Punjab-Haryana High Court
Municipal Corporation Ludhiana vs Balkar Singh & Ors on 5 November, 2024
Author: G.S. Sandhawalia
Bench: G.S. Sandhawalia
LPA No.1861 of 2014 (O&M) #1#
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
LPA No.1861 of 2014 (O&M)
Date of decision: 05.11.2024
Municipal Corporation, Ludhiana
......Appellant
Versus
Balkar Singh and Ors.
.....Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SANDHAWALIA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK MANCHANDA
Present: Mr. HPS Ghuman, Advocate for the appellant.
Mr. Amit Jain, Advocate for respondent Nos.1 to 5.
Ms. Arundhati Kulshreshtha, AAG, Punjab.
G.S. SANDHAWALIA, J
Mr. Ghuman has placed on record a receipt dated 16.05.2023 for a
sum of Rs.10,000/- deposited with the Punjab & Haryana High Court Advocate
Bar Association, Benevolent Fund Chandigarh. It is submitted that the same could
not be deposited on the last occasion. He submits that the better affidavit cannot
be filed in support of the application seeking condonation of delay.
2. Present appeal has been preferred against the order dated 13.08.2013
passed by learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No.1408 of 1988. The
appeal is accompanied by an application bearing CM No.3940-LPA-2014, seeking
condonation of 332 days delay in filing the appeal. Delay as such is not being
satisfactorily explained since the date of filing of the appeal is 16.10.2014 and the
only ground raised is that the delay was unintentional and considerable time was
LPA No.1861 of 2014 (O&M) #2#
taken by the appellant in following the procedure for getting the requisite sanction.
In spite of number of opportunities having been granted and orders having been
passed to file the affidavit, no affidavit has been filed as noticed in the earlier part
of the order. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that
sufficient cause has not been explained at all.
3. The Apex Court has time and again held that the same yardstick is to
be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private
individuals and the State, however, certain amount of latitude is impermissible in
the latter case. Reliance can be placed upon the judgment of the Apex Court
reported as Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by LRs vs. Exe. Eng, Jalgaon Medium
Project & Anr, 2008 (17) SCC 448 wherein the Apex Court set aside the
judgment of the High Court whereby delay of 1724 days had been condoned on
the ground that no sufficient cause was made out and therefore, it was concluded
that there was no occasion as such to condone the delay. Similarly, in another
judgment reported as Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd vs. Gujarat
Industrial Development Corporation and another, 2010 (5) SCC 459, the Apex
Court held that the law of limitation is founded on public policy and there should
be no resort to dilatory tactics. The delay for more than four years had been
condoned by High Court and keeping in view the law laid down whether plausible
and tangible explanation was tendered for condoning the delay for more than four
years, the judgment of High Court was set aside. In another judgment reported as
Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors vs. Living Media India Ltd &
Anr, 2012 (3) SCC 563, the Apex Court held that there has to be reasonable
acceptable explanation and in the absence of the same, it was not possible to go
into the merits as such. Paragraphs 12 & 13 of this judgment read as under:
"1 to 11. xxx xxxx
LPA No.1861 of 2014 (O&M) #3#
12. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were
well aware or conversant with the issues involved including
the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter
by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They
cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation
when the Department was possessed with competent persons
familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible
and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why
the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a party before
us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession
has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot
be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used
and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds
everybody including the government.
13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities
that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation
for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need
to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept
pending for several months/years due to considerable
degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The
Government departments are under a special obligation to
ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and
commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and
should not be used as an anticipated benefit for Government
departments. The law shelters everyone under the same
light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation
2024.11.14 03:59
I attest to the accuracy and offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of
authenticity of this order
LPA No.1861 of 2014 (O&M) #4#
various dates, according to us, the Department has
miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons
sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the
appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.".
4. In the present case, it is noticed that the learned Single Judge has
allowed the writ petition and set aside the order of eviction passed under the
Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1973 while
recording that the writ petitioner as such was in occupation of the land before the
purchase by the Municipal Corporation on 14.09.1976. In such circumstances, it
was held that the provisions of the Act do not apply and the learned Single Judge
as such has also left the remedy open to the present appellant by holding that the
writ petitioners shall not be evicted from the land in question, which is shown to
have been mentioned in records except in due course of law.
5. It is, thus, apparent that the interest of the appellant has not been
scuttled in any manner and the remedy as such to seek the possession of the land
remains before the court of competent jurisdiction if it so wishes/chooses to do so.
6. Resultantly, we do not find any ground as such to condone the delay.
7. Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed on ground of being time
barred and also on merits.
8. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
(G.S. SANDHAWALIA)
JUDGE
November 05, 2024 (DEEPAK MANCHANDA)
manoj JUDGE
1. Whether speaking/ reasoned : Yes /No
2. Whether reportable : Yes /No
