[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Orissa High Court
M/S. Re-Sustainability Ltd vs Bhubaneswar Municipal .... Opposite ... on 10 April, 2026
Author: R.K. Pattanaik
Bench: R.K. Pattanaik
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
AFR W.P.(C) No.1182 of 2024
M/s. Re-Sustainability Ltd. .... Petitioner
Mr. M. Mishra, Advocate
-Versus-
Bhubaneswar Municipal .... Opposite Party
Corporation
Mr. M.K. Mishra, Sr. Advocate
Mr. M.K. Panda, Advocate
Mr. N. Panda-1, Advocate
CORAM:
JUSTICE R.K. PATTANAIK
DATE OF HEARING:16.12.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:10.04.2026
1.
Instant writ petition is filed by the petitioner seeking a
declaration that the actions of the opposite party (in short,
'the BMC') in not abiding by the terms of the Concession
Agreement (CA) dated 6th November, 2013 at Annexure-1 is
arbitrary, illegal and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India followed by a direction to the BMC to
pay damages in the nature of compensation towards the
injury caused to it due to such arbitrariness and illegality
and realization of Rs.73,25,10,241/- (rupees seventy-three
crores twenty-five lacs ten thousand two hundred forty-one)
payable as on 30th November, 2023 along with interest,
costs and expenses, pendent lite and future interest @ 9%
per annum till such realization under the contract with such
other reliefs granted on the grounds inter alia that such a
direction with appropriate writs/orders to the BMC is
necessary in the interest of justice.
2. In fact, the petitioner is aggrieved by the improper
conduct and dealings of the BMC for denying it the
legitimate contractual claims under the CA and to the
contrary having imposed penalties in an arbitrary and
unjustified manner and in complete ignorance of the
statutory responsibilities assigned under the Odisha
Municipal Corporation Act, 2003 (in short, 'the Act'),
Municipal Solid Wastes (Management and Handling) Rules,
2000 (shortly as 'the MSW Rules') and Solid Waste
Management Rules, 2016 (hence called as 'the SWM
Rules') qua handling of waste management, more
particularly, when it has fulfilled the obligations for the
period more than the prescribed time line under Annexure-1.
The actions of the BMC, which are alleged to be illegal, are
for (i) non-payment of tipping fees with escalated rates;(ii)
wrongful deductions of 4% from each monthly bill; (iii)
levy of arbitrary penalties contrary to terms of the CA; (iv)
unilaterally withholding 20% amount from June 2019 bill
for the additional services rendered during the 'Fani'
cyclone period; (v) arbitrary withholding of consideration
qua services rendered during the Covid-19 (2020/21);(vi)
denying payment relating to services rendered in relation to
MCC works and Kalinga Stadium;(vii) further withholding
payment towards tonnage loss incurred upon deployment of
NGO vehicles for door-to-door collection; and finally(viii)
non-payment of interest claims on delayed receipts.
3. According to the petitioner, it is a Company registered
under the Companies Act, 1956 involved in the business of
waste management (Municipal), hazardous and biomedical,
and other environment solutions having operational
experience of more than 25 years and considered to be a
pioneer in the above specialized field and earlier known as
Ramky Enviro Engineers Ltd. changed to the present with
effect from 10th February, 2022 and has been issued a
Certificate of Incorporation as per Annexure-4.
3.1. The Government of India through Ministry of
Environment and Forest notified the MSW Rules in exercise
of power conferred under Section 3 of the Environment
Protection Act, 1986, by virtue of which it was made
mandatory for every Municipal Authority to implement a
scientific solid waste management system wherein solid
wastes are duly collected, transported, processed and the
residual inert is disposed of in an engineered sanitary
landfill. The procedures through which such waste is
generated in any city or town shall be managed and handled
are provided under Schedule-2 of the MSW Rules.
Referring to Rules 4 & 7 of the MSW Rules, it is pleaded on
record by the petitioner that the BMC is thus entrusted with
statutory responsibilities pertaining to solid waste
management within its jurisdiction and such responsibilities
include collection, treatment and proper disposal of
offensive sewerage, wastes and rubbish. The further
pleading is that the BMC is also responsible for maintaining
and cleaning drains, drainage works and public facilities and
other conveniences, moreover, it is accountable to adhere to
the Rules framed by the Government of India under the
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, which regulates the
management and handling of solid wastes.
3.2. In order to make the waste management more efficient
and to follow the mandatory mechanism prescribed under
the MSW Rules, the concept of Public-Private Partnership
(in short, 'the PPP') for collection, segregation, processing
and residual inert disposal and engineered sanitary landfill
has been used. According to the petitioner, the objective is
not only to efficaciously collect residual wastes but also to
dispose it of in a scientific manner, which is economically
viable and environmentally benign as per the Rules. To
manage the waste collection and disposal in terms of the
Rules and the Act, the BMC invited proposals from eligible
bidders towards the same and on 26th February, 2013, it
issued Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) followed by a
Corrigendum (Annexure-6) on 22nd March, 2013 pursuant to
the pre-bid meeting held on 13th March, 2013, whereby,
necessary clarifications were issued upon considering the
suggestions received from the bidders. Consequent to the
BMC's proposal for collection and transportation of
Municipal solid wastes, the petitioner submitted its bid for
Package-I in respect of 12 Wards, which was approved by
the Housing and Urban Development Department,
Government of Odisha, whereafter, the Letter of Acceptance
(LoA) i.e. Annexure-7 was issued in its favour, later to
which, the CA was executed for a period of seven years and
subsequently, a supplementary agreement dated 20th
October, 2014 came into being revising it to 15 Wards. In
fact, the petitioner was awarded the project for collection
and transportation of Municipal solid wastes for fifteen
Wards and it contained the scope of work in detail.
3.3. Referring to the relevant provisions of the CA and in
particular, Clause 3.19 thereof, it is pleaded by the petitioner
that even though the BMC has the authority to impose
penalties, it was to be followed by an order. According to
the petitioner, Clause 3.25 deals with payment mechanism
and it provides a step-by-step and clear procedure for
submission of bills and its clearance as well as deadline for
making such payment, inasmuch as, it is a comprehensive
set of guidelines for compliance throughout the payment
process from submission of bills to verify the same and
payments while taking into account any such penalty that
have been levied but the exercise as contemplated has not
been duly followed and therefore, the decisions of the BMC,
as per the petitioner, are arbitrary for non-compliance of
Clause 3.25 of the CA, which enumerates situations,
wherein, deductions can be made, amounts withheld and
penalties levied as well as solutions to what is needed to be
considered in case of non-payment in a timely manner and
furthermore, the BMC failed in making payments taking
into account the escalation of rates for computation of
amount in terms of Clause 3.26 thereof, wherein, a clear cut
calculation of rates applicable as per different components
has been prescribed.
3.4. That the CA expired on 5th November, 2020, however,
by unilateral extensions, the BMC kept on extending the
tenure of the contract and such extension continued on
regular intervals, but by letters of request, the petitioner
expressed its unequivocal intention for closure of the
contract and handing over the site in time. However, again
with a letter issued on 11th October, 2021 stating therein that
the parties entered into a supplementary agreement
expanding the scope of work, the BMC extended the
contract till 5th January, 2022 but it was inclined to notify to
handover the project fifteen days prior to the extended date
i.e. 5th January, 2022 as per Clause 3.23 of the CA and
furthermore when has obligations to intimate the members
of the workforce for closure of the project with such
information shared with them with a month's prior notice.
3.5. After the petitioner expressed its disinterestedness in
continuing the services and had given a formal intimation to
the BMC to initiate pre-closure under the CA and for
making alternative arrangements for replacement so that the
services remain uninterrupted and in connection therewith,
it issued the letters vide Annexures-9 series, 10 series and
11 series to the BMC. However, despite the above intention
made clear, the BMC repeatedly issued unilateral extensions
and finally on 10th October, 2022, issued notice of closure to
it stating therein that the CA was to expire with
retrospective effect from 30th September, 2022 and further
communicated that it would require to demobilize all its
assets, tools, vehicles and equipments within a month,
which has been a decision of the BMC in contravention to
the terms of the contract, as such a decision caused financial
loss and damage to it. According to the petitioner, the BMC
is under obligation to issue a completion certificate,
however, failed to do so effectively disabling it from
participating in tenders of similar nature despite its
admission of completion by letter dated 10th October, 2022,
in response to which, necessary correspondences were made
with a request to clear the outstanding dues payable to the
petitioner but it was of no avail and lastly, on 31st January,
2023, the completion certificate was issued without clearing
any such dues and because of such conduct, there has been a
gross failure to abide by the reciprocal obligations under the
CA from the side of the BMC. Since there was unilateral
extension of the contract and finally with inordinate delay
that the completion certificate arrived in the month of
January, 2023 and that too, without clearing the outstanding
payments, as pleaded by the petitioner, hence, was
compelled to file the writ petition when the BMC failed to
resolve the issue even amicably in view of Clause3.30(a) of
the CA despite best efforts put forward from its side.
According to the petitioner, it sought to resolve all the
outstanding disagreements/disputes with the BMC multiple
times through amicable settlement but the same yielded no
fruitful result.
3.6. It is further pleaded that the decision of the BMC on
each of the heads is arbitrary including imposition of
penalties and deduction of amounts from the legitimate bills
payable to the petitioner, which fulfilled its obligations to
the best of the abilities in terms of the CA. It is alleged that
the imposed penalties are not according to the provisions of
the contract since Clause 3.19 thereof specifically stipulates
that the BMC is required to record the service shortfall on a
daily basis and communicate the same to it and a
consolidated monthly achievement was to be taken under
consideration while evaluating the purposes, however,
instead of informing any such shortfall in service, the
penalties were imposed without intimation, which is
contrary to the CA itself. With the above facts pleaded on
record, the action of the BMC is questioned as illegal.
4. The following are the grounds challenging the decision of
the BMC, such as, (i) right to live and personal liberty
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
includes within its right to have clean environment and
ecology, which is considered to be a paramount
responsibility of the State to ensure the same and that the
environmental impact on the society and the larger
ramification in the world dealing with the complex nature of
environmental issues in tandem with national policy and the
responsibility of the Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) with all
such activities in public utility service and discharge of
contractual obligations by a concessionaire and the related
projects are not merely contracts whereby the remedies only
to be adjudicated before a civil court's jurisdiction, rather,
all such aspects are to be taken cognizance by this Court in
exercise of its writ jurisdiction in order to redress the
grievances of the petitioner in order to ensure and safeguard
the Fundamental Rights of the inhabitants of the city of
Bhubaneswar; (ii) upon execution of the CA during
operation of the period of contract, the difficulties faced by
the petitioner while performing contractual obligations
towards public utility service are the issues, which are writ
large and require indulgence of this Court for the purpose of
enumerating guidelines for the future contracts for being
smooth and operationally efficient; (iii) the Apex Court over
a period of time has formulated a very fulcrum of
jurisprudential evolution of public law wherein the issue in
respect of the State or its agencies executing a contract with
a private entity, the issues and remedies thereof, have been
dealt with notwithstanding availability of remedy lying
within the civil court's jurisdiction at Bhubaneswar, hence,
its actions are amenable to the test of arbitrariness, which is
engraved in Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which
means even, the action of a party is still amenable to writ
jurisdiction to test the fairness in the judgment and the very
reason for seeking indulgence of this Court is to
demonstrate the conduct and the manner by which the BMC
responded while discharging its contractual obligations
under the CA and the violations, which are being alleged,
are not limited to the conditions of the contract but it is an
outcome of Executive's highhandedness taking advantage of
its dominant position, which has substantially prejudiced the
operation of the contract and also the financial wellbeing of
the petitioner; (iv) referring to the case laws cited, the
petitioner finally pleads that every action of the State and its
instrumentality whether contractual or otherwise is
subjected to judicial review on the anvil of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. As a matter of contractual right,
according to the petitioner, it is entitled to receive tipping
fees at the revised escalated rate during the term of the CA
and for the extended period with interest. According to the
petitioner, the BMC arbitrarily levied penalties and
deducted amounts from the legitimate bills payable to it
despite fulfillment of the contractual obligations and
therefore, such a decision is in contravention of the contract.
The petitioner alleges that despite the obligations under the
CA were discharged, the BMC arbitrarily deducted 4% from
the monthly bills for MSW Funds, which is nowhere
provided in contract; withholding payment of amount
towards the services provided during 'Fani' cyclone for no
apparent reasons; not making payment towards the MCC
and the services provided in Kalinga Stadium at
Bhubaneswar on the instructions of the BMC; not releasing
payment towards compensation for tonnage loss due to
deployment of the NGO vehicles for door-to-door
collections of waste contrary to the terms of the contract and
the above conduct clearly revealed the disinterestedness
shown in performing their part of duty under the CA and
hence, being an instrumentality of the State, any such
decision detrimental to the interest of the petitioner must
have to be backed by reasons and if it does not satisfy the
test of reasonableness, it shall automatically attract the vice
of the arbitrariness.
5. On the contrary, a preliminary objection has been raised
by the BMC regarding maintainability of the writ petition in
view of the directions for recovery demanded by the
petitioner arising out of a contract dated 6th November, 2013
since such demand on each head is seriously disputed and
specifically denied. It is pleaded by the BMC that in the
garb of a writ petition, the petitioner demands recovery of
money, which is not legally impermissible. That apart,
according to the BMC, the petitioner has knocked the doors
of this Court after nine years in order to avoid limitation of
three years to institute a suit and hence, the cause of action
is also time barred and therefore, the writ petition deserves
to be dismissed on such ground and also for the delay and
laches and as per the records, the entitlements have been
already paid to the petitioner after its determination in terms
of the CA. According to the BMC, on a plain reading of the
averments in the writ petition and the relief demanded on
each of the claims put forth is based on disputed questions
of facts, which are of complex nature and require evidence
and physical verification on the field and hence, the same
cannot be adjudicated upon in a writ petition and therefore,
it shall have to be dismissed. It is pleaded further that when
the entire amount claimed by the petitioner has been
disputed, jurisdiction of this Court though wide enough but
in respect of pure contractual matters, the parties should be
directed to move the forum agreed to. The contention is that
when there is no admission on the part of the BMC and it is
not possible to crystalise the amount payable to the
petitioner without verification of records and determination
of the disputed questions of facts, the writ jurisdiction
should not be invoked since the law is well settled that
money claims per se arising out of a contractual obligation
are normally not to be entertained barring in exceptional
circumstances. As per the BMC, it has acted as per the terms
and conditions of the contract and there is no illegality
committed while considering the entitlements of the
petitioner.
6. Heard Mr. M. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Mr. M.K. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate along with
Mr. N. Panda-I, learned counsel appearing for the BMC.
7. Law is well settled that a writ court can exercise
discretionary powers vested under Articles 226 & 227 of the
Constitution of India for curbing arbitrariness of the State or
its instrumentalities whenever alleged and demonstrated. In
Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi & others Vrs. State of U.P.
& others (1991) 1 SCC 212 cited at the Bar, it has been
held that the impact of every State action is also on public
interest and therefore, even if the dispute is purely
contractual, the challenge to a contract may be on the
ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India
since the conduct of the BMC is alleged as arbitrary,
unreasonable, unfair and in clear contravention of the
provisions of the CA. Further referring to a decision in
Suresh Kumar Wadhwa Vrs. State of Madhya Pradesh
and others (2017) 16 SCC 757, it is contended by Mr.
Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner that a party to a
contract has no right to unilaterally alter the terms and
conditions of the same and since the contract has been
extended as a matter of contractual right, the petitioner is
entitled to receive the tipping fees at the revised escalated
rate during the extended period. That apart, the petitioner is
entitled to payment of interest on the outstanding amount
since the principle of carrying cost is nothing but restitution
for the time value of money lost and in order to adequately
compensate, it is entitled to interest, which is also a well
settled law, as according to Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for
the petitioner, referring to the decision in Uttar Haryana
Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. And another Vrs. Adani Power
(Mundra) Ltd. And another (2023) 2 SCC 624. The other
citations are to the following, namely, Vice-Chairman and
Managing Director, City & Industrial Development
Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd. And another Vrs.
Shishir Realty Private Ltd. & others (2021) SCC OnLine
SC 1141 regarding applicability of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India to the conduct of a Government body
in a private contract; Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd.
Vrs. EMTA Coal Ltd. And another AIR 2022 SC 2478
on the maintainability of writ petition concerning
contractual disputes in certain circumstances; and ABL
International Ltd. And another Vrs. Export Credit
Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. & others (2004) 3
SCC 553 and Joshi Technologies International Inc. Vrs.
Union of India & others (2015) 7 SCC 728; and Union of
India & others Vrs. Tantia Construction Pvt. Ltd. (2011)
5 SCC 697 have been placed for reliance from the side of
the petitioner to contend that the action of the BMC is
violative of the provisions of the contract and for such
arbitrary action, the writ jurisdiction is invocable and so the
demands payable to the petitioner.
8. On the other hand, Mr. M.K. Mishra, learned Senior
Advocate appearing for the opposite party to counter the
allegations of arbitrariness and at the same time questioning
the maintainability of the writ petition especially when the
cause of action demanding any such relief(s) is clearly time-
barred cited the following decisions, such as, State of Bihar
& others Vrs. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. (2002) 1
SCC 216; Joshi Technologies International INC. Vrs.
Union of India & others (2015) 7 SCC 728; Union of
India & others Vrs. Puna Hinda (2021) 10 SCC 690;
Divisional Forest Officer Vrs. Biswanath Tea Co. Ltd.
(1981) 3 SCC 238; State of U.P. & others Vrs. Bridge
and Roof Company (India) Ltd. (1996) 6 SCC 22; Shiv
Dass Vrs. Union of India & others (2007) 9 SCC 274;
Rushibhai Jagdishbhai Pathak Vrs. Bhavnagar
Municipal Corporation (2022) 18 SCC 144; and V.
Chandrasekaran and another Vrs. Administrative
Officer & others (2012) 12 SCC 133.
9. The Apex Court in a catena of decisions concluded that
Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not to be invoked
for adjudicating any such dispute arising out of contracts. In
Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd. (supra), it has been held
and observed that under the law when a party is having the
remedy to approach a court of competent jurisdiction for
appropriate relief on account of breach of contract and when
any such alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open,
the same is required to be pursued instead of invoking the
writ jurisdiction and equally the existence of alternative
remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue
writs, but ordinarily that would be a good ground in
refusing to exercise the discretion. In the decision (supra),
the Apex Court referring to the contentions raised in the
affidavits and counter affidavits concluded that it would
hardly be a ground for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of alleged
breach of contract. It has been further held therein that
serious disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with
regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and
determined on the basis of evidence adduced before a civil
court. In Puna Hinda (supra), it has been held that the
dispute could not have been raised by way of a writ petition
on disputed questions of facts and therein observed further
that though the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is wide but pure contractual matters in
field of private law having no statutory flavour are better
adjudicated upon before the forum agreed to by parties,
inasmuch as, a dispute as to whether amount is payable or
not and/or how much amount is payable are disputed
questions of facts especially when there is no admission on
the part of the State or its agencies to infer that amount
stands crystalised. The above decisions are referred to from
the side of the BMC to convince the Court that any such
dispute raised by the petitioner on the strength of a
contractual agreement should not be entertained but instead
to be left open for determination in appropriate forum all the
more when there has been delay of nine years and as such,
institution of a suit is barred by limitation. Essentially, the
argument is that when the suit is no more liable and grossly
barred, on the self-same cause of action, the petitioner's
claim for recovery should not be entertained at all. Mr. M.K.
Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner cites the
decision in Shiv Dass (supra) to contend that therein the
Apex Court in case of delay in filing the writ petition
beyond three years in a matter wherein disability pension for
an Army employee was demanded held and concluded that
negligence, delay and laches on the part of the writ
petitioner may be a ground to refuse considering the same.
10. Law is well settled that in case of a contract having no
statutory flavour, a writ court is not to entertain any such
action leaving the parties to approach the appropriate forum.
That apart, whenever there is a claim put forth demanding
payment of outstanding dues and specifically denied by the
State or its instrumentalities and it cannot be crystallized, in
such a situation, determination of the outstanding payable
needs evidence, hence, the writ court is to step aside leaving
it for parties to seek relief before the forum agreed to as a
part of the contract. Insofar as the case of the petitioner is
concerned, it is no doubt a contract and the contract
emanated from a statutory obligation imposed on the BMC,
the Court is to consider whether at this juncture any such
direction may be issued to the BMC vis-à-vis the relief
sought for. The petitioner's demand stands at a staggering
amount of Rs.73,25,10,241/-, which would obviously
require scrutiny and verification. When for the
determination, the materials on record are necessarily to be
evaluated, the contention of the BMC is that the writ
petition is not to be entertained. But considering the fact that
there can be a decision on the basis of the contract and in
terms thereof regarding the entitlements, this Court is of the
view that a direction may perhaps be issued in that regard to
freshly examine reconciling it with the records already in
place being alive to the settled position of law that
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is
generally not invoked for enforcing contractual payments, if
it involves disputed facts, as alternative remedy either by a
suit or arbitration is the best possible way. The Court is of
the above view that when actions of the BMC in imposing
penalties, deductions etc. with decisions are alleged to be
arbitrary, in a given set of circumstances, a direction to
revisit it could be a desirable option. Such a course of action
is necessary to end the dispute between the parties arising
out of a contract. From the record, the Court finds that there
had been discussions between the parties with
communications and assurances received from the BMC to
look into the claims of the petitioner but no result could be
achieved. Even though the Court is not in a position to
determine the entitlements in full, which the petitioner
demands and it needs quantifiable data, which can best be
possible with all such materials exchanged between the
parties, this Court is of the view that though the claims are
based on a contractual obligation, it would be justified to
direct consideration of any such outstanding dues payable
with interest or otherwise in terms of the CA.
11. A lot of emphasis has been laid by Mr. Mishra, learned
counsel for the petitioner with reference to the provisions of
the CA on the basis of the escalation of rate and its
computation and the non-payment of tipping fees at such
escalated rate and though its determination depends on the
relevant records maintained by it at the ground level, this
Court deems it proper to direct reconsideration of the same
by the BMC for a decision vis-à-vis outstanding dues
payable. In fact, the conditions of the contract are not in
question but only its enforcement and corresponding
contractual obligations but insofar as determination of the
outstanding payable to the petitioner is concerned, this
Court reiterates that it can be sorted out with exchange of
the relevant records and all such quantifiable data for
consideration of each other and for a final decision in that
regard instead of outrightly rejecting and dismissing the plea
on the premise that the writ petition is not to be entertained
since it relates to a contract, which is when, it has statutory
flavour and to be performed in terms of the Rules and Act
and not entirely a private contract. The Court is also of the
view that the delay in raising plea and in not demanding the
outstanding dues immediately should not always weigh
against it and the same depends on the facts and
circumstances of each particular case for a Court to
determine whether a writ jurisdiction is to be invoked. In the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case at hand, the
Court, considering the fact that the parties have had attempts
quite at intervals to settle the dispute, which failed to result
in an outcome and that there has not been any denial by the
BMC during the subsistence of the contract that it is not
liable to honour the same, rather, entertained
correspondences to deal with the request of the petitioner, is
also one of the grounds to persuade the Court to adopt the
above course of action for a fresh decision by the BMC on
the basis of the records available and reconciled. If there has
no intimation about any such data necessary for considering
the entitlements to the petitioner in terms of the CA and it
was necessary on a daily basis, the objection of the BMC
denying the claims cannot be sustained. For instance, any
service shortfall since required to be shared with the
petitioner in the manner contemplated and as per the CA, if
not communicated at right point of time by the BMC, it
shall have to ensure payments as any such materials relied
on behind the back of the petitioner cannot be the basis to
deny the legitimate payments.
12. On the point of maintainability of the writ petition in
contractual dispute, the Court is inclined to elaborate further
with reference to the case laws cited from the side of the
petitioner. The submission of Mr. Mishra, learned counsel
for the petitioner is that the BMC being an instrumentality
of the State having a statutory responsibility and having
acted in complete contravention of the Rules and Act, this
Court is required to exercise the writ jurisdiction to curb the
same. It has been alleged that there is arbitrariness in the
decision of the BMC, hence, indulgence of the Court is
absolutely necessary. A reference is made to the decision in
Shrilekha Vidyarthi (supra). The BMC's response is that
the State is not a party, as it should have been impleaded,
nevertheless, the Court is not to invoke the writ jurisdiction
where further evidence is needed to consider the claim of
the petitioner. The Court is inclined to reproduce the
relevant extract of the decision in Shrilekha Vidyarthi
case, wherein, it has been held that every action of the
State's instrumentality contractual or not shall be subject to
judicial review and the same is herein below:
"22. There is an obvious difference in the
contracts between private parties and contracts to
which the State is a party. Private parties are
concerned only with their personal interest
whereas the State while exercising its powers
and discharging its functions, acts indubitably, as
is expected of it, for public good and in public
interest. The impact of every State action is also
on public interest. This factor alone is sufficient
to import at least the minimal requirements of
public law obligations and impress with this
character the contracts made by the State or its
instrumentality. It is a different matter that the
scope of judicial review in respect of disputes
falling within the domain of contractual
obligations may be more limited and in doubtful
cases the parties may be relegated to
adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies
provided for adjudication of purely contractual
disputes. However, to the extent, challenge is
made on the ground of violation of Article 14 by
alleging that the impugned act is arbitrary, unfair
or unreasonable, the fact that the dispute also
falls within the domain of contractual obligations
would not relieve the State of its obligation to
comply with the basic requirements of Article
14. To this extent, the obligation is of a public
character invariably in every case irrespective of
there being any other right or obligation in
addition thereto. An additional contractual
obligation cannot divest the claimant of the
guarantee under Article 14 of non-arbitrariness
at the hands of the State in any of its actions.
24. The State cannot be attributed the split
personality of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde in the
contractual field so as to impress on it all the
characteristics of the State at the threshold while
making a contract requiring it to fulfil the
obligation of Article 14 of the Constitution and
thereafter permitting it to cast off its garb of State
to adorn the new robe of a private body during the
subsistence of the contract enabling it to act
arbitrarily subject only to the contractual
obligations and remedies flowing from it. It is
really the nature of its personality as State which
is significant and must characterize all its actions,
in whatever field, and not the nature of function,
contractual or otherwise, which is decisive of the
nature of scrutiny permitted for examining the
validity of its act. The requirement of Article 14
being the duty to act fairly, justly and reasonably,
there is nothing which militates against the
concept of requiring the State always to so act,
even in contractual matters. There is a basic
difference between the acts of the State which
must invariably be in public interest and those of a
private individual, engaged in similar activities,
being primarily for personal gain, which may or
may not promote public interest. Viewed in this
manner, in which we find no conceptual difficulty
or anachronism, we find no reason why the
requirement of Article 14 should not extend even
in the sphere of contractual matters for regulating
the conduct of the State activity.
28. Even assuming that it is necessary to import
the concept of presence of some public element in
a State action to attract Article 14 and permit
judicial review, we have no hesitation in saying
that the ultimate impact of all actions of the State
or a public body being undoubtedly on public
interest, the requisite public element for this
purpose is present also in contractual matters. We,
therefore, find it difficult and unrealistic to
exclude the State actions in contractual matters,
after the contract has been made, from the
purview of judicial review to test its validity on
the anvil of Article 14."
In view of the above decision, the scope of judicial
review is to test the validity of the action of the State or its
instrumentality on the touchstone of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India when there is arbitrariness alleged.
13. The case of the petitioner is that the CA was to expire
in 2020, but it was extended unilaterally and after such
extension, there has been action from the side of the BMC
even imposing penalties not in consonance with the contract
between the parties. On unilateral extension, the decision of
the Apex Court in Suresh Kumar Wadhwa (supra) is
relied on by Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner,
wherein it has been concluded that a party to the contract
can insist on performance of the terms and conditions
stipulated therein and has no right to unilaterally alter the
same nor having the right to add any terms and/or
conditions, but insofar as the petitioner is concerned, the
contract has been accepted and acted upon during the
extended period. Strictly speaking, it is not a case of any
alteration of terms and conditions of the agreement but the
parties proceeded further in terms of the original contract.
According to the Court, even with the extension of the same
having taken place beyond 2020, the petitioner cannot be
allowed to claim that such decision by the BMC materially
affected its interest and rights thereunder and therefore, the
contention of Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner
referring to the decision of Suresh Kumar Wadhwa
(supra) is not of any real assistance.
14. The plea is that 4% deduction from the monthly bills
for MSW Funds to be illegal and not in terms of the CA and
such other decisions of the BMC to be violative of Article
14 of the Constitution of India. It has been alleged that as
the State's instrumentality, it should have been backed by
reasons and as the actions do not specify the test of
reasonableness, the Court is to exercise the writ jurisdiction
to set it right. In Srilekha Vidyarthi (supra) relied on by
Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, it has been
held as to be following:
"36. The meaning and true import of
arbitrariness is more easily visualized than
precisely stated or defined. The question, whether
an impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately
to be answered on the facts and in the
circumstances of a given case. An obvious test to
apply is to see whether there is any discernible
principle emerging from the impugned act and if
so, does it satisfy the test of reasonableness.
Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act and
there is no impediment in following that
procedure, performance of the act otherwise and
in a manner which does not disclose any
discernible principle which is reasonable, may
itself attract the vice of arbitrariness. Every State
action must be informed by reason and it follows
that an act uninformed by reason, is arbitrary.
Rule of law contemplates governance by laws and
not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to
whom the governance is entrusted for the time
being. It is trite that 'be you ever so high, the laws
are above you'. This is what men in power must
remember, always."
In the above decision, the act of arbitrariness and its
consequences have been discussed and it has been
concluded therein that reasonableness should be the
foundation of every action of the State based on reasons. In
the case at hand, the petitioner alleges that decisions have
been taken on deductions and for such actions of the BMC,
the Court shall have to intervene exercising jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court is
of the view that the fairness of the decision of the BMC
having been challenged by the petitioner and to a reasonable
extent demonstrated, it is a fit case where such interference
by this Court is necessary and therefore, the objection from
the side of the BMC on the maintainability of the writ
petition is liable to rejection.
15. In Noble Resources Ltd. Vrs. State of Orissa and
others (2006) 10 SCC 236, the Apex Court held and
observed that if an action on the part of the State is violative
of the equality clause containing Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, a writ petition would be maintainable
even in the contractual field, but a distinction must be borne
in mind between a matter, which is at the threshold of a
contract and a breach of contract since in the former the
Court's scrutiny is more intrusive and in the latter, it may
not ordinarily exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of
judicial review unless it is found to be in violation of Article
14 of the Constitution of India and while exercising
contractual powers, the Government and its
instrumentalities may be subjected to such review in order
to prevent arbitrariness or favourtism on their part and
indisputable inherent limitations exist, but it would not be
correct to conclude that under no circumstances, a writ shall
lie only because it involves a contractual dispute. In view of
the aforesaid decision and considering the claim of the
petitioner and non-consideration of the plea advanced even
with request for mediation having not been acceded to, this
Court is inclined to entertain the writ petition since the
actions of the BMC are alleged to be arbitrary and it is
demonstrated to an extent clearly revealed from the record.
According to the Court, the decisions need a scrutiny and
judicial review.
16. The decision in Shishir Realty Private Ltd. (supra)
outlines the principles laid down by the Apex Court on
upholding fairness and equality in the rule of law by the
Government and public authorities while dealing with
contractual matters and therefore, it has been held that to
examine the role of a Constitutional Court, every action of
the State or its instrumentality must have to follow the rule
of law while exercising executive powers. It has been
categorically held and observed therein that being governed
under rule of law, action of the State and its
instrumentalities must recognize the existence of a freedom
to enter or not to enter into contracts, the manner, method
and motive behind the decision can be subjected to judicial
review on the touchstone of equality, fairness,
proportionality and natural justice and therefore, the
decision of the Executive must strike a balance with the
alleged violations with that of the penalties imposed. A
reference may also be placed on ABL International Ltd.
besides Joshi Technologies International Inc. (supra),
wherein, principles have been elaborately discussed for the
High Courts to take judicial notice of at the time of
exercising writ jurisdiction in contractual disputes between
the State and a private party. In Tantia Construction Pvt.
Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court held that even on the question
of maintainability of the writ petition on account of
arbitration clause included in the contract, any such
alternative remedy does not stand as an absolute bar to the
invocation of writ jurisdiction and that without exhausting
such remedy, it would not be maintainable, rather, the law is
well established that the constitutional powers vested cannot
be fettered by any alternative remedy available to the
authorities as injustice whenever and wherever it takes place
has to be struck down as anathema to the rule of law and the
provisions of the Constitution of India. Having taken
cognizance of the case laws cited by Mr. Mishra, learned
counsel for the petitioner, the Court is to reiterate the view
that the action of the BMC needs judicial scrutiny.
17. As regards delay in filing the writ petition and the
contention of Mr. M. K. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate
for the BMC in that regard is that the writ petition is not
maintainable as the suit for any such reliefs sought for is
grossly barred. This Court is not inclined to accept the
contention and to respectfully disagree with it for the reason
that even though the contract is for seven years, it was
extended from time to time and at last, brought to an end in
2022-2023. Though it is claimed that there is delay of nine
years in approaching this Court and as such, the civil action
is barred by limitation as a suit was needed to be filed
within three years from the date of cause of action and it has
been counted from 2015 when the CA was for a period of
seven years commencing from 2013, according to the Court,
the cause of action is not time barred. If in course of
continuation of the contract, any such action of the BMC
has not been questioned, it is not to debar the petitioner to
challenge the same after the closure of the contact in 2022-
2023. In fact, all along the petitioner have had
correspondences for consideration towards payment of
tipping fees at escalated price, deductions etc. and even
suggested for mediation, which could not be successful and
filing of the writ petition towards the end upon closure of
the contract cannot be said to be barred by limitation, hence,
the contention on limitation is liable to be rejected.
18. Insofar as in payment of tipping fees at escalated rate
as per the CA, a reference has been made to the Gazette
notification at Annexure-16 series and the submission is that
the minimum wages for the labour force have been
increased, as a result thereof and that apart, there was drastic
rise in manpower cost, maintenance, lubricants and price of
spare parts and hence, the petitioner was entitled to such
payments at the escalated rates. In reply to the above, Mr.
M. K. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the BMC would
submit that no any quantifiable data was ever produced by
the petitioner while claiming payment on escalation of price.
Admittedly, the CA provides a clause on escalation towards
labour component, fuel and lubricants, repair, maintenance
and replacement, minimum wages (unskilled) as notified by
the Government of Odisha, and therefore, the BMC shall
have to comply the same. In fact, Clause 3.26 of the CA
stipulates the formula for escalation of rates and according
to Mr. M. K. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the BMC,
such escalation is not automatic, but on a subjective
satisfaction in terms thereof. When the petitioner demands
escalation in respect of the tipping fees, the Court is in
agreement with Mr. M. K. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate
for the BMC that it shall have to be considered with regard
to the labour deployment and actual payment of service to
the labour force at the relevant point of time in order to
demand such payment in terms of Clause 3.26 at escalated
rates. For the said purpose, the petitioner is required to
submit the bills on labour component with such other
expenses incurred at a higher price for consideration of the
BMC. If a case is made out by the petitioner with all such
facts and figures submitted to the BMC, the Court is of the
view that it would be entitled to payment of tipping fees for
the relevant periods at escalated rates in view of Clause 3.26
of the CA.
19. From the record, it is made to reveal that necessary
correspondences have been made by the petitioner to the
BMC vide Annexure-18 series and 20 with a demand for
payment of tipping fees at the revised rates, but it was not
considered. The Court finds that the petitioner moved the
BMC seeking an amicable settlement on several issues
including non-payment of tipping fees, however, it led to no
solution. It is, therefore, necessary that the petitioner, if
having submitted the data on labour component etc. while
demanding payment on tipping fees at escalated rates, it
shall have to be considered by the BMC. Any such payment
without the relevant data as rightly pointed by Mr. M. K.
Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the BMC could result
in unjust enrichment.
20. According to the petitioner, deduction @ 4% from the
monthly bills towards MSW Funds is illegal and contrary to
the terms of the contract is seriously opposed by Mr. M. K.
Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the BMC with the
submission that it is a part of the CA vide Clause-2.1.5 Part-
E under the heading of 'Ancillary Activities'. It is submitted
that said Clause stipulates setting up of state of art control
room and instrument to facilitate real time, tracking and
monitoring solid waste management system and to provide
required resource support for registration, monitoring and
compliance and at the same time, to undertake community
interaction and consultations at regular intervals along with
the BMC officials and as the petitioner did not adhere to the
same, as the scope of work also included the rate fixed for
tons of MSW collected and transported, a meeting was held
under the Chairmanship of the Commissioner, BMC to set
up a City Solid Waste Management Fund in order to ensure
successful operationalization of the contracts assigned and
therein a decision was taken and placed before the Standing
Committee of the Corporation vide Resolution dated 30 th
December, 2014 and thereafter, in the next meeting held on
4th December, 2014, there was participation of the petitioner
and it was decided therein that for generation of fund for
solid waste management, 4% deduction shall be made from
each monthly bill of SWM Operators. In fact, several
correspondences with the BMC are shown to have taken
place with pleading that 4% deduction from the monthly
invoice to be illegal, but having regard to the relevant
Clause under Part-E, the BMC in order to ensure
compliance and to cover the scope of work in terms of the
contract and for proper tracking and monitoring of Solid
Waste Management System created the fund allowing 4%
deduction from the monthly bills. According to the BMC,
such deduction was not objected to by the petitioner and
when it is in terms of Clause 2.1.5 of the contract, the same
is in accordance with the CA, not in breach thereof. The
Court is inclined to hold that such a deduction is permissible
and the source of the deduction from the monthly bills is a
part of an exercise for ensuring successful tracking and
monitoring of the Solid Waste Management System. It was
also within the knowledge of the petitioner regarding the
purpose of the deductions taking place and when it is in
terms of the contract in view of Clause 2.1.5 Part-E thereof,
this Court is of the view that any such decision by the BMC
in that regard does not call for interference.
21. The petitioner alleges that there has been levy of
penalties arbitrarily contrary to the provisions of the
contract. It is alleged that the penalties have been regularly
imposed without following any of the contractual terms and
following Clause 3.19 of the CA, which stipulates that the
BMC is required to record the service shortfalls on a daily
basis and communicate the same to it on a regular basis. Mr.
Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that solid
waste management achievement must be taken into
consideration while evaluating the performance, however,
the BMC instead of any intimation to the petitioner
regarding the shortfall in service levied penalties, which is
contrary to the contract itself. In reply to the above, Mr.
M.K. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the BMC would
submit that such imposition of penalties is in accordance
with the contract. A reference is made to Clause 2.1.7 of the
CA, which relates to exclusion of certain activities from the
scope of work. It has been alleged by the BMC that
collection and disposal of construction wastes do not form a
part of the petitioner's contractual obligations but in order to
get more tonnage, the materials like concrete, soil, bricks,
wood, asphalt and metals were transported by the petitioner
and it has been physically verified and certified by the
Sanitary Inspector on duty on each day with report received,
and therefore, on account of such collection and
transportation to the Temporary Transit Station (TTS), the
levy of penalties is justified as it is in accordance with
Clause 2.1.9. When it is claimed by the BMC that regular
inspection was held upon receiving the solid wastes at TTS
and some of the reports have been produced for the Court's
perusal, it is not forthcoming from the record as to if the
petitioner had the intimation about the same. The petitioner
claims that no shortfall in service was ever informed by the
BMC and therefore, the penalties could not have been
levied. Such service shortfalls, though, have not been
alleged, but the levy of penalties, as claimed by the BMC,
was on the ground that the same is in terms of Clause-2.1.7.
The Court is of the view that the BMC might have intimated
the petitioner regarding the reports received from the
Sanitary Inspector on a daily basis. It is not discernable from
the record whether the BMC ever had issued such intimation
on a daily basis with regard to the reports about collection
and transportation of such materials, which do not form part
of the contract, but to be governed by its exclusion clause,
hence, a direction in that regard is necessary.
22. The claim of the petitioner that there has been
withholding of 20% of the amount from June, 2019 bill for
the service rendered by it during 'Fani' cyclone period, but
the response of the BMC is that the cyclonic storm had
landfall on 3rd May, 2019 and the restoration work in the
City of Bhubaneswar was substantially completed by the
end of June, 2019 with limited removal of trees and
branches, which continued till July, 2019. It is also
responded by claiming that the per day average waste
transported to the TTS during June to July, 2019 had
increased disproportionately compared to the preceding and
succeeding months and while claiming so, a reference was
made to the additional counter affidavit filed by the BMC.
The explanation of the BMC is that the weightage of
garbage suddenly increased and it was claimed as abnormal
with the apprehension expressed that waste from nearby
peripheral areas beyond the jurisdiction of the BMC may
have been transported to the TTS resulting thereby
increased tonnage figures and keeping in view the same and
in order to safeguard the public exchequer, the City Health
Officer recommended withholding of 20% of the invoice
amount for the alleged period with a direction to release the
same only after receipt of the audit observation and it is
within the realm of contract agreement. Nothing is brought
to the notice of the Court regarding any such audit held
justifying withholding 20% of the bill amount for June,
2019. Any such apprehension that wastes from peripheral
areas of the BMC to have been shown as collection and
disposal by the petitioner is based on no material. In other
words, it is merely an assumption that the petitioner might
have collected the waste and transported it to the TTS,
which are cyclone related debris and hence, the
recommendation to withhold 20% of the invoice amount
was received and acted upon is misconceived. To justify any
such decision by the BMC merely on the ground that there
has been sudden increase in collection of waste at the
relevant point of time alleging that the garbage of cyclone
related debris might have been collected by the petitioner
without any specific evidence shall have to be rejected
outrightly, hence, it shall have to clear the bill for the month
of June, 2019 furthermore in absence of any such finding
from the audit.
23. Insofar as the additional cost, expenses and daily
tonnage loss incurred during Covid-19 period is concerned,
it is claimed by the petitioner that such loss is to be
calculated and paid to it by the BMC and even for that, a
force majeure as per Annexure-28 was issued in terms of
Clause-3.31 of the CA. Replying to the same, it is
contended by the BMC that the contract does not contain
any clause assuring a Minimum Guarantee Quantity (MGQ)
of waste supplied and in absence of any such assurance,
demand of compensation for the alleged shortfall or tonnage
loss is wholly misleading and cannot be entertained. A
dispute is over the collection and transportation on a
tonnage basis, which according to the BMC, collected more
than the previous years and as such, the petitioner sustained
no loss, all the more when the contract does not assure
MGQ. No necessary correspondence by the petitioner to the
BMC is shown to have taken place demanding
compensation for the period between 2020 and 2021. The
record needs verification in view of the claim of the BMC
that there has been no tonnage loss with reference to the
terms of the contract. If the CA does not have any such
clause to assure the MGQ of waste supply in a given period
and there is a rival claim to the effect that there was rather
no shortfall or tonnage loss referring to relevant data on
record, the Court is inclined to direct the BMC to reconsider
the plea of the petitioner.
24. As regards the claim of the petitioner on withholding
payment relating to the services rendered vis-à-vis MCC
and Kalinga Stadium, it is seriously disputed by the BMC
with the plea that such an action and decision is on the basis
of SoP on decentralized management systems issued by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development,
Government of Odisha, in consequence whereof, MCC and
Material Recovery Facility (MRF) together known as
Wealth Centres were established and operationalized. The
further explanation is that on the observation of the then
Principal Secretary, Housing and Urban Development
Department-cum-Administrator, BMC in the file dealing
with sanitation bill payments to the effect that the proposal
does not seem to be fully in alignment with the progress of
the Wealth Centres established and in operation
recommended a Committee to re-examine it and submit its
view and as an interim measure, to direct release of 60% of
the proposed payment, later to which, 40% of the bill was
withheld but according to the Court, such a direction could
not have been issued for not being a part and parcel of the
contract and therefore, a further direction to the BMC is
necessary to ensure release balance of the sanitation bill.
25. If the BMC instructed the petitioner to undertake
sanitation work at the Stadium for any event to happen, it is
under obligation to make the payment. In fact, any such
payment beyond the contract with consent of the BMC
cannot be avoided. It is based on the doctrine of quantum
meruit, that apart, the BMC utilized the services of the
petitioner and appropriated the benefits and hence, it is
liable to ensure payment on sanitation bill and simply
cannot sit over the matter with a plea that necessary
requisition has been placed before the Sports and Youth
Department, Government of Odisha.
26. On the additional work taken up at Kalinga Stadium,
Bhubaneswar, it is submitted that no payment has been
made to the petitioner. Referring to Annexure-31 series,
which are the copies of the letters addressed to the BMC, it
is claimed by the petitioner that there is non-payment for the
works done in spite of the request made to the BMC at
whose instance garbage disposal and cleaning inside its
premises for the ensuing Hockey World Cup was carried
out. The reply by the BMC is that after receipt of the bill, it
has requisitioned the Sports and Youth Department,
Government of Odisha for reimbursement of the
expenditure towards sanitation during the World Cup and
therefore, there is no arbitrary withholding of payment, but
the fact remains, it is for the BMC to ensure that the
payment towards sanitation on the bills received from the
petitioner is ensured and for that, it cannot be allowed to
take a stand that the Government has not been impleaded as
a party herein. In other words, the petitioner was engaged to
clean the stadium for the event and the payment whether the
bills submitted should have been honoured. Merely placing
a requisition before the Government does not absolve the
BMC from its responsibility and therefore, such payment
shall have to be ensured without delay along with interest,
as has been claimed.
27. On the claim of the petitioner in withholding payment
towards tonnage loss incurred qua deployment of NGO
vehicles from door-to-door collection contrary to the CA
similar is the response of the BMC that the contract does not
contain any clause with a guarantee of minimum tonnage
nor does it contemplate any compensation mechanism for
reduction in waste quantity due to changes in the Municipal
Collection System. No material is on record to show from
the side of the petitioner that for any such collection of solid
wastes, there was any tonnage loss due to the involvement
of the NGO vehicles. Rather, the Court is inclined to accept
the explanation of the BMC in that regard. There has been
no such guarantee clause that a minimum tonnage and
anything less could entitle the petitioner to compensation
and that apart, the action and exercise undertaken have been
in consonance with the Rules and it was to stop
indiscriminate dumping of wastes. The contention is that the
Government took a policy decision that each ULB shall
implement door-to-door collection of segregated wastes
through SHGs, community-based non-profit groups etc.
That apart, the contract being tonnage based, the petitioner
is entitled to payment strictly on the basis of actual waste
handed without any entitlement to compensation for any
decrease in the quantity and therefore, the petitioner is not
entitled to demand compensation on such count.
28. With the discussions as aforesaid and conclusion
arrived at taking note of the case laws cited by both the
sides, this Court further reaches at a decision that the BMC
should have been open and transparent in dealing with
grievance of the petitioner, which made an attempt for
mediation, but it received a cold response. The details of the
attempts made by the petitioner for mediation are pleaded
on record. Since the Court is inclined to direct payment on
the heads identified hereinabove leaving the rest for
reconsideration by the BMC, it is of the ultimate view that
immediate exercise is necessary for a decision thereon with
the participation of the petitioner making it available with
all the relevant records. It is also realized that the petitioner
is to reciprocally respond by placing the facts and figures
for consideration of the BMC while demanding payment of
tipping fees with escalated rates permissible under the CA,
especially with regard to labour and other components
discussed earlier. The Court is inclined to observe that even
though it is a contractual obligation on the part of the BMC,
it shall have to deal with the demands of the petitioner
strictly in accordance with the contract fairly and
transparently or else every decision thereon could be
branded as acts of arbitrariness. To obviate any such
eventuality, this Court observes that the BMC shall have to
consider the relevant records to re-examine the claim of the
petitioner on the heads vis-à-vis the payments demanded
releasing the dues for the remainder, as has been directed.
29. Accordingly, it is ordered.
30. In the result, the writ petition stands allowed to the
extent indicated hereinabove. As a necessary corollary, the
BMC is directed to release the dues of the petitioner in
respect of the claims admitted by this Court and to re-
examine/reconcile the records with a decision vis-à-vis
payments demanded on other heads by undertaking an
exercise at the earliest and concluding it preferably within a
period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of
this judgment. The Court directs that the BMC shall hold
convenient sessions/sittings for the participation of the
petitioner to freshly examine and to take a decision on the
claims winding up the exercise in time and before expiry of
the above stipulated period.
(R.K. Pattanaik)
Judge
Manoj
