Sanju Alias Sahil Kumar vs State Of Punjab And Others
2024 Latest Caselaw 5898 P&H

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Sanju Alias Sahil Kumar vs State Of Punjab And Others on 15 March, 2024

                                                     Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:037331




                                                            2024:PHHC:037331

        IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                     AT CHANDIGARH

107                               CRM-M-11537-2024
                                  Date of Decision : March 15, 2024

SANJU ALIAS SAHIL KUMAR                                -PETITIONER

                                          V/S

STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS                             -RESPONDENTS

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI

Present:      Mr. Gagandeep Singh Simble, Advocate
              for the petitioner.

              Mr. Pardeep Bajaj, D.A.G., Punjab.

                                 ***

KULDEEP TIWARI, J. (ORAL)

1. Through the instant petition, the petitioner craves for

indulgence of this Court for his being enlarged on regular bail, in case FIR

No.323 dated 02.12.2023, under Sections 307/452/148/149 of the IPC, 1860,

and, Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act, 1959, registered at P.S. Civil Lines

Batala, District Batala.

ALLEGATION(S) AGAINST THE PETITIONER

2. The allegation(s) against the present petitioner, is that, he along

with his co-accused intruded into the house of the complainant by scaling wall

and thereupon, one of the assailants fired four gunshots towards the

complainant, out of which, one of the gunshots hit the leg of the complainant.

During the course of investigation, it has transpired that it was co-accused

Gagandeep @ Poochi, who had fired the gunshots.

SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in his asking for the

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hereinabove extracted relief, has made the following submissions:-

(i) Petitioner has been inadvertently nominated as accused in

the present FIR, as is clear from the compromise (Annexure P-2),

which is entered inter se the petitioner and the respondent

No.2/complainant.

(ii) Nonetheless, neither any specific role has been attributed to

the petitioner in the present FIR, nor any specific injury has

been attributed therein to him;

(iii) Petitioner's co-accused, namely, Ramesh Kumar @ Meshi

has been granted the concession of ad-interim bail by this

Court, vide order dated 27.02.2024, passed in CRM-M-9380-

2024;

(iv) Petitioner has undergone incarceration of approx. 3½

months, and, he is not involved in any other criminal case;

(v) Investigation stands completed, whereupon, Final Report has

also been presented on 01.03.2024;

(vi) the trial is not likely to conclude anytime soon, as charges

have not yet been framed, therefore, keeping the petitioner behind

the bars would serve no gainful purpose;

SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED STATE COUNSEL

4. Per contra, the learned State counsel though has opposed the

grant of regular bail to the petitioner, however, on instructions imparted to

him by the official concerned, he has not disputed the factum that the Final

Report has already been presented on 01.03.2024 and charges are yet to be

framed.

ANALYSIS

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5. "Bail is the Rule and Jail is an Exception". This basic

principle of criminal jurisprudence was laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, way back in 1978, in its landmark judgment titled "State

of Rajasthan V. Balchand alias Baliay", 1977 AIR 2447, 1978 SCR (1)

535. This principle finds its roots in one of the most distinguished

fundamental rights, as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Though the underlying objective behind detention of a person is to ensure

easy availability of an accused for trial, without any inconvenience,

however, in case the presence of an accused can be secured otherwise,

then detention is not compulsory.

6. The right to a speedy trial is one of the rights of a detained

person. However, while deciding application for regular bail, the Courts

shall also take into consideration the fundamental precept of criminal

jurisprudence, which is "the presumption of innocence", besides the

gravity of offence(s) involved.

7. In "Nikesh Tarachand Shah V. Union of India", (2018) 11

SCC 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has recorded the following:-

"14. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 at 586-588, the purpose of granting bail is set out with great felicity as follows:-

"27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which deal with the right to ordinary bail because that right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right to anticipatory bail. It is, however, interesting that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra v. King-Emperor [AIR 1924 Cal 476, 479, 480 : 25 Cri LJ 732] that the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be

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applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which, significantly, are the 'Meerut Conspiracy cases' observations are to be found regarding the right to bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor [AIR 1931 All 504 : 33 Cri LJ 94] it was observed, while dealing with Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which corresponds to the present Section 437. It was observed by the court that there was no hard and fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. In Emperor v. Hutchinson [AIR 1931 All 356, 358 : 32 Cri LJ 1271] it was said that it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules which will bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the court unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes. It was observed that the principle to be deduced from the various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much

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better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.

28. Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor [(1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] that: (SCC p. 242, para

1) "... the issue of bail is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitized judicial process. . . . After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of procedure established by law. The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right."

29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) [(1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the court, that: (SCC p. 129, para 29) "There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail."

30. In AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (2d, Volume 8, p. 806, para 39), it is stated:

"Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission

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to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end."

It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail."

8. Also, in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of

Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No.2271 of 2010, the Hon'ble Supreme

Court has insisted upon striking a perfect balance of sanctity of an

individual's liberty as well as the interest of the society, in grant or

refusing bail. The relevant extract of the judgment (supra) is reproduced

hereinafter:-

3. The society has a vital interest in grant or refusal of bail because every criminal offence is the offence against the State. The order granting or refusing bail must reflect perfect balance between the conflicting interests, namely, sanctity of individual liberty and the interest of the society.

The law of bails dovetails two conflicting interests namely, on the one hand, the requirements of shielding the society from the hazards of those committing crimes and potentiality of repeating the same crime while on bail and on the other hand absolute adherence of the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence regarding presumption of innocence of an accused until he is found guilty and the sanctity of individual liberty.

9. This Court has examined the instant petition on the

touchstone of the hereinabove extracted settled legal principle(s) of law

and is of the considered opinion that the instant petition is amenable for

being allowed.

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10. The reason for forming the above inference emanates from the

factum that:- (i) as per custody certificate filed today by the learned State

counsel, the petitioner has suffered incarceration of approx. 3½ months and

he has clean past antecedents, inasmuch as, he is not involved in any other

criminal case; (ii) since charges are yet to be framed, therefore, keeping the

petitioner behind the bars would serve no fruitful purpose.

FINAL ORDER

11. Considering the hereinabove made discussion, this Court deems

it appropriate to grant the concession of regular bail to the petitioner.

Therefore, without commenting upon the merits and circumstances of the

present case, the present petition is allowed. The petitioner is ordered to be

released on bail on furnishing of bail bond and surety bond to the

satisfaction of concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate/trial Court/Duty

Magistrate.

                                                (KULDEEP TIWARI)
March 15, 2024                                      JUDGE
devinder
           Whether speaking/reasoned :                 Yes/No
           Whether Reportable        :                 Yes/No

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