Punjab-Haryana High Court
Gurtej Singh And Ors vs State Of Punjab And Others on 27 April, 2023
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:060233
CRM-M-6804-2023 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-6804-2023 (O&M)
Reserved on: 11.04.2023
Pronounced on: 27.04.2023
Gurtej Singh & Others
... Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of Punjab & Others
...Respondent (s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
Present:- Mr. Pushp Jain, Advocate
for the petitioner(s).
Mr. IPS Sabharwal, DAG, Punjab.
Mr. Vibhu Agnihotri, Advocate for
Mr. Paras Sharma, Advocate
for respondents no.2 to 4.
***
ANOOP CHITKARA, J.
FIR No. Dated Police Station Sections
21 5.4.2014 Joga, District Police Mansa 452, 326, 324, 148, 149 IPC
The petitioners, arraigned as accused in the above captioned FIR, have come up before
this Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR and all consequential
proceedings including the judgment of conviction dated 27.7.2017 passed by ACJM,
Mansa, based on the compromise with the aggrieved person.
2. During the pendency of appeal against the judgment of conviction, the accused
and the legal representative(s) of victim/complainant, who are now aggrieved persons
have compromised the matter, and its copy is annexed with this petition as Annexure
P-3.
3. After that, the petitioners came up before this Court to quash the FIR,
impleading the aggrieved person as respondents.
4. This court had asked the parties to appear before the concerned court and had
asked the said court to give its report as per the format. The report(s) reads as follows:
1 of 8
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:060233
Name of the reporting ACJM, Mansa
Court
Criminal Case no. CIS No.CHI/1658/2014
before trial Court CNR No.PBMN030015222014
1. Names of the complainant/ victims(s)/ Dev Singh s/o Zora Singh represented
aggrieved persons(s) by LRs (i) Rajinder Singh (ii) Kuldeep
Singh @ Dara and (iii) Kulwinder Kaur
2. Dates on which the statement(s) of the 28.2.2023 and 24.3.2023
complainant/ victims(s)/ aggrieved
persons(s) were recorded
3. Has the identity of the complainant/ Yes
victims(s)/ aggrieved persons(s) been
verified?
4. Whether all the victims/ all the Yes (Through legal hairs)
aggrieved persons have compromised
the matter?
5. Is there pressure, threat, or coercion No
upon the victim(s)/aggrieved
person(s)/complainant?
6. Names of the accused person(s) Gurtej Singh, Gurpreet Singh, Mona
Kaur and Veerpal Kaur
7. Dates on which the statement(s) of the 28.2.2023
accused persons(s) recorded
8. Whether all the accused have Yes
compromised the matter? If no, then
the names of the accused who have
compromised.
9. Whether proclamation proceedings No
are pending against any accused?
10. Has the police report been filed or Yes
not?
11. Notice of accusation /Charges have Yes
been framed or not?
12. Sections of statutes invoked in the 452, 326, 324, 148, 149 IPC
matter
13. Whether the court is satisfied with the Yes
genuineness of the compromise?
ANALYSIS & REASONING:
5. Despite the severe opposition of the State's counsel to this compromise, the
following aspects would be relevant to conclude this petition: -
a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably settled the matter
between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded
before the concerned Court;
b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the settlement has not been
secured through coercion, threats, social boycotts, bribes, or other dubious
means;
c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal
proceedings;
2 of 8
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:060233
d) There is no objection from the private respondent in case present FIR and
consequent proceedings are quashed;
e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or
tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or
involve matters concerning public policy;
f) The rejection of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial
affects career and happiness;
g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an
unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender;
h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work
to bring peace to family, community, and society;
i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequential
proceedings is justified to secure the ends of justice.
6. In the present case, all the offences are not compoundable under Section 320 of
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). However, in the facts and circumstances
peculiar to this case, the prosecution qua the non-compoundable offences can be
closed by quashing the FIR and consequent proceedings.
7. In Y. Suresh Babu v State of A.P., (2005) 1 SCC 347, Hon'ble Supreme Court, while
dealing with section 326 of IPC, which was non-compoundable offence, permitted the
parties to compound the offence.
8. In Yogendra Yadav v State of Jharkhand, 21.7.2014, Supreme Court holds,
[4]. Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court
can compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 of the
IPC which are non-compoundable. Needless to say that
offences which are non-compoundable cannot be
compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of
compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said
provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex
Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : (2012)10 SCC 303). However, in a
given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in
exercise of its power under section 482 of the Code having
regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their
disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the
offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High
Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will
depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences
which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape,
murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings
because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such
offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or
two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong
signal to the society. However, when the High Court is
convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature
3 of 8
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:060233
and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquillity and
where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of
compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends
of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases,
the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a
lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will
also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of
peace.
9. In Ram Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 2 SCC 149, Supreme Court holds,
The appellants, who are the accused and the complainant, Shri
Ram, who was the person injured as a result of firing, have
appeared before us and stated that they wish to compound
the offence. The offence for which both the appellants have
been convicted is one under Section 307 read with Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code, but having regard to the nature of
the injury sustained by Shri Ram, we think that the proper
offence for which the appellants should have been convicted
was under Section 324 read with Section 34. Shri Ram received
only one injury on the shoulder and that was also in the nature
of simple hurt. We would, therefore, convert the conviction of
the appellants to one under Section 324 read with Section 34.
Since the parties belong to the same village and desire to
compound the offence, we think, in the larger interest of
peace and harmony between the parties and having regard to
the nature of the injury, that it would be proper to allow the
parties to compound the offence.
10. In Shiji @ Pappu v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
[13]. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not
compoundable under Section 320 Indian Penal Code is by itself
no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power
under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code That power can in
our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of
recording a conviction against the accused and the entire
exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There
is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by
the parties before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and
the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the
prosecution under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code on
the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an
appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit
compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at
between the parties in cases where the offences are not
compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash
the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which
the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The
inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Criminal
Procedure Code are not for that purpose controlled by Section
320 Criminal Procedure Code Having said so, we must hasten
to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482
Criminal Procedure Code by itself, makes it obligatory for the
High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution.
The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its
exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is,
for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance
of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the
4 of 8
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:060233
process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to
enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under
Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the
exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and
only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result
in the abuse of the process of law. The High court may be
justified in declining interference if it is called upon to
appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an
appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High
Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of
each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the
inherent powers may be invoked.
11. In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench of
Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing of FIR, which are
reproduced as follows: -
[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents
on the subject, may be summarized in the following
propositions:
16 (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High
Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new
powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere
in the High Court;
16 (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on
the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While
compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed
by the provisions of section 320 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is
attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the
ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power;
16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide
ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the
ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any
court;
16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First
Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the
offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves
ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no
exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and
while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the
High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of
the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental
depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of
the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly
speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon
society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is
5 of 8
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:060233
founded on the overriding element of public interest in
punishing persons for serious offences;
16 (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in
so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is
concerned;
16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in
appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute;
16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression
and prejudice; and
16 (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving
the financial and economic well-being of the state have
implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute
between private disputants. The High Court would be justified
in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an
activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of
upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance.
12. In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on
29.09.2021, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
[11]. True it is that offences which are 'non-compoundable'
cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported
exercise of its powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such
attempt by the court would amount to alteration, addition and
modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive
domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity
in the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which may justify its
wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket
of 'compoundable' offences which have been consciously kept
out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited
jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework of
Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking
inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Section
482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts
and circumstances of a case and for justifiable reasons can
press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.
[12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of
the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled
their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the
nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such
proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-compoundable. The
High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects
of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter
adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if
6 of 8
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:060233
goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very
object of the administration of criminal justice system.
[13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non-
heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of
a private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that
trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed
against conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole
form of delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws
evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without
saying, that the cases where compromise is struck post-
conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion
with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding
the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been
arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness
of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and
after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the
extraordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be to
secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast line
constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial
justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious justice, which
in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead
to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where heinous
offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such
benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this
Court in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs. State of Punjab &Ors. [(2014)
6 SCC 466, 29], and Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688, 15].
[14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences
which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the
social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters
concerning public policy, cannot be construed between two
individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potential
to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences
through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal
to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to
unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can
secure a 'settlement' through duress, threats, social boycotts,
bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that "let no guilty
man escape, if it can be avoided."
13. In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642, Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Justice arises propitiously when
parties, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.
14. In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of
compromise, placement of parties, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents
of the compromise deed and its objectives point towards its acceptance.
15. In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018 (4)
Crimes 324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ Petition (Criminal) No.
135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of
cognizance only because of the reason that matter was already pending as the
appellants had filed the Special Leave Petitions against the order of the High Court
7 of 8
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:060233
rejecting their petition for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these
peculiar facts, writ petition has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that
FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automatically stand vitiated."
16. Considering the entire facts, compromise, and in the light of the above-
mentioned judicial precedents, I believe that continuing these proceedings will not
suffice any fruitful purpose whatsoever. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this
case, the Court invokes the inherent jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC and quashes
the FIR and all subsequent proceedings, including the judgment of conviction dated
27.7.2017 qua the petitioner(s). The bail bonds of the petitioners are accordingly
discharged. Fine deposited by the petitioners forfeited to the State, as cost incurred by
State on proceedings. All pending application(s), if any, stand closed.
Petition allowed in the terms mentioned above.
(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE
April 27, 2023
AK
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes
Whether reportable : No
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:060233
8 of 8
