Punjab-Haryana High Court
Rajinder Singh And Ors vs State Of H Ry. And Ors on 26 September, 2023
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:127193-DB
CWP-20463-2006 (O&M) & CWP-21930-2020 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
(I) CWP-20463-2006 (O&M)
Reserved on: 14.09.2023
Date of Decision : September 26, 2023
RAJINDER SINGH AND OTHERS
...Petitioners
V/S
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS
...Respondents
(II) CWP-21930-2020
RAJBALA AND OTHERS
...Petitioners
V/S
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS
...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURESHWAR THAKUR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KULDEEP TIWARI
Present : Mr. P.R. Yadav, Advocate
for the petitioners (in both cases)
(except petitioners No.2 and 4 in CWP-20463-2006 and
petitioners No.4 and 6 in CWP-21930-2020).
Mr. Ajay Jain, Advocate
for the petitioners No. 1 to 6 (in CWP-21930-2020)
for the petitioners No.1 to 4 (in CWP-20463-2006)
Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. A.G., Haryana with
Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana.
***
SURESHWAR THAKUR, J.
1. Since both the writ petitions arise from different notifications,
but since the disputed lands are similar in both the notifications, therefore
both the writ petitions are amenable for a common verdict becoming made
thereons.
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2. In CWP-20463-2006 a notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1894'), became
issued on 06.01.2006. The same became succeeded by a declaration made on
09.08.2006 under Section 6 of the Act of 1894. An award in terms of Section
11 of the Act of 1894 became rendered, on 07.12.2006.
3. In CWP-21930-2020 a notification under Section 4 of the Act
of 1894 became issued on 14.03.2012. The same became succeeded by a
declaration made on 31.01.2013 under Section 6 of the Act of 1894. An
award in terms of Section 11 of the Act of 1894 became rendered, on
22.04.2013.
4. In both the petitions, the petitioners seek relief for the quashing
of respectively Annexures P-1 and P-3, wherein becomes enclosed, notifica-
tions issued respectively under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894.
5. The predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, had earlier
challenged, the launching of the acquisition proceedings, in respect of the
petition lands, thus at the instance of the respondent(s) concerned. The said
challenge was embodied in CWP-8439-2013. However, through a verdict
made thereon, on 11.12.2015, and, which becomes enclosed in Annexure
R-3, the said challenge became negated. Though the aggrieved therefrom
filed thereagainst SLP(C) No.29371-72 of 2016, however, the Hon'ble Apex
Court dismissed the said SLP on 31.01.2020. Thereafter CWP-10208-2014
was also filed, and, the same was also dismissed on 13.08.2018. Recently,
another writ petition pertaining to the same acquisition proceedings bearing
CWP-17711-2021 became also dismissed vide order of 21.09.2021.
6. In sequel, the present petitioners, who are the successors-in-
interest of their father, who received thus adversarial judgments, upon, lis'
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(supra), are bound by the earlier decision(s), as became made against their
predecessor-in-interest. Resultantly, the lis relating to the legality of the
launching of the acquisition proceedings, at the instance of the respondent(s)
concerned, when becomes earlier completely rested, through binding and
conclusive decision(s) being made thereon(s). Therefore, on the principle of
estoppel, as, becomes engrafted in the statutory norm of constructive res
judicata, thereby the earlier recorded clinching decision(s), thus appertaining
to the legality of the launching of the acquisition proceedings, under the Act
of 1894, cannot but be re-opened.
7. The decision, as was made by the Hon'ble Apex Court, on the
SLP (supra), was made on 31.01.2020. Consequently, when at the stage of
the SLP (supra) being subjudice before the Hon'ble Apex Court, thus the
provisions of Section 101-A of The Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,
2013 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 2013'), as became inserted
therein, through Haryana Act No.21 of 2018, and, which were brought into
force w.e.f. 01.01.2014, provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter,
rather were then in existence. However, no liberty was asked for, nor became
granted by the Hon'ble Apex Court to the predecessor-in-interest of the
petitioners to, on the anvil of the above statutory provisions, thus make a
motion before this Court.
"101A. Power to denotify land. - When any public purpose, for
which the land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(Central Act 1 of 1894) becomes unviable or nonessential, the
State Government shall be at liberty to denotify such land, on
such terms, as considered expedient by the State Government,
including the payment of compensation on account of damages,
if any, sustained by the land owner due to such acquisition:
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Provided that where a part of the acquired land has been
utilized or any encumbrances have been created, the landowner
may be compensated by providing alternative land alongwith
payment of damages, if any, as determined by the State
Government."
8. Therefore, in the wake of the said motion not being addressed
before the Hon'ble Apex Court, despite the statutory provisions (supra)
being then in existence, thus results in a conclusion that the non-availment(s)
of the said statutory provision, rather thereby leading to an inference that
thereby they became waived or abandoned. Therefore, the petitioners are
estopped from raising the said argument before this Court.
9. Even otherwise, the makings of pleading qua the above fact, in
the earlier motion, which continued uptill the Hon'ble Apex Court, though
was enjoined to be, in terms of Order II Rule 2 CPC, provisions whereof
become extracted hereinafter, thus raised thereins, whereas, evidently no
pleading qua the availment or applicability of the provisions (supra), rather
becoming raised thereins. Resultantly, thereby begets attraction, to the
espousal (supra), as, made in respect of the availability now of above
statutory provisions (supra), thus the estopping principle, as engrafted in
Order II Rule 2 CPC.
"2. Suit to include the whole claim.--
(2) Relinquishment of part of claim.--Where a plaintiff omits
to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion
of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the
portion so omitted or relinquished."
10. Be that as it may, even on merits, the plea raised by the
petitioners but banked upon the statutory provisions (supra), relating to the
acquired lands being both "non-essential" or "unviable" for furthering the
requisite public purpose, is also a misfounded plea. The reason becomes
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embedded in the factum, that in the relevant drawn layout plan, a Bus Stand
has to be constructed on the acquired lands. The above is a dire public
purpose and cannot be frustrated, merely on account of the present
petitioners mis-raising or mis-espousing a ground, thus upon the statutory
provisions (supra). The statutory provisions (supra) are not meant to be
purveying, or, assigning any latitude to the land looser(s) concerned to, at
any time, proceed to frustrate the relevant public purpose, and, that too on
any purported ground of invidious discrimination, as this Court, in a verdict
rendered upon CWP-15174-2023, titled "The Press Employees and Friends
Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. V/s State of Haryana and
others", relevant paragraph whereof becomes extracted hereinafter, has
restricted and trammeled the exercise of executive discretion, vis-a-vis, the
statutory provisions (supra). Therefore, when the instant case is also not an
exceptional case, whereby, in the Executive exercising its statutory
discretion, thus would not make breaches of the expostulations of law, as
made by this Court, in CWP (supra). Predominantly also when on the said
purported ground, thus the exercising of discretion, is thus trammeled by the
necessity of the acquired lands, being imminently required for subserving a
salutory public purpose.
"The mandate recorded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in M.
Bhaskaran Pillai's case (supra) that mere non utilization of the
acquired land(s) yet does not withhold the authority of the State
to, in the larger public interest, thus make utilization thereof for
any other public purpose or through sale by way of public
auction, but obviously is required to be read into the
un-essentiality or unviability of the retention of the acquired
land. Therefore, the Executive in the exercise of its executive
contemplation, in terms of the above statutory discretion, has to
also bear in mind the above expostulation of law. The fate
thereof would be that the Executive while making an objective
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contemplation about non-availability of the benefit of the
statutory coinages vis-a-vis the land looser concerned, thus has
to enlighten itself to the fact that the above exercise, as made in
M. Bhaskaran Pillai's case (supra). Therefore, any exercising
of jurisdiction by Executive in favour of the land looser
concerned, has to be an extremely cautious exercise thus
requiring its being made with a well informed objective,
besides judicious application of mind, so as to save the
acquired land, from becoming hit by the expostulation
occurring in M. Bhaskaran Pillai's case (supra). Necessarily
hence the availability of the parameter (supra), as enshrined in
the statutory provisions (supra), thus to my considered mind,
has to be exercised by the Executive, if it is deemed fit to be
exercised by the Executive in favour of the land looser
concerned, thereby such exercisings of discretion in favour of
the land looser concerned is to be done in extremely urgent and
exceptional cases. In nut shell, the statutory discretion is an
extremely trammeled or is a restricted discretion vested in the
Executive, thus by the verdict (supra)."
11. Consequently, the above espousal relating to release of the
acquired lands to the landloser(s) concerned, is but a feeble and a frail
attempt, to make any dependence thereons. Contrarily, when evident public
purpose would be facilitated, on the acquired lands being put to use, for
construction thereon, of a Bus Stand. Therefore, this Court does not deem it
fit to forestall the carrying ahead of the said public purpose.
12. Predominantly also since except in a very rare or exceptional
circumstances, inasmuch as, upon occurrence of vis major or upon
exorbitant sums of compensation monies being determined, thus making
their liquidations, to cause an onerous burden to the State exchequer, thus,
thereby the statutory parameters of un-essentiality or unviability of retention
of the acquired lands, may become adopted by the State of Haryana.
However, the above exceptions are not available on the records of this case.
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FINAL ORDER
13. As a sequel to the above, this Court finds no merit in the instant
writ petitions, and, is constrained to dismiss them. Since the instant writ
petitions are a frivolously raised writ petitions, therefore, they are dismissed
with cost of Rs.50,000/- upon each of the petitioners to be forthwith
deposited by the petitioners with the 'Punjab and Haryana High Court
Employees' Welfare Association'.
14. All pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of
accordingly.
(SURESHWAR THAKUR)
JUDGE
(KULDEEP TIWARI)
th
September 26 , 2023 JUDGE
Ithlesh
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether Reportable : Yes/No
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:127193-DB
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