Sidhartha Kumar vs Ambika Prasad Mohanty .... Opposite ...
2026 Latest Caselaw 1901 Ori

Orissa High Court

Sidhartha Kumar vs Ambika Prasad Mohanty .... Opposite ... on 27 February, 2026

Author: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi

Bench: Sanjeeb K Panigrahi

                                              IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                                                            CRLMC No.816 of 2024

                                           Sidhartha Kumar                  ....            Petitioner(s)
                                           Samantaray
                                                                         Mr. Bamadev Baral, A.N. Dash,
                                                                            B.K. Jena, G.B. Parida, Adv.

                                                                 -versus-
                                           Ambika Prasad Mohanty     ....              Opposite Party(s)

                                                                          Mr. Diptimaya Pattnaik, Adv.

                                                 CORAM:
                                                 HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI

                                                                       ORDER

Order No. 27.02.2026

1. This matter is taken up through hybrid arrangement.

2. The Petitioner has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of

this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure seeking quashment of the order dated 21st

February, 2024 passed by the learned 2nd Additional

Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar in Crl. Revision No.60/92 of

2023. By the said order, the learned Revisional Court set

aside the order dated 21.09.2023 passed by the learned

Designation: Senior Stenographer

J.M.F.C. (L.R.), Bhubaneswar in 1 C.C. Case No.2686 of 2017 Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK Date: 06-Mar-2026 17:50:09

and directed that the complaint be returned for

presentation before the Court possessing the appropriate

territorial jurisdiction. The present petition thus questions

the legality and propriety of the revisional order whereby

the earlier decision of the learned Magistrate to entertain

the complaint was interfered with on the ground of lack of

territorial jurisdiction.

3. The Petitioner, being the complainant, instituted 1C.C.

Case No.2686 of 2017 before the learned J.M.F.C. (LR),

Bhubaneswar under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, "N.I. Act"), alleging

commission of offence punishable under Section 420 of the

I.P.C.

4. The case of the complainant, in brief, is that on 23.04.2017

the Opposite Party approached the Petitioner at

Bhubaneswar and borrowed a sum of Rs.2,20,000/- as a

friendly loan, assuring that the said amount would be

repaid within a period of one month. However, despite

repeated demands made by the Petitioner after the expiry

of the stipulated period, the Opposite Party failed to

discharge the liability. Eventually, in order to liquidate the

outstanding dues, the Opposite Party issued an account

payee cheque bearing No.046325 dated 25.05.2017 for a sum

of Rs.2,20,000/- drawn on Indian Bank, Bhubaneswar

Branch. The said cheque was thereafter presented by the

Petitioner through his bank, namely Indian Bank,

Choudwar Branch, Cuttack, on 26.05.2017. Upon

presentation, the cheque was returned unpaid on the very

same day with the endorsement "Funds Insufficient",

thereby giving rise to the cause of action for initiating the

present proceeding. Statutory notice dated 02.06.2017 was

issued under Section 138(b) of the N.I. Act, which was

received by the Opposite Party on 03.06.2017. Despite

receipt of the said notice, the cheque amount was not paid

within the statutory period.

5. Subsequently, the Petitioner instituted a complaint before

the Court of the learned S.D.J.M., Bhubaneswar alleging

commission of the offence arising out of the dishonour of

the aforesaid cheque. Upon taking cognizance of the matter,

the case was later transferred to the Court of the learned

J.M.F.C. (L.R.), Bhubaneswar for the purpose of trial and

disposal in accordance with law.

6. During the course of the trial, the Petitioner-Complainant

entered the witness box and was examined as well as cross-

examined on 18.11.2019. Thereafter, the statement of the

accused was recorded on 13.09.2022, following which the

matter was posted for adducing defence evidence. The case

thus had substantially progressed in the trial and had

reached the stage of defence evidence.

7. At that juncture, the Opposite Party/accused filed a

petition on 13.09.2020 raising an objection with regard to

the territorial jurisdiction of the learned trial Court and

questioning the maintainability of the complaint in view of

the provisions contained in the Negotiable Instruments Act,

1881. The objection was specifically founded on Section

142(2) of the said Act, contending that the Court at

Bhubaneswar lacked the requisite territorial jurisdiction to

entertain and try the complaint. On such premise, a prayer

was made before the learned trial Court to adjudicate upon

the said objection relating to jurisdiction and to pass

appropriate orders in that regard.

8. The learned J.M.F.C. (L.R.), Bhubaneswar, upon hearing

the parties and considering the materials available on

record, rejected the said petition by order dated 21.09.2023.

The learned trial Court, inter alia, observed that the

objection relating to territorial jurisdiction had been raised

at a belated stage after the trial had substantially

progressed and that the matter had already advanced to a

stage where the statement of the accused had been

recorded. In such circumstances, the learned Court held

that the plea was not maintainable and declined to entertain

the same.

9. Aggrieved thereby, the Opposite Party preferred Crl.

Rev. No.60/92 of 2023 before the court of learned 2nd Addl.

Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar, challenging the same.

10. The learned Revisional Court, by judgment dated

21.02.2024, allowed the revision petition and set aside the

order passed by the learned trial Court. While doing so, the

Revisional Court directed that the complaint be returned to

the complainant for presentation before the Court having

competent territorial jurisdiction at Cuttack. The Revisional

Court observed that, in view of the statutory mandate

contained in Section 142(2) of the Negotiable Instruments

Act, 1881, the jurisdiction to entertain and try a complaint

arising out of dishonour of cheque vests in the Court within

whose territorial limits the bank branch of the payee, where

the cheque is presented for collection, is situated. Since the

cheque in the present case had been presented by the

complainant in his account at Indian Bank, Choudwar

Branch, Cuttack, the Revisional Court held that the Courts

at Cuttack alone possessed the requisite territorial

jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaint. Learned counsel

for the Petitioner contends that:

i. The cheque was issued and handed over at

Bhubaneswar. Hence, Bhubaneswar Court has

jurisdiction;

ii. The plea of jurisdiction was raised belatedly and

amounts to waiver and admission;

iii. The learned Sessions Judge failed to consider the

provisions under Section 115 i.e. principles of

estoppel and under Section 58 of the Evidence Act

i.e. facts once admitted cannot be denied;

iv. Refiling the complaint would result in de novo trial

causing prejudice;

v. The Revisional Court misinterpreted Section 142(2)

and Section 142A of the N.I. Act.

11. Per contra, learned counsel for the Opposite Party,

while supporting the impugned judgment passed by the

learned Revisional Court, contends that the question of

territorial jurisdiction goes to the very root of the matter

and cannot be conferred upon a Court by consent,

acquiescence, waiver or estoppel of the parties. It is further

submitted that the issue is squarely governed by the

statutory framework contained in the amended provisions

of the Negotiable Instruments Act, particularly Section

142(2) thereof, which clearly delineates the Court

competent to entertain a complaint arising out of dishonour

of cheque. According to the learned counsel, once the

statute expressly prescribes the Court having territorial

jurisdiction, the same must be strictly adhered to

irrespective of the stage at which the objection is raised. On

such premise, it is contended that the learned Revisional

Court has rightly interfered with the order of the learned

Magistrate and directed return of the complaint for

presentation before the competent Court. Accordingly, it is

prayed that the present CRLMC, being devoid of merit,

deserves to be dismissed.

12. Heard learned counsel for the Petitioner and learned

counsel for the Opposite Party. Perused the available

materials on record.

13. The principal question that arises for consideration in

the present case is whether the learned Revisional Court

was justified in directing return of the complaint on the

ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction after the trial had

substantially progressed and had reached the stage of

defence evidence.

14. At the outset, it is necessary to note that the offence

alleged in the present case arises under Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The law relating to

territorial jurisdiction in such matters underwent significant

legislative clarification through the introduction of Section

142(2) of the Act by the 2015 amendment. The provision

stipulates that where a cheque is delivered for collection

through an account, the Court within whose jurisdiction the

branch of the bank where the payee maintains his account

is situated shall have jurisdiction to try the offence.

15. It is apt to quote the amended provision of under

Section 142A of N.I. Act, which reads as under:

"142.A Validation for transfer of pending cases- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any judgment, decree, order or direction of any court, all cases transferred to the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of section 142, as amended by the Negotiable Instruments (Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, shall be deemed to have been transferred under this Act, as if that sub-

section had been in force at all material times".

16. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the cheque in

question was presented by the complainant through his

bank account at Indian Bank, Choudwar Branch, Cuttack.

Prima facie, therefore, the Court at Cuttack would fall

within the statutory framework contemplated under

Section 142(2) of the N.I. Act. However, what assumes

significance in the present case is the stage at which the

objection regarding territorial jurisdiction was raised. The

record reveals that the complainant had already been

examined and cross-examined and the statement of the

accused had also been recorded. The matter had

progressed to the stage of defence evidence. Thus, the

trial had substantially advanced and the evidentiary

process had nearly reached completion.

17. It is a well-settled principle of procedural jurisprudence

that objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, unlike

objections relating to inherent lack of jurisdiction, are

essentially procedural in nature and are required to be

raised at the earliest possible opportunity. If such

objections are permitted to be raised after the trial has

substantially progressed, it would defeat the very

objective of expeditious adjudication and would cause

serious prejudice to the complainant who has already led

evidence before the Court.

18. In the present case, the learned Magistrate took note of

this aspect and held that the plea regarding territorial

jurisdiction had been raised belatedly after substantial

progress of the trial. The learned Magistrate was

therefore justified in declining to entertain such objection

at that stage of the proceeding.

19. The learned Revisional Court, however, interfered with

the order of the learned Magistrate and directed return of

the complaint solely on the ground that territorial

jurisdiction vested in the Court at Cuttack under Section

142(2) of the N.I. Act. In doing so, the learned Revisional

Court appears to have overlooked the stage of the

proceedings and the prejudice that would be caused by

directing return of the complaint after the trial had

almost reached its fag end.

20. It is trite that procedural provisions are intended to

advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Where

the trial has already substantially progressed and the

parties have participated in the proceedings without

raising timely objection, directing a fresh presentation of

the complaint before another Court would inevitably

result in a de novo trial, thereby causing unnecessary

delay and hardship.

21. Having considered the afforested facts and submissions,

this Court is of the view that the learned Magistrate had

exercised his discretion judiciously in declining to

entertain the belated objection regarding territorial

jurisdiction. The interference made by the learned

Revisional Court in such circumstances cannot be

sustained.

22. Consequently, the impugned judgment dated 21.02.2024

passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge,

Bhubaneswar in Crl. Revision No.60/92 of 2023 is hereby

set aside. The order dated 21.09.2023 passed by the

learned J.M.F.C. (L.R.), Bhubaneswar in 1 C.C. Case

No.2686 of 2017 stands restored.

23. The learned trial Court is directed to proceed with the

trial of the case from the stage at which it presently

stands and dispose of the same in accordance with law

with due expedition.

24. The learned trial Court shall return the complaint in

terms of the revisional order, if not already returned.

25. Pending application (s), if any, stand disposed of.

26. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi) Judge

Sipun