[Cites 27, Cited by 0]
Orissa High Court
Dr.Manas Ranjan Senapati vs State Of Orissa & Another ..... Opposite ... on 2 February, 2026
Author: A.K. Mohapatra
Bench: Aditya Kumar Mohapatra
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No.4397 of 2025
An application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read
with Section 528 of BNSS, 2023
.
Dr.Manas Ranjan Senapati ..... Petitioner
Represented by Adv;
Mr. Shibani Shankar
Pradhan
-versus-
State of Orissa & Another ..... Opposite Party
Represented by
Adv;
Mr.Udit Ranjan Jena,
A.G.A.
Mr. Ramdas Achary, Adv
(for the OP No.2)
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ADITYA KUMAR MOHAPATRA
Date of Hearing: 08.01.2026 : Date of Judgement: 02.02.2026
A.K. Mohapatra, J. :
1. The present CRLMC application has been filed by the Petitioner
with a prayer to quash the charge-sheet dated 25.06.2025, under
Annexure-2, and the entire criminal proceeding against the Petitioner in
Chandrasekharpur P.S. Case No.330 of 2023 corresponding to C.T. Case
No.837 of 2023, for commission of offences punishable under sections
498A/ 341/ 323/ 294/ 506/ 34 of the IPC read with Section 4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, pending in the court of the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class-II, Bhubaneswar.
FACTS OF THE CASE
2. The factual matrix of the case leading to the filing of the present
CRLMC application, as gathered form the F.I.R and Charge-sheet, is as
follows; initially an F.I.R was lodged on 13.07.2023 and registered as
Chandrasekharpur P.S. Case No.330 of 2023 against the present
Petitioner, alleging commission of offences under the IPC as well as the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereinafter 'DP Act'). The Informant in the
present case is the sister-in-law of the Petitioner, this implies that the
Petitioner is the younger brother of the husband of the Informant-
Opposite Party No.2. The marriage between the Informant-Opposite Party
No.2 and the Petitioner's older brother was earlier solemnized on
23.01.2019, and the Informant's parents have allegedly given a sum of
Rs.4,00,000/- along with around 200gm of gold ornaments and other
valuables to the groom's family. However, after a few days of the
solemnization of marriage, the Informant's in-laws and husband
demanded a further sum of Rs.30,00,000/- as dowry. Since the informant
expressed her inability to fulfil the same, she was allegedly harassed and
tortured, mentally and physically, in pursuance of such dowry demand, by
her in-laws and husband.
3. The F.I.R further reveals that not only was the Informant-Opposite
Party No.2, who happened to be a doctor, not allowed to continue her
medicine practice or pursue higher education but also on 04.03.2019,
24.05.2019, 19.01.2021, and several other occasions the husband and her
in-laws would physically torture, including strangulating the Informant
till the point she passes out and then confining her to a room. As per the
F.I.R, on one such occasion while the Informant was being physically
assaulted by her husband and a few of her in-laws, she was saved at the
last moment by her mother-in-law and grandfather-in-law. An attempt
was once also made to find common ground between the parties and
mutually resolve the issue by holding a discussion between the families of
the parties. However, such discussion could not fructify into something
tangible on account of the Informant's husband abusing and assaulting
the Informant and her mother by hurling chairs at them and attempting to
assault them with a Panikhi. Apart from the aforesaid instances of assault
and abuse, the in-laws and husband of the Informant have also, on many
occasions, threatened to kill the Informant if she ever attempted to lodge
any complaint against the perpetrators.
4. Consequently, the Informant-Opposite Party No.2 lodged the F.I.R,
at Annexure-1, implicating her husband and in-laws including the
Petitioner. After registration of the F.I.R, the investigation in the matter
was initiated, the seizure list, zimanama, and injury report were prepared
and, statement of witnesses were recorded under section 161 of Cr.P.C,
available at Annexure-3. Finally, the Investigating Officer has filed the
impugned Charge-sheet bearing C.S No.465 on 25.06.2025, at Annexure-
2, against the present Petitioner, among others, as the accused, for
commission of the offences as mentioned above. Aggrieved by his
implication as an accused in the case, the Petitioner has approached this
Court with a prayer as mentioned above.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER
5. Heard Mr.Shibani Shankar Pradhan, learned counsel
appearing for the Petitioner. The Petitioner, from the very outset, has
maintained that on the basis of the allegations in the F.I.R and the
Chargesheet, no case whatsoever is made out against the Petitioner for
commission of the offences alleged therein. The learned counsel for the
Petitioner contended that being the younger brother-in-law of the
Informant, the Petitioner's name has been mechanically included in the
F.I.R with an oblique motive and malafide intention to wreck vengeance
on the Petitioner's personal life. It was submitted that at no point in time
had the Petitioner ever demanded any dowry from the Informant-
Opposite Party No.2, nor has he ever subjected her to any torture, either
physical or mental.
6. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the
Petitioner that when the marriage of the Informant-Opposite Party No.2
was solemnized with the Petitioner's brother on 23.01.2019, the
Petitioner was residing at the hostel of S.C.B Medical College and
Hospital, Cuttack (hereinafter "SCB MCH") where he was continuing his
internship/ housemanship. Whereas, the Informant-Opposite Party No.2,
being a Dental Surgeon and having her practice at Bhubaneswar, moved
into her parental house at Bhubaneswar along with her husband. Later, in
August of 2019, after completing his internship, the Petitioner took up a
house on rent at Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar as he was engaged as a Medical
Officer at Capital Hospital until March of 2020. From March, 2020 till
July, 2020 the Petitioner was posted as a Medical Officer at Puri Hospital,
and then from July 2020 up until the same time in 2023, the Petitioner
was pursuing his Post-graduate at SCB MCH. As such, it has been
strenuously contended by the learned counsel for the Petitioner that the
Petitioner and the Informant-Opposite Party No.2 have never shared a
common household at any point of time during the Informant's marriage.
Therefore, it can safely be inferred that the Petitioner could not have, at
any point in time, indulged in any act of harassment or torture the
Informant-Opposite Party No.2.
7. The learned counsel for the Petitioner, further submitted that
the Informant-Opposite Party No.2 has not levelled any specific
allegation against the Petitioner, either in the F.I.R or in her statement
recorded under section 161 of the Cr.P.C. Moreover, referring to the
statements of other charge-sheeted witnesses recorded under section 161
of the Cr.P.C, the learned counsel for the Petitioner stated before this
Court that no allegation has been made against the Petitioner that would
justify his implication in the present case. In the aforesaid context the
learned counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the Investigating Officer
has proceeded on a presumption that the allegation in the F.I.R is
completely true and, instead of carrying out a proper investigation, he has
mechanically filed a charge-sheet against the Petitioner despite there
being no material on record for doing so.
8. Lastly, to further support his contentions, the learned counsel
for the Petitioner has relied on the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court in
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335,
Geeta Mehrotra and Anr. v. State of U.P and Anr., reported in (2012) 10
SCC 741, Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana and Anr., reported in (2025)
3 SCC 756 and Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, reported
in (2025) 3 SCC 735, and contended that mere reference to the
Petitioner's name without any specific allegation against him does not
implicate him in the alleged crime. In such view of the matter, the learned
counsel for the Petitioner contended that hypothetically, even if the
allegation in the F.I.R is taken at its face value, no case is made out
against the Petitioner. It was submitted that this is a clear instance of a
malafide prosecution instituted against an innocent Petitioner and, in the
event the present criminal proceeding is allowed to continue against the
Petitioner, the same would amount to an abuse of the process of law.
Accordingly, it was prayed that the present criminal proceeding against
the Petitioner be quashed to secure the ends of justice.
CONTENTIONS OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES
9. Heard Mr.Udit Narayan Jena, AGA and Mr.Ramdas Achary,
learned counsel for the Opposite Party No.2-Informant. Learned AGA, at
the outset submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R are grave and serious
in nature and make out a good case against the Petitioner. It was further
contended that after a thorough investigation the IO has filed a charge-
sheet where the Petitioner has also been shown as an accused. As such, it
was submitted that the criminal proceeding against the Petitioner be
allowed to continue to the stage of trial where the actual guilt of the
Petitioner, or lack thereof, can be determined.
10. Similarly, the learned counsel for the Opposite Parties,
referring to the law laid down in Bhajanlal's case, submitted before this
Court that the inherent powers of a High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C
must be exercised sparingly in exceptional circumstances only, and, a
criminal proceeding or an F.I.R can be quashed in exercise of such
inherent powers excepting when no clear case is made out against the
Petitioner as per the allegations on record. The learned counsel for the
Opposite Parties contended that in the present case, as per the F.I.R and
the Charge-sheet a clear case of cruelty on account of demand for dowry
is made out against the present Petitioner. As such, no valid case for
quashing of the criminal proceeding can be said to have been made out
against Petitioner. Additionally, the learned counsel for the Opposite
Parties has submitted before this Court that while considering an
application under section 482 of the Cr.P.C with a prayer to quash a
criminal proceeding, the High Court must confine itself to a prima facie
examination of the materials on record and not enter into to evidence
produced by the accused in his/ her defence, since the later exercise
would clearly amount to conducting a mini-trial. In support of the
aforesaid contention, the learned counsel has relied on Rajeev Kourav v.
Baisahab, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 317.
11. Lastly, referring to Muskan v. Ishaan Khan and Ors.,
bearing 2025 INSC 287, learned counsel for the Opposite Parties
contended that even though, on many instances, the Courts have granted
the relief of quashing a criminal proceeding involving matrimonial
disputes, a routine exercise of such power under section 482 of Cr.P.C
should be strictly avoided when the allegations are of a grave and serious
nature. As such, given the fact that the present case involves serious
allegations of demand of dowry along with persistent physical/ mental
harassment and torture, it would be apt to let the criminal proceeding
follow its natural course and culminate in a trial where the guilt, or lack
thereof, of all the parties involved would be comprehensively determined.
12. In such view of the matter, the learned AGA and the learned
counsel for the Opposite Parties opposed the application filed by the
Petitioner and prayed that the present CRLMC application be dismissed
forthwith.
ANANLYSIS OF THE COURT
13. Heard the learned counsel for the respective parties, perused
the F.I.R, the Chargesheet, the statement of witnesses under section 161
Cr.P.C and other documents available on record. On a prima facie perusal
of the F.I.R and the Charge-sheet it appears that the Informant, who is the
Opposite Party No.2 in the present case, has alleged physical and mental
harassment on account of dowry demand from the side of her in-laws.
Pursuant to such allegations, the in-laws family members along with the
present Petitioner, who happens to be the Informant's brother-in-law,
have been implicated as the accused in the present case. On a prima facie
perusal of the F.I.R and the Charge-sheet, it appears that allegations are
indeed serious in nature. However, the present Petitioner has filed this
CRLMC application with a prayer to quash the criminal proceeding
against him on the primary ground that he is in no way involved in the
said occurrence and there is no material on record to entangle him in the
present crime. Accordingly, the Petitioner has prayed for quashing of the
criminal proceeding against him. It is in this factual and legal backdrop
that this Court is called upon to scrutinise the Petitioner's prayer on the
touchstone of the inherent powers vested in it under Section 528 of the
BNSS (formerly Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.), read with the established
principles governing quashing of criminal proceedings.
14. The principles governing the quashing of an F.I.R. or
criminal proceedings are now well settled through a catena of
pronouncements of this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court. As
such, a detailed excursus is unnecessary. It would suffice to make a brief
reference to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604, wherein the scope
of the High Court's inherent powers to quash an F.I.R. or criminal
proceedings was delineated. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in para 102
thereof, laid down the following illustrative scenarios where the High
Court may proceed with the exercise of its inherent powers to prevent the
abuse of the process of the Court or to secure the ends of justice.
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
Having adverted to the time-tested and settled principles
emanating from Bhajan Lal's case (supra), the enquiry must now shift to
the governing touchstone for exercise of inherent jurisdiction. The power
under Section 528 of the BNSS is intended to be invoked only where such
exercise is necessary to give effect to orders under the Code, to prevent
abuse of the process of Court, or to secure the ends of justice.
15. The aforesaid principles have been repeatedly reiterated by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of cases, more recently, in B.N.
John v. State of U.P., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 and in Ajay
Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185.
Relevant paragraphs of the Hon'ble Court's judgement in Ajay Malik's
case (supra) are reproduced hereinbelow;
"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue
orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends
of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited
by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and
profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded
within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act
only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is
essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several
decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High
Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the
threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its
case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,
contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has
been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the
legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the
dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and
omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and
compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)."
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v.
State (NCT of Delhi), reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, has laid
down that the High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under
section 482 Cr.P.C, has to take the allegations in the FIR at the face
value. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that;
"29. It is settled law that power of quashing of a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection
and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the
averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It
has been repeatedly held that save in exceptional cases where non-
interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the
judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of
offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not
be used in a routine manner according to its whims or caprice."
17. Furthermore, in addition to the aforesaid basic principles
which are to be followed by this Court while evaluating whether a
criminal proceeding is fit for being quashed, certain additional
clarifications/ restrictions have also been enumerated by the Apex
Court in many of its decisions. Recently, in Abhishek Singh v. Ajay
Kumar & Ors., bearing 2025 INSC 807, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has further clarified that the High Court, while exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS, is not justified to conduct a mini-
trial. Instead, the High Court is required to restrict its inquiry to
whether the allegations made in the complaint or FIR, if accepted as
true on their face, constitute a prima facie offence (reference, in this
regard, may also be had to the Apex Court's dictum in CBI vs Aryan
Singh, reported in 2023 SCC Online SC 379). In a similar vein, in
Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in
(2019) 18 SCC 191, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, has once again
observed that;
"13. it is clear that for quashing the proceedings, meticulous
analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the
Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not
permissible in exercise of its inherent powers. If the allegations set
out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which
cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the
same in exercise of its inherent powers."
18. Furthermore, in Abhishek Singh's case (supra), the Hon'ble
Apex Court, relying on its prior dictum in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab,
reported in (2020) 3 SCC 317, also stressed that this limited scope
prevents the High Court from delving into the sufficiency or reliability of
the material, or from evaluating the likelihood of conviction. Such
matters are squarely within the domain of the trial court. The underlying
rationale is to ensure that genuine prosecutions are not stifled at the very
outset, while at the same time guarding against abuse of the judicial
process through frivolous or vexatious proceedings. Similar sentiments
were also reflected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Naresh Aneja v.
State of U.P, reported in (2025) 2 SCC 604, wherein it was observed that;
"18. It is well settled that when considering an application
under Section 482CrPC, the court cannot conduct a mini-trial but
instead is to be satisfied that prima facie the offences as alleged are
made out. To put it differently, it is to be seen, without undertaking a
minute examination of the record, that there is some substance in the
allegations made which could meet the threshold of statutory
language."
19. The present matter is predominantly matrimonial in nature
and involves allegation of dowry torture meted out to the Informant-
Opposite Party No.2 by her husband and in-laws. The Petitioner in the
present CRLMC application happens to be one of the in-laws family
member of the Informant. There can be no doubt whatsoever that cases of
the present nature are sensitive and warrant a thorough investigation by
the investigating authorities. However, it must also be borne in mind that
while conducting such investigation the Investigating Authority must
exercise restraint in roping in innocent family members of the principal
accused on general allegation of omnibus nature. So far as matrimonial
disputes are concerned, especially those involving demand for dowry and
offences under the DP Act, the Hon'ble Apex Court on several occasions
has issued warning against implicating the family members of the
accused without any specific allegations against such person. In Geeta
Mehrotra & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Anr., reported in (2012) 10 SCC
741, the Hon'ble Apex Court while overruling the impugned order passed
by the High Court, allowed the appeal on the ground that the F.I.R did not
disclose any material to constitute any offence against the appellants.
Relying on its earlier pronouncements in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad,
reported in (2000) 3 SCC 693 and B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana,
reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675, observed that;
"25. However, we deem it appropriate to add by way of caution
that we may not be misunderstood so as to infer that even if there are
allegations of overt act indicating the complicity of the members of
the family named in the FIR in a given case, cognizance would be
unjustified but what we wish to emphasise by highlighting is that, if
the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific allegation against the
accused more so against the co-accused specially in a matter
arising out of matrimonial bickering, it would be clear abuse of the
legal and judicial process to mechanically send the named accused
in the FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses
specific allegations which would persuade the court to take
cognizance of the offence alleged against the relatives of the main
accused who are prima facie not found to have indulged in
physical and mental torture of the complainant wife. It is the well-
settled principle laid down in cases too numerous to mention, that if
the FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence, the court
would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing the
abuse of process of law. Simultaneously, the courts are expected to
adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing, especially in
cases of matrimonial disputes whether the FIR in fact discloses
commission of an offence by the relatives of the principal accused or
the FIR prima facie discloses a case of overimplication by involving
the entire family of the accused at the instance of the complainant,
who is out to settle her scores arising out of the teething problem or
skirmish of domestic bickering while settling down in her new
matrimonial surrounding."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Likewise in Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar, reported
in (2022) 6 SCC 599, in a dowry demand and harassment case, where a
woman had lodged criminal complaint against her husband and in-laws
but no specific role was attributed to the in-laws, a two-Judge Bench of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it would be unjust if the in-laws are
forced to go through the tribulations of a trial and that general and
omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of
the complainant's husband are forced to undergo trial. The Court
observed that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts
severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must therefore be
discouraged. The Hon'ble Court took note of several rulings wherein
concern was expressed over the misuse of section 498A IPC and the
increased tendency of implicating relatives of the husband in matrimonial
disputes, without analysing the long term ramifications of a trial on the
complainant as well as the accused. It was observed that;
"17. The abovementioned decisions clearly demonstrate that
this Court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the
misuse of Section 498-AIPC and the increased tendency of
implicating relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes, without
analysing the long-term ramifications of a trial on the complainant
as well as the accused. It is further manifest from the said
judgments that false implication by way of general omnibus
allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, if left
unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore,
this Court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from
proceeding against the relatives and in-laws of the husband when
no prima facie case is made out against them.
18. Coming to the facts of this case, upon a perusal of the
contents of the FIR dated 1-4-2019, it is revealed that general
allegations are levelled against the appellants. The complainant
alleged that "all accused harassed her mentally and threatened her
of terminating her pregnancy". Furthermore, no specific and
distinct allegations have been made against either of the appellants
herein i.e. none of the appellants have been attributed any specific
role in furtherance of the general allegations made against them.
This simply leads to a situation wherein one fails to ascertain the
role played by each accused in furtherance of the offence. The
allegations are, therefore, general and omnibus and can at best be
said to have been made out on account of small skirmishes. Insofar
as husband is concerned, since he has not appealed against the order
of the High Court, we have not examined the veracity of allegations
made against him. However, as far as the appellants are concerned,
the allegations made against them being general and omnibus, do
not warrant prosecution."
(Emphasis Supplied)
21. More recently, in Achin Gupta vs. State of Haryana and
Anr., reported in (2025) 3 SCC 756, a division bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court once again referring to its earlier decisions in Mahmood
Ali v. State of U.P., reported in (2023) 15 SCC 488, Geeta
Mehrotra v. State of U.P., reported in (2012) 10 SCC 741, G.V.
Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, reported in (2000) 3 SCC 693 and Arnesh
Kumar v. State of Bihar, reported in (2014) 8 SCC 273, overturned the
impugned judgement of the High Court and allowed the appeal. While
doing so, the Hon'ble Apex Court even urged the legislature to take note
of the pragmatic realities, as enumerated in the judgement, and consider
suitable amendments to Sections 85 and 86 of the Bharatiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 before they were put into force, and held that;
"24. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some
general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record any
specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but abuse of the
process of the court. The court owes a duty to subject the allegations
levelled in the complaint to a thorough scrutiny to find out, prima
facie, whether there is any grain of truth in the allegations or
whether they are made only with the sole object of involving certain
individuals in a criminal charge, more particularly when a
prosecution arises from a matrimonial dispute.
***
35. In one of the recent pronouncements of this Court
in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. [Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P.,
(2023) 15 SCC 488] , authored by one of us (J.B. Pardiwala, J.), the
legal principle applicable apropos Section 482CrPC was examined.
Therein, it was observed that when an accused comes before the
High Court, invoking either the inherent power under Section
482CrPC or the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed,
essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly
frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive of
wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances, the High Court
owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely.
It was further observed that it will not be enough for the Court to
look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not as, in frivolous or
vexatious proceedings, the court owes a duty to look into many
other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the
case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care
and circumspection, to try and read between the lines.
36. For the foregoing reasons, we have reached to the
conclusion that if the criminal proceedings are allowed to continue
against the appellant, the same will be nothing short of abuse of
process of law and travesty of justice. This is a fit case wherein, the
High Court should have exercised its inherent power under Section
482CrPC for the purpose of quashing the criminal proceedings."
(Emphasis Supplied)
22. In Dara Lakshmi Narayana and Ors. v. State of Telengana and
Anr., reported in (2025) 3 SCC 735, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referring
to its earlier decisions on the topic summarised the position as follows;
"27. A mere reference to the names of family members in a
criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific
allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in
the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience,
that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the
husband's family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial
discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported
by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the
basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in
such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal
process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family
members. In the present case, Appellants 2 to 6, who are the
members of the family of Appellant 1 have been living in different
cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant 1
and Respondent 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into
criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process
of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of
them.
***
33. Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand
[Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 7 SCC 667 : (2010) 3
SCC (Cri) 473] held that the courts have to be extremely careful
and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take
pragmatic realties into consideration while dealing with
matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment by the husband's
close relatives who had been living in different cities and never
visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided
would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the
complainant are required to be scrutinised with great care and
circumspection."
(Emphasis supplied)
23. Reverting to the present case, from the undisputed facts of
the case and the allegations made in the F.I.R as well as the Charge-sheet,
two distinct inferences emerge clearly. Firstly, that the Petitioner, at no
point in time has shared a household with the Informant-Opposite Party
No.2. Secondly, there is no specific allegation against the Petitioner.
Rather, the Informant has clearly stated in the F.I.R that the husband and
her in-laws except 'Manas', i.e. the present Petitioner, would assault her
physically and deprive her of food and clothing. Additionally, on perusal
of the statement of witnesses recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C, under
Annexure-3, it can be seen that even though there have been repeated
mention of the husband of the Informant-Opposite Party No.2, there has
been no specific allegation against the present Petitioner which would
disclose the commission of the offences as have been made out in the
present case.
24. So far as the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for
the Opposite Parties are concerned, this Court is of the considered view
that they pertain to a general clarification of the scope of exercise of the
High Court's inherent powers. Additionally, in Muskaan's case (supra),
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has set-aside the impugned order of the High
Court, wherein the petition by the respondents under section 482 of the
Cr.P.C was allowed resulting in quashing of the criminal proceeding
against them, primarily on the ground that the High Court had exceeded
its scope while exercising its inherent powers and had conducted a 'mini-
trial'. In the present case, the core issue that falls for consideration is the
sustainability of the Petitioner's implication, particularly in view of the
conspicuous absence of any specific allegations against him. Therefore, it
would appear that the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the
Opposite Parties are of little assistance to their case.
25. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
and upon a careful examination of the F.I.R., the charge-sheet, the
statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., and
the other materials placed on record, this Court is of the considered view
that no specific role or overt act has been attributed to the Petitioner in
respect of the alleged offences. Even on a prima facie assessment of the
material forming the basis of the prosecution, the allegations do not
disclose the commission of any offence under either the IPC or the D.P.
Act insofar as the Petitioner is concerned. Therefore, this Court has no
hesitation in arriving at the conclusion that the present case falls within
the exceptional category contemplated under the third illustration in
Bhajan Lal's case (supra), justifying interference by this Court in
exercise of its inherent powers under Section 528 of the BNSS (erstwhile
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.) to prevent abuse of the process of Court and
to secure the ends of justice.
26. Accordingly, the present criminal proceeding bearing
Chandrasekharpur P.S. Case No.330 of 2023 corresponding to C.T. Case
No.837 of 2023, for commission of offences punishable under sections
498A/ 341/ 323/ 294/ 506/ 34 of the IPC, read with Section 4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, pending in the court of the learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class-II, Bhubaneswar, is hereby quashed so far as the
present Petitioner.
27. The CRLMC application is allowed. However, there shall be
on order as to costs.
(A.K. Mohapatra)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 2nd February, 2026/S. K. Sethi, P.A..
Designation: Personal Assistant
