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Punjab-Haryana High Court
Charan Gir vs State Of Punjab And Anr on 8 December, 2025
Author: Rajesh Bhardwaj
Bench: Rajesh Bhardwaj
CRM-M-69011-2025 -1-
154 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-69011-2025
Date of Decision: 08.12.2025
Charan Gir ..... Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab and another .......Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH BHARDWAJ
Present: Mr. Dhiraj Jindal, Advocate, for the petitioner.
Rajesh Bhardwaj, J. (ORAL)
1. Prayer in the present petition is for quashing of order dated
06.09.2024 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sangrur directing the
petitioner to deposit 20% of compensation amount in Criminal Appeal
No.346 of 2024 titled as Charan Gir vs. State of Punjab and another, arising
out of NACT/59/2020 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
titled as Kuldeep Singh vs. Charan Gir. Further prayer has been made to
quash the order dated 20.08.2025 passed by learned Sessions Judge,
cancelling the bail and issuing non-bailable warrants against the petitioner.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that the petitioner
was prosecuted in a complaint under Section 138 of the Act and he was
convicted by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Moonak, under Section
138 of the Act, vide judgment dated 09.08.2024 and sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for one year and was ordered to pay compensation to
the tune of Rs.3,70,000/- to the complainant. It is further submitted that
against the order dated 09.08.2024, the petitioner filed an appeal before the
Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge at Sangrur and learned
Appellate Court vide its impugned order dated 06.09.2024 (Annexure P-3)
suspended the sentence of petitioner subject to deposit of 20% of the
compensation amount. He has submitted that in view of Section 148 of the
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Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, automatic deposit of 10 % of the
compensation amount, at the appellate stage, is not mandatory. However,
due to financial constraints, the petitioner failed to comply with the order
dated 06.09.2024 and thereafter, bail of the petitioner was cancelled and he
was ordered to be summoned through non-bailable warrants by learned
Sessions Judge, Sangrur, vide its order dated 20.08.2025. However, he has
submitted that Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of M/s
Coromandel International Limited vs. Shri Ambica Sales Corporation,
in CRM-M-7799-2025 decided on 24.09.20245 has dealt with the issue
involved in the present petition and the has observed as under:-
75. The legislative sanction given to an Appellate Court to
direct an Appellant who has challenged the conviction,
sentence, and compensation amount, by filing an appeal, to
deposit at least 20% of the compensation amount under Section
148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, miserably fails on
the proportionality test. The provision of Section 148 is based
on proclivities and thus arbitrary; on the contrary, as per the
literal and practical meaning, it does not authorize the
Appellate Court to suspend the sentence by mandatorily
imposing a condition of deposit. The purpose Section 148
intended to achieve was to ensure that at least 20% of the
compensation amount is handed over to the holder of the
cheque whose debt or other liability amount was withheld due
to the dishonor of the cheque. However, due to ambiguous
drafting because of the absence of clear procedures for quick
recovery, e.g., freezing bank accounts to the extent of the
deposit, attachment of property, etc., has led to the recovery of
the deposits by imposition of conditions while suspending the
sentence in a bailable offence. Furthermore, as per Section 148
of the NI Act, the only individual who can be compelled to
deposit is the person who issued the cheque in his personal
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liability. For corporate entities, signing and issuing a cheque is
a ministerial act; the signatory is often an employee working
for the company, with a limited liability partnership,
association, body, or firm, and none of these can be forced to
deposit due to vicarious liability, not personal liability.
Additionally, suspending the sentence based on the deposit
does not affect juristic persons because they cannot be
imprisoned and thus cannot seek a suspension of sentence or
appeal, as these are statutory rights that cannot be subjected to
the deposit. Given the above, the legislatures' dominant
purpose has failed miserably on two counts; first it does not
impact juristic persons, and second, individuals whose cheques
are often security cheques taken by the money lenders, and
these individuals face forced recoveries, which may discourage
some from even challenging their convictions, before the first
appellate Court itself, disconnecting rationality behind the
legislative objectives that section 148 NI Act projected to
achieve, by not affecting the juristic persons on the one hand
and discouraging the impoverished on the other, and thus,
miserably fails to strike a fair, rationale, and a reasonable
balance between the obligations of elected representatives
towards the society's poorest segments, who at the time of
emergency situations when they are in urgent need of money,
the financial institutions rarely give any loan or immediate loan
and these poor people, who have a weaker community support,
turn to the money lenders, who in turn, mostly keep blank
signed undated cheques as security for unsecured debts.
76. Therefore, the simplest solution to all these issues is that
whenever the deposits are expensive than the liberty, and
the Appellate Courts are convinced that the convicts are not
in a position to deposit and likely to forego their liberty
even when the first appeal is yet to be decided, the Appellate
Courts must make efforts to prioritize hearing appeals filed
against the convictions under Section 148 NI Act and decide
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those preferably within sixty days of filing, and not later
than ninety days, which clearly aligns with the legislators'
intentions. However, the time of sixty days should be
extended to the extent to which the decision of the appeal is
delayed because of the complainant."
Thus, learned counsel for the petitioner has restricted his prayer
to the extent that in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble Division Bench
of this Court in M/s Coromandel International Limited's case (supra),
learned Appellate Court be directed to decide the appeal filed by the
petitioner within a period of 60 days. He further prays that order dated
20.08.2025 cancelling the bail of the petitioner and issuing non-bailable
warrants against him, be also set aside.
4. Notice of motion.
5. Ms. Ramta Chowdhary, DAG, Punjab, accepts notice on behalf
of the State.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
Admittedly, Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in M/s Coromandel
International Limited's case (supra) had already held the Appellate Courts
must make efforts to prioritize hearing appeals filed against the conviction
under Section 148 of NIA Act and decide the same within 60 days of the
filing and not later than 60 days, where the appellant is not in a position to
deposit the compensation amount as ordered by the Appellate Court.
7. Thus, in view of the same, the present petition is disposed of
with a direction to the Appellate Court concerned to hear the appeal of the
petitioner and decide the same within 60 days and not later than 90 days. It
is further clarified that the parties shall not seek any unnecessary
adjournments.
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8. As far as impugned order dated 20.08.2025 cancelling the bail
of the petitioner is concerned, this Court without going into the authenticity
of the ground taken for the absence of the petitioner, deems it appropriate to
direct him to appear before the Court concerned and to face the proceedings
in the present case. Hence, order dated 20.08.2025, is set aside, subject to
costs of Rs.25,000/- to be paid by the petitioner to the complainant on his
appearance before learned Appellate Court.
9. The petitioner is directed to appear before the trial Court within
a period of ten days from the date of receipt of copy of this order and file an
appropriate application alongwith the costs of Rs.25,000/- and learned
Appellate Court would grant him bail till the disposal of the appeal on his
already furnished bail/surety bonds (as directed vide order dated
06.09.2024). The petitioner will have protection from arrest for a period of
ten days from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Learned Appellate
Court is free to impose any condition it likes on the petitioner while
admitting him to bail.
10. Needless to say that in case the petitioner fails to comply with
the abovesaid direction, this order would be of no avail to him and the order
dated 20.08.2025 will come in force and the present petition shall be
deemed to have been dismissed.
11. Petition stands disposed of in abovesaid terms.
(RAJESH BHARDWAJ)
08.12.2025 JUDGE
sharmila Whether Speaking/Reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No
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