[Cites 25, Cited by 0]
Patna High Court
The Union Of India Through Assistant ... vs Brajesh Kumar Sinha on 11 December, 2025
Author: Rajiv Roy
Bench: Rajiv Roy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Miscellaneous Appeal No.449 of 2025
======================================================
1. The Union of India through Assistant General Manager Engineer (Civil)
Airports Authority of India Gaya Airport, Gaya-923004 (Bihar).
2. Airport Authority of India, A Statutory Corporation incorporated under the
Airports Authority of India Act, 1995, having its Head Office at Rajiv
Gandhi Bhawan, Safdarjung Airport, New Delhi-110003.
3. The Chairman, Airports Authority of India Head Office at Rajiv Gandhi
Bhawan, Safdarjung Airport, New Delhi-110003.
4. Member (Planning) Head of the Department of Engineering, Airports
Authority of India, Head Office at Rajiv Gandhi Bhawan, Safdarjung
Airport, New Delhi-110003.
5. Executive Director, Airports Authority of India, Head Office at Rajiv Gandhi
Bhawan, Safdarjung Airport, New Delhi-110003.
6. General Manager, Engg. (c) Airports Authority of India, NSCBI Airport,
Kolkata-700002.
7. Assistant General Manager, Engineer (civil) Airports Authority of India,
Gaya Airport, Gaya-823004 (Bihar).
... ... Appellant/s
Versus
Brajesh Kumar Sinha son of Sri Bharat Sinha, Resident of behind H/150, Veer
Kunwar Singh Colony, Hinoo, Ranchi, P.O.-Hinoo, P.S.-Doranda, District-
Ranchi-834002.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Appellant/s : Mr. Dr. Pankaj, Advocate
For the Respondent/s : Mr. Saurabh Bishwambhar, Advocate
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV ROY
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 11-12-2025
Heard the parties.
2. The present application has been preferred against
the judgment dated 07/04/2025 passed by the learned
Principal District and Sessions Judge, Patna in Arbitration
Case No 18/2024. [The Union of India Through Assistant
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
2/23
General Manager, Engineer (Civil), Airports Authority of India,
Gaya Airport, Gaya- 923004 Bihar vs. Brajesh Kumar Sinha]
as also Award dated 31.05.2023 passed by the sole Arbitrator
by which the case of the sole claimant-respondent was allowed
and the appellants were directed to pay the Award amount
within 90 days.
3. The matrix of facts giving rise to the present
appeal is/are as follows:
4. Tenders were invited through the e-tendering portal
by the Assistant G.M. (E-C), AAI, Gaya Airport (Bid
Manager) on behalf of Chairman, Airports Authority of
India (henceforth for short 'the AAI'), on 07.11.2016 from the
eligible contractors for the Construction of the Property
Boundary Wall of 'the AAI' land situated at Gaya Airport, Gaya
at an estimated cost of Rs.2,12,07,560.00 with the completion
period of six months. The scope of work included RCC footing,
RCC column, RCC Plinth beam, brick work etc. The last date
and time of sale of tender document was 07.11.2016 while the
last date for submission of e-bid was 17.12.2016.
5. The claimant-respondent thereafter submitted his
application form along with other candidates within the
stipulated period and time i.e. 02.12.2016 and after completion
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
3/23
of paraphernalia, the claimant respondent was selected for the
above captioned work.
6. This followed the issuance of the Letter of
Appointment on 04.01.2017 for the work mentioned above at
the item rates quoted by him totaling to Rs.1,25,77,245/- (Rs.
One Crore Twenty Five Lakhs Seventy Seven thousand Two
hundred & Forty Five only) which was 40.69% below the
estimated cost of tender of Rs. 2,12,07,560/- (Rupees Two
Crores Twelve Lacs Seven Thousand Five Hundred & Sixty
only). The claimant respondent was acknowledged about
conversion of Earnest Money Amount of Rs. 4,24,152/- (Rupees
Four Lakhs Twenty Four Thousand One Hundred Fifty Two
only) into SECURITY DEPOSIT, as per condition number 15
of the contract document.
7. The further direction to the claimant respondent
was to deposit the remaining amount of Security Deposit i.e. Rs.
8,33,573/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs Thirty Three Thousand Five
Hundred & Seventy Three only) within ten days from the date
of issue of the letter, failing which, the same will be deducted as
per condition 13(iii) of the tender/contract document.
8. The claimant respondent was further asked to be
present before the Assistant General Manager (E-C), of 'the
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
4/23
AAO' Gaya Airport, Gaya, the in-charge of the contract, to sign
and complete the contract agreement on 15.01.2017.
9. Thereafter, the Contract Agreement No-
AAI/GAYA/AGM/Engg(c) 03/2016-17 dated 19.01.2017
signed and executed between 'the AAI' and Brajesh Kumar
Sinha, the claimant-respondent.
10. The contention is that there was no dispute on the
proposed property regarding title and possession of said
property of the Gaya Airport and the State Agencies demarcated
the said property/premises which was proposed to be boundary
walled.
11. The claimant respondent accordingly started
construction work without any hindrance and being satisfied
with the performance of the claimant-respondent, the appellants
cleared the 1st Running Account Bill(R/A Bill) without any
dispute for the work done up to 31.03.2017.
12. On 03.04.2017, the claimant respondent reported
to the Assistant G.M. (E-C) that on the previous day,
02.04.2017
, a mob of around 250 people led by one Shri Bhism
Narayan Rai reached at the site and threatened the Supervisor
and the labourers to face consequences if they would not
demolish the structure constructed at the site within 7-8 days.
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
13. On 04.04.2017, the claimant
respondent/contractor lodged an FIR in Bodh Gaya P.S. Case
No-207/17 u/s 147 149, 34, 323 & 504 IPC as the mob of about
75-100 persons came to the site and created hooliganism/
quarrel/nuisance with his workmen. On 05.04.2017, the same
was reported to 'the AAI' which followed the Director, AAI,
Gaya Airport apprising the S.S.P., Gaya with a request to
maintain the law and order on spot.
14. As the story further unfolds, on 14.04.2017, the
claimant respondent approached the applicants with reference to
letter dated 03.04.2017 & 05.04.2017 to take necessary steps for
removal of hurdles caused by local people bringing the
construction works at total stand still.
15. On 26.04.2017, the claimant respondent referring
to the letters dated 03.04.2017; 05.04.2017 and 14.04.2017
claimed that though he tried to restart the construction of work
at the site but due to agitation of the villagers, the work could
not be started. The claimant respondent further recorded that he
has suffered loss to the tune of Rupees 1,50,000/-(approx)
towards the establishment and labours cost and further as there
was no possibility of execution of work at the site.
16. In view of the representations/letters dated
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
03.04.2017; 05.04.2017; 14.04.2017 & 26.04.2017 as well as
FIR dated 04.04.2017, the Airport Director, Gaya Airport, Gaya
vide letter dated 05.05.2017 addressed to Sub-Divisional
Officer, Sadar, Gaya requested for arrangements to ensure
restarting of construction of Boundary Wall at 'the AAI' land at
Techno Farm, which was stopped since 04.04.2017.
17. Further, after the meeting with the District
Magistrate, Gaya, he directed vide letter dated 15.06.2017 to the
Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Gaya to ensure the construction
work of the boundary wall of 'the AAI' land by providing police
force at the site.
18. The contention is/was that while the appellants
were taking steps to resume the construction work at the said
site, the claimant-respondent was more interested in closure of
the construction work and payment towards the work executed
by him as would be evident from letters dated 03.06.2017 &
19.06.2017. The claimant respondent never co-operated with the
appellants in order to resume the construction work on 'the
AAI' land.
19. The case of the appellants is/was that the
claimant-respondent for the reasons best known to him did not
resume the construction work despite the best efforts extended
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
by the applicants and the local Administration. However it is
pertinent to mention here that the applicants had granted several
extension of contract for completion of the work under Clause-
5 of Clauses of Contract starting with the first letter dated
13.07.2017 by which the contract got extended up to 10.08.2017
which was extended from time to time till 05.11.2018 when it
was extended till 04.12.2018. However, the claimant-respondent
chose not to resume work.
20. The claimant respondent submitted representation
before the appellants on 06.09.2017 demanding the
measurement of work done, preparation of bills as also
payments and issuance of letter of foreclosure beside payment
of Compensation and permission for withdrawal of men and
machineries as well as different materials stocked at the site and
further to refund the Security Deposit amount.
21. The AGM Engg.(C) thereafter vide letter dated
11.09.2017 asked the claimant respondent to submit the bill for
construction work done in between 01.04.2017 and 03.04.2017
but the claimant respondent failed to comply.
22. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, a joint
meeting was held on 05.12.2017 between the claimant
respondent and 'the AAI' in which the claimant respondent
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
assured construction work and the applicants had apprised him
about the assurance given by the State Administration for
extending security to the claimant respondent and his men as
well as materials. The claimant respondent informed that he
requires a week's time for mobilization and assured to intimate
the date by 12.12.2017.
23. However, instead, the claimant respondent served
a legal notice to the applicants vide Notice/378 dated
11.12.2017, which was promptly replied vide Reference no.-
AAI/Gaya/Tekuna/B-Wall/Legal/ AGM/Engg.(C)/1617-22 dated
31.01.2018 by the AGM Engg. (C), Gaya Airport denying to
each and every point.
24. This followed the notices to the Claimant
respondent vide letters nos.-1643-46 dated 07.02.2018 & 1786-
89 dated 06.03.2018. The claimant respondent again served a
legal notice no.-58 dated 08.02.2018 which was also replied
vide letter dated 22.02.2018.
25. As the claimant respondent chose not to reply to
the Show-Cause notices dated 07.02.2018 & 06.03.2018, instead
served a Demand dated 10.03.2018 through his Advocate for the
following:
(i) measurement of the remaining
work executed after the measurement done
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
under 1st on Account Bill,
(ii) preparation of Final Bill,
(iii) payment of the amount under
the Final Bill and
(iv) compensation to compensate
the losses suffered by the contractor. 'The
AAI' through its lawyer sent an explanatory
reply of the said Notice of Demand on
10.04.2018.
26. The contention is that the claimant respondent left
the work without any sufficient reasons and estimated cost of
leftover construction work to Rs. 1,96,08,019.00 and served an
additional Notice of Demand on 30.04.2018 to the appellants.
27. The appellants had sanctioned the amount to the
claimant respondent as per clause of payment in the work order
dated 04.01.2017 in respect of 2nd RA Bill on 11.05.2018 which
was transferred in the Bank account.
28. The claimant respondent thereafter sent legal
notices vide no. 314 and 315 dated 21.09.2018/23.10.2018 as
well as 05.01.2019 to the appellants requesting for appointment
of Dispute Resolution Committee in terms of Clause-25(i)
arising out of the Agreement dated 19.01.2017 for
conciliation/adjudication of the dispute of the subject matter,
which was received by the applicants on 25.10.2018.
29. The appellants took cognizance of the legal
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
notices dated 21.09.2018/23.10.2018 & 05.01.2019, which was
served to Chairman, 'the AAI' for appointment of Dispute
Resolution Committee(DRC) in terms of Clause-25(i) arising
out of the said Agreement and Work Order bearing No-AAI/
GAYA/B-WALL/AGM(Engg-C)/w.o-02/2016-17/1891-96 dated
04.01.2017 and referred the matter to RHQ-ER vide letter dated
30.11.2018. The order dated RHQ-ER constituted the DRC vide
22.12.2018 comprising three members namely:
1. Sh. K. K. Singh, GM, Project.
2. Sh. Nayak, DGM, Finance.
3. Sh. Gorai, DGM, Law.
The same information was given to all
concerned vide letter dated 08.01.2019.
30. In the meantime, Sri. Gorai, one of the members
of the DRC, was transferred and relieved from RHQ-ER. He
was replaced with Sri. Amit Kumar, Manager, (Law) vide order
dated 11.04.2019 of RHQ-ER and approved by the GM (Engg)
on 12.04.2019. The proceedings of the DRC commenced on
16.05.2019. The appellants had submitted their reply on the
same date which was duly signed on 30.04.2019.
31. The DRC adjourned the matter with the direction
to the claimant respondent to go through the reply of the
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
appellants and submit rejoinder if any and observed that the next
meeting would be fixed after submission of the claimant
respondent's reply.
32. In the meanwhile, the appellants under Clause-3
of the agreement dated 19.01.2017 took action against the
claimant respondent and terminated the Agreement vide letter
no-1148-54 dated 26.12.2018 in view of apathy shown by the
claimant respondent either in completion of work or in replying
the issues raised in the show cause notices dated 07.02.2018 &
06.03.2018.
33. Thereafter, the appellants submitted their reply on
16.05.2019 which was duly signed on 30.04.2019. The DRC
adjourned the matter with the direction to the claimant
respondent to go through the reply of appellants and submit
rejoinder if any and observed that the next meeting would be
fixed after submission of the claimant respondent's reply.
34. In response to the reply submitted by the
appellants, the claimant respondent vide a petition dated
10.06.2019 appeared before the Disputes Committee through his
lawyer and intimated that the copy of reply of appellants is not
legible. Hence, he requested to send a legible copy of the reply
of the appellants with a request to postpone further proceedings
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
& extend the period of six weeks to submit the reply of the
claimant respondent. He also raised the issue of appointment of
DRC after the expiry of limitation period with respect to Clause-
25(i) of the Agreement.
35. He further prayed for appointment of an Arbitrator
by filing a Request Case bearing Req. Case no. 44/2019
before the Hon'ble Patna High Court, which was disposed of
vide an order dated 27.09.2019 passed by Hon'ble the then
Chief Justice with the following observation:
"In view of the arbitration clause
available and in view of the provisions of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
and Appointment of Arbitrator by the
Hon'ble Chief Justice of Patna High Court
Scheme, 1996, I hereby appoint Hon'ble
Mr. Justice V.N. Sinha (Retd.), as an
Arbitrator to enter upon the dispute and
render his award. The Registrar General to
take steps accordingly for information as
well as for sending the records to the
Arbitrator."
(emphasis added)
36. The sole Arbitrator thereafter took up the matter
and passed the AWARD on 26.04.2022 in which he
propounded/allowed the claim or the claimants while dismissing
the stand taken by 'the AAI'.
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
37. Thereafter the claimant respondent filed a petition
u/s 33 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (henceforth for
short 'the Act') on 30.05.2022 which was rejected vide an order
dated 31.05.2023 with the following observations:
"In the circumstances, there is also no
substance in the other prayer made by the
claimant in the application to adjudicate claims
no. 19, 21,23 & 24 and to publish additional
award. The application under section 33 (1) (a)
and (b) is accordingly rejected."
The Award dated 26.04.2022 passed
by the learned Sole Arbitrator attained finality
on 31.05.2023 with the passing of Additional
Award on petition u/s 33 of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act 1996.
38. Thereafter, the Arbitration Case No-18/2024 was
filed u/s 34 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 on behalf
of appellants for setting aside the arbitral award dated
26.04.2022, which attained finality on 31.05.2023 after passing
of the arbitral award u/s 33 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act
1996 passed in Arbitration proceedings arising out of Request
Case No-44/2019 by the sole Arbitrator. It was filed on
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
14.03.2024 along with application for condonation of delay
Upon scrutiny of the instant application, 'Sheristedar' reported
that there is a delay of 197 days in filing the application.
39. The contention is/was that the delay in filing the
petition u/s 34 of 'the Act' has to be attributed to the
organization such as processing of the case through proper
channels and after obtaining the order dated 31.05.2023 passed
by the Arbitrator. Thereafter, the Award as a whole was analyzed
which followed a decision to challenge it by way of filing the
petition u/s 34 of 'the Act'.
40. The Arbitration Case No. 18 of 2024 (The
Union of India & Ors. vs. Brajesh Kumar Sinha) was heard
by the learned Principal District Judge, Patna and dismissed on
07.04.2025. The conclusion arrived at have been incorporated in
paragraph nos. 17 and 18 which read as follows:
17. Thus, applying the aforesaid
provision and proposition to the present case, it
unfolds that award has been passed on 26th April,
2022 which attained finality on 31 May, 2023
after passing of the additional award under
Section 33 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, whereas, the present application has been
filed on 14th March, 2024, ie., after a period of
197 days. Proviso to Section 34(3) provides that
even if the Court is satisfied that the applicant
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
was prevented by 'sufficient cause', from making
the application within the said period of three
months, it can entertain the application only
within a further period of thirty days, and not
thereafter. Therefore, in this case under no event,
this Court can entertain the application of the
applicants beyond 28th September, 2023 whereas,
the present application under Section 34
Arbitration Act has been filed on 14th March,
2024.
18. Therefore, in view of the foregoing
discussions, this Miscellaneous (Arbitration) case
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, being
time barred under sub-section (3) of Section 34 of
the Arbitration Act, stands dismissed.
(emphasis added)
41. Aggrieved, the present appeal.
42. Learned counsel for the appellants submit that in
view of the fact that it is an organization, they took some time to
come to a decision to file an application under Section 34 of 'the
Act'. This must have been taken into account while deciding the
case. The further submission is that though there has been delay
of 197 days as pointed out, every delay does not reflect malafide
or dilatory attitude of the litigant to delay proceeding and it is
the circumstance governing each case that has to be tested on
its merit.
43. Further, in the case of the State or an organization,
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
various factors including the functioning of the Government
which is not individual but institutional involving decision
making process at various levels should also have been taken
into consideration.
44. The submission is that unfortunately, this was not
taken into account when the case was dismissed on the ground
of delay in filing of the petition under Section 34(3) of 'the Act'
and thus it needs interference.
45. This Court has taken note of the facts of the case,
the submissions of the appellants as recorded above as also the
order passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Patna in
Arbitration Case No. 18 of 2024 (the Union of India & Ors.
vs. Brajesh Kumar Sinha) dated 07.04.2025.
46. The admitted position is that the Award came to be
passed on 26.04.2022. Subsequently, a petition under Section 33
of 'the Act' was preferred which was dismissed on 31.05.2023.
The application under Section 34 of 'the Act' was filed on
14.03.2024. The appellants thus took 197 (195 days?) more days
than what is mandated in 'the Act'.
47. At this stage, it would be appropriate to
incorporate Section 34(3) of 'the Act' which read as follows:
34(3). An application for setting
aside may not be made after three months
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
have elapsed from the date on which the
party making that application had received
the arbitral award or, if a request had been
made under section 33, from the date on
which that request had been disposed of by
the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is
satisfied that the applicant was prevented
by sufficient cause from making the
application within the said period of three
months it may entertain the application
within a further period of thirty days, but
not thereafter.
48. The language of Section 34(3) of 'the 1996 Act' is
very clear. After the lapse of three months, if the Court is
satisfied that sufficient cause is there and the reasons have been
explained which prevented them to file a petition within the said
period, it can entertain the application for further period of thirty
days but not thereafter. Thus, 'the Act' completely bars
entertaining any petition after lapse of thirty days.
49. This Court is further guided by the order passed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India vs.
Popular Construction Company reported in (2001) 8 SCC
470. Paragraphs 12, 14 and 16 of the said order read as
follows:
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
12. As far as the language of
Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the
crucial words are "but not thereafter" used
in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our
opinion, this phrase would amount to an
express exclusion within the meaning of
Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and
would therefore bar the application of
Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not
need to go further. To hold that the court
could entertain an application to set aside
the award beyond the extended period under
the proviso, would render the phrase "but
not thereafter" wholly otiose. No principle of
interpretation would justify such a result.
14. Here the history and scheme of
the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the
time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to
challenge an award is absolute and
unextendible by court under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. The Arbitration and
Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the
1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives
the need "to minimise the supervisory role of
courts in the arbitral process". This
objective has found expression in the Section
5 of the Act which prescribes the extent of
judicial intervention in no uncertain terms:
"5. Extent of judicial intervention.
Notwithstanding anything contained in any
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
other law for the time being in force, in
matters governed by this Part, no judicial
authority shall intervene except where so
provided in this Part."
16. Furthermore, Section 34(1)
itself provides that recourse to a court
against an arbitral award may be made only
by an application for setting aside such
award "in accordance with" sub-section (2)
and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates
to grounds for setting aside an award and is
not relevant for our purposes. But an
application filed beyond the period
mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3)
would not be an application "in accordance
with" that sub-section. Consequently by
virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court
against an arbitral award cannot be made
beyond the period prescribed. The
importance of the period fixed under Section
34 is emphasised by the provisions of
Section 36 which provide that
"where the time for making an
application to set aside the arbitral award
the award shall be enforced under the Code
under Section 34 has expired of Civil
Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as if it
were a decree of the court"
This is a significant departure
from the provisions of the Arbitration Act,
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to
set aside the award expired, the court was
required to "proceed to pronounce judgment
according to the a award, and upon the
judgment so pronounced a decree shall
follow" (Section 17). Now the consequence
of the time expiring under Section 34 of the
1996 Act is that the award becomes
immediately enforceable without any further
act of the court. If there were any residual
doubt on the interpretation of the language
used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996
Act would resolve the issue in favour of
curtailment of the court's powers by the
exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.
50. Hon'ble Apex Court made it clear that one of the
main objective of 'the Act' is "to minimise the Supervisory role
of the Courts in the arbitral process."
51. The Hon'ble Apex Court further took note of
Section 36 of 'the Act' and recorded that once the time under
Section 34 of 'the Act' expires, the award immediately becomes
enforceable without any futher act of the Court.
52. There is a recent judgment of the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of State of West Bengal represented
through the Secretary & ors. vs. Rajpath Contractors and
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
Engineers Limited reported in (2024) 7 SCC 257 wherein
paragraph nos. 8 and 9 recorded as follows:
8. As per Section 12(1) of the
Limitation Act, the day from which the
limitation period is to be reckoned must be
excluded. In this case, the period of
limitation for filing a petition under Section
34 will have to be reckoned from 30-6-2022,
when the appellants received the award. In
view of Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act,
30-6-2022 will have to be excluded while
computing the limitation period. Thus, in
effect, the period of limitation, in the facts of
the case, started running on 1-7-2022. The
period of limitation is of three months and
not ninety days. Therefore, from the starting
point of 1-7-2022, the last day of the period
of three months would be 30-9-2022. As
noted earlier, the pooja vacation started on
1-10-2022.
9. We may note here that Section
43 of the Arbitration Act provides that the
Limitation Act shall apply to the arbitrations
as it applies to proceedings in the Court. We
may note here that the consistent view taken
by this Court right from the decision in
Union of India v. Popular Construction Co.
is that given the language used in the
proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
the Arbitration Act, the applicability of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act to the petition
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act has
been excluded.
(emphasis added)
53. As observed above, the admitted position is that
the award/order came to be passed on 26.04.2022, the petition
under Section 33 of 'the Act' filed thereafter too was rejected
on 31.05.2023. The three months period ended on 31.08.2023
by which an application under Section 34 of 'the Act' should
have been filed by the appellants. Further, alongwith the
sufficient reason explaining the delay, the petition could have
been filed upto 30.09.2023 and not thereafter. However, the
petition was filed only on 14.03.2024. Section 34(3) of 'the Act'
records three months and not 90 days and as such, there was
delay of 195 days in filing the petition. The award became
enforceable after the period under Section 34(3) of 'the Act'
came to an end.
54. In that background, the learned Principal District
Judge, Patna was fully justified in coming to the conclusion that
under no circumstances, it can entertain the application of the
apellants beyond the period mandated under Section 34(3) of
'the Act'. The well reasoned order dated 07.04.2025 passed in
Arbitration Case No. 18 of 2024 need no interference.
Patna High Court MA No.449 of 2025 dt.11-12-2025
55. M.A. No. 449 of 2025 stands dismissed.
56. Before parting, this Court must record its
disappointment in the manner, the Gaya International Airport is
being manned. People across the world specially those
following the teachings of Gautam Buddha take this Airport
route to visit Bodh Gaya, the place of Lord Buddha's
enlightenment. The moment they board the plane from their
respective countries, are in a pious mood thinking of visiting
their most reverred place. After alighting from the plane, they
touch the reverred ground of Lord Buddha and as such, the
Airport authorities are duty-bound to respect their sentiments
and extend best services in line with the purpose of their visit
and not in an unprofessional manner by treating them just as
normal passengers. It not only affects the prestige of the nation,
it hurts the sentiments of the devotees too. The Director, Gaya
Airport is expected to look into the matter and do the needful.
(Rajiv Roy, J)
Vijay Singh/-
AFR/NAFR AFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 18.12.2025
Transmission Date
