Punjab-Haryana High Court
Mala Bhagat And Others vs State Of Haryana And Others on 8 July, 2024
Bench: Sureshwar Thakur, Sudeepti Sharma
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:084271-DB
CWP-21545-2021 -1-
110-4
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
CWP-21545-2021
Date of decision: 08.07.2024
MALA BHAGAT AND OTHERS
...Petitioners
Versus
THE STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS
...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA
Present: Mr. Sandeep Sharma, Advocate
for the petitioners.
Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. AG Haryana with
Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana.
Mr. Ankur Mittal, Advocate and
Ms. Kushaldeep K. Manchanda, Advocate for HSVP.
****
SURESHWAR THAKUR, J. (ORAL)
1. Through the instant writ petition, the land-losers concerned, the
petitioners herein, rely upon the policy dated 14.09.2018 (Annexure P-27),
for staking a claim before this Court that in pursuance thereto the subject
lands be released or exempted from acquisition. The said policy has been
framed by the State in terms of Section 101-A, as became inserted vide Act
No.21 of 2018 in the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition, Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred
to as the "Act of 2013"), the provisions thereof become extracted hereinafter.
"101A. Power to denotify land.- When any public purpose, for
which the land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
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(Central Act 1 of 1894) becomes unviable or non-essential, the
State Government shall be at liberty to denotify such land, on
such terms, as considered expedient by the State Government,
including the payment of compensation on account of damages,
if any, sustained by the land owner due to such acquisition:
Provided that where a part of the acquired land has been
utilized or any encumbrances have been created, the landowner
may be compensated by providing alternative land along with
payment of damages, if any, as determined by the State
Government."
2. Before proceeding to assess the worth of the said raised claim in
the instant writ petition, it is relevant to mention the trite factum that the
subject lands become acquired through notifications which become
respectively issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 1894"). The said notifications were
respectively made on 13.11.1981 and on 15.11.1983, and, became succeeded
by an award made on 02.05.1986. The subject lands became acquired for
public purpose namely development and utilization of residential and
commercial area of Gurugram for Sectors 21, 22 and 23.
3. Moreover, it is also imperative to refer to the conspicuous fact
that prior to the institution of the instant writ petition, the petitioners along
with other land-losers concerned, had challenged the apposite acquisition
proceedings by instituting CWP-1312 of 1984 titled as "Sudarshan Kumar
Bhagat and another V. State of Haryana and others". In the said writ
petition, the petitioners had raised a claim that the subject lands be released
from acquisition on the ground that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed
in terms of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. In the operative part of the
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verdict made on the apposite writ petition, operative part whereof becomes
extracted hereinafter, the writ claim was allowed on merits.
"[6] The respondents have admittedly not taken possession of
the acquired land in the instant cases, of course, due to stay orders
passed by this Court or by Hon'ble Supreme Court. The award was
passed more than five years before 01.01.2014 i.e., the date when the
2013 Act came into force. The petitioners have not received any
compensation also till date. The principle of inclusion of pendente
lite period expounded in Shiv Raj and others' case (supra) thus is
fully applicable in the instant case(s).
[7] The concept of pendente lite having been explained by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, the acquisition of petitioners' land is
declared to have lapsed. Consequently, the writ petitions are
allowed; the impugned notifications dated 13.11.1981 and
24.01.1984 and the awards dated 06.01.1986, 02.05.1986,
12.05.1986 and 15.11.1984 qua the petitioners are set aside. The
respondents, however, shall be at liberty re-acquire the subject
property in accordance with law and provisions of 2013 Act.
[8] Having held that, we cannot be oblivious of the fact that
the land was acquired for the regulated development of Gurgaon
City. As a consequence of the lapse of acquisition, if the petitioners
succeed in changing the nature of land or if they create third party
rights, it is likely to be detrimental to the 'public interest' as several
basic amenities like roads, sewerage or park etc. would also be
adversely affected. We, thus, restrain the petitioners from alienating
and/or changing the nature of their released land for a period of one
year from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order. No
construction shall be raised by the petitioners on their respective
sites and the District Administration shall ensure that nature of the
land is not changed by anyone."
4. However, the aggrieved-State of Haryana preferred thereagainst
SLP bearing No.10196 of 2017. On the said SLP the Hon'ble Apex Court
while relying upon the verdict made by the Constitutional Bench of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as "Indore Development Authority V.
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Shailendra (Dead) Through its LRs" and others reported in 2018 AIR SC
824, after allowing the SLP, proceeded to quash and set aside the verdict
made by this Court, in the writ petition (supra), whereby this Court had
accepted, the writ relief relating to the petitioners' claim, thus on the ground
the acquisition proceedings, as became launched under the Act of 1894,
became lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The operative
portion of the verdict rendered on the SLP becomes extracted hereinafter.
"Coming to the decision of M/s Usha Stud and Agricultural
Farms Pvt. Ltd. And ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors. relied upon
by the learned senior counsel, this Court had noted the facts that it
has been opined that it was residential zone land which may be
acquired except the portion which was residential buildings that had
been constructed. Several declarations were issued under Section 6.
In that context, this Court has observed that decision taken in that
case was not in accordance with the Section 5A (2) and the refusal to
release the land was not appropriate. Inquiry under Section 5A was
directed to be held again and then fresh decision was directed to be
taken. However, notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 was not quashed.
Another decision of this Court has been relied upon in Hari
Ram Vs. State of Haryana and Ors. (supra). In that the policy dated
26.10.2007 was taken into consideration. Different orders were
passed and policy was not equally applied. Admittedly, there was no
such policy at the time when the acquisition had taken place way
back in the Eighties. The facts of the case were totally different.
It is apparent from the stand taken by respondent that poultry,
areas and certain other areas were required for road, pubic
amenities, it was not possible to leave them out and was necessary to
be acquired for planned development and public amenities as most
of the area was abutting Delhi-Gurgaon Road. It is clear that Court
can sit in the appeal on merits of the decision rendered under Section
5A. It is not ordinarily open to Court to substitute the opinion to
planned development and as requirement of particular area. Inquiry
and the material placed on record clearly indicate that mind had
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been duly applied and decision taken not to exclude the area could
not be said to be illegal or arbitrary or said to suffer from any
illegality. All the area cannot be left out, as whatever is required for
development had to be acquired including constructed area. The plea
of discrimination with respect to areas left out cannot be said to be
justified on fact situation. The requirement of planned development is
to be judged by the concerned authority and appropriate
Government and they have applied their mind in accordance with
law by assigning the reasons and enough materials had been placed
on record by them to support their decision. Thus, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, no case to entertain plea of discrimination
is made out. Thus, we find that no case for interference is made out
on ground which have been urged by the land owners.
The appeals are allowed. The impugned order is set Writ
petitions filed before the High Court are aside. dismissed."
5. A reading of the hereinabove underlined portion of the relevant
extract reveals, that the Hon'ble Apex Court had also dealt with the plea of
discrimination raised by the aggrieved-land-owners. The plea of
discrimination as raised by the land-losers, had become erected on the
ground that the respective estates of the aggrieved-land-owners concerned,
has been subjected to acquisition, despite the similarly situated estates of the
other land-losers concerned rather becoming exempted from acquisition.
However, as stated (supra), the thereins raised plea (supra) become rejected.
Consequent import thereof, is but naturally that, the present petitioners are
completely prohibited from raising the said ground of discrimination in the
instant writ petition.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner agitates before this Court
that since policy (Annexure P-27) came into force subsequent to the passing
of the verdict (supra), by the Hon'ble Apex Court, therebys he contends that
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the writ petition is yet maintainable and/or also claims that the writ petition
is not barred by the norm of constructive res judicata.
7. Learned counsels appearing before this Court, do not dispute
the factum that the policy (Annexure P-27), has been formulated in terms of
the special statutory provision, as became inserted on 24.05.2018, in the Act
of 2013, through Haryana Act No.21 of 2018. Therefore, it has to be
assessed whether in terms of the said policy, thus encapsulating the statutory
norm, as expounded in the above inserted statutory provision in the Act of
2013, thus the present petitioners are entitled to the writ relief. In the
aforesaid regard, the present petitioners were required to be placing such
cogent and tangible material thus displaying, that the subject lands are
neither essential nor viable for furthering the requisite public purpose, rather
they are amenable for being released or exempted from acquisition.
8. In the above regard, it is important to refer to the speaking
order, as became passed on the petitioners' representation. There is a
reference in the said declining order thus to a verdict made by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in case titled as "Ram Swaroop (Dead) through LRs and Anr.
V. State of Haryana and others" SLP (Civil) 16421 of 2021, whereins, the
Hon'ble Apex Court expounded the hereinafter extracted legal principles.
".... 11. The claim of the appellants for release of land on
account of Section 24(2) had been rejected by the State Government
on 12.09.2016. The writ petition against the said order stands
dismissed on 12.10.2020. Thus, the present appeal is merely an
attempt to continue to be in possession of the land on one pretext or
the other so as to defeat the public purpose of acquisition of the land
for development and utilization of residential, commercial and
institutional area, Sector-51, Gurgaon (now Gurugrm). This Court in
Raghubir Singh has held that Section 101-A does not give a vested
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right to the landowner to seek denotification or even that upon
denotification, the land in question must return to the erstwhile
owners only. The State Government is at liberty to pass such order
other than release of land in favour of the landowners.
12. Therefore, the appellants cannot compel an exercise of
power by the State Government in their favour as the appellants
have no vested right to seek denotification of the land. Consequently,
the present appeal is dismissed."
9. A reading of the above extracted expostulations of law as made
in the verdict (supra), does evidently display, that rather than the land-loser
concerned, becoming bestowed with any vestige of right to plank any claim
for the release or return of the subject lands to him, thus on the ground that it
is unviable or unessential for acquisition, rather there is a vestment of a right
in the State Government, rather to proceed to contemplate whether the
statutory norms of unessentiality or unviability are required to be applied
vis-a-vis the subject lands concerned.
10. Moreover, there is also a reference in paragraph 4 about the
import to be assigned to the statutory coinages "unessential" or "unviable"
wherebys the respondent-State, thus may proceed to make a contemplation
whether as such the subject lands are unviable or non-essential for furthering
the requisite public purpose.
11. A reading of the above extracted portion of the speaking order
reveals, that the said speaking order is in terms of the expostulations of law
made in various judgments passed by this Court whereby, this Court has held
that unless vis major falls upon the subject lands, besides when the quantum
of compensation assessed under the awards passed by the Land Acquisition
Collector concerned, is exorbitant, thereby placing an onerous burden upon
the acquiring authority, thereupon the land-loser concerned, is dis-
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empowered to canvass before this Court, that the subject lands are unviable
and thereby theirs being ordered to be released from acquisition.
12. Moreover, the factor of non-essentiality of the subject lands for
therebys the same becoming retained for furthering the public purpose
concerned, is necessarily erected upon the principle, that if the subject lands
are an integral component of the layout plan concerned, besides if the said
layout plans are prepared by an expert in the Engineering Cell of the
acquiring authority, thereupon the Courts of law are required to be refraining
from interfering with the validity of preparation of the layout plan, thus
including thereins the subject lands.
13. If so, it has been clearly stated in the speaking order wherebys
became rejected the petitioners' claim for subject lands becoming released
from acquisition, that the subject lands are an integral component of the
layout plan, therebys this Court deems it not fit and appropriate to order for
release of the subject lands, as thereupons the public interest or public
purpose would be defeated, whereas, paramountcy is to be assigned to public
purpose, than to the individualistic interest of the land-losers concerned.
14. In aftermath, this Court finds no merit in the instant petition,
and, the same is dismissed.
(SURESHWAR THAKUR)
JUDGE
08.07.2024 (SUDEEPTI SHARMA)
Ithlesh JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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