Punjab-Haryana High Court
Rajbir Singh Sekhon vs State Of Punjab & Ors on 31 August, 2022
LPA No.1545 of 2018 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
LPA No. 1545 of 2018 (O&M)
Reserved on:22.08.2022
Pronounced on : 31.08.2022
Rajbir Singh Sekhon
---Appellant
versus
State of Punjab and others
---Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SANDHAWALIA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAGMOHAN BANSAL
Present: Ms. Samiya Singh, Advocate
for the appellant
Ms. Niharika Sharma, AAG, Punjab
Mr. H.S.Dhindsa, Advocate
For respondent No. 5
***
JAGMOHAN BANSAL, J.
1. Through the instant appeal filed under Section X of the
Letters Patent Act, 1865, the appellant is seeking quashing of order
dated 28.08.2018 passed by learned Single Judge in C.W.P.
No. 19833 of 2017 vide which Civil Misc. Nos. 12357-58 of 2018
have been dismissed holding that the appellant has no locus standi
to be impleaded in the writ petition as his presence is neither proper
nor necessary for the adjudication of lis involved in the writ petition.
2. The facts leading to file the present appeal and
adjudication thereof, as emerging from the record and arguments of
both the counsels, are that the appellant got registered FIR No. 53
dated 21.04.2011 against different persons alleging commission of
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murder of his son. The FIR culminated into police report under
Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against different
persons. During the course of trial before the learned Sessions
Court, Harpreet Singh Beniwal-respondent No. 5 (for short
"Respondent" ), who at the time of registration of FIR was posted as
Deputy Superintendent of Police, appeared before the learned trial
Court as a defence witness entailing filing of complaints before
higher authorities against him by the appellant.
3. The Trial Court convicted four persons under Sections
304 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 25 of the Arms Act.
The persons convicted filed four appeals before this Court which
came to be dismissed vide order dated 16.10.2019. The appellant
had filed CRA-AD-74 of 2015 before this Court seeking enhancement
of sentence awarded by the Learned Sessions Judge, Gurdaspur
vide order dated 03.08.2015 which was also dismissed along with the
appeals filed by the convicts. Out of four convicted persons, two
accused namely Jasdeep Singh @ Jassu and Amarpreet Singh
Narula successfully assailed order passed by this Court before the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vide order dated 07.01.2022
has set aside the order passed by this Court whereby the order of
the trial Court was affirmed. The present appellant also preferred
Criminal Appeal No. 1586 of 2021 before the Supreme Court
assailing order dated 16.10.2019 passed by this Court whereby the
appeal of the present appellant seeking enhancement of sentence
was dismissed. The Supreme Court while allowing the appeals of
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two convicts, dismissed appeal of the present appellant.
4. On the one hand, process of trial, first appeal and second
appeal with respect to conviction of persons who allegedly committed
murder of son of the appellant was going on. On the other hand,
pursuant to the complaint filed by appellant, respondent was charge
sheeted under Rule 8 of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and
Appeal) Rules, 1970. The Additional Chief Secretary, Punjab, vide
order dated 24.05.2016 appointed Sh. Amarjit Singh Katari,
Additional Sessions Judge (Retired) Enquiry Officer qua charges
framed against the respondent. The respondent filed reply to the
aforesaid charge-sheet claiming that he has not done any act against
the department nor has he ever colluded or given any statement in
favour of any person and he was never negligent in discharge of his
duties. The Enquiry Officer after completion of enquiry submitted
report dated 08.07.2016 wherein he held that no charge is proved
against the respondent. In view of the enquiry report, the competent
authority vide order dated 26.07.2016 dropped all the charges
against the respondent and decided to withdraw all the departmental
proceedings against him.
5. The respondent in the departmental proceedings was
exonerated vide order dated 26.07.2016 and after expiry of period of
one year, the official respondents vide communication dated
08.08.2017 decided to re-initiate and re-look into the entire enquiry
proceedings. The respondent preferred CWP No. 19833 of 2017
assailing re-initiation of enquiry against him. The matter was listed
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before the learned Single Judge who stayed the proceedings initiated
against the respondent.
6. The appellant moved Civil Misc. applications No. 12357-
58 of 2018 in CWP No. 19833 of 2017 for being impleaded as
intervener to assist the Court. The learned Single Judge vide order
dated 28.08.2018 dismissed application of the appellant seeking
impleadment as an intervener. The operative portion of order dated
28.08.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge reads as below:-
"The question(s) involved in the present writ petition is
with regard to the legality of the re-initiation of the
disciplinary enquiry qua which the applicant (Rajbir
Singh Sekhon), in the opinion of this court, would have
no locus to be impleaded in the present writ, as his
presence is neither proper nor necessary for adjudication
of the lis involved herein. Hence, both the
present/aforementioned applications bearing CM Nos.
12357-58 of 2018 are not maintainable, and liable to be
dismissed."
The appellant has preferred present Letters Patent
Appeal assailing order dated 28.08.2018 passed by the learned
Single Judge.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently
contended that the appellant wants to assist the Court in adjudication
of the writ petition pending before the learned Single Judge. She
further contended that no prejudice would be caused to the
respondent if she assists the Court in reaching a just and right
conclusion.
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Learned counsels for the respondents vehemently
contended that appellant has no locus standi to be impleaded as
intervener in pending writ petition. They further contended that
appellant is a stranger and he has no locus standi to interfere in a
matter which is purely between the respondent and State
Government.
8. Having scrutinized the record of the case and having
heard arguments of both the sides, this Court is of the considered
opinion that present appeal is bereft of merits and deserves to be
dismissed.
9. The conceded position emerging from record as well as
arguments of both sides is that at the behest of appellant an FIR was
registered against different persons; the FIR culminated into police
report and thereafter four persons were convicted under different
Sections of IPC and Arms Act; the respondent during the course of
trial appeared before learned trial Court as defence witness; the
appellant filed complaint against respondent and respondent was
charge sheeted under Punishment and Appeal Rules; on the basis
of report of enquiry officer who happened to be retired Additional
Sessions Judge, the State government decided to drop charges
against the respondent; trial Court convicted four persons and they
preferred appeal before this Court which dismissed appeals of the
convicted persons; out of four convicted, two filed appeals before the
Supreme Court which allowed their appeals; appeal filed by the
appellant before this Court seeking enhancement of sentence was
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dismissed and appellant unsuccessfully challenged the same before
the Supreme Court; the official respondents have re-initiated enquiry
proceedings against respondent and learned Single Judge of this
Court has stayed proceedings initiated by official respondents; the
appellant moved an application before the learned Single Judge
seeking impleadment which was dismissed on the ground of locus
standi.
10. From above sequel of events, the question which arises
for the consideration is that whether appellant has locus standi to be
impleaded as intervener in the civil writ petition filed by the
respondent before this Court seeking quashing of re-initiation of
enquiry against him.
11. Before adverting with contention of appellant, it would be
apt to notice a four Judge Bench judgment of Supreme Court in
Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed,
(1976) 1 SCC 671. The Supreme Court at length has adverted with
the question of locus standi of a person to invoke jurisdiction of the
Court. The Supreme Court has held:-
34. This Court has laid down in a number of decisions
that in order to have the locus standi to invoke the
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant
should ordinarily be one who has a personal or individual
right in the subject-matter of the application, though in
the case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo
warranto this rule is relaxed or modified. In other words,
as a general rule, infringement of some legal right or
prejudice to some legal interest inhering in the petitioner
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is necessary to give him a locus standi in the matter,
(see State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta [AIR 1952
SC 12 : 1952 SCR 28] ; Calcutta Gas Co. v. State of
W.B. [AIR 1962 SC 1044 : 1962 Supp (3) SCR 1] ; Ram
UmeshwariSuthoo v. Member, Board of Revenue,
Orissa [(1967) 1 SCA 413] ; GaddeVenkateswara
Rao v. Government of A.P. [AIR 1966 SC 828 : (1966) 2
SCR 172] ; State of Orissa v. RajasahebChandanmall [
(1973) 3 SCC 739] ; Satyanarayana Sinha Dr v. S. Lal &
Co. [(1973) 2 SCC 696 : (1973) SCC (Cri) 1002] ).
35. The expression "ordinarily" indicates that this is not a
cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases
where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an
act or omission of an authority, even though he has no
proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-
matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or
a person who was not a party to the proceedings before
the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in
the subject-matter of the proceedings will be covered by
this rule. The principles enunciated in the English cases
noticed above, are not inconsistent with it.
36. In the United States of America, also, the law on the
point is substantially the same.
"No matter how seriously infringement of the
Constitution may be said called into question said,
Justice Frankfurter in Coleman v. Miller [(1939) 307 US
433] "
"this is not the tribunal for its challenge except by those
who have some specialised interest of their own to
vindicate apart from a political concern which belongs to
all."
To have a "standing to sue", which means locus standi to
ask for relief in a court independently of a statutory
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remedy, the plaintiff must show that he is injured, that is,
subjected to or threatened with a legal wrong. Courts can
intervene only where legal rights are invaded.
[Chapman v. Sheridan Wyoming Coal Co., 338 US 621]
"Legal wrong" requires a judicially enforceable right and
the touchstone to judiciability is injury to a legally
protected right. A nominal or a highly speculative
adverse affect [ American Jurisprudence, Vol. 2d ss 575,
p. 334 ; Joint Anti Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGarth, 341 US 123] on the interest or
right of a person has been held to be insufficient to give
him the "standing to sue" for judicial review of
administrative action. [United States Cane Sugar
Refiners' Asson. v. McNutt, 138 F 2nd 116 : 158 ALR
849] Again the "adverse affect" requisite for "standing to
sue" must be an "illegal effect". [United States v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 US 192] Thus, in the
undermentioned cases, it was held that injury resulting
from lawful competition not being a legal wrong, cannot
furnish a "standing to sue" for judicial relief. [Kansas
City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F 2d 924 (1955),
cert denied 350 US 884 (1955).]
37. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to
apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily
fall in any of these categories: (i) "person aggrieved"; (ii)
"stranger"; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper.
Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable
from those coming under the first two categories. Such
persons interfere in things which do not concern them.
They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend
to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have
no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.
They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial
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process either by force of habit or from improper
motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win
notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of
some applicants in this category, may be no more than
spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court
should do well to reject the applications of such
busybodies at the threshold.
38. The distinction between the first and second
categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-
demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two
concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a
grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding
centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of
uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are
those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such
applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of "persons
aggrieved". In the grey outer circle the bounds which
separate the first category from the second, intermix,
interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal
direction. All persons in this outer zone may not be
"persons aggrieved".
39. To distinguish such applicants from "strangers",
among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the
conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and
ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the
circumstances of the case, including the statutory context
in which the matter falls to be considered. These are:
Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has
been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury,
in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been
prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission
of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has
suffered a legal grievance, a person
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"against whom a decision has been pronounced which
has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully
refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to
something?"
Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own
beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him
in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to
object and be heard by the authority before it took the
impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in
the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of
jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in
the context of which the scope of the words "person
aggrieved" is being considered, a social welfare measure
designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of
conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with
private rights of particular individuals?"
12. The appellant in the case in hand is not petitioner,
however, ratio of law laid down by Supreme Court in Jasbhai
Motibhai Desai case (supra) is applicable to a person who wants to
intervene in a petition filed by an aggrieved person.
13. The appellant filed complaint before the competent
authorities to initiate departmental proceedings against the
respondent. On the complaint of the appellant, Additional Chief
Secretary, Punjab appointed Additional Sessions Judge (Retired) an
enquiry officer. The Enquiry Officer reported that respondent has not
committed any violation warranting major/minor penalty. The report
of Enquiry Officer was accepted by the departmental authorities. On
account of representations made by the appellant, official
respondents have re-initiated enquiry proceedings. The respondent
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has challenged re-initiation of proceedings and the learned Single
Judge had stayed the proceedings. The matter is purely between the
departmental authorities and the respondent. It is the departmental
authorities who have to decide the fate of the respondent. The
appellant has no locus standi to participate in each and every
proceeding initiated against the persons accused of commission of
murder of son of the appellant as well as the respondent who
appeared during the course of trial as defence witness. The present
appellant has participated in appeal filed by the convicts before this
Court as well as the appeals preferred before the Supreme Court.
The appeal filed by the appellant has been dismissed by this Court
as well as the Supreme Court. No substance in the averment of
appellant has been found by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court as
well as two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court. It is true that son of
the appellant has been murdered and everybody has sympathy with
the appellant. Nevertheless, appellant has no locus standi to
participate in each and every proceeding initiated against the
persons who were part of investigation or trial. Learned counsel for
the appellant has failed to demonstrate locus standi of the appellant
to participate in proceedings pending before the learned Single
Judge.
14. Merely because the appellant has filed CWP No. 2642 of
2017 challenging the dropping off the proceedings which stands
admitted, would not give him any locus standi to participate in the
challenge raised to the re-initiation of enquiry proceedings by the
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government employee.
In view of the above findings, we do not find any merit in
the instant appeal and it deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly
dismissed.
(G.S. SANDHAWALIA) (JAGMOHAN BANSAL)
JUDGE JUDGE
31.08.2022
PARAMJIT
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes
Whether reportable : Yes
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