Siddharth Sangwan vs State Of Haryana
2022 Latest Caselaw 7616 P&H

                                 (1)            CRM-M-25453-2019 (O&M)

         IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
                    AT CHANDIGARH

                                             CRM-M-25453-2019 (O&M)
                                             Date of Decision:-25.7.2022

SIDDHARTH SANGWAN
                                                                ... Petitioner
                                 Versus
STATE OF HARYANA
                                                               ... Respondent


                         *****


CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KARAMJIT SINGH

                         *****

Argued by :-

            Mr. Gurmandeep Singh Sullar, Advocate
            for the petitioner.

            Ms. Harpreet Kaur, AAG, Haryana.

                         *****

KARAMJIT SINGH, J.

Petitioner/accused has filed this petition seeking quashing of

FIR No.156 dated 7.3.2018 registered under Section 406/34 IPC at Police

Station Suraj Kund, Faridabad (Haryana).

Notice of motion was issued and reply by way of an affidavit of

Mr. Rajiv Kumar, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Suraj Kund, Faridabad

was filed on behalf of the State and the same has been taken on record.

The counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner was

employee of Hindustan Wellness 107, First Floor, Sector-44, Gurugram

1 of 9

(2) CRM-M-25453-2019 (O&M)

(clinical laboratory). In the impugned FIR, which was registered at the

instance of complainant-Nagendra Singhal, it was alleged that the lab

technician of said clinical laboratory went to the house of the complainant in

the morning, to collect his blood-sample for testing, for which, the

complainant paid charges worth `1,299/- against invoice No.92495 dated

10.2.2018 but the clinical laboratory failed to provide report of his blood-

sample to the complainant.

The counsel for the petitioner further contended that there is no

denying the fact that on 10.2.2018, blood-sample of the complainant was

taken for testing, for which he was charged `1,299/- against proper receipt.

The counsel for the petitioner further contended that when the said blood

sample was sent for its analysis, it was found to be clotted and as such the

said blood-sample was unfit for testing and due to the same reason no report

regarding aforesaid blood-test was prepared by the concerned doctor. The

counsel for the petitioner further contended that impugned FIR itself

suggests that at that time the present petitioner was working as a CEO of the

said clinical laboratory. The counsel for the petitioner further contended

that the aforesaid blood-sample was not personally collected by the

petitioner and he was not responsible for its preservence. The counsel for

the petitioner further contended that there was no mala-fide or dishonest

intention on the part of the petitioner as it was not his duty to collect,

preserve or to analyse the blood-sample in question. The counsel for the

petitioner further contended that the blood sample of the complainant may

have been damaged due to negligence of the person who collected the said

sample or for want of care after its collection. The counsel for the petitioner

2 of 9

(3) CRM-M-25453-2019 (O&M)

further contended that the petitioner cannot be held liable for the same on

the criminal side. The counsel for the petitioner further contended that even

admitting what has been mentioned in the FIR, this case should not come

within the purview of criminal proceeding as the entire allegations even if

admitted to be correct amounts to deficiency of service on the part of clinical

laboratory and no offence under Section 406 IPC is made out against the

petitioner.

On the other hand the State counsel submits that after

completion of investigation, the police presented challan under Section 406

IPC against the petitioner and his co-accused. She further submits that the

trial Court after hearing both the parties framed charges under Section 406

IPC and now the trial is under progress. The State counsel further submits

as the trial is going on, at this stage, no ground is made out to interfere in the

matter under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The State counsel further submits that

specific allegations are recorded against the petitioner in the FIR and that the

trial Court rightly framed charges under Section 406 IPC against the

petitioner and other accused persons. The State counsel further submits that

no ground for interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is called for.

I have considered the submissions made by the counsel for the

parties.

One of the ground the State counsel has taken while opposing

the prayer is that the case has proceeded and after framing of charges, some

of prosecution witnesses have also been examined. As per the State counsel,

since trial has proceeded, the FIR in question cannot be quashed. However,

the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Anand Mahatta vs. State (NCT of

3 of 9

(4) CRM-M-25453-2019 (O&M)

Delhi) (2019)11 SCC 706, has held that inherent power of the High Court to

quash the proceedings can be exercised even after the charge-sheet is filed.

So now it is well-settled that FIR can be quashed at any stage of the

proceedings, by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section

482 Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of process of law.

FIR in the instant case was registered on the basis of the

complaint lodged by the complainant-Nagendra Singhal, in which he alleged

that he gave his blood-sample for testing to the aforesaid clinical laboratory

against the payment of `1,299/-, but the clinical laboratory failed to provide

him the report with regard to his blood sample. Consequently, the police

registered impugned FIR under Section 406 IPC against the present

petitioner and one Rakesh Kumar Maurya. As per the allegations in the FIR,

the present petitioner at that time was working as a CEO of the clinical

laboratory while Rakesh Kumar Maurya collected the blood-sample of the

complainant.

The relevant statutory provisions describing criminal

misappropriation of property and criminal breach of trust are as follows:-

Section 403 IPC:- Dishonest misappropriation of property.--

Whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use

any movable property, shall be punished with imprisonment of

either description for a term which may extend to two years, or

with fine, or with both.

Section 405 IPC:- Criminal breach of trust.--Whoever, being in

any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over

property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use

that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in

4 of 9

(5) CRM-M-25453-2019 (O&M)

violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which

such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or

implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust,

or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal

breach of trust"

Explanation [1].--A person, being an employer 3[of an

establishment whether exempted under section 17 of the

Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous

Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), or not] who deducts

the employee's contribution from the wages payable to the

employee for credit to a Provident Fund or Family

Pension Fund established by any law for the time being in

force, shall be deemed to have been entrusted with the

amount of the contribution so deducted by him and if he

makes default in the payment of such contribution to the

said Fund in violation of the said law, shall be deemed to

have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution

in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.

Explanation 2.--A person, being an employer, who

deducts the employees' contribution from the wages

payable to the employee for credit to the Employees' State

Insurance Fund held and administered by the Employees'

State Insurance Corporation established under the

Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), shall

be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of the

contribution so deducted by him and if he makes default

in the payment of such contribution to the said Fund in

violation of the said Act, shall be deemed to have

dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution in

violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.

                           5 of 9

                                       (6)                   CRM-M-25453-2019 (O&M)

Section 406 IPC:- Punishment for criminal breach of trust.--

Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend

to three years, or with fine, or with both.

A careful reading of the Section 405 IPC shows that a criminal

breach of trust involves the following ingredients:-

(a) a person should have been entrusted with property, or

entrusted with dominion over property;

(b) that person should dishonestly misappropriate or

convert to his own use that property, or dishonestly use

or dispose of that property or willfully suffer any other

person to do so;

(c) that such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal

should be in violation of any direction of law

prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be

discharged, or of any legal contract which the person

has made, touching the discharge of such trust.

Now adverting to the facts of the present case. It appears that

the complainant handed over (entrusted) his blood-sample to the clinical

laboratory i.e. Hindustan Wellness, 107, First Floor, Sector 44, Gurugram for

the purpose of testing. However, after the collection of the said blood-

sample, the same got clotted and as such became unfit for testing and

resultantly, it was not analyzed and consequently the clinical laboratory

failed to provide any report of blood test to the complainant. In the given

circumstances, it cannot be said that the aforesaid blood-sample of the

complainant was misappropriated or converted to his own use by the

petitioner. The blood-sample of the complainant was not personally

6 of 9

(7) CRM-M-25453-2019 (O&M)

collected by the petitioner and even thereafter was not handled in any

manner by him. Further it cannot be said that the blood-sample of the

complainant was damaged or clotted due to malicious or mala fide intention

of the petitioner. Further there is nothing on the record to prima facie

establish that the aforesaid blood-sample was dishonestly used or disposed

of by the petitioner or by some other person at his instance.

A perusal of the penal statutory provisions, which are

reproduced above show that there has to be dishonest misappropriation or

conversion of the entrusted property by the accused. In the present case, as

has already been discussed earlier, the petitioner was having no such

dishonest or mala fide intention to misappropriate or convert the blood-

sample of the complainant. Thus, there leaves no manner of doubt in the

mind of the Court that even if the allegations levelled in the FIR are

accepted at their face value, even then the allegations do not constitute

commission of any offence against the petitioner, leave alone offence under

Section 406 IPC.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in State of Haryana and

Ors. vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and Ors. 1991(1) RCR Criminal 383 culled out

certain categories of cases by way of illustrations wherein power under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the inherent power under Section

482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised either to prevent abuse of process of the Court

or otherwise to secure ends of justice. A relevant extract from the said

judgment reads as follows:-

"In the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following categories of cases are given by way of

7 of 9

(8) CRM-M-25453-2019 (O&M)

illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:

(a) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused;

(b) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code;

(c) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused;

d) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code;

(e) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(f) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned

8 of 9

(9) CRM-M-25453-2019 (O&M)

Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party;

(g) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala-fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

As a sequel to above discussion, this Court feels that the present

case falls under (a) and (c) categories set out in State of Haryana and

others's case (supra) as has been reproduced above. Thus in the instant

case, the continuance of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner

would be nothing but an abuse of the process of Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed and FIR

No.156 dated 7.3.2018 registered under Section 406/34 IPC at Police Station

Suraj Kund, Faridabad (Haryana) and all the subsequent proceedings arising

therefrom are hereby quashed qua the petitioner.

                                                       ( KARAMJIT SINGH)
25.7.2022                                                   JUDGE
Gaurav Sorot/Paritosh Kumar




                                 Whether reasoned / speaking?        Yes / No

                                 Whether reportable?                 Yes / No




                                                  9 of 9