Punjab-Haryana High Court
Ritik Saini @ Parveen vs State Of Haryana on 5 November, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:143754
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224 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-53452-2024
Date of Decision:05.11.2024
Ritik Saini @ Parveen ...Petitioner
Vs.
State of Haryana ...Respondent
Coram : Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.S.Shekhawat
Present: Mr. Rajesh Lamba, Advocate for
for the petitioner.
Mr. Rajinder Kumar Banku, Deputy Advocate General, Haryana.
***
N.S.Shekhawat J.
1. The petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 483 of
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 with a prayer to grant regular bail to
him in a case FIR No.150 dated 08.06.2020 under Sections 148, 149, 302, 201,
216, 420, 120-B of IPC and under Section 25 of Arms Act, registered at Police
Station Kasola, District Rewari (Annexure P-1).
2. The FIR in the present case was registered on the basis of the
statement made by Sumit @ Sunni and the same has been reproduced below:-.
"Sir, It is requested to you that I, Sumit @ Sunni son of Kashiram,
resident of Mohalla Gujarwada Rewari. Today, I went to my plot
at Uttam Nagar from my home, where I asked my mother about
elder brother Amit. My mother told me that Amit had received a
call from someone and after attending the phone he took away the
car and was saying that he was going to Kasola Chowk. At the
same time, my uncle's grandson Raj son of Krishna told that Amit
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and his friend Govind Saini had been shot near bus stand near
Garhi Bolni Road Moda Wali, on which, I reached Garhi Bolni
Road, bus stand then my brother, Amit son of Kahiran @ Pappu
resident of Gurjar Wada age 32 years and Govind son of Rajesh
Kumar Saini resident of Arjun Nagar Rewari had already been
taken to the Trauma Center, Rewari on an ambulance in an
injured condition. The time was around 4:30 PM and I reached the
Government Hospital, Rewari. I came to know that my brother
Amit and his friend Govind had died due to the fire shots. Vikas @
lambu son of Sushil Yadav, Shiv Garden was also with them in the
car. I enquired about this from the people on the spot and I came
to know that Vaishali had called my brother Amit and Govind
Saini to come to Kasola Chowk with an intention of killing them.
My brother Amit and his friends Govind Saini and Vikas had gone
on Santro Vehicle bearing registration no. DL 3CBF 1928 of white
colour, who got down near Mod Wali to get Bidi (cigarettes) and
at the same time a Baleno white coloured and two motorcycles
came carrying Harkesh son of Kalu Ram, Manisa son of Bhoop
Singh, residents of New Adarsh Nagar Bhadawas Road Rewari,
Sundar son of Man Gujjar, Kali son of Dhanga Gaujjar,
Bhadawas Road Rewari and other persons came. One hit my
brother's car and one dropped motorcycle in front of my brother's
car and all fired at my brother Amit and Govind with an intention
of killing them, who had expired due to fire shots. It has come to
knowledge that Vikas ran away from my brother's car. Then the
miscreants left their Baleno car and went on motorcycles towards
Rewari on motorcycle. The reason of this fight is that there is
allegation of killing the Harkesh's cousin namely Sarjit son of
Tulli on my brother Amit, for which FIR no. 119/2018 under
section 302 IPC PS City Rewari was registered. Due to this
enmity, Harkesh made a plan to kill my brother Amit and Govind
Saini with Naveen son of Dhanga, who is in Jail by calling
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Vaishali together.All the above had shot Amit and Govind Saini
dead in a planned manner and strictest action be taken by
arresting the culprits. SD Sumit @ Sunni son of Kashiram @
Pappu, resident of Mohalla Gujarwada, Rewari PS City Rewari,
Mob. 9812989322.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner was
not initially named in the FIR and has been falsely involved on the basis of the
disclosure statement made by co-accused, namely, Manish on 12.07.2020. He
further contends that in the present case, out of total 62 witnesses, 32 witnesses
have been examined and 14 witnesses have been given up by the prosecution.
Since most of the material witnesses have already been examined by the
prosecution, there are no chances of tampering with the evidence. Learned
counsel further contends that co-accused namely Pardeep, Rahul and Naveen @
Dhangewal have already been granted the concession of bail by this Court.
Learned counsel further contends that even though two more cases were
ordered to be registered against the petitioner, but the petitioner is in custody
for the last more than 04 years and 03 months. Thus, the custody of the
petitioner will not serve any meaningful purpose.
4. On the other hand learned State counsel has vehemently opposed
the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that
the petitioner had actively participated in the commission of crime. Moreover,
the accused in connivance with each other had killed Amit and Gobind Saini
and sufficient evidence was collected against him.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their able
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assistance; I have perused the record.
6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of
Ranjan Dwivedi Vs. CBI, through the Director General, 2012(8) SCC 495;
2012 (4) RCR (Criminal) 880" as follows:-
"14. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (supra), another
Constitution Bench considered the right to speedy trial and opined
that the delay is dependent on the circumstances of each case,
because reasons for delay will vary. This Court held :
"84. The right to a speedy trial is a derivation from a
provision of Magna Carta. This principle has also been
incorporated into the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776
and from there into the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution
of United States of America which reads, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial...". It may be pointed out, in this connection,
that there is a Federal Act of 1974 called 'Speedy Trial Act'
establishing a set of time-limits for carrying out the major
events, e.g., information, indictment, arraignment, in the
prosecution of criminal cases. [See Black's Law Dictionary,
6th Edn. page 1400].
85. The right to a speedy trial is not only an important
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration, to
minimise anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation
and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an
accused to defend himself but also there is a societal interest
in providing a speedy trial. This right has been actuated in
the recent past and the courts have laid down a series of
decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In
fact, lot of cases are coming before the courts for quashing
of proceedings on the ground of inordinate and undue delay
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stating that the invocation of this right even need not await
formal indictment or charge.
86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right
to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by
arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may
result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time
of the commission of the offence till it consummates into a
finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be noted that
the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly
reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary,
AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1360, State of Bihar while dealing
with Article 21 of the Constitution of India has observed
thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
"No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick
trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it
would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no
doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential
part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in
Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to
what would be the consequence if a person accused of an
offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of
his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed
trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21.
Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed
from the charge levelled against him on the ground that
trying him after an unduly long period of time and
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convicting him after such trial would constitute violation of
his fundamental right under Article 21."
See also (1) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (I), (2)
Hussainara Khatoon (I) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar,
(3) Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secretary, State of
Bihar, Patna, (4) Hussainara Khatoon (VI) v. Home
Secretary, State of Bihar, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, (5) Kadra
Pahadia v. State of Bihar (II), (6) T.V. Vatheeswaran v.
State of T.N., and (7) Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak.
88. Thus this Court by a line of judicial pronouncements has
emphasised and re-emphasised that speedy trial is one of the
facets of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined
in Article 21 and the law must ensure 'reasonable, just and
fair' procedure which has a creative connotation after the
decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi."
The Court further observed :
"92. Of course, no length of time is per se too long to pass scrutiny
under this principle nor the accused is called upon the show the
actual prejudice by delay of disposal of cases. On the other hand,
the court has to adopt a balancing approach by taking note of the
possible prejudices and disadvantages to be suffered by the
accused by avoidable delay and to determine whether the accused
in a criminal proceeding has been deprived of his right of having
speedy trial with unreasonable delay which could be identified by
the factors - (1) length of delay, (2) the justification for the delay,
(3) the accused's assertion of his right to speedy trial, and (4)
prejudice caused to the accused by such delay. However, the fact
of delay is dependent on the circumstances of each case because
reasons for delay will vary, such as delay in investigation on
account of the widespread ramification of crimes and its designed
network either nationally or internationally, the deliberate absence
of witness or witnesses, crowded dockets on the file of the court
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etc."
7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu and
others v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1978 SC 429 has held as under:-
"Bail or Jail"- at the pre-trial or post-conviction stage - largely
hinged on judicial discretion. The learned Judge held that
personal liberty was too precious a value of our constitutional
system recognised under Article 21 that the crucial power to
negate it was a great trust exercisable not casually but judicially,
with lively concern for the cost to the individual and the
community. It was further held that deprivation of personal
freedom must be founded on the most serious considerations
relevant to the welfare objectives of society specified in the
Constitution. The learned Judge quoted Lord Russel who had said
that bail was not to be withheld as a punishment and that the
requirements as to bail were merely to secure the attendance of the
prisoner at trial. According to V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., the principal
rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of
the applicant to take judgment and serve sentence in the event of
the Court punishing him with imprisonment. After holding that it
makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to
prepare and present his case than one remanded in custody the
learned Judge observed that if public justice is to be promoted
mechanical detention should be demoted.
8. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia etc Vs The State of Punjab, AIR
1980 SC 1632, Hon'ble the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"Judges have to decide cases as they come before them, mindful of
the need to keep passions and prejudices out of their decisions.
The Court has also observed that in which case bail should be
granted and in which case it should be refused is a matter of
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discretion. The court found it interesting to note that as long back
as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra
Vs. King Emperor, AIR 1924 Calcutta 476, that the object of bail
was to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the
proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether
bail should be granted or refused was whether it was probable that
the party would appear to take his trial and that it was
indisputable that bail was not to be withheld as a punishment. The
Supreme Court also referred to the observation of the Allahabad
High Court in K.N. Joglekar Vs. Emperor, AIR 1931 Allahabad
504, that Section 498 of the Old Code which corresponds to
Section 439 of the New Code, conferred upon the Sessions Judge
or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not
handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which
corresponds to the present Section 437. The Allahabad High Court
had also observed that there was no hard and fast rule and no
inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion
conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was
established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously.
The Supreme Court referred also the decision of the Allahabad
High Court in Emperor Vs. H.L. Hutchinson, AIR 1931
Allahabad 356, wherein it was held that the principle to be
deduced from the various sections in the Cr.P.C. was that grant of
bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, that as a presumably
innocent person, the accused person is entitled to freedom and
every opportunity to look after his own case and to establish his
innocence and that an accused person who enjoys freedom is in a
much better position to look after his case and to properly defend
himself than if he were in custody. The High Court had also held
that it would be very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any
particular rules which would bind the High Court, having regard
to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the Court
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unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that
may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is
dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that
in particular classes bail may be granted but not in other classes.
The Supreme Court apparently approved the above views and
observations and held (vide paragraph 30) as follows :
"It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or
not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances,
the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial
verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of
universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or
refusal of bail."
9. At this stage, no doubt the allegations levelled by the complainant
in the present case point towards the seriousness of the offence. However, this
Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that now the petitioner is in custody for the
last 04 years and 03 months. The Court is also conscious of the settled cannons
that the object of the bail is neither punitive nor preventive and deprivation of
liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that the
accused person will not stand his trial when called upon. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held in plethora of judgments that pre-conviction detention should not
be resorted to, except in the cases of necessity to secure attendance at the trial
or upon material that the accused will tamper with the witnesses if left at
liberty.
10. From the allegations levelled in the present FIR, it is apparent that
serious allegations have been levelled against the petitioner in the present case,
however, the petitioner cannot be kept behind bars for an indefinite period. The
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petitioner was arrested in the present case on 13.07.2020 and similarly placed
co-accused, namely, Parveen, Rahul and Naveen @ Dhangewal have already
been granted the concession of bail by this Court. Any delay in conducting the
trial on the part of the prosecution violates the right to life, which is guaranteed
to every citizen under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Even the learned
State counsel has failed to prove on record that the trial proceedings have been
delayed by the present petitioner in any manner.
11. Without commenting on the merits of the case, the present petition
is allowed. The petitioner is ordered to be released on bail pending trial on his
furnishing bail bonds and surety to the satisfaction of the concerned trial Court/
Duty Magistrate/Chief Judicial Magistrate subject to the following conditions:-
(i) The petitioner shall not directly or indirectly make any
inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the
facts of the case, so as to dissuade him to disclose such facts to the
Court or to any other authority.
(ii) The petitioner shall remain present before the Court on the
dates fixed for hearing of the case.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself from the Court
proceedings except on the prior permission of the Court
concerned.
(iv) The petitioner shall surrender his passport, if any, (if already
not surrendered), and in case he is not holder of the same, he shall
swear an affidavit to that effect.
(v) The petitioner shall also file his affidavit before the concerned
Court, mentioning his ordinary place of residence and number of
mobile phone, which shall be used by him during the pendency of
the trial. In case of change of place of residence/mobile number,
he shall share the details with the concerned Court/learned Trial
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Court.
(vi) In case, the petitioner is involved in any other criminal
activity, during the pendency of the trial, it shall be viewed
seriously.
(vii) The concerned Court may insist on two heavy local sureties
and may also impose any other condition, in accordance with law,
while accepting the bails bonds and surety bonds of the petitioner.
(viii) The petitioner shall report on every 1st Monday of English
calender month to the concerned SHO till the conclusion of the
trial and SHO shall mark his presence by making an entry in the
Rojnamcha.
12. In case, the petitioner violates any of the conditions mentioned
above, it shall be viewed seriously and the concession of bail granted to him
shall be liable to be cancelled and the prosecution shall be at liberty to move an
application in this regard.
(N.S.SHEKHAWAT)
05.11.2024 JUDGE
hemlata
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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