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State Of Punjab vs Makhan Lal Jindal And Another
2022 Latest Caselaw 10603 P&H

Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 10603 P&H
Judgement Date : 7 September, 2022

Punjab-Haryana High Court
State Of Punjab vs Makhan Lal Jindal And Another on 7 September, 2022
          IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                       AT CHANDIGARH

                                               FAO-CARB-29-2022 (O&M)
                                               Date of decision : 07.09.2022
STATE OF PUNJAB
                                                               ..... APPELLANT
                                        VS

MAKHAN LAL AND ANR.
                                                           ..... RESPONDENTS

CORAM : HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH
        HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE ALOK JAIN

Present :-   Mr. Vikas Mohan Gupta, Additional Advocate General, Punjab.

                   ***

AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH, J. (Oral)

CM-82-FCARB-2022

This is an application for exemption from filing certified/true typed

copies of objection petition filed before Ld. Additional District Judge, Patiala

and award dated 25.08.2018 (Annexure A/1).

Application is allowed as prayed for and filing of certified/true typed

copies of objection petition and award dated 25.08.2018 is dispensed with.

Annexure A/1 is taken on record subject to just all exemption.

CM-83-FCARB-2022 in/and FAO-CARB-29-2022

Prayer in this application for condonation of delay of 112 in filing the

appeal.

The reason, which has been assigned for delay of 112 days in filing the

appeal, is primarily procedural where from one department to the other, the

file has been shuffling for approval.

The said explanation is not acceptable as the period utilized beyond the

period as has been prescribed under the Limitation Act, has to be explained on

day to day basis which is missing in the present case. Thus, we do not find

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FAO-CARB-29-2022 (O&M) -2-

any ground for accepting the present application.

On merits also, the order which is impugned in the present appeal

dated 17.02.2022 allowing the application of respondent No.1 for dismissal of

the objection petition filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 by the appellant being barred by limitation, has been

accepted. The plea, which had been taken by the appellant before the trial

Court, was that the limitation of 90 days expired on 24.11.2018. Thirty days

more have been granted in case there is any explanation put forth for the delay

in filing the appeal. These thirty days expired on 24.12.2018. Since the

Courts were closed for the winter break from 22.12.2018 till 01.01.2019, the

objection petition had been filed immediately on opening i.e. 02.01.2019 and

therefore, in the light of the provisions, as contained under Section 34 (3) of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 the objection petition was within

time and it could not be rejected on the ground of being beyond the period of

limitation.

This contention has not been accepted by the trial Court in the light of

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as "Assam Urban Water

Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Subash Projects and Marketing Ltd."

(2012) 2 SCC, 624, where on similar facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

referring to the same had, in para 13 and 14 while dealing with Section 4 of

the Limitation Act, held as follows:

"(13) The above Section enables a party to institute a suit, prefer

an appeal or make an application on the day court reopens

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FAO-CARB-29-2022 (O&M) -3-

where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or application

expires on the day when the court is closed. The crucial words in

Section of the 1963 Act are 'prescribed period'. What is the

meaning of these words?

Section 2 (j) of the 1963 Act defines 'period of limitation'

which means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit,

appeal or application by the Schedule, and 'prescribed period'

means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the

provisions of this Act.

Section 2 (j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of

Section 34 (3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the

prescribed period for making an application for setting aside

arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned

in proviso that follows sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996

Act is not the 'period of limitation' and, therefore, not 'prescribed

period' for the purposes of making the application for setting

aside the arbitral award. The period of 30 days beyond three

months which the court may extend on sufficient cause being

shown under the proviso appended to Sub-section (3) of Section

34 of the 1996 Act being not the 'period of limitation' or, in other

words, 'prescribed period', in our opinion, Section 4 of the 1963

Act is not, at all, attracted to the facts of the present case.

(14) Seen thus, the applications made by the appellants on

January 2, 2004, for setting aside the arbitral award dated

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FAO-CARB-29-2022 (O&M) -4-

August 26, 2003 were liable to be dismissed and have rightly

been dismissed by the District Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati, as time

barred."

The appeal, therefore, cannot survive in the light of the above.

An Argument has been sought to be raised by the learned counsel for

the appellant relying upon the provisions of Section 10 of the General Clauses

Act to contend that the limitation would not expire if the Court is closed on

the date when the prescribed period comes to an end, the limitation would be

deemed to be the date till the date the Court opens. If the case, application is

filed on the date of opening of the Court, the same shall be within limitation.

The said plea also cannot be accepted in the light of the judgment of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled as "Sagufa Ahmed and Ors. vs. Upper

Assam Polywood Products Private Limited and Ors." (2021) 2 SCC, 317,

wherein it has been held that the period of appeal cannot be extended and the

prescribed period would be the one which is specifically mentioned without

including the extension period, if permissible. In other words, any period

beyond the prescribed period during which the Court/Tribunal has discretion

to allow a person to institute proceedings, cannot be taken as prescribed

period.

In the light of the above two judgments even on merits, the appeal

cannot survive and therefore, the same stands dismissed both on the grounds

of it being barred by limitation and on merits as well.

4 of 5

CM-84-FCARB-2022

In view of the dismissal of the main case, the present application for

stay does not survive and thus, the same stands dismissed.

(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH) JUDGE

(ALOK JAIN) JUDGE

07.09.2022 manju

Whether speaking/reasoned Yes/No

Whether Reportable Yes/No

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