M/S.Digambar Road Lines vs Commissioner (Appeals)
2025 Latest Caselaw 9862 Ori

Orissa High Court

M/S.Digambar Road Lines vs Commissioner (Appeals) on 11 November, 2025

Author: Murahari Sri Raman

Bench: Murahari Sri Raman

                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK

                               W.P.(C) No.30271 of 2025

            M/s.Digambar Road Lines                   ...             Petitioner
                                          Mr.P. Ramakrishna Patro, Advocate



                                       -Versus-
            Commissioner (Appeals), GST, Central ...          Opposite parties
            Excise & Customs, Central Revenue
            Building, Rajaswa Vihar, Bhubaneswar
            and others
                              Mr.Avinash Kedia, Junior Standing Counsel and
                          Mr. Umesh Chandra Sahoo, Junior Standing Cousnel




                               CORAM:
                   THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
                                 AND
             THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN


                                          ORDER

Order No.                                11.11.2025
    01.     1.     Admittedly, the appellate authority under the Central Goods

and Services Act, 2017/the Odisha Goods and Services Act, 2017 (Collectively, "GST Act") proceeded and decided the matter by passing an order dated 25.08.2025, upholding the demand of duty, interest and penalty made in the original order. The petitioner chose to file the instant writ petition assailing the said order which is passed on the premise that Section 107(6) of the GST Act, 2017, postulates that no appeal shall be filed unless the appellant pays a

sum equal to 10% of the remaining amount of tax in dispute arising from the said order. According to him, the language employed in Section 107 (6) of the said Act is mandatory, as the appeal cannot be filed nor be taken on record unless the compliance contemplated under the aforesaid sub-section is complied with.

1.1. Section 107(6) of the said Act is quoted as under:-

"(6) No appeal shall be filed under sub-section (1), unless the appellant has paid-

(a) in full, such part of the amount of tax, interest, fine, fee and penalty arising from the impugned order, as is admitted by him; and

(b) a sum equal to ten per cent of the remaining amount of tax in dispute arising from the said order, [subject to a maximum of [twenty] crore rupees,] in relation to which the appeal has been filed:

Provided that no appeal shall be filed against an order under sub-section (3) of section 129, unless a sum equal to twenty-five per cent. of the penalty has been paid by the appellant."

2. We are not unmindful of the proposition, as understood from the bare reading of the above mentioned provision that the appeal shall not be allowed to be filed unless the appellant complies with the conditions enshrined therein. However, we find a distinctive fact emanating from the record that an attempt was made by the petitioner to upload the appeal through a portal but was not given an

access thereto, which constrained him to file the appeal in a physical form.

2.1. According to the petitioner, several requests were made for giving excess to deposit the amount as ordained under Section 107 of the Act but the authority remained silent and did not communicate to the petitioner in this regard. It is perceived by the petitioner that such appeal which is disposed of by the appellate authority in passing the impugned order was, in fact, non est appeal and therefore, it ought not to have been decided. To buttress the aforesaid submissions, the reliance is placed upon unreported orders of this Bench rendered in W.P.(C) No.25187 of 2025 (M/s. GAEA Engineers and Contractors Private Limited vs. Chief Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise, Odisha and others and W.P.(C) No.6650 of 2025 (M/s.Harsheel Auto Planet, Sundergarh vs. Commissioner (Appeals), CGST, Central Excise & Customs and others), wherein it is held that the authority ought to have pointed out to the appellant in the event the appeal is filed in the physical form to deposit the statutory amount under Section 107(6) of the said Act. Having not done so, the dismissal of the appeal is per se illegal.

2.2. There appears to be a fallacy in the argument of the petitioner in this regard. The aforesaid decisions relied upon by this Court can be distinguished on the factual matrix and the ratio laid down therein has to be culled out in the context in which it is so used. In both the decisions so relied upon, we find that after admiting the appeal and issuing the notice at the fag end of the hearing of the said appeal, the same was dismissed on a technical ground alone that the appellant

therein has not complied with the mandatory provision contemplated under Section 107(6) of the said Act.

2.3. We do not find any incongruity nor dissent in the proposition of law lay down therein that too on the proposition that the counsel appearing for the authority also conceded such proposition and supported the contention of the petitioner that the authority ought not to have proceeded to dismiss the appeal on such technical ground. Had it been a case that the authority after registering the appeal and issuing the notice proceeded to reject the appeal solely on the ground that the pre-requisite deposits have not been made, we would have applied the law as enunciated in the above referred cases. We are not unmindful of the proposition of law that the difference in facts or an additional fact may invite a different decision to be taken and, therefore, it is an ardent duty of the Court to find out the parity of facts before applying the ratio of law laid down in the judgments. 2.4. The reason for not accepting the proposition as laid down in the above cases can be reasonably gathered from the fact that the appellate authority, while dismissing the said appeal assigned two grounds, firstly, non-observance and/or fulfilment of the conditions under Section 107(6) of the said Act; and secondly, on merit. The operating portion of the impugned order is suggestive of the aforesaid facts that the appeal was not only dismissed on technical ground but also on merit. Once the appellate authority decided the case on merit, the Writ Court should be slow and circumspect in interfering with such order unless the findings returned in the order of the appellate authority is per se illegal, irrational, unreasonable and de-hors the parameters of law set forth in this regard. The Writ

Court cannot assume jurisdiction solely on the ground as to whether the decision is correct or not but must invoke the jurisdiction by ascertaining the process by which such decision has been arrived.

2.5. A lis can be decided on a multiple ground which leads to a decision in singularity. Even if one of the grounds is found to be perverse, illegal and not in consonance with the law, the other the ground(s) justifying the ultimate decisions to be taken, it does not invite quashing and setting aside of the order in its entirety. The grounds assigned in the order are in support of the ultimate conclusion and even if one of the grounds is found to be perverse, the other grounds justifying such conclusion should not be defeated and/or quashed solely on such parameters.

3. The instant writ petition is filed assailing the judgment which decides the cause both on technical aspect as well as on merit, solely on the ground of technical aspect being de-hors the law. Therefore, if we do not find any justification warranting the interference on the findings returned on the merit of the case. We do not find that it is a fit case either to set aside the order in its entirety or remand the case to the authority for fresh hearing. Even if we accept the contention of the petitioner that it is a fit case for remand for the argument sake, such remand is not permissible unless the order impugned in the instant writ petition is set aside as a whole and it would simply consume a considerable period of time as the authority after permitting the petitioner to comply the mandates provided under Section 107(6) and the authority on compliance of such defect, would replicate the same finding made on the merit.

4. We, thus, do not find it a fit case for interference as the findings returned on the merit do not appear to us irrational, unreasonable and/or perverse.

5. Hence, the writ petition is dismissed.

(Harish Tandon) Chief Justice

(M.S. Raman) Judge

Aswini

Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR SETHY Designation: Personal Assistant (Secretary in-charge) Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 13-Nov-2025 13:38:56