Punjab-Haryana High Court
Manpreet Kaur And Anr vs State Of Punjab on 23 January, 2024
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:008804
CRM-M-21397-2023 2024:PHHC:008804 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
SR. No.113
CRM-M-21397-2023
Date of decision:23.01.2024
Manpreet Kaur and another
...Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab
...Respondent(s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE N.S. SHEKHAWAT
Present: Mr.C.S. Bagri, Advocate for the petitioners.
(Through V.C.)
Mr. I.P.S. Sabharwal, DAG, Punjab .
N.S. SHEKHAWAT, J.
1. The present petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
with a prayer to issue appropriate directions to the trial Court to conclude the
trial in case FIR No.182 dated 31.08.2020 registered under Sections
307/387/452/506/120-B IPC at Police Station Mohkampura, District Police
Commissionerate, Amritsar within some specific time period.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that both the
petitioners are well educated and have been falsely involved in the present
case. He further submits that all the eye witnesses and the material
prosecution witnesses have been examined, however, they did not support
the case of the prosecution. He next submits that the FIR in the present case
was registered on 31.08.2020 and the petitioners are facing the prosecution
for the last more than three years. Consequently, the right of speedy trial,
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which is a fundamental right of the petitioners, is violated. Thus, he has
prayed for issuing appropriate directions to the trial Court for expeditious
disposal of the trial, which is pending against the petitioner.
3. On an advance notice, learned counsel for the State has
appeared and submitted that in the present case, 04 witnesses out of total 22
witnesses have been examined so far and every effort is being made to
conclude the trial at early as possible.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
case file.
5. In view of the fact that only limited prayer has been for issuance
of directions to the first appellate Court to decide the appeal in a time bound
manner and any order passed by this Court is not likely to prejudice the
respondent in any manner, consequently, this Court deems it appropriate not
to issue notice to the respondent, at this stage, which would also save the
time, energy and expenses of the respondents also.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the scope of
speedy trial and emphasizing that the speedy trial is one of the most
important facets of the fundamental rights to life and liberty enshrined in
Article 21, held in the matter of Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab and
connect case, 1994(2) RCR 169 as follows:-
"Speedy Trial
89. The right to a speedy trial is a derivation from a provision
of Magna Carta. This principle has also been incorporated into
the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776 and from there into
the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of United States of
America which reads, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial......
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90. It may be pointed out, in this connection, that there is a
Federal Act of 1974 called 'Speedy Trial Act' establishing a set
of time-limits for carrying out the major events, e.g.,
information, indictment, arraignment, in the prosecution of
criminal cases. See Black's Law Dictionary, (Sixth Edition) p.
1400.
91. The right to a speedy trial is not only an important
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration, to
minimise anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation
and to limit the possibility of impairing the ability of an accused
to defend himself but also there is a societal interest in
providing a speedy trial. This right has been actuated in the
recent past and the courts have laid down a series of decisions
opening up new vistas of fundamental rights. In fact, lot of
cases are coming before the courts for quashing of proceedings
on the ground of inordinate and undue delay stating that the
invocation of this right even need not await formal indictment
or charge.
92. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to
speedy trial begins with the actual restraint imposed by arrest
and consequent incarceration and continues at all stages,
namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and
revision so that any possible prejudice that may result from
impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the
commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can
be averted. In this context, it may be noted that the
constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in
Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
93. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. Home Secretary,
State of Bihar, 1980 (1) SCC 81 at P. 89 while dealing with
Article 21 of the Constitution of India has observed thus:
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"No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial
can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall
foul of Article 2 1. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy
trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial,
is an integral and essential part of th e fundamental right to life
and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would,
however, arise is as to what would be the consequent if a person
accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be
deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long
delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article
21. Would he be entitled to be released unconditionally freed
from the charge leveled against him on the ground that trying
him after an unduly long period of time and convicting him
after such trial would constitute violation of his fundamental
right under Article 21."
94. See also (1) Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, 1979 (1)
SCR 392; (2) Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. Home Secretary, State
of Bihar, 1979 (3) SCR 169; (3) Hussainara Khatoon v. Home
Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna, 1979 (3) SCR 532; (4)
Hussainara Khatoon and others v. Home Secretary, State of
Bihar, Govt. of Bihar, Patna 1979 (3) SCR 1276; (5) Kadra
Pahadia v. State of Bihar, 1983 (2) SCC 104;, (6) T. V.
Vatheeswaran v. State of T.N., 1983(2) SCR 348; and (7) Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R. S. Nayak, 1992 (1) SCC 225.
7. Again, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down certain
propositions, which govern the basic human right to a speedy trial in a
criminal prosecution in the matter of Abdul Rehman Antulay and others
Vs. R.S. Nayak and another 1992(2) RCR 634 as follows:-
"54. In view of the above discussion, the following
propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must
forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is
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difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down
any hard and fast rules. These propositions are :
1. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of
the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried
speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The
fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves
the societal interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right
of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt
or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as
possible in the circumstances.
2. Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21
encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation,
inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this
Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a
restricted view.
3. The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial from
the point of view of the accused are :
(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be
as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be
subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to
his conviction;
(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation
and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation,
inquiry or trial should be minimal; and
(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of
the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death,
disappearance or non- availability of witnesses or otherwise.
4. At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is
usually the accused who is interested in delaying the
proceedings. As is often pointed out, "delay is a known defence
tactic". Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies
upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the
prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses, disappearance of
evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of the
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prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the
prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings.
Therefore, in every case, where the Right to speedy trial is
alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and
answered is who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings
taken by either party in good faith, to vindicate their rights and
interest, as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying
tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be
counted towards delay. It goes without saying that frivolous
proceedings or proceedings taken merely for delaying the day
of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good
faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted and
an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof
that the proceeding is not a frivolous. Very often these stays
obtained on ex-parte representation.
5. While determining whether undue delay has occurred
(resulting in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have
regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of
offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work-load of the
court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on-what is
called, the systemic delays. It is true that it is the obligation of
the State to ensure a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as
well, but a realistic and practical approach should be adopted
in such matters instead of a pedantic one.
6. Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the
accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As
has been observed by Powell, J. in Barker "it cannot be said
how long a delay is loo long in a system where justice is
supposed to be swift but deliberate". The same ideal has been
stated by White, J. in U.S. v. Ewell, 15 Law Edn. 2nd 627, in
the following words :
"the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily
relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition,
rather than more speed, as its essential ingredients; and
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whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an un-
constitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the
circumstances.
However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive
proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of
accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not
be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the
prosecution become prosecution, again depends upon the facts
of a given case.
7. We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the
'demand' rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the
court at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accussed's
plea of denial of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that
the accused did at no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given
case, he did make such a demand and yet he was not tried
speedily, it would be a plus point in his favour, but the mere
non- asking for a speedy trial cannot be put against the
accused. Even in U.S.A., the relevance of demand rule has been
substantially watered down in Barker and other succeeding
cases.
8. Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the
several relevant factors-'balancing test' or 'balancing process'-
and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has
been denied in a given case.
9. Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the
conclusion that Right to speedy trial of an accused has been
infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be,
shall be quashed. But this is not the only course open. The
nature of the offence and other circumstances in a given case
may be such that quashing of proceedings may not be in the
interest of justice. In such a case, it is open to the court to make
such other appropriate order including an order to conclude the
trial within a fixed time where the trial is not concluded or
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reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded-as may be
deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case.
10. It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit
for trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one.
Such rule cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of
proving justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In
every case of complaint of denial of Right to speedy trial, it is
primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At
the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the
circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the
complaint. The Supreme Court of U.S.A. too as repeatedly
refused to fix any such outer time limit inspite of the Sixth
Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer
limit in effectuates the guarantee of Right to speedy trial.
11. An objection based on denial of Right to speedy trial and
for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the High
Court. Even if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily
it should not stay the proceedings, except in a case of grave and
exceptional nature. Such proceedings in High Court must,
however, be disposed of on a priority basis".
8. The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution
of India and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down the guidelines in
Abdul Rehman Antulay case (supra), adequately took care of right to
speedy trial and this Court is always guided by the said propositions, as,
which are also binding precedents. The criminal Courts should exercise their
available powers such as those under Section 309, 311 and 258 of Cr.P.C. to
effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and diligent Judge can prove
to be a protector of such rights within any guidelines.
9. In the present case, the FIR was registered on 31.08.2020 and
the trial is pending against the petitioner for the last more than three years
and further only 04 witnesses out of total 22 prosecution witnesses have
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been examined so far. Needless to say that in a series of judgments, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court has held that "reasonably
expeditious" proceedings in a criminal trial/appeal is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty.
10. In view of the above discussion, the present petition succeeds
and the trial appellate Court is directed to decide the trial arising out of in
case FIR No.182 dated 31.08.2020 registered under Sections
307/387/452/506/120-B IPC at Police Station Mohkampura, District Police
Commissionerate, Amritsar within a period of eight months from the date of
receipt of certified copy of this order.
(N.S. SHEKHAWAT)
23.01.2024 JUDGE
mks
Whether Speaking/Reasoned: YES / NO
Whether Reportable: YES / NO
Neutral Citation No:=2024:PHHC:008804
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