Punjab-Haryana High Court
National Highway Authority Of ... vs Yashpreet Singh And Ors on 30 September, 2022
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
Reserved on 28.09.2022
Date of Decision-30.09.2022
1. CR No.259 of 2022(O&M)
National Highway Authority of India and another
... Petitioners
Versus
Yashpreet Singh and another ... Respondents
2. CR No.831 of 2022(O&M)
National Highway Authority of India and another
... Petitioners
Versus
Yashpreet Singh and another ... Respondents
3. CR No.3150 of 2021(O&M)
National Highway Authority of India and another
... Petitioners
Versus
Parampal Kaur and another ... Respondents
4. CR No.3153 of 2021(O&M)
National Highway Authority of India and another
... Petitioners
Versus
Dilbar Singh @ Jagseer Singh and another ... Respondents
5. CR No.3155 of 2021(O&M)
Union of India ... Petitioner
Versus
Sandeep Kumar and others ... Respondents
1 of 39
::: Downloaded on - 01-10-2022 19:45:05 :::
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 2
6. CR No.3164 of 2021(O&M)
Executive Engineer
... Petitioner
Versus
Rainu Bala and others ... Respondents
CORAM:-HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJ MOHAN SINGH
Present: Mr. Satya Pal Jain, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. R.S. Madan, Advocate and
Mr. Mahender Joshi, Advocate
for the petitioners.
Mr. Puneet Bali, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Ranjit Saini, Advocate and
Mr. Vikram Rathore, Advocate
for respondent No.1 in CR Nos.259, 831 of 2022
and in CR Nos.3150 and 3153 of 2021, for
respondents No.1 and 2 in CR No.3155 of 2021
and for respondents No.1 to 4 in CR No.3164 of
2021.
Mr. R.S. Pandher, Sr. DAG, Punjab.
***
RAJ MOHAN SINGH, J.
[1]. Vide this common order, CR No.259 of 2022 titled
National Highway Authority of India and another Vs.
Yashpreet Singh and another, CR No.831 of 2022 titled
National Highway Authority of India and another Vs.
Yashpreet Singh and another, CR No.3150 of 2021 titled
National Highway Authority of India and another Vs. Parampal
2 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 3
Kaur and another, CR No.3153 of 2021 titled National
Highway Authority of India and another Vs. Dilbag Singh @
Jagseer Singh and another, CR No.3155 of 2021 titled Union
of India Vs. Sandeep Kumar and others and CR No.3164 of
2021 titled Executive Engineer Vs. Rainu Bala and others are
being decided.
[2]. Since common questions of law in the aforesaid
cases are involved, therefore, facts are being culled out from
CR No.259 of 2022.
[3]. Petitioners in the aforesaid cases except in CR
No.831 of 2022 have assailed the order dated 26.10.2021
passed by the Executing Court, dismissing the application
under Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
and order dated 26.10.2021 to the extent, whereby the
executing Court has directed the petitioners to deposit the
awarded amount passed by the Arbitrator.
[4]. In CR No.831 of 2022, the petitioners have
assailed the order dated 18.02.2022 passed by the Additional
District Judge, Faridkot, vide which the application under
Order 21 Rule 29 read with Section 151 CPC was dismissed
as well as the order of even date i.e. 18.02.2022 to the extent
where the executing Court has directed the petitioners to
deposit the decretal amount till 11.03.2022.
3 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 4
[5]. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
the award was passed by the Arbitrator on 18.01.2019.
Respondent No.1 filed an application for correction of award
under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the same
was allowed by the Arbitrator on 23.01.2019. On 13.03.2019,
Union of India filed an objection petition under Section 34 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the District
Court at Bathinda. The case was registered vide ARB No.15
of 2019 and notice was issued to the respondents
accordingly. Respondent No.1 has appeared through his
counsel on 20.04.2019. In the execution petition filed by
respondent No.1, the executing Court issued notice on
07.11.2019. Petitioner filed an application under Section 42 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Section
151 CPC for transfer of execution proceedings to the Court of
competent jurisdiction at Bathinda on the ground that the land
is situated in Bathinda and the parties are also residents of
Bathinda. The aforesaid application under Section 42 of the
Act for transfer of execution petition to the Court of competent
jurisdiction at Bathinda has been dismissed by the Additional
District Judge vide order dated 26.10.2021.
[6]. On 01.09.2021, reply to the application for stay was
filed by respondent No.1 and the order was passed by the
Additional District Judge on 11.02.2022. With reference to the
4 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 5
aforesaid facts, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted
that the petitioners had acquired the land for widening/four
lanning of NH-15 of Bathinda Section in District Bathinda from
265.700 to 287.215 KM.
[7]. Respondent No.1 filed an application under Section
3G(5) of the National Highways Act before the Arbitrator,
which was allowed vide award dated 18/23/01/2019. Against
the aforesaid award of the Arbitrator, NHAI filed an objection
petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 in the District Court at Bathinda as the acquired
land is situated in District Bathinda. Respondent No.1 filed an
execution petition in the District Court at Faridkot as the
arbitration proceedings have taken place at Faridkot.
[8]. According to the learned counsel for the
petitioners, the executing Court at Faridkot has no jurisdiction
to carry on with the execution proceedings as the assets of
the petitioners are not located in Faridkot. With this
background, the petitioners have submitted that the execution
proceedings filed by respondent No.1 in District Court,
Faridkot lacks jurisdiction as no assets of the petitioners are
located in District Faridkot, rather the assets are situated in
District Bathinda and therefore, the execution petition filed by
respondent No.1 at Faridkot is liable to be transferred to the
Court of competent jurisdiction at Bathinda.
5 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 6
[9]. Learned counsel further submitted that the
executing Court at Faridkot lacks territorial jurisdiction as per
Section 42 of the Act as the petitioners had filed objection
petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act prior to the filing of execution petition by respondent No.1.
In the aforesaid objection petition, award dated 18/23.01.2019
has been assailed and the same has been registered vide
ARB No.15 of 2019 titled Union of India Vs. Niranjan Singh
and others before the Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction at Bathinda. Notice was issued on 13.03.2019.
Respondent No.1 has also appeared through his counsel on
20.04.2019. Respondent No.1 has filed the execution petition
for execution of award at Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction at Faridkot and the same has been registered vide
Execution No.202 of 2019. Notice was also issued in the
execution petition on 07.11.2019.
[10]. Learned counsel submitted that as per the
mandate of Section 42 of the Act, the proceedings arising out
of the award ought to have been filed in the Court of Principal
Civil Court of original jurisdiction, where the party to the
arbitration proceedings has approached at the first instance.
Since the petitioners have approached the Principal Civil
Court of original jurisdiction at the first instance at Bathinda,
therefore, subsequent execution petition filed by respondent
6 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 7
No.1 at Faridkot is liable to be transferred to the competent
Court at Bathinda as the executing Court at Faridkot has no
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the execution petition. In
support of his contention, learned counsel has referred to
OMP (Enf.) (Comm.) 38 of 2021 titled Continental
Engineering Corporation Vs. Sugesan Transport Pvt. Ltd.
decided on 10.01.2022 by the Delhi High Court.
[11]. With reference to the aforesaid, learned counsel
submitted that there is no justification for filing an execution
petition before the Court within whose jurisdiction the arbitral
award has been passed and then to seek a transfer to the
Court, which has jurisdiction over the judgment debtor or their
properties. Irrespective of the place where the award has
been passed, the same is to be executed by a Court within
whose jurisdiction the judgment debtor resides, carries on
business or his property is situated. Since the judgment
debtor is residing within the territorial jurisdiction of Court at
Bathinda, therefore, the Court at Bathinda has the jurisdiction
to enforce the arbitral award and the Court at Faridkot has no
territorial jurisdiction.
[12]. Learned counsel placed reliance upon Civil
Revision Petition No.507 of 2021 titled M/s India Media
Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s SBPL Infrastructure Limited
decided by Telangana High Court on 09.06.2022 and
7 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 8
contended that in view of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in State of West Bengal Vs. Associated Contractors,
(2015) 1 SCC 32, the Court at Faridkot has no territorial
jurisdiction and the enforcement of award has to be
transferred to the Court at Bathinda. With reference to the
aforesaid judgment, learned counsel for the petitioner sought
to distinguish the ratio laid down in Sundaram Finance
Limited Vs. Abdul Samad, (2018) SCC 622 on the premise
that the Hon'ble Apex Court had reviewed the decisions of
various High Courts while considering the relevant provisions
of the Act as well as the Civil Procedure Code and held that
an award can be enforced anywhere in the country and there
is no requirement of obtaining transfer of the decree from the
Court which would have jurisdiction over the arbitral
proceedings. In Sundaram Finance Limited case (supra),
two aspects were noticed by the Court. Firstly, based on the
term of contract straightway Arbitrator was appointed by
Sundaram Finance Limited and award passed by the
Arbitrator had become final. There was no application filed
prior to commencement of arbitral proceedings during the
arbitral proceedings or after the arbitral proceedings under
Section 9 of the Act. No application was filed under Section 34
of the Act, challenging the award. Straightway execution
application was filed, taking recourse to Section 36 of the Act.
The Hon'ble Apex Court had held that the award of the
8 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 9
Arbitrator can be enforced anywhere in the country. In view of
aforesaid, Section 42 of the Act was not considered by the
Hon'ble Apex Court. Secondly, the opinion expressed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Associated Contractors case
(supra) was not considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sundaram Finance Limited case (supra).
[13]. Learned counsel further submitted that the High
Court in a bunch cases with lead case TA No.191 of 2021
titled Madanjit Kaur Vs. National Highways Authority of
India and others decided on 14.10.2021 has passed an
order, requesting NHAI to take a policy decision with respect
to the matter. Pursuant to the aforesaid, the National Highway
Authority of India has issued an office order dated 11.10.2021
on the subject of transfer applications pending in the High
Court regarding adjudication of land acquisition disputes in
Civil Courts. In this regard, it has been decided that NHAI
would file objection petitions under Section 34 of the Act in
Civil Courts, where the land is situated and not at a place
where arbitration proceedings are held in order to avoid
multiplicity of proceedings. The said directive is however
subject to compliance of mandate of Section 42 of the Act.
The aforesaid policy is prospective in nature and takes care of
the objections which have been filed subsequent to the
9 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 10
aforesaid policy decision. High Court was pleased to transfer
the objection petitions from one place to another.
[14]. Learned counsel further submitted that vide
notification dated 19.03.2021, the Central Government in
pursuance of sub Section (5) of Section 3G of the National
Highways Act, 1956 appointed Sh. Satwant Singh
(Commissioner Retd.) at D.C. Office, Ferozepur as Arbitrator
for the purpose of said sub Section, who was required to
exercise the powers conferred and perform the duties
imposed on an Arbitrator by or under the said Act within the
local limits of his respective jurisdiction as specified in the
relevant column. Sub Sections (6) and (7) of Section 3G of the
Act were to be taken into consideration while passing the
award. The Arbitrator was having revenue jurisdiction of
Faridkot, Fazilka, Ferozepur, Moga and Sri Muktsar Sahib.
The seat of the Arbitrator was at Ferozepur.
[15]. Learned counsel by referring to Associated
Contractors case (supra), submitted that Section 2(1)(e) of
the Act contains an exhaustive definition making out only the
Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a District or a
High Court having original civil jurisdiction in the State and no
other Court as "Court" for the purpose of Part 1 of the Act.
The expression "with respect of an arbitration agreement"
makes it clear that Section 42 of the Act will apply to all
10 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 11
applications made whether before or during arbitral
proceedings or after an award is pronounced under Part-1 of
the 1996 Act. However, Section 42 of the Act only applies to
applications made under Part-1 if they are made to a Court as
defined. Since applications made under Section 8 of the Act
are made to judicial authorities and since applications under
Section 11 of the Act are made to Chief Justice or his
designate, the judicial authority and the Chief Justice or his
designate not being Court as defined, such applications would
be outside the purview of Section 42 of the Act. Applications
under Section 9 of the Act being applications made to a Court
and Section 34 of the Act applications to set aside arbitral
awards are applications which are within the purview of
Section 42 of the Act. Section 42 of the Act will apply to
applications made after the arbitral proceedings have come to
an end provided they are made under Part-1 of the Act.
[16]. Learned counsel further relied upon Civil Appeal
Nos.6958-6959 and 6965-6966 of 2009 titled National
Highways Authority of India Vs. Sayedabad Tea Company
Ltd. and others decided on 27.08.2019. With reference to
para No.19 of the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel
submitted that when the special law sets out a self-contained
code, the application of general law would impliedly be
excluded. The scheme of Act, 1956 being a special law
11 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 12
enacted for the purpose and for appointment of an Arbitrator
by the Central Government under Section 3G(5) of the Act,
1956 and sub Section (6) of Section 3G itself clarified that
subject to the provisions of the Act, 1956, the provisions of
Act, 1996 shall apply to every arbitration obviously to the
extent where the Act, 1956 is silent, the Arbitrator may take
recourse in adjudicating the dispute invoking the provisions of
Act, 1996 for the limited purpose. But so far as the
appointment of an Arbitrator is concerned, the power being
exclusively vested with the Central Government as envisaged
under sub Section (5) of the Section 3G of Act, 1956, Section
11 of the Act, 1996 has no application.
[17]. Learned counsel further submitted that the concept
of seat and venue as interpreted in reference to commercial
arbitration governed by an agreement cannot be applied to
statutory arbitration under the National Highways Act, 1956.
When there is no meeting of mind, no formal agreement is
required. When arbitration is conducted in accordance with
the provisions of a Special Act that specifically provides for
arbitration in respect of disputes arising on matter covered by
that Act, then such arbitration is called as statutory arbitration.
A statutory arbitration is distinct from a consensual arbitration
which is the result of an agreement between the parties. In
case, statutory arbitration applies, the arbitral Tribunal
12 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 13
constituted by the Statute has exclusive jurisdiction and the
proceedings are the creation of the Parliament and not of a
meeting of minds. The distinguishing feature under statutory
arbitration is that there is no question of consent of the
parties. Therefore, appointment of Arbitrator and procedure
for the conduct of proceedings are governed by the provisions
of the Statute under which arbitration proceedings are initiated
and in the absence of enabling provisions under the Statute,
as per the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996.
[18]. Section 2(4) and (5) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 provides for the application of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act to statutory arbitrations. It
replaces Section 46 of the old Act 1940. Arbitral proceedings
under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 is
statutory arbitration where the Central Government has been
empowered to appoint an Arbitrator. Thus, there is no party
autonomy in the appointment of the Arbitrator. Absence of the
party autonomy means that the intention of the parties has to
be seen in light of the scheme of the statutory arbitration. The
scheme of the statutory arbitration under the National
Highways Act is therefore a guiding consideration for setting
out the procedure for the conduct of arbitral proceedings.
13 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 14
[19]. Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act is a
beneficial provisions incorporated to facilitate the parties with
expeditious and cost-effective dispute resolution with respect
to compensation for the compulsory acquisition of land. In the
absence of specific provisions under the National Highways
Act, the principles governing the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 have to be applied considering the interest of the
parties involved and also considering that the remedy of
arbitration under the National Highways Act remains
expeditious and cost-effective.
[20]. Learned counsel further submitted that in case of
statutory arbitration which is distinct from commercial
contractual arbitrations as in statutory arbitration under the
National Highways Act, there is no formal arbitration
agreement that specifies the rights and obligations or
procedure to be followed. The procedure, rights and
obligations in the case of statutory arbitrations are derived
from the provisions of the National Highways Act with
notifications for the acquisition of land. The concept has been
recognized in case of Sayedabad Tea Co. Ltd. case (supra)
and it has been held that the provisions of the Arbitration Act
have no applicability on statutory arbitrations and the
provisions of National Highways Act override the provisions of
the Arbitration Act.
14 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 15
[21]. With reference to Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the National
Highways Act, learned counsel submitted that the Court
having jurisdiction shall be the Court having jurisdiction to
decide the questions forming the subject matter of the
arbitration i.e. the land which has been acquired under the
National Highways Act. Learned counsel further submitted
that in the instant case, the confarnment of jurisdiction on the
Court where the subject matter of the dispute is located is the
appropriate Court and the same is also as per convenience of
the majority of landowners, who will prefer the jurisdiction of
the local Courts. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
does not employ the words 'seat' or 'venue' of arbitration and
only employs the word 'place' of arbitration in the sense of
'juridical seat'. Learned counsel further referred to Section 20
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and contended that the
parties would be free to agree for the place of arbitration. In
case of failure of agreement, the place of arbitration shall be
determined by the arbitral Tribunal having regard to the
circumstances of the case including the convenience of the
parties. Irrespective of the aforesaid, the arbitral Tribunal may
unless otherwise agreed by the parties, meet at any place
which it considers appropriate for consultation amongst its
members for hearing witnesses, experts or the parties or for
inspection of documents, goods or other properties.
15 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 16
[22]. The seat of arbitration and venue of arbitration
cannot be used inter-changeably. In the light of scheme of
statutory arbitration, the seat of the arbitration under National
Highways Act has to be construed as the place where the
land is situated. The Divisional Commissioner, Faridkot was
empowered to act as an Arbitrator for the land acquisitions
made in revenue Districts including District Bathinda. The
Divisional Commissioner, Faridkot while holding the
proceedings at Faridkot has chosen the venue as Faridkot.
Merely because the arbitration proceedings were held at
Faridkot, the same does not confer the jurisdiction to the
Court at Faridkot. Arbitrator did not determine the seat of the
arbitral Tribunal at Faridkot and in the absence of the same,
merely the arbitral proceedings were held at Faridkot, will not
ipso facto designate the seat of the Arbitrator at Faridkot,
particularly when the subject matter of the acquired land is
situated in Bathinda.
[23]. Learned counsel referred to Matter under Article
227 No.6890 of 2021 titled Hasmukh Prajapati Vs. Jai
Parkash Associates Ltd., decided on 17.02.2022 and
Bharat Aluminium Co. Vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical
Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 (BALCO case for short). In
BALCO case (supra), it has been held that there are
concurrent jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings i.e. Courts
16 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 17
possessing the subject matter or cause of action and the
Courts where the place/seat of arbitration was designated.
The Hon'ble Apex Court has clarified the legal position in para
No.96 of the aforesaid judgment. Learned counsel also
referred to BGS SGS Soma JV Vs. NHPC, (2020) 4 SCC 234
to distinguish that where the parties have not agreed on the
seat of arbitration, the arbitral Tribunal is used to determine
the seat under Section 20(2) of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. Since no interim order was passed by
the Arbitrator, showing the parties had consented to the seat
for arbitration proceedings at District Faridkot, therefore, the
said judgment is distinguishable. On the strength of the
aforesaid submission, learned counsel contended that the
execution proceedings pending in the Court at Faridkot are
liable to be transferred to the competent Court at Bathinda
where the land is situated and parties are also residing there.
[24]. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for the
respondents submitted that the seat of the Arbitrator was fixed
at Faridkot vide letter No.1/1/2014-IAS(2)/538942/5 dated
16.07.2015 as per Section 3G(5) of the National Highways
Act, 1956. The aforesaid reference finds mentioned in the
award of the Arbitrator itself. The award was signed and
pronounced in Fardikot by the Arbitrator. In the objection
petition filed by the petitioners under Section 34 of the
17 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 18
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in Bathinda District
Court, no stay has been granted in favour of the petitioners.
The respondents have filed an application for returning the
petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act on the ground that the Court at Bathinda has no
jurisdiction. The respondents have filed execution petition at
Faridkot, where at the fag end of the execution proceedings,
when the Additional District Judge asked the petitioners to
deposit the enhanced compensation, the petitioners filed the
application under Section 42 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act on the ground that they had already filed the
objection petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act at Bathinda, therefore, the execution petition
be transferred to Bathinda. Petitioners pleaded the concept of
automatic stay so as to seek stay of disbursement of amount,
though there is no concept of automatic stay after the
amendment in the Arbitration Act and the award has to be
treated as a money decree and the same cannot be stayed.
No stay has been granted against disbursement of the
amount by the executing Court.
[25]. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
have also perused the relevant facts and precedents relied by
the parties.
18 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 19
[26]. In BBR (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. S.P. Singla
Constructions Pvt. Ltd, (2022) SCC Online SC 642 it has
been held that Section 42 of the Act is to no avail to the
petitioner as in the present case, the Arbitrator has fixed the
jurisdictional seat under Section 20(2) of the Act before any
party had moved the Court under the Act being a Court where
a part or whole of the cause of action has arisen. Para No.33
of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:-
"33. Section 42 is to no avail as it does not help the case
propounded by the appellant, as in the present case the
arbitrator had fixed the jurisdictional 'seat' under Section
20(2) of the Act before any party had moved the court
under the Act, being a court where a part or whole of the
cause of action had arisen. The appellant had moved the
Delhi High Court under Section 34 of the Act after the
arbitral tribunal vide the order dated 5th August 2014
had fixed the jurisdictional 'seat at Panchkula in
Haryana. Consequently, the appellant cannot, based on
fastest finger first principle, claim that the courts in Delhi
get exclusive jurisdiction in view of Section 42 of the Act.
The reason is simple that before the application under
Section 34 was filed, the jurisdictional 'seat' of arbitration
had been determined and fixed under sub-section (2) to
Section 20 and thereby, the courts having jurisdiction
over Panchkula in Haryana, have exclusive jurisdiction.
The courts in Delhi would not get jurisdiction as the
jurisdictional 'seat of arbitration' is Panchkula and not
Delhi."
19 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 20
[27]. The respondents have filed the execution petition
at Faridkot following the law laid down in Sundaram Finance
Limited case (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has
held in para No.17 to the following effect:-
"17. However, what has been lost sight of is Section 32
of the said Act, which reads as under:
32. Termination of proceedings.-(1) The arbitral
proceedings shall be terminated by the final arbitral
award or by an order of the Arbitral Tribunal under sub-
section (2).
(2) The Arbitral Tribunal shall issue an order for the
termination of the arbitral proceedings where-
(a) the claimant withdraws his claim, unless the
respondent objects to the order and the Arbitral
Tribunal recognises a legitimate interest on his part
in obtaining a final settlement of the dispute;
(b) the parties agree on the termination of the
proceedings; or
(c) the Arbitral Tribunal finds that the continuation
of the proceedings has for any other reason
become unnecessary or impossible.
(3) Subject to Section 33 and sub-section (4) of
Section 34, the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal
shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral
proceedings."
The aforesaid provision provides for arbitral proceedings
to be terminated by the final arbitral award. Thus, when
an award is already made, of which execution is sought,
20 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 21
the arbitral proceedings already stand terminated on the
making of the final award. Thus, it is not appreciated
how Section 42 of the said Act, which deals with the
jurisdiction issue in respect of arbitral proceedings,
would have any relevance. It does appear that the
provisions of the said Code and the said Act have been
mixed up."
Para No.19 of the aforesaid judgment is also
necessary to be quoted hereasunder:-
"19. The Madras High Court in Kotak Mahindra Bank
Ltd. v. Sivakama Sundari referred to Section 46 of the
said Code, which spoke of precepts but stopped at that.
In the context of the Code, thus, the view adopted is that
the decree of a civil court is liable to be executed
primarily by the court, which passes the decree where
an execution application has to be filed at the first
instance. An award under Section 36 of the said Act, is
equated to a decree of the court for the purposes of
execution, and only for that purpose. Thus, it was rightly
observed that while an award passed by the Arbitral
Tribunal is deemed to be a decree under Section 36 of
the said Act, there was no deeming fiction anywhere to
hold that the court within whose jurisdiction the arbitral
award was passed should be taken to be the court,
which passed the decree. The said Act actually
transcends all territorial barriers."
[28]. The award was passed by the Arbitrator and was
signed at Faridkot. Petitioners have already deposited the
amount in Faridkot in respect of other co-sharers whose lands
were acquired by the same acquisition though the awards
21 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 22
were different, but the award of the Collector was the same.
Section 42 of the Act is not applicable after passing of the
award. For enforcement of award, its execution can be filed
anywhere in the country where such decree can be executed
and there is no requirement for obtaining a transfer of decree
from the Court, which would have jurisdiction over the arbitral
proceedings. Under Section 36 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, an award under Section 36 of the Act
is equated to a decree of the Court for the purposes of
execution. No deeming fiction is attached to hold that the
Court within whose jurisdiction the arbitral award has been
passed should be taken to be the Court, which passed the
decree. Arbitration Act actually transcends all territorial
barriers.
[29]. In view of BGS SGS Soma JV case (supra) , the
petitioners cannot be allowed to contend that as per 2019
Rules, there is automatic stay in contrary to Section 36 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Reliance can be placed upon
Pam Developments and Private Limited Vs. State of West
Bengal, 2019(3) RCR (Civil) 603 and BCCI Vs. Kochi
Cricket Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 287, where the contentions
with regard to automatic stay was deprecated by the Court
and it was held that in view of Section 36 of the Act, mere
filing of an application under Section 34 of the Act, shall not
22 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 23
stay enforceability of the award unless the Court grant a stay
of operation of the arbitration award in accordance with the
provision of sub Sections 2 and 3 of Section 36 of the Act. No
stay has been granted by the Court at Bathinda in the
objection petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act. Petitioners have deposited the awarded
amount as per the award by the Arbitrator at Faridkot. It is
only the enhanced amount for which this method has been
adopted by the petitioners under the garb of Section 42 of the
Act. The respondents are losing huge amount per day
towards interest. The amount has been partly deposited by
the petitioners in the executing Court. Petitioners are not
going to lose anything if the amount is released to the
claimants. Para No.1 of the award itself shows that
Government of India had appointed the Commissioner,
Faridkot, Division Faridkot as Arbitrator under Section 3G(5)
and (6) of the National Highways Act, 1956 vide letter dated
16.07.2015 for Bathinda District, Punjab, thereby creating seat
of the Arbitrator at Faridkot. In the proceedings arising out of
the same award, the petitioners have already deposited the
enhanced amount in the executing Court in Ex.535 of 2019
titled Harpreet Singh Vs. National Highway Authority of
India. Perusal of Arbitration Case No.10 dated 04.01.2016
titled Union of India and others Vs. Ujjagar Singh and
others decided on 29.01.2016 and Case Code No.PBLD01-
23 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 24
000559-2016 titled Nirmal Singh and another Vs. Union of
India and others decided on 29.01.2020 would show that the
petitioners have admitted the jurisdiction of the Court, where
the award is passed. Even in those cases, the petitioners had
admitted that the objection petition under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act is maintainable in the Court
where the award is passed by the Arbitrator and the objection
petition under Section 34 of the Act, challenging the award
can only be filed before the Court, who is having jurisdiction
over the place where the award is passed. The stand has
been taken in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court
in Civil Appeal No.2077 of 2015 arising out of SLP(C)
No.8675 of 2014 titled M/s Bhandari Udyog Ltd. Vs.
Industrial Faciliation Council and another.
[30]. In the context of para No.19 of Hasmukh
Prajapati's case (supra), it can be seen that the seat of the
Arbitrator is of utmost importance and the same connotes the
situs of arbitration. The term "venue" is often confused with
the term "seat" but it is more a place often chosen as
convenient location by the parties to carry out arbitration
proceedings but the same should not be confused with "seat".
The term "seat" carries more weight than "venue" or "place".
[31]. With reference to BGS SGS Soma JV's case
(supra), it can be seen that the Arbitrator has fixed the seat at
24 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 25
Faridkot as per para No.1 of the award and as per notification
and therefore, Faridkot shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to
entertain and hear the dispute under Section 34 of the Act.
Once the seat has been chosen, it would then amount to an
exclusive jurisdiction, so far as the seat is concerned. If no
seat of Arbitration was specified and the parties agreed about
the venue of Arbitration and the arbitration proceedings took
place at such a venue and award is passed, then in view of
ratio laid down in BGS SGS Soma JV case (supra), if the
venue of arbitration is designated without specifying the seat
of arbitration, the stated venue would be the juridical seat of
the arbitration and the objection petition under Section 34 of
the Act would lie at that place only.
[32]. In the instant case, the seat of the Arbitrator has
been fixed at Faridkot, therefore, by no stretch of imagination,
Bathinda Court has any jurisdiction. The provision of Section
42 of the Act provides that any application for arbitration shall
be made to that Court who has supervisory jurisdiction over
the arbitral Tribunal and in no other Court. The language itself
is explanatory and it is applicable till the finalization of the
arbitral proceedings and after termination of the arbitral
proceedings i.e. after pronouncement of award in terms of
Section 32 of the Act, arbitral proceedings stand terminated
and thereafter, Section 42 of the Act has no application.
25 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 26
[33]. In reference to interpretation of seat and venue,
ratio of Inox Renewables Ltd. Vs. Jayesh Electricals Ltd,
2021 SCC OnLine Sc 448 can be seen. Para Nos.11, 12, 13
and 17 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced
hereasunder:-
"11. What is clear, therefore, as per this paragraph is
that by mutual agreement, parties have specifically
shifted the venue/place of arbitration from Jaipur to
Ahmedabad. This being so, is it not possible to accede
to the argument made by learned counsel for the
Respondent that this could only have been done by
written agreement and that the arbitrator's finding would
really have reference to a convenient venue and not the
seat of arbitration.
12. In BGS SGS (supra), this Court, after an exhaustive
review of the entire case law, concluded thus: 32. It can
thus be seen that given the new concept of "juridical
seat" of the arbitral proceedings, and the importance
given by the Arbitration Act, 1996 to this "seat", the
arbitral award is now not only to state its date, but also
the place of arbitration as determined in accordance with
Section 20. However, the definition of "court" contained
in Section 2(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, continued
as such in the Arbitration Act, 1996, though narrowed to
mean only principal civil court and the High Court in
exercise of their original ordinary civil jurisdiction. Thus,
the concept of juridical seat of the arbitral proceedings
and its relationship to the jurisdiction of courts which are
then to look into matters relating to the arbitral
proceedings including challenges to arbitral awards was
26 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 27
unclear, and had to be developed in accordance with
international practice on a case by case basis by this
Court.
XXX 48. The aforesaid amendment carried out in the
definition of "Court" is also a step showing the right
direction, namely, that in international commercial
arbitrations held in India, the High Court alone is to
exercise jurisdiction over such proceedings, even where
no part of the cause of action may have arisen within the
jurisdiction of such High Court, such High Court not
having ordinary original jurisdiction. In such cases, the
"place" where the award is delivered alone is looked at,
and the High Court given jurisdiction to supervise the
arbitration proceedings, on the footing of its jurisdiction
to hear appeals from decrees of courts subordinate to it,
which is only on the basis of territorial jurisdiction which
in turn relates to the "place" where the award is made. In
the light of this important change in the law, Section
2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 must also be
construed in the manner indicated by this judgment.
49. Take the consequence of the opposite conclusion, in
the light of the facts of a given example, as follows. New
Delhi is specifically designated to be the seat of the
arbitration in the arbitration clause between the parties.
Part of the cause of action however, arises in several
places, including where the contract is partially to be
performed, let us say, in a remote part of Uttarakhand. If
concurrent jurisdiction were to be the order of the day,
despite the seat having been located and specifically
chosen by the parties, party autonomy would suffer,
which BALCO specifically states cannot be the case.
Thus, if an application is made to a District Court in a
27 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 28
remote corner of the Uttarakhand hills, which then
becomes the court for the purposes of Section 42 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 where even Section 34 applications
have then to be made, the result would be contrary to
the stated intention of the parties as even though the
parties have contemplated that a neutral place be
chosen as the seat so that the courts of that place alone
would have jurisdiction, yet, any one of five other courts
in which a part of the cause of action arises, including
courts in remote corners of the country, would also be
clothed with jurisdiction. This obviously cannot be the
case. If, therefore, the conflicting portion of the judgment
of BALCO in para 96 is kept aside for a moment, the
very fact that parties have chosen a place to be the seat
would necessarily carry with it the decision of both
parties that the courts at the seat would exclusively have
jurisdiction over the entire arbitral process.
XXX 53. In Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd., after
clearing the air on the meaning of Section 20 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996, the Court in para 19 (which has
already been set out hereinabove) made it clear that the
moment a seat is designated by agreement between the
parties, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause,
which would then vest the courts at the "seat" with
exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral
proceedings arising out of the agreement between the
parties. XXX XXX XXX
82. On a conspectus of the aforesaid judgments, it may
be concluded that whenever there is the designation of a
place of arbitration in an arbitration clause as being the
"venue" of the arbitration proceedings, the expression
"arbitration proceedings" would make it clear that the
28 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 29
"venue" is really the "seat" of the arbitral proceedings, as
the aforesaid expression does not include just one or
more individual or particular hearing, but the arbitration
proceedings as a whole, including the making of an
award at that place. This language has to be contrasted
with language such as "tribunals are to meet or have
witnesses, experts or the parties" where only hearings
are to take place in the "venue", which may lead to the
conclusion, other things being equal, that the venue so
stated is not the "seat" of arbitral proceedings, but only a
convenient place of meeting. Further, the fact that the
arbitral proceedings "shall be held" at a particular venue
would also indicate that the parties intended to anchor
arbitral proceedings to a particular place, signifying
thereby, that that place is the seat of the arbitral
proceedings. This, coupled with there being no other
significant contrary indicia that the stated venue is
merely a "venue" and not the "seat" of the arbitral
proceedings, would then conclusively show that such a
clause designates a "seat" of the arbitral proceedings. In
an International context, if a supranational body of rules
is to govern the arbitration, this would further be an
indicia that "the venue", so stated, would be the seat of
the arbitral proceedings. In a national context, this would
be replaced by the Arbitration Act, 1996 as applying to
the "stated venue", which then becomes the "seat" for
the purposes of arbitration.
98. However, the fact that in all the three appeals before
us the proceeding were finally held at New Delhi, and
the awards were signed in New Delhi, and not a
Faridabad, would lead to the conclusion that both parties
have chosen New Delhi a the "seat" of arbitration under
29 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 30
Section 20(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. This being the
case, both parties have, therefore, chosen that the
courts at New Delhi alone would have exclusive
jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings. Therefore, the
fact that a part of the cause of action may have arisen at
Faridabad would not be relevant once the "seat" has
been chosen, which would then amount to an exclusive
jurisdiction clause so far as Courts of the "seat" are
concerned."
13. This case would show that the moment the seat is
chosen as Ahmedabad, it is akin to an exclusive
jurisdiction clause, thereby vesting the courts at
Ahmedabad with exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the
arbitration. However, learned counsel for the
Respondent referred to and relied upon paragraphs 49
and 71 of the aforesaid judgment. Paragraph 49 only
dealt with the aspect of concurrent jurisdiction as dealt
with in Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 ["BALCO"]
which does not arise on the facts of the present case.
Paragraph 71 is equally irrelevant, in that, it is clear that
the parties have, by mutual agreement, entered into an
agreement to substitute the venue at Jaipur with
Ahmedabad as the place/seat of arbitration under
Section 20(1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996.
17. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the
Respondent on Indus Mobile (supra), and in particular,
on paragraphs 18 and 19 thereof, would also support the
Appellant's case, inasmuch as the "venue" being shifted
from Jaipur to Ahmedabad is really a shifting of the
venue/place of arbitration with reference to Section
30 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 31
20(1), and not with reference to Section 20(3) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as it has been
made clear that Jaipur does not continue to be the seat
of arbitration and Ahmedabad is now the seat
designated by the parties, and not a venue to hold
meetings. The learned arbitrator has recorded that by
mutual agreement, Jaipur as a "venue" has gone and
has been replaced by Ahmedabad. As clause 8.5 of the
Purchase Order must be read as a whole, it is not
possible to accept the submission of Shri Malkan that
the jurisdiction of Courts in Rajasthan is independent of
the venue being at Jaipur. The two clauses must be read
together as the Courts in Rajasthan have been vested
with jurisdiction only because the seat of arbitration was
to be at Jaipur. Once the seat of arbitration is replaced
by mutual agreement to be at Ahmedabad, the Courts at
Rajasthan are no longer vested with jurisdiction as
exclusive jurisdiction is now vested in the Courts at
Ahmedabad, given the change in the seat of arbitration."
[34]. As regards CR No.831 of 2022, it can be
appreciated that as regards Rule 3 of the National Highways
(Manner of depositing the amount by the Central Government;
making requisite funds available to the competent authority for
acquisition of land) Rules, 2019 is concerned, the same does
not create any automatic stay as the Rule is only in respect of
manner in which the disbursement has to be made and also
the manner of making requisite funds available to the
competent authority. Rule 3 of the National Highways Act
31 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 32
deals with the manner of making requisite funds available to
the competent authority which shall be as follows:-
"3. The manner of making requisite funds available to
the competent authority shall be as follows:-
(i) Subject to provisions of the Act, the executing
agency authorised by the Central Government in
this behalf, shall open and maintain an account
with one or more Scheduled Commercial Banks for
remittance of the amount for land acquisition
across the country, with arrangements for access
to such account by the competent authority for
specific jurisdiction as per authorisation of limits by
the executing agency. The Executing Agency shall,
on the demand raised by the competent authority
before announcement of the award, issue requisite
authorisation limits in favour of the competent
authority for withdrawal of amount from such
account as per requirements from time to time for
disbursement to the landowners or persons
interested therein through an electronic banking
mechanism as per extant Reserve Bank of India
regulations and the said authorisation limits,
revolving in nature, shall entitle the competent
authority to withdraw money from such account as
per requirements, without any further reference to
the land acquiring agency, for disbursement to the
landowners or persons interested therein, as
follows:
(a) The amount determined under section 3-G of
the Act within fifteen days of the raising of demand
by the competent authority, and
32 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 33
(b) Where the amount determined by the Arbitrator
under sub section (7) of section 3-G of the Act is in
excess of the amount determined by the competent
authority, the excess amount, together with
interest, if any, awarded by the Arbitrator, within 30
days of the communication of Arbitrator's award,
unless such Award has been further challenged by
either of the aggrieved parties."
[35]. Bare perusal of the aforesaid Rule would show that
the Rules only govern the internal functioning of the
Government and has nothing to do with the enforcement of
the arbitral award. The Rules cannot create a law, which has
already been legislated and does not provide for automatic
stay. These rules are formulated as per Clause (aa) of sub
Section (2) of Section 9 of National Highways Act, 1956,
which is reproduced hereasunder:-
"9. Power to make rules.-(1) The Central Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules
for carrying out the purposes of this Act.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of
the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or
any of the following matters, namely
(a) the manner in which, and the conditions subject
to which, any function in relation to the
development or maintenance of a national highway
or any part thereof may be exercised by the State
Government or any officer or authority subordinate
33 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 34
to the Central Government or the State
Government;
[(aa) the manner in which the amount shall be
deposited with the competent authority under sub-
sections (1) and (6) of section 3H
(b) the rates at which fees for services rendered in
relation to the use of ferries, permanent bridges,
temporary bridges and tunnels on any national
highway [and the use of sections of any national
highway] may be levied, and the manner in which
such fees shall be collected, under section 7;]
(c) the periodical inspection of national highways
and the submission of inspection reports to the
Central Government;
(d) the reports on works carried out on national
highways;
(e) any other matter for which provision should be
made under this Act.
[(3) Every rule made under this section shall be laid, as
soon as may be after it is made, before each House of
Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of
thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in
two or more successive sessions and if, before the
expiry of the session immediately following the session
or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses
agree in making any modification in the rule or both
Houses agree that the rule should not be made. the rule
shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or
be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that
any such modification or annulment shall be without
34 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 35
prejudice to the validity of anything previously done
under that rule.]"
[36]. The Statute clearly states that the Rules are to be
formulated regarding the deposit of compensation amount and
does not provide for any stay of the proceedings. It is also
pertinent to mention here that Section 3G(6) of the National
Highways Act clearly states that subject to the provision of this
Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 shall apply to every arbitration under this Act. Once the
matter has been settled by the Arbitrator and award has been
passed, it becomes a decree to be enforced by the executing
Court while following law as per Code of Civil Procedure. The
provisions of the National Highways Act shall not govern the
proceedings once the arbitration award has been passed.
[37]. Section 2(e)(i) of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act would reveal that Faridkot Court has only jurisdiction to
entertain and decide the objection petition under Section 34 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and also the execution and
therefore, the objection petition filed at Bathinda Court is not
maintainable. Petitioners have raised points, which were
never pleaded in the applications before the executing Court
and the same cannot be allowed to be taken in revisional
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and
the objection petition deserved to be dismissed.
35 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 36
[38]. Case titled Land Acquisition No.9689 of 2019
titled Ram Awadh Vs. Competent Authority/Spl. Land
Acquisition Officer, Bbk. and another decided on
16.04.2019 is not applicable to the present case for the simple
reason that in the aforesaid case, the Court did not consider
the fact that 2019 Rules are not applicable so far as payments
to landowners are concerned. The Rules are framed under
Section 9 of the National Highways Act, 1956 and the Statute
clearly states that the Rules are to be formulated regarding
deposit of compensation amount and does not provide for any
automatic stay of disbursement. In the aforesaid judgment,
unamended Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
has been quoted without adhering to the bar created in view
of proviso to Section 36(3) of the Act. Section 3G(6) of the
National Highways Act clearly states that subject to the
provisions of this Act, provisions of Arbitration and Conciliation
Act shall apply to every arbitration under this Act. Once the
matter has been decided by the Arbitrator and the award has
been passed, it becomes a decree to be enforced by the
executing Court after following procedure as mentioned under
Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions of National Highways
Act shall not govern the proceedings once the award has
been passed. Rule itself makes it clear that the same is
internal arrangement of the Central Government/Highway
Authority and the competent authority only for making the
36 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 37
funds available to the land owners. 2019 Rules talks about the
national highway manner of depositing the amount by the
Central Government making requisite funds available to the
competent authority for acquisition of land.
[39]. Since in Ram Awadh's case (supra), unamended
Section 36 of the Act has been relied, therefore, the same is
distinguishable on the facts of present case and in view of
interpretation of Rules of 2019.
[40]. In view of Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. Vs.
Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. and others, AIR 2017 SC
2017 SC 2105 it can be appreciated that once the seat of
arbitration has been fixed, it would be in the nature of an
exclusive jurisdiction clause as to the Court which exercises
supervisory power over the arbitration. A conspectus of all the
aforesaid provisions shows that the moment the seat is
designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause.
[41]. In the present case, the seat of the Arbitration was
designated at Faridkot and therefore, the jurisdiction
exclusively vests in the Court at Faridkot. Under the law of
arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to
suits filed in Courts, a reference to "seat" is a concept by
which a neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to an
arbitration clause. The neutral venue may not in the classical
sense have jurisdiction i.e. no part of the cause of action may
37 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 38
have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the
provisions of Sections 16 to 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure
be attracted. In arbitration law however, as has been held
above, the moment "seat" is determined, the fact that the seat
is at Faridkot would vest Faridkot Court with exclusive
jurisdiction for the purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings
arising out of the agreement between the parties.
[42]. It is well settled that where more than one Court
has jurisdiction, it is open for the parties to exclude all other
Courts. For an exhaustive analysis, ratio laid down in Swastik
Gases Private Limited Vs. Indian Oil Corporation Limited.
(2013) 9 SCC 32 can be relied and this view was followed in
later judgment i.e. B.E. Simoese Von StaraburgNiedenthal
Vs. Chhatisgarh Investment Limited, (2015) 12 SCC 225.
[43]. Having regard to the aforesaid case laws, it can be
held that the Court at Faridkot has the exclusive jurisdiction to
the exclusion of other Courts in the country as juridical seat of
the arbitration was fixed at Faridkot.
[44]. Taking into consideration the totality of facts and
circumstances of the case, I am of the considered view that
the seat of the Arbitrator was fixed at Faridkot and the
execution proceedings are maintainable in the Court at
Faridkot. Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
38 of 39
CR No.259 of 2022, CR No.831 of 2022, CR Nos.3150, 3153, 3155, 3164 of 2021 (O&M) 39
1996 has no application. The award has to be executed in the
Principal Civil Court at Faridkot.
[45]. Having considered the totality of facts and
circumstances of the case, I do not find any substance in the
present civil revision petitions and the same are accordingly
dismissed.
(RAJ MOHAN SINGH)
JUDGE
30.09.2022
Prince
Whether reasoned/speaking Yes/No
Whether reportable Yes/No
39 of 39
