Punjab-Haryana High Court
Gurmeet Singh And Others vs State Of Punjab And Others on 11 July, 2022
CRM-M No. 10634-2020 --1--
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CRM-M No. 10634-2020
Reserved on 27.04.2022
Pronounced on : July 11, 2022
Gurmeet Singh and others ......Petitioners
Vs.
State of Punjab and others ......Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA
Present: Mr.G.S. Sirphikhi, Advocate for the petitioners
Mr. H.S. Multani, AAG, Punjab
Mr. Vishal Sodhi, Advocate for respondents No.2 and 3.
***
ANOOP CHITKARA J.
FIR No. Dated Police Station Sections
78 27.06.2019 Sri Hargobindpur, Police 451/354/323/149 IPC
District Batala
The petitioners, arraigned as accused in the above captioned FIR, have come up before
this Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings
based on the compromise with the aggrieved person.
2. During the pendency of the petition, the accused and the aggrieved person have com-
promised the matter, and its copy is annexed with this petition as Annexure P-2.
3. After that, the petitioner came up before this Court to quash the FIR, and in the quash-
ing petition, impleading the aggrieved person as respondent.
4. On 8-4-2022, the aggrieved persons Maninder Kaur (R-2) and Amanpreet Singh (R-3)
stated before the JMIC Batala and stated that there would be no objection if the court
quashes this FIR and consequent proceedings. As per the concerned court's report dated
16-04-2022, the parties consented to the quashing of FIR and consequent proceedings with-
out any threat.
1 of 7
CRM-M No. 10634-2020 --2--
ANALYSIS & REASONING:
5. Despite the severe opposition of the State's counsel to this compromise, the following
aspects would be relevant to conclude this petition: -
a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably settled the matter be-
tween them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded before the
concerned Court;
b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the settlement has not been secured
through coercion, threats, social boycotts, bribes, or other dubious means;
c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal pro-
ceedings;
d) There is no objection from the private respondent in case present FIR and conse-
quent proceedings are quashed;
e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or tranquillity,
moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or involve matters
concerning public policy;
f) The rejection of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial affects
career and happiness;
g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an unscru-
pulous, incorrigible, or professional offender;
h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work to
bring peace to family, community, and society;
i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequential pro-
ceedings is justified to secure the ends of justice.
6. In the present case, the offence under sections 354, 148, & 149 of Indian Penal Code,
1860 (IPC) are not compoundable under Section 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
(CrPC. However, in the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the prosecution qua the
non-compoundable offences can be closed by quashing the FIR and consequent proceedings.
7. In Bharti v. State of Haryana, 2014(4) SCC 14, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
[6]. We are mindful of the fact that Section 354 of the IPC is, as of
today, non-compoundable. But, as noticed by us, it was compound-
able when the instant offence was committed with the permission
of the court. Even then, we would have hesitated to permit com-
pounding of the offence. But, facts of this case are very peculiar. Re-
spondent No.2 and her husband have, even today, maintained their
stand taken in the trial court that they have entered into a compro-
mise with the appellant. As we have already noted, respondent No.2
has filed an affidavit to that effect in this Court. Compromise is,
therefore, not an afterthought. Pertinently, the incident in question
took-place way back in the year 2000. About 13 long years have
2 of 7
CRM-M No. 10634-2020 --3--
gone-by. In her affidavit respondent No. 2 has stated that the appel-
lant is her neighbour and they are staying peacefully since 2000 till
date. We are of the opinion that since the appellant and respondent
No. 2 are neighbours it would be in the interest of justice to permit
the parties to compound the offences. If the conviction is con-
firmed, the relations may get strained and the peace, which is now
prevailing between the two families, may be disturbed. In the pecu-
liar facts of this case, therefore, in order to accord quietus to the
disputes between the appellant and respondent No. 2 and in the
larger interest of peace, we permit the appellant and respondent
No. 2 to compound the offences. Accordingly, offences under Sec-
tions 451 and 354 of the IPC are permitted to be compounded. The
impugned judgment is set aside. The appellant is acquitted...
8. In Shiji @ Pappu v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
[13]. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not compound-
able under Section 320 Indian Penal Code is by itself no reason for
the High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482
Criminal Procedure Code That power can in our opinion be exer-
cised in cases where there is no chance of recording a conviction
against the accused and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to
be an exercise in futility. There is a subtle distinction between com-
pounding of offences by the parties before the trial Court or in ap-
peal on one hand and the exercise of power by the High Court to
quash the prosecution under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code
on the other. While a Court trying an accused or hearing an appeal
against conviction, may not be competent to permit compounding
of an offence based on a settlement arrived at between the parties
in cases where the offences are not compoundable under Section
320, the High Court may quash the prosecution even in cases where
the offences with which the accused stand charged are non-
compoundable. The inherent powers of the High Court under Sec-
tion 482 Criminal Procedure Code are not for that purpose con-
trolled by Section 320 Criminal Procedure Code Having said so, we
must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section
482 Criminal Procedure Code by itself, makes it obligatory for the
High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The
width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is
sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be
recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution
would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither
necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which
the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that
we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing
the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that
power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High court
may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to ap-
preciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court
while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to con-
sider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine
whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be in-
voked.
3 of 7
CRM-M No. 10634-2020 --4--
9. In Parbatbhai Aahir v State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, a three Judges Bench of
Hon'ble Supreme Court, laid down the broad principles for quashing of FIR, which are repro-
duced as follows: -
[16]. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the
subject, may be summarized in the following propositions:
16 (i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court
to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the
ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only
recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
16 (ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a
First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that
a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the vic-
tim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose
of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the
power of the court is governed by the provisions of section 320 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under
Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16 (iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or com-
plaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section
482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice
would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
16 (iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit
and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice
or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
16 (v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information
Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and vic-
tim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of princi-
ples can be formulated;
16 (vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court
must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Hei-
nous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences
such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed
though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dis-
pute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but
have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with
the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public
interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16 (vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be crimi-
nal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a
civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise
of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
16 (viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commer-
cial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an
essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quash-
ing where parties have settled the dispute;
16 (ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal pro-
ceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the
possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a crimi-
nal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16 (x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in proposi-
tions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial
4 of 7
CRM-M No. 10634-2020 --5--
and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie
beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants.
The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the
offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic
fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of
upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.
10. In Ramgopal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Cr.A 1489 of 2012, decided on
29.09.2021, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds,
[11]. True it is that offences which are 'non-compoundable' cannot
be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its
powers under Section 320 Cr.P.C. Any such attempt by the court
would amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section
320 Cr.P.C, which is the exclusive domain of Legislature. There is no
patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Section 320 Cr.P.C.,
which may justify its wider interpretation and include such offences
in the docket of 'compoundable' offences which have been con-
sciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the limited
jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework of Sec-
tion 320 Cr.P.C. is not an embargo against invoking inherent powers
by the High Court vested in it under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High
Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of a case
and for justifiable reasons can press Section 482 Cr.P.C. in aid to
prevent abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends
of justice.
[12]. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the
offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their dispute
and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification of criminal
proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., even if the offences are non-
compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate the conse-
quential effects of the offence beyond the body of an individual and
thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure that the felony,
even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or paralyze the very
object of the administration of criminal justice system.
[13]. It appears to us those criminal proceedings involving non-
heinous offences or where the offences are predominantly of a pri-
vate nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial has al-
ready been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against convic-
tion. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of delivering jus-
tice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is always subject to
lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that the cases where
compromise is struck postconviction, the High Court ought to exer-
cise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in view the circum-
stances surrounding the incident, the fashion in which the compro-
mise has been arrived at, and with due regard to the nature and se-
riousness of the offence, besides the conduct of the accused, before
and after the incidence. The touchstone for exercising the extraor-
dinary power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be to secure the ends
of justice. There can be no hard and fast line constricting the power
of the High Court to do substantial justice. A restrictive construction
of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may lead to rigid or
specious justice, which in the given facts and circumstances of a
case, may rather lead to grave injustice. On the other hand, in cases
where heinous offences have been proved against perpetrators, no
5 of 7
CRM-M No. 10634-2020 --6--
such benefit ought to be extended, as cautiously observed by this
Court in Narinder Singh &Ors. vs. State of Punjab &Ors. [(2014) 6
SCC 466, ¶ 29], and Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688, ¶ 15].
[14]. In other words, grave or serious offences or offences which in-
volve moral turpitude or have a harmful effect on the social and
moral fabric of the society or involve matters concerning public pol-
icy, cannot be construed between two individuals or groups only, for
such offences have the potential to impact the society at large. Ef-
facing abominable offences through quashing process would not
only send a wrong signal to the community but may also accord an
undue benefit to unscrupulous habitual or professional offenders,
who can secure a 'settlement' through duress, threats, social boy-
cotts, bribes or other dubious means. It is well said that "let no
guilty man escape, if it can be avoided."
11. In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642, Hon'ble Su-
preme Court observed that the finest hour of Justice arises propitiously when parties, who
fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion.
12. In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of compro-
mise, placement of parties, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents of the com-
promise deed and its objectives point towards its acceptance.
13. In Himachal Pradesh Cricket Association v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018 (4) Crimes
324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is
concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only be-
cause of the reason that matter was already pending as the appellants had filed the Special
Leave Petitions against the order of the High Court rejecting their petition for quashing of the
FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ petition has also been enter-
tained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would
automatically stands vitiated."
14. Considering the entire facts, compromise, and in the light of the above-mentioned judi-
cial precedents, I believe that continuing these proceedings will not suffice any fruitful pur-
pose whatsoever.
15. Given the nature of allegations and the other circumstances peculiar to this case, the
petitioner/accused shall surrender all weapons, firearms, ammunition, if any, and the arms
license to the concerned authority within 30 days from today and inform the Investigator
about the compliance. However, if the concerned Superintendent of Police gives written
permission to arrive at such a decision to retain the firearms and license, then this condition
shall not be applicable.
6 of 7
CRM-M No. 10634-2020 --7--
16. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the inherent ju-
risdiction under section 482 CrPC and quashes the FIR and all subsequent proceedingsqua
the petitioner(s). The bail bonds of the petitioner are accordingly discharged. All pending ap-
plication(s), if any, stand closed.
Petition allowed in the terms mentioned above.
(ANOOP CHITKARA)
JUDGE
July 11, 2022
sonia arora
Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes
Whether reportable: No.
7 of 7
