Punjab-Haryana High Court
Karanpreet Singh And Ors vs State Of Punjab And Others on 25 April, 2023
Neutral Citation No:=2023:PHHC:059554
CRM-M-10498-2023 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M-10498-2023 (O&M)
Reserved on: 11.04.2023
Pronounced on: 25.04.2023
Karanpreet Singh & others
... Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of Punjab & others
...Respondent (s)
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
Present:- Mr. Anshul Sharma, Advocate
for the petitioner(s).
Mr. IPS Sabharwal, DAG, Punjab.
Mr. Rahul Verma, Advocate for
Mr. Satnam Singh Thakur, Advocate
for respondent nos.2 to 4.
***
ANOOP CHITKARA, J.
DDR No. Dated Police Station Sections
35 8.9.2022 Bhikhiwind, District Tarn 307, 452, 326, 324, 34 IPC
Taran
IN
FIR No. Dated Police Station Sections
98 5.9.2022 Bhikhiwind, District Tarn 452, 326, 324, 148, 149 IPC
Taran
The petitioners, arraigned as accused in the above captioned DDR, have come up
before this Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the DDR and all consequential
proceedings based on the compromise with the aggrieved persons.
2. During the pendency of criminal proceedings, the accused and the aggrieved
persons have compromised the matter, and its copy is annexed with this petition as
Annexure P-2.
3. After that, the petitioners came up before this Court to quash the DDR, and in the
quashing petition, impleading the aggrieved person as respondent Nos.2 to 4.
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4. This court had asked the parties to appear before the concerned court and had
asked the said court to give its report as per the format. The report reads as follows:
Name of the reporting JMIC, Patti.
Court
Criminal Case no. --
before trial Court
1. Names of the complainant/ victims(s)/ Baldev Raj, Bobby @ Bobby Sharma
aggrieved persons(s) and Ravi Parkash @ Ravi Parkash
Sharma
2. Dates on which the statement(s) of the 15.3.2023
complainant/ victims(s)/ aggrieved
persons(s) were recorded
3. Has the identity of the complainant/ Yes
victims(s)/ aggrieved persons(s) been
verified?
4. Whether all the victims/ all the Yes
aggrieved persons have compromised
the matter?
5. Is there pressure, threat, or coercion No
upon the victim(s)/aggrieved
person(s)/complainant?
6. Names of the accused person(s) Karanpreet Singh, Lovepreet Singh and
Gurjant Singh
7. Dates on which the statement(s) of the 15.3.2023
accused persons(s) recorded
8. Whether all the accused have Yes
compromised the matter? If no, then
the names of the accused who have
compromised.
9. Whether proclamation proceedings No
are pending against any accused?
10. Has the police report been filed or No
not?
11. Notice of accusation /Charges have No
been framed or not?
12. Sections of statutes invoked in the 307, 452, 326, 324, 34 IPC
matter
13. Whether the court is satisfied with the Yes
genuineness of the compromise?
ANALYSIS & REASONING:
5. Despite the severe opposition of the State's counsel to this compromise, the
following aspects would be relevant to conclude this petition: -
a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably settled the matter
between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded
before the concerned Court;
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b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the settlement has not been
secured through coercion, threats, social boycotts, bribes, or other dubious
means;
c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal
proceedings;
d) There is no objection from the private respondent in case present FIR and
consequent proceedings are quashed;
e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or
tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or
involve matters concerning public policy;
f) The rejection of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial
affects career and happiness;
g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an
unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender;
h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work
to bring peace to family, community, and society;
i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequential
proceedings is justified to secure the ends of justice.
6. The parties belong to the same village and must be living there for generations
and might continue to live, who knows for how long. In the closely-knit village
community, when the parties have buried their hatchets, the continuation of criminal
proceedings will not advance the reformative purposes of jurisprudence just for the
sake of deterrence.
7. In the present case, the offences under Sections 307, 452, 326, 324 of Indian
Penal Code, 1860 are not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC. However, in the facts
and circumstances peculiar to this case, the prosecution qua the non-compoundable
offences can be closed by quashing the FIR and consequent proceedings.
8. In Ram Prasad v State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 2 SCC 149, Supreme Court holds,
The appellants, who are the accused and the complainant, Shri
Ram, who was the person injured as a result of firing, have
appeared before us and stated that they wish to compound
the offence. The offence for which both the appellants have
been convicted is one under Section 307 read with Section 34
of the Indian Penal Code, but having regard to the nature of
the injury sustained by Shri Ram, we think that the proper
offence for which the appellants should have been convicted
was under Section 324 read with Section 34. Shri Ram received
only one injury on the shoulder and that was also in the nature
of simple hurt. We would, therefore, convert the conviction of
the appellants to one under Section 324 read with Section 34.
Since the parties belong to the same village and desire to
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compound the offence, we think, in the larger interest of
peace and harmony between the parties and having regard to
the nature of the injury, that it would be proper to allow the
parties to compound the offence.
9. In Y. Suresh Babu v State of A.P., (2005) 1 SCC 347, Hon'ble Supreme Court, while
dealing with section 326 of IPC, which was non-compoundable offence, permitted the
parties to compound the offence.
10. In Yogendra Yadav v State of Jharkhand, 21.7.2014, Supreme Court holds,
[4]. Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court
can compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 of the
IPC which are non-compoundable. Needless to say that
offences which are non-compoundable cannot be
compounded by the court. Courts draw the power of
compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code. The said
provision has to be strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex
Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : (2012)10 SCC 303). However, in a
given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding in
exercise of its power under section 482 of the Code having
regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their
disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the
offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High
Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will
depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences
which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape,
murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings
because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such
offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or
two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong
signal to the society. However, when the High Court is
convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature
and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquillity and
where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of
compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends
of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases,
the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a
lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That will
also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of
peace.
11. In Mahesh Chand v State of Rajasthan, 1990 SCC 781, Hon'ble Supreme Court
holds as under:
[2]. The accused were acquitted by the trial court, but they
were convicted by the High Court for the offence under section
307 Indian Penal Code This offence is not compoundable under
law. The parties, however. want to treat it a special case, in
view of the peculiar circumstances of the case. It is said and
indeed not disputed that one of the accused is a lawyer
practising in the lower court. There was a counter case arising
out of the same transaction. It is said that this case has already
been compromised. The decision of this Court in Suresh Babu v.
State of Andhra Pradesh, 1987(2) JT 361, has been also referred
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to in support of the plea for permission to compound the
offence.
12. In Dimpey Gujraj v Union Territory, (2013) 11 SCC 497, Supreme Court holds,
[5]. In light of the above observations of this court in Gian Singh
v. State of Punjab and another, 2012(4) R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 :
2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.) 549 : 2012(5) CTC 526
(SC) we feel that this is a case where the continuation of
criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of
law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences
showing extreme depravity nor are they against the society.
They are offences of a personal nature and burying them would
bring about peace and amity between the two sides. In the
circumstances of the case, FIR No. 163 dated 26/10/2006
registered under Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452 and 506
of the Indian Penal Code at Police Station Sector 3, Chandigarh
and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom including
the final report presented under Section 173 of the Code and
charges framed by the trial court are hereby quashed.
13. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2014 (6) SCC 466, a two-member bench of
Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
[24]. Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court has
approved the quashing of proceedings under section 307, IPC
whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is of
serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though in
each of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may be
justified on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes an
explanation as to why two different approaches are adopted in
various cases. The law declared by this Court in the form of
judgments becomes binding precedent for the High Courts and
the subordinate courts, to follow under Article 141 of the
Constitution of India. Stare Decisis is the fundamental principle
of judicial decision making which requires `certainty' too in law
so that in a given set of facts the course of action which law
shall take is discernable and predictable. Unless that is
achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will lose its
significance. The related objective of the doctrine of stare
decisis is to put a curb on the personal preferences and priors
of individual Judges. In a way, it achieves equality of treatment
as well, inasmuch as two different persons faced with similar
circumstances would be given identical treatment at the hands
of law. It has, therefore, support from the human sense of
justice as well. The force of precedent in the law is heightened,
in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by "that curious, almost
universal sense of justice which urges that all men are to be
treated alike in like circumstances".
[25]. As there is a close relation between the equality and
justice, it should be clearly discernible as to how the two
prosecutions under Section 307 IPC are different in nature and
therefore are given different treatment. With this ideal
objective in mind, we are proceeding to discuss the subject at
length. It is for this reason we deem it appropriate to lay down
some distinct, definite and clear guidelines which can be kept in
mind by the High Courts to take a view as to under what
circumstances it should accept the settlement between the
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parties and quash the proceedings and under what
circumstances it should refrain from doing so. We make it clear
that though there would be a general discussion in this behalf
as well, the matter is examined in the context of offences under
Section 307 IPC.
[31]. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay
down the following principles by which the High Court would be
guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between
the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the
Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the
proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction
to continue with the criminal proceedings :
(I) Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code
is to be distinguished from the power which lies in
the Court to compound the offences under Section
320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the
Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash
the criminal proceedings even in those cases which
are not compoundable, where the parties have
settled the matter between themselves. However,
this power is to be exercised sparingly and with
caution.
(II) When the parties have reached the settlement
and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases
would be to secure :
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to
form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two
objectives.
(III) Such a power is not be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on
society. Similarly, for offences alleged to have been
committed under special statute like the Prevention
of Corruption Act or the offences committed by
Public Servants while working in that capacity are
not to be quashed merely on the basis of
compromise between the victim and the offender.
(IV) On the other, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and pre-dominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial
transactions or arising out of matrimonial
relationship or family disputes should be quashed
when the parties have resolved their entire disputes
among themselves.
(V) While exercising its powers, the High Court is to
examine as to whether the possibility of conviction
is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal
cases would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
(VI) Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and
therefore is to be generally treated as crime against
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the society and not against the individual alone.
However, the High Court would not rest its decision
merely because there is a mention of Section 307
IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this
provision. It would be open to the High Court to
examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307
IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would
lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC.
For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court
to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether
such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of
the body, nature of weapons used etc. Medical
report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim
can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of
this prima facie analysis, the High Court can
examine as to whether there is a strong possibility
of conviction or the chances of conviction are
remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse
to accept the settlement and quash the criminal
proceedings whereas in the later case it would be
permissible for the High Court to accept the plea
compounding the offence based on complete
settlement between the parties. At this stage, the
Court can also be swayed by the fact that the
settlement between the parties is going to result in
harmony between them which may improve their
future relationship.
(VII) While deciding whether to exercise its power
under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of
settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where
the settlement is arrived at immediately after the
alleged commission of offence and the matter is still
under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in
accepting the settlement to quash the criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of the
reason that at this stage the investigation is still on
and even the charge sheet has not been filed.
Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed
but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is
still at infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but
after prima facie assessment of the
circumstances/material mentioned above. On the
other hand, where the prosecution evidence is
almost complete or after the conclusion of the
evidence the matter is at the stage of argument,
normally the High Court should refrain from
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code,
as in such cases the trial court would be in a
position to decide the case finally on merits and to
come a conclusion as to whether the offence under
Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in
those cases where the conviction is already
recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the
appellate stage before the High Court, mere
compromise between the parties would not be a
ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of
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the offender who has already been convicted by the
trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307
IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous
crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing
a convict found guilty of such a crime.
14. In State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149, Hon'ble Supreme
Court holds,
[14] We notice that the gravity of the injuries was taken note of
by the Sessions Court and it had awarded the sentence of 10
years rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under
Section 307 IPC, but not by the High Court. The High Court has
completely overlooked the various principles laid down by this
Court in Gian Singh , and has committed a mistake in taking the
view that, the injuries were caused on the body of Abdul Rashid
in a fight occurred at the spur and the heat of the moment. It
has been categorically held by this Court in Gian Singh that the
Court, while exercising the power under Section 482, must have
"due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime" and "the
societal impact". Both these aspects were completely
overlooked by the High Court. The High Court in a cursory
manner, without application of mind, blindly accepted the
statement of the parties that they had settled their disputes
and differences and took the view that it was a crime against
"an individual", rather than against "the society at large".
[15] We are not prepared to say that the crime alleged to have
been committed by the accused persons was a crime against an
individual, on the other hand it was a crime against the society
at large. Criminal law is designed as a mechanism for achieving
social control and its purpose is the regulation of conduct and
activities within the society. Why Section 307 IPC is held to be
non-compoundable, because the Code has identified which
conduct should be brought within the ambit of non-
compoundable offences.
Such provisions are not meant, just to protect the individual,
but the society as a whole. High Court was not right in thinking
that it was only an injury to the person and since the accused
persons had received the monetary compensation and settled
the matter, the crime as against them was wiped off. Criminal
justice system has a larger objective to achieve, that is safety
and protection of the people at large and it would be a lesson
not only to the offender, but to the individuals at large so that
such crimes would not be committed by any one and money
would not be a substitute for the crime committed against the
society. Taking a lenient view on a serious offence like the
present, will leave a wrong impression about the criminal
justice system and will encourage further criminal acts, which
will endanger the peaceful co-existence and welfare of the
society at large.
[16] We are, therefore, inclined to allow this appeal and set
aside the judgment of the High Court. The High Court was
carried away by the settlement and has not examined the
matter on merits, hence, we are inclined to direct the High
Court to take back the appeal to its file and decide the appeal
on merits.
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15. In Yogendra Yadav v State of Jharkhand, 21.7.2014, Supreme Court holds,
[4]. Now, the question before this Court is whether this Court
can compound the offences under Sections 326 and 307 of the
IPC which are non-compoundable. Needless to say that
offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded
by the court. Courts draw the power of compounding offences
from Section 320 of the Code. The said provision has to be
strictly followed (Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, 2012(4)
R.C.R.(Criminal) 543 : 2012(4) Recent Apex Judgments (R.A.J.)
549 : (2012)10 SCC 303). However, in a given case, the High
Court can quash a criminal proceeding in exercise of its power
under section 482 of the Code having regard to the fact that the
parties have amicably settled their disputes and the victim has
no objection, even though the offences are non-compoundable.
In which cases the High Court can exercise its discretion to
quash the proceedings will depend on facts and circumstances
of each case. Offences which involve moral turpitude, grave
offences like rape, murder etc. cannot be effaced by quashing
the proceedings because that will have harmful effect on the
society. Such offences cannot be said to be restricted to two
individuals or two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may
send wrong signal to the society. However, when the High
Court is convinced that the offences are entirely personal in
nature and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquillity
and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on
account of compromise would bring about peace and would
secure ends of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In
such cases, the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution.
Pursuing such a lame prosecution would be waste of time and
energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct
restoration of peace.
16. In Kailash Chand v. State of Rajasthan, 2018(4) R.C.R (Criminal) 292, Hon'ble
Supreme Court holds,
[7]. Upon perusal of the record, it appears that the incident has
occurred almost 30 years ago. Since the complainant/s and the
appellant-accused belong to the same family and are living in
the same house, they have buried their animosity and settled
their disputes amicably in writing under an agreement letter
dated 28.07.2017, copy of which is already placed on the file.
The injured victims are brother and sister-in-law of the
appellant. It is also stated in the aforesaid application for
compromise/compounding of offence that there is no
untoward incident has ever taken place after the date of
incident.
[8]. Though the offences under sections 307 and 326 of the IPC
are non-compoundable, having regard to the fact that the
incident in the present case did not have an impact on the
society in general, and having regard to the fact that the
dispute between the parties has been settled amicably and
there is no likelihood of the repetition of such incident, we
allow the application for compromise/compounding of offence
and set aside the orders of conviction and sentence passed by
the courts below against the appellant by exercising our
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The
appellant is ordered to be acquitted of the charges levelled
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against him. Since the appellant is confined in jail, he is ordered
to be released from custody forthwith if not required in any
other case.
17. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dhruv Gurjar, (2019) 5 SCC 570, the FIR was
registered under S 307, 294 and 34 IPC based on the allegations that Dhruv Gurjar
(accused) armed with a 12-bore gun, and his gang, visited the house of the complainant
with a view to take revenge with his nephew. When the complainant told them that his
nephew was not present at home, on this Dhruv Gurjar fired, and the pellets struck on
his forehead, left shoulder and left ear. Disagreeing with the order of High Court
quashing the FIR, Hon'ble Supreme Court held,
[16.1] However, the High Court has not at all considered the
fact that the offences alleged were non-compoundable
offences as per Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned
judgments and orders, it appears that the High Court has not at
all considered the relevant facts and circumstances of the case,
more particularly the seriousness of the offences and its social
impact. From the impugned judgments and orders passed by
the High Court, it appears that the High Court has mechanically
quashed the respective FIRs, in exercise of its powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at all considered the
distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social
wrong and the social impact. As observed by this Court in the
case of State of Maharashtra vs. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, 2014
15 SCC 29, the Court's principal duty, while exercising the
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal
proceedings, should be to scan the entire facts to find out the
thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement. As
observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid
and the said experience should be used with care, caution,
circumspection and courageous prudence.
18. In Shiji @ Pappu v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
[13]. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not
compoundable under Section 320 Indian Penal Code is by itself
no reason for the High Court to refuse exercise of its power
under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code That power can in
our opinion be exercised in cases where there is no chance of
recording a conviction against the accused and the entire
exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in futility. There
is a subtle distinction between compounding of offences by
the parties before the trial Court or in appeal on one hand and
the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the
prosecution under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code on
the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an
appeal against conviction, may not be competent to permit
compounding of an offence based on a settlement arrived at
between the parties in cases where the offences are not
compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may quash
the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which
the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The
inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 Criminal
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Procedure Code are not for that purpose controlled by Section
320 Criminal Procedure Code Having said so, we must hasten
to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482
Criminal Procedure Code by itself, makes it obligatory for the
High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution.
The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its
exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is,
for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance
of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the
process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to
enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under
Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the
exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and
only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result
in the abuse of the process of law. The High court may be
justified in declining interference if it is called upon to
appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an
appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High
Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of
each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the
inherent powers may be invoked.
19. In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench of
Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing of FIR, which are
reproduced as follows: -
[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents
on the subject, may be summarized in the following
propositions:
16 (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High
Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new
powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere
in the High Court;
16 (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on
the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While
compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed
by the provisions of section 320 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is
attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the
ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power;
16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide
ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the
ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any
court;
16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First
Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the
offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves
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ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no
exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and
while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the
High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of
the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental
depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of
the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly
speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon
society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is
founded on the overriding element of public interest in
punishing persons for serious offences;
16 (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in
so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is
concerned;
16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in
appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute;
16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression
and prejudice; and
16 (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving
the financial and economic well-being of the state have
implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute
between private disputants. The High Court would be justified
in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an
activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of
upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance.
20. In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on
29.09.2021, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
[11]. True it is that offences which are 'non-compoundable'
cannot be compounded by a criminal court in purported
exercise of its powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such
attempt by the court would amount to alteration, addition and
modification of Section 320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive
domain of Legislature. There is no patent or latent ambiguity
in the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C., which may justify its
wider interpretation and include such offences in the docket
of 'compoundable' offences which have been consciously kept
out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited
jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework of
Section 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking
inherent powers by the High Court vested in it under Section
482 Cr.P.C. The High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts
and circumstances of a case and for justifiable reasons can
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press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court and/or to secure the ends of justice.
[12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of
the offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled
their dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the
nullification of criminal proceedings, can quash such
proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-compoundable. The
High Court can indubitably evaluate the consequential effects
of the offence beyond the body of an individual and thereafter
adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony, even if
goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very
object of the administration of criminal justice system.
[13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non-
heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of
a private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that
trial has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed
against conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole
form of delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws
evenly is always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without
saying, that the cases where compromise is struck post-
conviction, the High Court ought to exercise such discretion
with rectitude, keeping in view the circumstances surrounding
the incident, the fashion in which the compromise has been
arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and seriousness
of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before and
after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the
extraordinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be to
secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard and fast line
constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial
justice. A restrictive construction of inherent powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or specious justice, which
in the given facts and circumstances of a case, may rather lead
to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases where heinous
offences have been proved against perpetrators, no such
benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this
Court in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs. State of Punjab &Ors. [(2014)
6 SCC 466, 29], and Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688, 15].
[14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences
which involve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the
social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters
concerning public policy, cannot be construed between two
individuals or groups only, for such offences have the potential
to impact the society at large. Effacing abominable offences
through quashing process would not only send a wrong signal
to the community but may also accord an undue benefit to
unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders, who can
secure a 'settlement' through duress, threats, social boycotts,
bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that "let no guilty
man escape, if it can be avoided."
21. In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642,
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of Justice arises propitiously
when parties, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or
reunion.
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22. In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of
compromise, placement of parties, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents
of the compromise deed and its objectives point towards its acceptance.
23. In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018 (4)
Crimes 324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ Petition (Criminal) No.
135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of
cognizance only because of the reason that matter was already pending as the
appellants had filed the Special Leave Petitions against the order of the High Court
rejecting their petition for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these
peculiar facts, writ petition has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that
FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automatically stand vitiated."
24. Given the nature of allegations and the other circumstances peculiar to this
case, the petitioners/accused shall surrender all weapons, firearms, ammunition, if
any, and the arms license to the concerned authority within thirty days from today
and inform the concerned SHO about the compliance. However, if the police chief of
the concerned district, (S.P./S.S.P/Commissioner), gives written permission by passing a
reasoned order to arrive at such a decision to retain the firearms and license and in
that case, this condition shall not be applicable. If the petitioners do not have such
licence, then no such permission should be granted to acquire firearms and
ammunition. However, if the police chief of the concerned district
(S.P./S.S.P/Commissioner) gives written permission through a reasoned order to get the
firearms and license, then this condition shall not be applicable.
25. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the
inherent jurisdiction under section 482 CrPC and quashes the FIR and all subsequent
proceedings qua the petitioner(s) only. The bail bonds of the petitioners are accordingly
discharged. All pending application(s), if any, stand closed.
Petition allowed in the terms mentioned above.
(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE
April ___, 2023
AK
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes
Whether reportable : No
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