Orissa High Court
Ratikanta Satpathy vs State Of Orissa (Vigilance) on 13 October, 2025
Author: Chittaranjan Dash
Bench: Chittaranjan Dash
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLA No.181 of 2010
Ratikanta Satpathy .... Appellant
Mr. L. Mishra, Advocate
-versus-
State of Orissa (Vigilance) .... Respondent
Mr. M. S. Rizvi, ASC
Vigilance
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
Date of Judgment: 13.10.2025
Chittaranjan Dash, J.
1. This Appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 27.03.2010, passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance),
Cuttack, in T.R. Case No.55 of 1996 (Sambalpur) / T.R. Case
No.134 of 2004 (Bhubaneswar) / T.R. Case No.281 of 2007, arising
out of Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No.59 of 1995, wherein the
Appellant, Ratikanta Satpathy, was found guilty of offences under
Sections 7/13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act (hereinafter, "the P.C. Act"). The Appellant was
sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to
pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in default, to undergo R.I. for seven days for
the offence under Section 7 of the P.C. Act, and R.I. for one year and
a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default, to undergo R.I. for fifteen days for the
offence under Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act, with the further
direction that the sentences shall run concurrently.
2. The factual matrix giving rise to the Appeal is that, the
Appellant, while posted as S.D.O. (Electrical) at Kamakshyanagar in
the district of Dhenkanal, being a public servant, committed criminal
misconduct by corruptly obtaining a pecuniary advantage of Rs.300/-
as gratification to supply electrical connection to the L.I. Point to a
farmer under the scheme meant for the SC & ST Society, intended
for supply of free water to 160 cultivators of village Jaladharpur
under Kamakshyanagar P.S. According to the prosecution, one of the
cultivators, Rabinarayan Patra (the Informant) requested the
Appellant to supply electrical connection to the L.I. Point to facilitate
free water supply to his land. The Appellant demanded a sum of
Rs.600/- as bribe and informed the complainant that the electrical
connection cannot be supplied unless the bribe would be paid.
On the request of the Informant, the Appellant asked him to
come to his office the next morning with Rs.300/-, on the condition
that the balance of Rs.300/- would be paid later. Not being
acceptable to the informant, he reported the matter in writing to the
Additional S.P. Vigilance, Cuttack, who directed the O.I.C.
Vigilance P.S., Cuttack, to register the case under Sections 7/13(2)
read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act (Cuttack Vigilance P.S.
Case No.59 of 1995) and to lay a trap. The complainant was directed
to attend the revenue Rest Shed of Kamakshyanagar on 20.11.1995,
and preparations for the trap were made.
Upon completion of the formalities, the trap was laid on
21.11.1995 at 8:20 a.m. The detection report was prepared following
the trap and recovery of the tainted bribe money from the Appellant,
and the matter was investigated by an Inspector of Vigilance. During
the course of investigation, the I.O. recorded statements of witnesses,
seized the tainted money, the collected hand wash samples of the
Appellant in a bottle, as well as the wash solution of the magisterial
witness, The Appellant's won wearing apparels and the wash
solution from its pocket preserved in bottles too was seized besides
the Personal money of the Appellant amounting to Rs.20/- kept in his
undergarment pocket, copies of the preparation report, and the
concerned L.I. Point electric supply file under different seizure lists.
The hand wash solution bottles were sent for chemical examination
to S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar, and the chemical examination
report was obtained. Sanction for prosecution against the Appellant
was obtained from the G.A. Department, Government of Orissa, and
upon completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted for the
offences mentioned above.
3. The plea of the Appellant before the trial court was one of
complete denial, contending that the case against him had been
falsely initiated.
4. In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined six
witnesses: P.W.1, the magisterial witness; P.W.2, the overhearing
witness; P.W.3, the Informant; P.W.4, the Scientific Officer,
S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar; P.W.5, the Junior Engineer
(Electrical) at Kamakshyanagar, where the Appellant was working
as S.D.O.; and P.W.6, the Investigating Officer. No evidence was
adduced on behalf of the defence to support the Appellant's case.
5. The learned Trial Court, having relied upon the prosecution
evidence, more particularly the testimonies of P.Ws. 1, 2, 4, and 5-
together with the surrounding circumstances of the case, and taking
into account the portions of evidence of P.W.3 supporting the
prosecution version, held the Appellant guilty of the offences
charged and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as discussed
above.
6. Mr. L. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant,
while assailing the impugned judgment, argued that the prosecution
has failed to bring home the charges and that the learned trial court
erred both in appreciating the evidence and in applying the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, thereby arriving at an
erroneous conclusion in holding the Appellant guilty. It was further
submitted that the very genesis of the case i.e. the demand of bribe
has not been proved. He emphasized that the Informant (P.W.3) has
categorically stated that the Appellant never demanded nor accepted
the tainted money; rather, the Informant forcibly thrust the money
into his pocket, to which the Appellant not only protested but also
shouted at him. Thus, the primary evidence with regard to demand
and acceptance, which requires corroboration, does not support the
prosecution version, particularly when the star witness, P.W.3,
himself does not support the case.
It was further contended that the trial court misconstrued the
evidence of P.W.2, who had never stated before the I.O. during his
examination in his earlier recorded statement, that the Appellant
made a demand or that he witnessed the acceptance of money.
Learned Counsel argued that the trial court overlooked the fact that
the supply of electrical energy to the L.I. Point, which had been
entrusted to the Agro-Industrial Corporation by the Government of
Orissa for providing free irrigation water to farmers, did not rest
entirely with the Appellant in his capacity as S.D.O. The said
supply was contingent upon the completion of several other
formalities such as the installation of the L.I. Point, installation of
the meter, and submission of the testing report. On this note, it was
further argued that as per the evidence of P.W.5, electrical energy
could not have been supplied without a valid testing report, and it
stood established that the said report was submitted only on
20.11.1995. Moreover, the electrical line could not have been
charged without prior instruction from the Executive Engineer.
Consequently, the allegation that the Appellant deliberately delayed
the supply of electrical energy to the L.I. Point for illegal
gratification cannot be sustained, as the essential formalities had not
been completed to enable the Appellant to take action.
It was further submitted that the responsibility entrusted to
P.W.5 by the Agro-Industrial Corporation had already been
discharged, and completion of the remaining work was beyond the
control of the Appellant. Hence, the very question of demand of
bribe does not arise. Learned counsel placed his reliance on the
decision in Jamuna Choudhury and Others vs. State of Bihar,
(1974) 3 SCC 774, followed by the State of Orissa vs.
Manogovinda Sahoo, ILR (2009) 1 Cuttack 606. Drawing
attention to these precedents and to the mandate of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, learned counsel submitted that the impugned
judgment suffers from illegality, being contrary to the evidence on
record, and therefore deserves to be set aside.
7. Mr. Rizvi, learned counsel for the State (Vigilance), on the
other hand, contended that ample evidence has been adduced
through the witnesses substantiating the factum of demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification. He further argued that in order to
prove the factum of demand and acceptance of gratification, it is not
always necessary that such facts be proved by direct evidence; they
may also be established by circumstantial evidence. In support of
this contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Hazari Lal vs. State (Delhi Administration),
(1980) 2 SCC 390.
He further submitted that P.W.1, the magisterial witness,
P.W.2, the overhearing witness, and P.W.5 have consistently
deposed about the manner in which the trap was laid, and that the
demand and acceptance of bribe money by the Appellant that stood
corroborated through their testimonies. This, according to him,
gives rise to the application of Section 20 of the P.C. Act, where the
statutory presumption operates in favour of the prosecution, and it
becomes obligatory on the part of the Appellant to rebut the same.
Mr. Rizvi also submitted that the defence plea of the
Appellant-that the tainted money was forcibly thrust into his pocket
by the decoy-remains unsubstantiated, inasmuch as no suggestion to
that effect was put to any other witness except P.W.3, the
complainant. He further contended that even assuming, for the sake
of argument, that the Appellant was not directly dealing with the
particular work, that by itself does not exonerate him from criminal
liability in view of the Explanation (d) to Section 7 of the P.C. Act.
The said provision makes it explicit that a person who receives
gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not
intend to do, or is not in a position to do, or has not done, would
nevertheless fall within the mischief of the section. Mr. Rizvi,
therefore, urged that in light of the above statutory provision, the
defence plea raised by the Appellant cannot withstand judicial
scrutiny, and the prosecution evidence is sufficient to implicate him
in the offences alleged. He submitted that the learned trial court has
rightly appreciated the evidence on record and has reached a just
and proper conclusion in holding the Appellant guilty. Hence, the
impugned judgment, according to him, calls for no interference.
8. Keeping in view the submissions advanced by the learned
counsel for the respective parties, this Court has carefully examined
the entire evidence on record. Admittedly, P.W.1, Budhinath
Parida, a Dairy Inspector in the office of the Director of Animal
Husbandry and Veterinary Services, Cuttack, was examined as an
independent witness who had accompanied the Vigilance staff to
Kamakshyanagar for the trap proceedings. P.W.2, Prasanna Kumar
Swain, a Statistical Assistant in the same office, also accompanied
the Vigilance team and was cited as an overhearing witness. P.W.3
is Rabinarayan Patra, the complainant, who allegedly offered a sum
of Rs.300/- to the Appellant for facilitating electrical connection to
the L.I. Point. P.W.4, Satyananda Maharana, Joint Director,
S.F.S.L., Bhubaneswar, proved the chemical examination report
marked as Ext.12. P.W.5, Ganesh Chandra Hembram, was serving
as Junior Engineer (Electrical) at Kamakshyanagar at the relevant
time, while P.W.6, Radhamohan Patra, was the Investigating
Officer of the case.
9. The learned defence counsel has laid emphasis on the
evidence of the complainant, P.W.3, whose testimony constitutes
the foundation of the prosecution case. In his deposition, P.W.3
stated that on the relevant day, i.e., 21.11.1995, he met the
Appellant and requested him to provide electrical supply to the L.I.
Point, for which he offered Rs.300/-. The Appellant, however,
declined to accept the amount, whereupon the complainant forcibly
thrust the money into the shirt pocket of the Appellant, to which the
latter objected and shouted at him. It is an admitted position that
P.W.3 was declared hostile and was cross-examined by the
prosecution. Despite being confronted with leading questions,
nothing material could be elicited from him to support the
prosecution version. His testimony, even as a hostile witness,
remained consistent insofar as he denied any demand or voluntary
acceptance of money by the Appellant.
This Court finds that the evidence of P.W.3, being the
complainant and the only witness to the alleged demand and
acceptance, does not substantiate the prosecution case. In the
absence of credible proof of demand, which is a sine qua non for
establishing an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, the very foundation of the
prosecution case appears to be shaken.
10. As contended by the learned counsel for the Appellant, the
surrounding circumstances of the case also warrant close scrutiny in
order to determine whether there was, in fact, any demand or
acceptance of illegal gratification. In this regard, the evidence of
P.Ws.1, 2, and 5 assumes relevance. Among them, P.W.2 was cited
as the overhearing witness, while P.W.5, the Junior Engineer
(Electrical), was examined regarding the procedural aspects
connected with supply of electricity to the L.I. Point.
11. Upon careful examination of the deposition of P.W.2, it is
found that though he stated in his examination-in-chief that he had
witnessed the demand and acceptance of money by the Appellant,
in his cross-examination he candidly admitted that he had not made
any such statement before the Investigating Officer when his earlier
statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded. When this
contradiction was confronted to P.W.6, the Investigating Officer,
during his deposition, he confirmed that P.W.2 had indeed not
stated before him that he had seen the Appellant demanding or
accepting the tainted money. This material omission, therefore,
strikes at the root of the credibility of P.W.2's testimony, rendering
his evidence unreliable so far as the core issue of demand and
acceptance is concerned.
12. Coming to the testimony of P.W.5, he has deposed only
with respect to the official procedure and formalities required for
supply of electricity to the L.I. Point. In his evidence, he stated that
though all formalities for supply of energy had been completed by
March 1995, the essential steps such as submission of the test
report, installation of the meter, and receipt of instruction from the
Executive Engineer had not yet been complied with. He
categorically stated that without these prerequisites, the Appellant,
in his capacity as S.D.O. (Electrical), was not competent to order or
effect the supply of electricity.
In light of the above evidence of P.W.5, when the
Investigating Officer (P.W.6) was confronted during cross-
examination as to whether he had verified these aspects either
before laying the trap or during the investigation, he answered in
the negative. This omission assumes significance, for it raises
serious doubt as to whether any work of the complainant was
actually pending with the Appellant so as to afford him an occasion
to demand illegal gratification.
In such a factual scenario, the allegation that the Appellant
deliberately withheld the complainant's file or delayed the supply
of electrical energy for want of bribe becomes doubtful. It is trite
law that the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be invoked in the absence of
proof of the foundational fact of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification. The evidence of P.W.5 unequivocally establishes that
as on the date of the alleged trap, the Appellant was not in a
position to supply electricity, the necessary procedural formalities
being incomplete. This circumstance, viewed in conjunction with
the inconsistent and uncorroborated testimony of P.W.2 and the
categorical denial by P.W.3, leads this Court to the conclusion that
the demand of illegal gratification, which forms the ingredient of
the charge under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
13. In B. Jayaraj vs. State of A.P. reported in (2014) 13 SCC
55, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that -
"7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it
is a settled position in law that demand of illegal
gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence
and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute
the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all
reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted
the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position
has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of
this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made
to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [(2010)
15 SCC 1] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [(2009) 3 SCC
779].
× × ×
9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn
under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such
presumption can only be in respect of the offence under
Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i)
and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of
acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can
be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such
gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do
any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal
gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand.
As the same is lacking in the present case the primary
facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under
Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent."
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in it's above decision held that
failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal
gratification is fatal to the case, and mere recovery of the tainted
amount from the accused, under Section 7 or Section 13 of the P.C.
Act, would not by itself entail conviction. In the present case, as
deposed by the complainant, the bribe money was forcibly thrust
into the pocket of the Appellant. This naturally resulted in the
pocket wash and hand wash turning pink, as the currency notes
were smeared with phenolphthalein powder. Therefore, although
recovery of the tainted money stood established, the same cannot be
linked to a demand of bribe by the Appellant.
15. Further, in Neeraj Dutta vs. State (NCT of Delhi), reported
in (2023) 4 SCC 731, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated that
proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public
servant, as a fact in issue, is a sine qua non for establishing guilt
under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) of the P.C. Act, read as follows -
"68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
summarised as under:
(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the
prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the
guilt of the accused public servant under Sections
7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and(ii) of the Act.
(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the
prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal
gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of
fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct
evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or
documentary evidence.
(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also
be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of
direct oral and documentary evidence.
(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the
demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the
public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in
mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without
there being any demand from the public servant and the
latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal
gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of
the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand
by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a
demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and
tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is
received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment.
In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal
gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an
offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the
bribe giver and the demand by the public servant
respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a
fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt
of an illegal gratification without anything more would
not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13
(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act.
Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring
home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates
from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public
servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a
prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the
bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is
received by the public servant, would be an offence of
obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the
Act.
(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand
and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification
may be made by a court of law by way of an inference
only when the foundational facts have been proved by
relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the
absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record,
the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact
while considering whether the fact of demand has been
proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a
presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused
and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.
(f) In the event the Complainant turns 'hostile', or has
died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial,
demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in
the evidence of any other witness who can again let in
evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the
prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial
evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an
order of acquittal of the accused public servant.
(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the
proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court
to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was
for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the
said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by
the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law.
Of course, the said presumption is also subject to
rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d)
(i) and (ii) of the Act.
(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section
20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred
to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory
presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.
14. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles and the evidence
of the prosecution, as discussed above, it is evident that there exists
a gap between the alleged demand and acceptance of bribe in the
present case. This goes to the root of the matter, as the evidence is
inadequate to establish a nexus between the work entrusted to the
Appellant, the alleged demand of bribe, and its acceptance. On a
holistic consideration of the evidence, anomalies appear in the three
essential aspects which are sine qua non to hold a public servant
guilty of the offence. The specific fact, as stated by P.W.5, that no
test report had been submitted prior to 20.11.1995 so as to enable
the S.D.O. to issue direction for supply of electrical energy, nor was
any instruction received from the Executive Engineer in that regard,
completely rules out the role of the Appellant in proceeding with
the file. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to believe that the
there was any demand of bribe for non-supply of the connection.
Thus, the prosecution case appears inadequate and incongruous to
sustain a finding that the Appellant demanded or accepted the bribe
money, which, according to the evidence, was thrust into his pocket
and later recovered. The learned trial court, therefore, failed to
appreciate the evidence and the law in its right perspective and
consequently arrived at an erroneous conclusion in holding the
prosecution to have proved the case. Accordingly, the impugned
judgment suffers from illegality and is liable to be set aside.
15. In the result, the impugned judgment and order dated
27.03.2010 passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance),
Cuttack in T.R. Case No.55 of 1996 (Sambalpur)/T.R. Case No.134
of 2004 (Bhubaneswar)/T.R. Case No.281 of 2007, arising out of
Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No.59 of 1995, are hereby set aside.
16. Accordingly, the Appeal is allowed.
(Chittaranjan Dash)
Judge
AKPradhan
Signed by: ANANTA KUMAR PRADHAN
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Date: 14-Oct-2025 16:47:32
