[Cites 12, Cited by 0]

Orissa High Court

M.V. Act vs Gulapi Disari & Others on 6 February, 2026

Author: G. Satapathy

Bench: G. Satapathy

     IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                   MACA NO.215 of 2025
                   & I.A. No. 213 of 2025

   (In the matter of application under Section-173(1) of
   M.V. Act, 1988).
   National Insurance Co. Ltd., ...                 Appellant
   Koraput
                       -versus-

   Gulapi Disari & Others             ...       Respondents

   For Appellant         : Mr. S. Satpathy, Advocate

   For Respondents      : Mr. R.K. Pati, Advocate(R-7)
                          None(R1 to 6)
            CORAM:      JUSTICE G. SATAPATHY
     DATE OF HEARING & JUDGMENT: 06.02.2026 (ORAL)

G. Satapathy, J.

1. The present Interlocutory Application in

I.A. No. 213 of 2025 U/S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963

has been filed by the appellant-petitioner to condone

the delay of 313 days in preferring the appeal.

2. Heard, Mr. Subrat Satapathy, learned

counsel for the appellant-insurer and Mr. R.K. Pati,

learned counsel for R-7 in the matter and perused the

record, but none appears for R-1 to 6 despite valid

service of notice of the limitation petition.

3. In support of the claim for condonation of

delay, the appellant-insurer has in fact taken the

following averments in paragraph 4 of the limitation

petition which reads as under: -

"4. That, it is humbly submitted that after pronouncement of judgment the counsel for the Petitioner/O.P No. 2 did not inform about the pronunciation of judgment to the T.P. Hub office of the Petitioner rather remained silent. After few months the T.P. Hub office of the Petitioner received an execution notice in the month of May 2024, then on quarry the Hub office came to know about pronunciation of judgment in MAC Case No. 02/2021. Thereafter, the T.P Hub office frequently contacted the concerned advocate even either by telephone and E-mail, to provide certified copies of judgment and other relevant documents, but of no result. Finally finding no other way out one staff was deputed to contact the said concerned Advocate to get copies and opinion, then only certified copies of the entire record were obtained from 1st MACT Jeypore and on further request the concerned advocate provided his opinion on 07.12.2024 which the office received on 17.12.2024. Thereafter, those documents scrutinized through the legal department of the T.P Hub and found the judgment/order is need to be assailed in appeal as on the date of accident the offending Bus was having no route permit, hence the company is liable from exoneration. In this regard opinions from different corners were sought for & received positive nods towards filling appeal. Then the Legal Cell forwarded the entire file in the first week of January' 2025 to present advocate for filing appeal, but by that time it sustained delay of 323 days. Therefore, this petitioner humbly submits that delay caused due to

above mentioned reasons are not intentional or deliberate from its side. True copies of mail communication between T.P Hub and conducting panel Advocate appended to this petition for better appreciation of this Hon'ble Court."

4. In the aforesaid backdrop, Mr. Satapathy,

however, submits that since there was a

communication gap between the advocate and the

Insurance Company, the delay has occasioned and

thereby, the delay is neither intentional nor deliberate,

rather is due to unavoidable cause and therefore, the

delay in preferring the appeal may kindly be condoned,

but Mr. R.K. Pati, learned counsel for R-7, however,

submits that the delay can never be said to be not

intentional, rather it is intentional and the appellant-

Insurance Company is only to avoid its liability has

preferred this appeal with a delay of 313 days and,

therefore, the delay should not be condoned.

5. It is no doubt true that the appellant-

Insurance Company has taken the plea of

miscommunication between the company and its

advocate which is the primary reason for condonation

of delay, but it can never be disputed that the

Insurance Company is a statutory body and it cannot

be treated like a simple litigant, more particularly when

the Insurance Company is dealing such matters day in

and day out. Further, compensation to the victim of

motor vehicular accident is a product of Motor Vehicle

Accident Act, 1988, which is a beneficial & social

legislation and the aim and objective of such Act is to

provide succor to the victims of accident only to

prevent them from destitution and vagrancy. In this

case, the impugned judgment was passed on

28.11.2023 in a claim of the year 2021 and the

Insurance Company has fought the claim of the

appellant diligently before the learned Tribunal,

however, it has not preferred the appeal in time.

Further, the Insurance Company albeit received the

notice of execution in the month of May, 2024, but it

could not file the present appeal immediately thereafter

and after seven months of receipt of notice of execution

of award in the claim, the Insurance Company could file

the appeal, however, there is no plausible explanation

for the time consumed between May, 2024 to January,

2025.

6. No doubt, the learned counsel for the

appellant-insurer has relied upon the decision in N.

Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy; AIR 1998 SC

3222, wherein the Apex Court has observed as under:

"It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court. Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter; acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation, whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on whole untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower court."

6.1. Further, the counsel for the appellant-insurer

relies upon the decision in Mool Chandra vs. union of

India (UOI) & Others; MANU/SC/0835/2024,

wherein at paragraphs-21 & 22, the Apex Court has

observed as under: -

"21. In this background when we turn our attention to the facts on hand, it would emerge from the records that Appellant being aggrieved by the dismissal of the O.A. No. 2066 of 2020 on the ground of delay had approached the Delhi High Court challenging the same. The High Court on the ground of penalty Imposed being a minor penalty, refused to entertain the writ petition or in other words confirmed the order impugned before the Tribunal on merits. This Court in Commissioner, Nagar Parishad, Bhilwara v. Labour Court, Bhilwara and Anr. reported in MANU/SC/0122/2009: 2009 (3) SCC 525 has taken a view that while deciding an application for condonation of delay the High Court ought not to have gone into the merits of the case. It has been further held:

5. While deciding an application for condonation of delay, it is well settled that the High Court ought not to have gone into the merits of the case and would have only seen whether sufficient cause had been shown by the Appellant for condoning the delay in filing the appeal before It. We ourselves have also examined the application filed Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before the High Court and, in our opinion, the delay of 178 days has been properly explained by the Appellant. That being the position, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court. Consequently, the appeal filed before the High Court is restored to its original file. The High Court is requested to decide the appeal on merit in accordance with law after giving hearing to the parties and after passing a reasoned order.

22. If negligence can be attributed to the Appellant, then necessarily the delay which has not been condoned by the Tribunal and

affirmed by the High Court deserves to be accepted. However, if no fault can be laid at the doors of the Appellant and cause shown is sufficient then we are of the considered view that both the Tribunal and the High Court were in error in not adopting a liberal approach or justice-oriented approach to condone the delay.

This Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Anr. v. Shah Hyder Beig and Ors.

MANU/SC/0022/2000: 1999: INSC: 549: 2000 (2) SCC 48 has held:

6. Incidentally this point of delay and laches was also raised before the High Court and on this score the High Court relying upon the decision in Abhyankar case (N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India [MANU/MH/0408/1994:

(1995) 1 Mah LJ 503]) observed that it is not an inflexible Rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must and necessarily refuse to entertain the petition filed after a period of three years or more which is the normal period of limitation for filing a suit. The Bombay High Court in Abhyankar case [MANU/MH/0408/1994: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503] stated that the question is one of discretion to be followed in the facts and circumstances of each case and further stated:

The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as such but the test is whether by reason of delay, there is such negligence on the part of the Petitioner so as to infer that he has given up his claim or where the Petitioner has moved the writ court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.

6.2. In Post Master General and others

Vrs. Living Media India Ltd. and another; (2012) 3

SCC 563, the Apex Court in paragraph 29 has

observed as under: -

"29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the Government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept their usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/ years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The Government Departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the Government Department. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."

6.3. Moreover, this Court considers it profitable to

refer to the decision in G. Ramegowda, Major &

Others Vrs. Special Land Acquisition Officer,

Bangalore; (1988) 2 SCC 142, wherein the Apex

Court in paragraph-14 has held as under: -

"14. The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court.

See: Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd.; Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi; Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan; Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered on the particularities of its own special facts. xx xx xx xx xx."

7. It is also held by the Apex Court in

paragraph 28 in Post Master General (supra) that

the claim on account of impersonal machinery and

inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several

notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern

technology being used and available. The law of

limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the

Govt. In view of the aforesaid facts and the law laid

down by the Apex Court and on a careful scrutiny of

the materials placed on record and the grounds taken

by the appellant-insurer in support of claim for

condonation of delay and the aim and objective of