Punjab-Haryana High Court
Estate Office, Huda vs Rajwanti on 19 December, 2022
RSA-3091-1994(O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
RSA-3091-1994(O&M)
Date of decision:-19.12.2022
Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority, Karnal and
others
...Appellants
Versus
Rajwanti Devi and others
...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE H.S.MADAAN
Present: Mr.Deepak Sabharwal, Advocate
for the appellants.
Mr.Sachin Mittal, Advocate
for the respondents.
****
H.S. MADAAN, J.
1. In nutshell, the facts of the case are that plaintiff
Rajwanti Devi widow, Om Parkash Mittal and Rattan Lal Mittal -
sons of Sh.Gita Ram Mittal had brought a suit for declaration and
permanent injunction against defendants i.e. Estate Officer, Haryana
Urban Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as HUDA),
Karnal, Chairman, HUDA, Chandigarh, Chief Administrator,
HUDA, Faridabad and Dr.Ram Bilas Mittal son of Sh.Gita Ram
Mittal.
2. As per the case of the plaintiffs, Sh.Gita Ram Mittal
predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs and defendant No.4, was allotted
1 of 10
RSA-3091-1994(O&M) -2-
a plot bearing No.1054 in Sector 13, Urban Estate, Karnal vide office
letter No.1338 dated 13.3.1974; he had made the entire payment of
the plot and nothing remained due; the demand notice was also
received at the address at Hissar beginning from the year 1975 and
going up to 12.3.1980; in July 1980 Sh.Gita Ram Mittal had suffered
an attack of paralysis, as such he shifted to Jind, however, defendant
No.1 - Estate Officer, HUDA, Karnal had been intimated regarding
change of address of Sh.Gita Ram Mittal; Sh.Gita Ram Mittal
however died on 18.2.1982 at Jind; the plaintiffs and defendant No.4
being LRs of Sh.Gita Ram Mittal had no intimation that any
outstanding dues were there against the plot in question since they
had not received any notice of demand; in February 1986 when the
plaintiffs went to Narnaund to clean the house, they found some
papers lying there with regard to allotment of plot in question; the
plaintiffs No.2 and 3 went to Karnal and made inquiries, which
revealed that the plot had been resumed by defendant No.1, since the
enhanced price was not paid by the plaintiffs despite alleged issuance
of many notices; the plaintiffs came to know that allotment had been
cancelled and plot had been resumed; the plaintiffs had then
preferred an appeal before Chief Administrator, HUDA, Faridabad
on 3.3.1986, which was declined on 5.8.1986; the plaintiffs had
applied for supply of copy of resumption order but it was not given
to them. Terming the act of resumption of the plot as illegal, null and
2 of 10
RSA-3091-1994(O&M) -3-
void ineffective qua the rights of the plaintiffs and defendant No.4,
the plaintiffs had brought the suit in question.
3. On getting notice, defendants No.1 to 3 filed a joint
written statement contesting the suit raising preliminary objections
that suit was not maintainable in the present form; no cause of action
arose to the plaintiff to bring the suit; the Civil Court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit; the suit was time bared; suit
was liable to be dismissed for want of notice under the provisions of
HUDA Act and CPC. On merits, the answering defendants submitted
that deceased allottee Sh.Gita Ram Mittal was required to deposit the
regular annual installments as per the terms and conditions of the
allotment letter, though the installments had been deposited by the
allottee but subsequently a huge amount became outstanding on
account of additional price and levy of other charges, against the
allottee. Refuting the remaining assertions, the defendants prayed for
dismissal of the suit.
4. The plaintiffs had filed replication to the written
statement controverting the allegations in the written statement
whereas reiterating the averments in the plaint.
5. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were
framed:
1. Whether the plaintiff and defendant No.4 are the legal heirs
and intermeddlers of the estate of Sh.Gita Ram Mittal
3 of 10
RSA-3091-1994(O&M) -4-
(deceased) OPP.
2. Whether Shri Geeta Ram was allotted one plot as mentioned in
para No.2 of the plaint? OPP.
3. Whether the entire payment of the said plot has been duly
made by the late Sh.Gita Ram if so, to what effect? OPP.
4. Whether no letter was received at Jind address at Narnaud or
any letter was redirected at Jind given address in the plaint?
OPP.
5. Whether the act of resumption of the above said plot is illegal,
ultra-vires, void and not binding upon the plaintiffs and
defendant No.4 on the grounds mentioned in the plaint? OPP.
6. Relief.
6. Both the parties were afforded adequate opportunities to
lead their evidence.
7. During the course of evidence of plaintiffs, they
examined Sh.Harnarayan as PW1, Sh.Ram Niwas Garg as PW2 and
Sh.Om Parkash as PW3. They relied upon documents Ex.P1 to
Ex.P8.
8. In rebuttal, defendants examined two witnesses and
tendered in evidence documents Ex.D1 to Ex.D33.
9. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the trial
Court decided issue No.1 in favour of the plaintiffs against
defendants No.1 to 3, issue No.2 was decided in favour of the
4 of 10
RSA-3091-1994(O&M) -5-
plaintiff and against defendants No.1 to 3, issues No.3, 4 and 5 were
decided against the plaintiffs and in favour of defendants No.1, 2 and
3.
Resultantly vide judgment and decree dated 26.11.1990
the suit of the plaintiffs was dismissed with costs by the trial Court.
10. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the
plaintiffs had filed an appeal in the Court of District Judge, Karnal,
which was assigned to Additional District Judge, Karnal, who vide
judgment and decree dated 21.5.1994 accepted the appeal, set aside
the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and decreed the
suit of the plaintiffs declaring the resumption of plot and subsequent
order in appeal passed by respondent No.3 as illegal, null and void
not binding upon the rights of the plaintiffs and defendant No.4 in
respect of the plot in question holding that they are deemed to be
allottees of the plot.
11. Being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed
by Additional District Judge, Karnal, the defendants have filed the
present regular second appeal before this Court, notice of which was
issued to the respondents, who put in appearance through counsel.
12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties besides going
through the record.
13. I find that the judgment and decree passed by the trial
Court were rightly set aside by learned Additional District Judge,
5 of 10
RSA-3091-1994(O&M) -6-
Karnal since the trial Court had misappraised the evidence and
wrongly interpreted the law, justifying the resumption of plot by
HUDA on account of non-payment of the additional fees etc.
Learned Additional District Judge, Karnala has adopted a judicious
approach by properly analysing the evidence and correctly
interpreting the law on the subject.
14. Here it may be mentioned that Sh.Gita Ram Mittal being
allottee of plot No.889 measuring 14 marla in Sector 13 Urban Estate
Karnal, which was later on renumbered as plot No.1054 stands
established on the record. It is also established on the file that Sh.Gita
Ram Mittal had expired and plaintiffs and defendant No.4 are his
legal heirs. The case of the plaintiffs is that Sh.Gita Ram Mittal, who
was retired Headmaster on account of old age and ill health had
shifted to Jind and he had intimated defendant No.1, Estate Officer,
HUDA, Karnal in that regard. According to plaintiffs, the entire
installments with regard to price of the plot in question had been paid
by Sh.Gita Ram Mittal and nothing remained due, whereas the
version of the defendants is that a considerable amount towards
additional cost was payable by Sh.Gita Ram Mittal, which, he did not
pay despite repeated demands, as such the plot was resumed.
15. Learned Additional District Judge, Karnal referred to
Section 42 of Haryana Urban Development Authority Act, 1977,
which provides mode of service of notice. The relevant portion of
6 of 10
RSA-3091-1994(O&M) -7-
this Section for ready reference is being reproduced as under:
"Service of notice etc.-(1) all notices
(d) in any other case, if the document is addressed to the
person to be served and
(i) is given or tendered to him ;or
(ii)is sent by registered post to the person; or
(iii)if such person cannot be found, is affixed on some
conspicuous part of his last known place of residence or
.business, if within an urban area or is given or tendered
to some adult member of his family or is affixed on some
conspicuous part of the land or building to which it
relates."
16. It has been found that in the instant case no such mode of
service of notice was adopted by respondents, rather respondents
No.1 to 3 served notice on the allottee through public notice Ex.D21
published in the newspaper, copy of which being Ex.D30. When
such mode of service is no where provided in Section 42 of the Act,
therefore such service cannot be said to be due service. While saying
so, learned Additional District Judge, Karnal had relied upon
judgments Sarup Singh Versus Angrez Singh, 1972 PLJ 443 and
Bachittar Singh Versus Harnam Singh 1972 RLR 24. Learned First
Appellate Court has also come to the conclusion that allottee Sh.Gita
Ram Mittal was not informed about enhanced price payable by him
since the original price stood already paid and in absence of any
intimation enhanced price could not possibly be paid by the allottee
7 of 10
RSA-3091-1994(O&M) -8-
to HUDA. It has further been observed in para No.13 that Section 17
of the Act provide mode of resumption and forfeiture for breach of
conditions of transfer and as per Sub-Section 4 of Section 17, the
Estate Officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, make an
order resuming the land or building or both, as the case may be after
giving the transferee a reasonable opportunity of being heard and he
may forfeit whole or any part of the money paid in respect of a sale
and in the present case no order in writing for resumption of the plot
in question had been passed by the Estate Officer and the plot in
question has been resumed only on the basis of public notice. DW1
Ashwani Kumar, Clerk, HUDA, Karnal in his cross-examination had
stated that there was no resumption order available on the file and no
separate order of resumption of the plot in question was passed. DW2
Sohan Lal Sharma, Head Clerk, HUDA had stated that he did not
know whether there was resumption order in the office or not and
only publication in the newspaper had been made; further under
Section 17 of the Act, there is no provision for resumption of plot by
publication in newspaper or by issuing public notice and the Estate
Officer was required to pass resumption order after recording reasons
in writing. Therefore, in absence of the resumption order, it could not
be said that the plot in question had been resumed legally and
validly. The First Appellate Court referring to judgment D.N.
Kejriwal Versus The State of Haryana & Others 1987 PLJ, 532 had
8 of 10
RSA-3091-1994(O&M) -9-
observed that the power of resumption of plot should be used with
great caution and circumspection and it must be a weapon of last
resort. It was observed by the First Appellate Court that what to talk
of taking reasonable care and caution, even no formal order of
resumption has been passed by the Estate Officer, HUDA and the
plot in question has been resumed merely by issuing public notice
through publication in the newspaper only, which is not warranted by
law. Another judgment by Full Bench of this Court i.e. Shri Ram
Puri Versus The Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh 1982 PLR 388
has also been referred to.
17. With regard to the objection by learned counsel for the
respondents that plaintiffs had already availed of the remedy of
appeal against resumption order provided under the Act, which had
been dismissed and further jurisdiction of the Civil Court in that
regard is barred, the learned First Appellate Court has dealt with
those contentions in a proper and effective manner observing that
resumption of plot had been made by respondents No.1 to 3 in
violation of mandatory provisions of the Act, therefore dismissal of
appeal by the Appellate Authority cannot cure the initial defect and
the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred if the resumption of
plot is violative of the provisions of the Act. Reliance was placed
upon M/s G.M. Worsted Spinning Mills (P) Ltd. Faridabad Versus
Haryana Urban Development Authority & Other 1994(1) PLR 268
9 of 10
RSA-3091-1994(O&M) -10-
wherein it was observed that when order of resumption having been
passed in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 17 of the
Act, in that eventuality the jurisdiction of Civil Court is not excluded.
18. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the present appeal
and do not see any reason to disturb the legal, valid and well
reasoned judgment passed by the Additional District Judge, Karnal.
19. No substantial question of law or fact arises in this
appeal.
20. The appeal stands dismissed accordingly.
Since the main appeal stands dismissed, the
miscellaneous application(s), if any, stand disposed of accordingly.
19.12.2022 (H.S.MADAAN)
Brij JUDGE
Whether reasoned/speaking: Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
10 of 10
