Maha Singh And Others vs State Of Punjab And Others
2023 Latest Caselaw 1385 P&H

           IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                      AT CHANDIGARH


                                                             CWP-30024-2022
                                                   Date of Decision: 23.01.2023

Maha Singh and others                                          .....Petitioner(s)

                                          Versus

State of Punjab and others                                    ....Respondent(s)

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SANDHAWALIA
       HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE HARPREET KAUR JEEWAN

Present:     Mr. R.S. Rangpuri, Advocate,
             for the petitioners.

             Mr. Abhay Pal Singh Gill, DAG, Punjab.

G.S.SANDHAWALIA, J. (Oral)

The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioners under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ in the

nature of mandamus directing the respondents to restore the acquired land to

the original land owners and their legal representatives. Reliance has been

placed upon the standing orders of the Land Administration Manual in this

regard.

As per the case of the petitioners itself, the land was acquired on

19.02.1954 for the Department of Jails, which was measuring around 15 acres

in Muktsar, then District Ferozepur for the public purpose i.e. construction of

a judicial lock up at Muktsar in Ferozepur District. Notifications in this

regard have been appended as Annexures P-1 and P-2. The petitioners are

stated to be owners of 20 kanals 4 marlas of land out of the said land and as

per the revenue record, which would go on to show that they had received a

sum of Rs.1,900/- at that point of time as per the mutation now appended as

Annexure P-4. Now, averments have been made that there is no

compensation received. The present petitioners are stated to be the grand 1 of 4

children of Harnam Singh, who died on 31.05.1958 and even his son and

father of the petitioners took no steps to initiate any litigation at that point of

time. The averments are that judicial lock up has now been shifted to other

locality and now the land is lying abandoned after the fulfillment of public

purpose. The legal heirs have, thus, made a representation as such for return

their land. Reference has been made to Section 101 of the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short 'the 2013 Act').

The proceedings had long been finalized under the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short 'the 1984 Act'), which stands repealed and

provisions of the 2013 Act would go on to show that it applies to the land

acquired under the said Act. Section 48 as such of the 1894 Act would go on

to show that the Government is at liberty to withdraw from acquisition of any

land of which possession has not been taken. The facts are not disputed

herein that possession was taken and also used for the jail department. The

fact that they have been not now utilizing as such the acquired land and the

same is lying vacant on account of shifting would not give a right to the land

owners for restoration as the State had become an absolute owner of the land

and the land had vested after the award was passed in view of the provisions

of Section 16 of the 1894 Act.

In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that

there is no such legal right of the petitioners as such to seek a writ of

mandamus for the land which had become the ownership of the State

Government who is free to use it in whichever manner it so wishes. In the

absence of the same, merely by serving demand notice dated 11.08.2022

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(Annexure P-7) would not give any such right once there is a statutory

provision that the land as such vested with the State.

Reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in State of

Haryana and others vs. Gurcharan Singh and others, (2004) 12 SCC 540

on the ground that the land is no longer required and should be restored to the

land owners would not be helpful to the counsel for the petitioner as in the

said case, on the basis of the Standing Order No.28 which has also been relied

upon by counsel for the petitioner, the appeal had been dismissed. In the said

case upholding the judgment of this Court, which had upheld the suit which

had been decreed on the said ground, it was found that the Government had

no power to discriminate between persons similarly situated and once land

had been released in favour of the other persons, the interference as such was

not done while holding that Standing Order No. 28 and Para No. 493 do not

create any right in favour of the persons to get back the possession of the

land.

Rather, observations in the subsequent decision of the Apex

Court would be directly applicable in Leela Wanti and others vs. State of

Haryana and others, (2012) 1 SCC 66 wherein also, Para No. 493 of the

Land Administration Manual and Standing Order No.28 was referred to. It

was also noticed that apart from the gap of three decades between the

issuance of the notifications in the year 1976 and the filing of the writ petition

in 2007 would also invoke doctrine of laches for negating the challenge to the

acquisition of land. Accordingly, it was held that the State cannot be

debarred from using the acquired land for any other public purpose and such

an interpretation would be contrary to the language of Section 16 of the Act.

Relevant portion of Leela Vanti case (Supra) reads thus:-

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"16. A reading of the above reproduced Paragraph of the Land Administration Manual nowhere suggests that the State Government is duty-bound to restore the acquired land to the owners after the purpose of acquisition is accomplished. It merely mentions that as a matter of grace the Government is usually willing to restore agricultural and pastoral land to the owners on their refunding the amount of compensation. If Paragraph 493 is read in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants then in all the cases the acquired land will have to be returned to the owners irrespective of the time gap between the date of acquisition and the date on which the purpose of acquisition specified in Section 4 is achieved and the Government will not be free to use the acquired land for any other public purpose. Such an interpretation would also be contrary to the language of Section 16 of the Act, in terms of which the acquired land vests in the State Government free from all encumbrances and the law laid down by this Court that lands acquired for a particular public purpose can be utilised for any other public purpose."

Accordingly, we do not find any merit in the present writ petition

and the same stands dismissed.

                                                   (G.S. SANDHAWALIA)
                                                           JUDGE



23.01.2023                                    (HARPREET KAUR JEEWAN)
shivani                                                 JUDGE


Whether reasoned/speaking                     Yes
Whether reportable                            No


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