punished with stoppage of his interview for next order, by the Superintendent Jail and a case FIR No.264 dated 24.10.2008 u/s 222/224/ 225/120B/419/420/467/471/34 IPC, P.S. Baldev Nagar, Ambala, was also registered against him: Convicted and sentenced to imprisonment as already undergone with fine of Rs.2000/-, on 18.12.2013.

(iii) On 19.08.2012, quarreled with other inmate. Warned by the Superintendent Jail.

(iv) On 04.04.2018, quarreled with other inmate. Warned by the Superintendent Jail.

(v) On 31.05.2018 absconded from furlough for 02 years, 08 months and 04 days. In this regard, a case FIR No.116 dated 10.06.2018 U/s 8/9 HGCP Act and 420/467/468/471/120-B IPC, P.S. Bilaspur was registered against him: Pending (not on bail)

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24. While referring to the abovementioned offences, a conclusion

has been drawn by the competent authority that the abovementioned jail

offences committed by the petitioner reflected that the petitioner had not

improved his conduct despite incarceration for a period of about 20 years. It

has been further observed that the abovementioned jail offences show that

the convict has no sign of reformation.

25. With regard to abovementioned observations, it is pertinent to

mention here that as per policy regarding premature release of life convicts,

Clause 4(i) of the abovementioned policy deals with the procedure for

assessment of conduct of a prisoner with regard to jail offences. It prescribes

that 'the Superintendent of the Jails concerned shall submit premature

release cases of life convicts two months before they complete the sentence

mentioned above along with their comments to the Director General of

Prisons, Haryana keeping in view the following points:-

(i) Overall conduct of the life convicts during his/her confinement in the jail with specific emphasis, however on his conduct for the last five years from the date of his/her eligibility for consideration of premature release under para 2(aa) to 2(a) may be termed as under:-

                                 a. If he/she has not been punished for any jail        Good
                                    offence during the last five years.

                                 b. If he/she has been punished with a minor            Satisfactory
                                    punishment during the last five years.








                                     CRWP-10858-2024 (O&M)





                               c. If he/she has been punished with a major           Satisfactory
                                  punishment during the last five years.

26. The abovementioned clause in the policy shows that for the

purpose of assessment of a prisoner for premature release, only the conduct

of the petitioner in the last 05 years has to be looked into, but the impugned

order shows that while considering the abovementioned factor, the jail

offences committed by the petitioner during the period 2005-2018, too, have

been taken into consideration. Since the impugned order was passed on

06.08.2024 by any stretch of imagination, the jail offences committed by the

petitioner prior to 2019 should not have been taken for the assessment of

conduct of the petitioner. Thus, it is hereby held that an error has been

committed by the competent authority while observing that due to large

number of jail offences committed by the petitioner, this conclusion can be

drawn that there was no sign of reformation.

27. In this context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Home

Secretary (Prison) (supra) has observed that 'in case, as pointed out above, a

petition is filed without any decision(s) of the State Level Committee in

terms of Para 5(I) of the G.O. in question, the Court should direct the

concerned Committee/authority to take decision within a reasonable period.

Obviously, too much time cannot be given because the liberty of a person is

at stake. This order would be more in the nature of a writ of mandamus

directing the State to perform its duty under the Scheme'.

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28. In the case of Rajkumar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court of

India has observed that 'the State having formulated Rules and a standing

Policy for deciding cases of premature release, it is bound by its own

formulations of law. Since there are legal provisions, which hold the field, it

is not open to the State to adopt an arbitrary yardstick for picking up cases

for premature release. It must strictly abide by the terms of its policies

bearing in mind the fundamental principle of law that each case for

premature release has to be decided on the basis of the legal position as it

stands on the date of the conviction subject to a more beneficial regime

being provided in terms of a subsequent policy determination. The

provisions of law must be applied equally to all persons: Moreover, those

provisions have to be applied efficiently and transparently so as to obviate

the grievance that the policy is being applied unevenly to similarly

circumstanced persons. An arbitrary method adopted by the State is liable to

grave abuse and is liable to lead to a situation where persons lacking

resources, education and awareness suffer the most'.

29. Similarly in the case of Rashidul Jafar @Chota (supra), the

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has observed that 'the implementation of

the policy for premature release has to be carried out in an objective and

transparent manner as otherwise it would impinge on the constitutional

guarantees under Articles 14 and 21. Many of these life convicts who have

suffered long years of incarceration have few or no resources. Lack of

literacy, education and social support structures impede their right to access

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legal remedies. Once the state has formulated its policy defining the terms

for premature release, due consideration in terms of the policy must be given

to all eligible convicts. The constitutional guarantees against arbitrary

treatment and of the right to secure life and personal liberty must not be

foreclosed by an unfair process of considering applications for premature

release in terms of the policy'.

30. In the case of State of Haryana & Ors. V/s Jagdish, AIR 2010

SC 1690, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has observed that 'at the time

of considering the case of pre-mature release of a life convict, the authorities

may require to consider his case mainly taking into consideration:-

 Whether the offence was an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large;

 Whether there was any chance of future recurrence of committing a crime;

 Whether the convict had lost his potentiality in committing the crime;

 Whether there was any fruitful purpose of confining the convict any more;

 The socio-economic condition of the convict's family and

 Other similar circumstances'.

31. In the case of Gurbax Singh (supra), this Court has observed

that 'it can hardly be doubted that in every murder there is an element of

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brutality and murder in itself is a heinous crime but if the State Government

itself has chosen to classify murder in different ways for the purpose of

premature release, it is bound by its instructions and they must be followed.

It will be seen that paragraph 2(a) deals with a situation where the murder is

motivated by lust, greed or avarice, that are the cases of human instincts, or

where it has been exceptionally brutal in its execution'.

32. This Court in the case of Kamal Kant Tiwari (supra) deprecated

the practice of jail authorities when contrary to the Government policy, the

case of a convict, who had not committed any jail offence in the last 05

years, was not recommended by the jail authorities.

33. With regard to impugned order, it is also relevant to mention

here that the impugned order contains a comment with regard to background

in which the death sentence awarded to the petitioner was converted into life

imprisonment. This part reads as under:-

"In Writ Petition (Criminal) No.188 of 2013 filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, on the grounds of delay in deciding her mercy appeal by the His Excellency the President of India, his death sentence was converted to life imprisonment, vide order dated 21.01.2014 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Thus, his death sentence was not converted to life imprisonment on merits and the facts of his case but the same was converted on the ground of delay in deciding her mercy petition."

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34. In addition to above, the impugned order also discussed the

evidence, which was placed before the learned trial Court. The

abovementioned reference is recorded in the impugned order in the

following words:-

"Further, in his judicial confession and suicide note, this life convict admitted that the small children were killed otherwise they would kill his son. This act of this life convict shows that the murders were meticulously executed having even future plans in the mind."

35. As far as the abovementioned contents of the impugned order

are concerned, the same show that the competent authority while passing the

impugned order has transgressed into the jurisdiction, which is exclusively

vested in the Court, which is reflective of the fact firstly that the State Level

Committee while discussing the abovementioned facts was already having a

prejudice mind, and secondly that it has ventured into the field, which was

beyond the scope of its jurisdiction. The quality of evidence, which was

placed before the learned trial Court, has to be discussed either by the

learned trial Court or the Court dealing with appeal. But the State Level

Committee while dealing with an issue with regard to eligibility of the

petitioner for remission in sentence, is not supposed to look into the quality

of evidence, which was placed before the learned trial Court during the

course of trial. The abovementioned discussion in the impugned order in

itself vitiates the findings recorded by the High Level Committee and

renders the impugned order perverse.

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36. One more area, wherein the observations beyond its jurisdiction

have been made by the State Level Committee, is the recommendation that

the petitioner should be kept in jail till his last breathe. With regard to above,

it is relevant to note that the scope of High Level Committee while making

recommendation, and of the competent authority while passing the

impugned order, was limited to the scope as to whether under the policy, the

benefit of remission of sentence could be awarded to the petitioner or not.

As such, there was no authority vested either in the State Level Committee

or in the competent authority to enlarge the scope of sentence awarded to the

petitioner and take a decision upto what period the petitioner would serve

the sentence. Once the verdict of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India was

already there and with regard to period to which the petitioner is to undergo

sentence, statutory provisions and policy were already there, it was not

within the competence of State Level Committee, while making a

recommendation or the competent authority while passing the impugned

order, that the period of sentence to be undergone by the petitioner could

have been enlarged.

37. In this regard, the Division Bench of this Court in the case of

'Union of India V/s V. Sriharan @Murugan, (2016) 7 SCC 1, has ruled that

'the power derived from the Penal Code for any modified punishment within

the punishment provided for in the Penal Code for such specified offences

can only be exercised by the High Court and in the event of further appeal

only by the Supreme Court and not by any other Court in this country. To

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put it differently, the power to impose a modified punishment providing for

any specific term of incarceration or till the end of the convict's life as an

alternate to death penalty, can be exercised only by the High Court and the

Supreme Court and not by any other Court'.

38. With regard to instant case the observations made by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of 'Ravada Sasikala V/s State of

Andhra Pradesh', 2017(4) SCC 546 are also relevant, wherein the Hon'ble

Supreme Court of India has reiterated that the imposition of sentence also

serves a social purpose as it acts as a deterrent by making the accused realize

the damage caused not only to the victim but also to the society at large. The

law in this regard is well settled that opportunities of reformation must be

granted and such discretion is to be exercised by evaluating all attending

circumstances of each case by noticing the nature of the crime, the manner

in which the crime was committed and the conduct of the accused to strike a

balance between the efficacy of law and the chances of reformation of the

accused.

39. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of 'Karamjit

Singh V/s State (Delhi Admn.) made the following observations:

"Punishment in criminal cases is both punitive and reformative. The purpose is that the person found guilty of committing the offence is made to realise his fault and is deterred from repeating such acts in future. The reformative aspect is meant to enable the person concerned to relent and repent for his

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action and make himself acceptable to the society as a useful social being. In determining the question of proper punishment in a criminal case, the court has to weigh the degree of culpability of the accused, its effect on others and the desirability of showing any leniency in the matter of punishment in the case. An act of balancing is, what is needed in such a case; a balance between the interest of the individual and the concern of the society; weighing the one against the other. Imposing a hard punishment on the accused serves a limited purpose but at the same time, it is to be kept in mind that relevance of deterrent punishment in matters of serious crimes affecting society should not be underminal. Within the parameters of the law an attempt has to be made to afford an opportunity to the individual to reform himself and lead the life of a normal, useful member of society and make his contribution in that regard. Denying such opportunity to a person who has been found to have committed offence in the facts and circumstances placed on record would only have a hardening attitude towards his fellow beings and towards society at large. Such a situation, has to be avoided, again within the permissible limits of law."

40. In the case of Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik (supra), the Hon'ble

Supreme Court of India has observed that 'the process of rehabilitation is

also not a simple one since it involves social reintegration of the convict into

society. Of course, notwithstanding any information made available and its

analysis by experts coupled with the evidence on record, there could be

instances where the social reintegration of the convict may not be possible.

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If that should happen, the option of a long duration of imprisonment is

permissible'.

41. If the facts and circumstances of the case pertaining to the

present case are analyzed in the light of principles of law, discussed above, it

transpires that the impugned order is patently perverse, illegal, unsustainable