Orissa High Court

State Of Odisha & Others vs Vibgyor@Vibgyour Structural on 11 November, 2025

Author: Sashikanta Mishra

Bench: Sashikanta Mishra

   IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                     RSA No.116 of 2023

[In the matter of an appeal under Section 100 of CPC from
the order dated 13.07.2022 and passed by learned District
Judge, Sambalpur in R.F.A. No.7 of 2019 arising out of the
judgment and decree dated 15.09.2014 and 27.09.2024
respectively passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division),
Sambalpur in C.S. No.86 of 2010]


State of Odisha & Others                   ....    Appellants

                            -Versus-

Vibgyor@Vibgyour Structural
Construction Pvt. Ltd., Dhankauda        ....     Respondent


Advocate(s) appeared in this case:


For the Appellants            : Mr. A.R. Dash,
                            [Additional Government Advocate]


For Respondent               : Mr. G.M. Rath, Advocate

CORAM:
         JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA

                        JUDGMENT

th 11 November, 2025

SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J.

The State-defendants in C.S. No.86 of 2010 of the

Court of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Sambalpur have

preferred this appeal being aggrieved by the

judgment/order dated 13.07.2022 passed by the learned

District Judge, Sambalpur in R.F.A. No.7 of 2019

dismissing the said appeal on the ground of limitation.

2. For convenience, the parties are referred to as per

their respective status before the trial Court.

3. The facts, relevant only to decide the present

appeal are that the aforementioned suit was filed by the

plaintiff for recovery of sum of Rs.64,30,495/- from the

defendants with PI and FI @9% per annum. The claim of

the plaintiff was allowed by the trial Court by its judgment

dated 15.09.2014 followed by decree.

4. The State-defendants preferred the aforementioned

appeal after a long period of delay. The appeal was

accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the

Limitation Act for condonation of the delay.

5. Learned District Judge, after hearing the parties

on the question of limitation was not inclined to condone

the delay and hence, by the order impugned, the appeal

was not admitted. Being further aggrieved, the State-

defendants have preferred the present second appeal,

which was heard extensively on the question of admission.

6. Heard Mr. A.R. Dash, learned Additional

Government Advocate for the State and Mr. G.M. Rath,

learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent.

7. Mr. Dash argues that the first appellate Court did

not appreciate the facts properly, rather adopted a hyper-

technical approach. He further submits that the delay in

filing the appeal was properly explained by the defendant-

appellants by furnishing all the relevant dates showing the

movement of the file from one authority to the other. Since

the State is involved, no single person is authorized to take

a decision regarding filing the appeal and such decision

can only be collective in nature after passing through the

official hierarchy. Mr. Dash further argues that the first

appellate Court has not considered the practical difficulties

of the concerned authorities particularly when the decretal

amount is substantial. The first appeal was preferred on

substantial grounds which, is considered, would have

revealed the error in the judgment/decree passed by the

trial Court. According to Mr. Dash, the impugned

judgment/order cannot be sustained in the eye of law and

the matter needs to be remitted for hearing the appeal on

its own merit.

8. Mr. Rath, on the other hand, would argue that

law is well settled that State is not entitled to any

preferential treatment in the matter of condonation of

delay and that the same parameters as applicable to a

private litigant are to be applied to it. In this context, Mr.

Rath argues that there are long gaps in the explanation

submitted by the State while seeking condonation of the

inordinate delay of more than five years. It is well settled

that for the lack of promptitude and diligence of the

Government officials, a private litigant cannot be deprived

of enjoying the fruit of the decree passed in his favour.

9. Before delving into the facts, it would be

apposite to keep the settled position of law regarding

condonation of delay in perspective. The law relating to

limitation has received a fresh look by the Supreme Court

recently in the case of Shivamma V. Karnataka Housing

Board & Others1. As regards the question of technical

considerations vis-a-vis substantive justice, the Supreme

Court after examining the relevant provisions and the

meaning of the expression 'sufficient cause' held as

follows:-

"ii. Technical Considerations vis-a-vis

Substantive Justice.

"135. In construing "sufficient cause" it must be borne in mind that rules of procedure are handmaids of justice. Procedural rigidity should not become an instrument of injustice. In the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this balance assumes special significance. Courts have repeatedly underscored that while limitation provisions are founded on sound principles of finality and certainty, their application cannot be divorced from the overarching objective of ensuring that litigants are not shut out from the doors of justice merely on account of technicalities.

136. When technical considerations of limitation conflict with the imperative of substantial justice, the latter should ordinarily prevail. Rules of limitation are not designed to destroy the rights of

2025 SCC Online SC 1969

parties but to prevent inordinate delay in seeking remedies. Thus, the interpretation of "sufficient cause" must be liberal and purposive, aimed at advancing the cause of justice rather than defeating it. This is why the courts, while construing applications for condonation of delay, emphasize the bona fides of the applicant over the sheer arithmetical length of the delay.

137. Where strict adherence to these rules results in injustice, the Court is duty-bound to apply a liberal interpretation of "sufficient cause" so as to balance technical requirements with the demands of justice. A litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and therefore, a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must inform the judicial discretion under Section 5. This decision continues to be the most frequently cited authority for the proposition that the judiciary should incline towards justice rather than technicality. Therefore, when courts interpret "sufficient cause," they are expected to exercise discretion in a manner that fosters justice, fairness, and equity, keeping in mind the realities of litigation.

138. When a Court of Law deals with an application to condone the delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, such application will have to be generally viewed in a liberal and lenient way to do substantial justice between the parties. Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be liberally construed and applied so as to advance substantial justice. It is undoubtedly true that a justice oriented approach is necessary while deciding application under Section 5 of Limitation. However, it cannot be said that in every case delay must necessarily be condoned. It is a condition precedent for Section 5 of the Limitation Act that there must be a sufficient reason for condoning the delay.

139. However, while substantial justice must be advanced, the law of limitation is equally binding, and "sufficient cause" must be shown in substance, not in empty form. This ensures that the balance between justice and certainty is not skewed in favour of unmerited litigants.

140. However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for

condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause"

has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay.

141. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain.

142. Another practical reason why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation is that it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. This ensures that the ultimate adjudication of rights occurs in a neutral and unprejudiced setting.

143. The law of limitation is meant to apply uniformly across cases, regardless of the intrinsic strength or weakness of the claims involved. To import merits into condonation proceedings would effectively dilute this uniformity."

10. Thus, the argument that there was merit

otherwise in the first appeal preferred cannot ipso-facto be

a reason to condone the delay. As regards the question

whether any laxity can be given to the State, the Supreme

Court, after analyzing several judgments noticed that prior

to its judgment in Office of the Chief Post Master

General & Others V. Living Media India Ltd. &

Another2 the approach was characterized by judicial

sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in

matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar

nature of their functioning. However, there has been a

shift in jurisprudence on condonation of delay after the

decision of Chief Post Master General (supra).

11. Referring to the judgments rendered in Chief

Post Master General & Others (Supra) the Supreme

Court held as follows:-

"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a

2012 3 SCC 563

special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an

anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay."

12. Returning to the facts of the present case, it

would be proper to refer to the explanation offered by the

State as regards the delay in filing the first appeal. The

first appellate Court has summarized the explanation of

the State under paragraph 2 of its judgment as follows:-

"It has been submitted by the learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the Petitioners-appellants that after receipt of the certified copies of the impugned judgment and decree in CS No.86/2010 of the Senior Civil Judge, Sambalpur on

13.10.2014, the Government Pleader sent the same to the appellant No.4 on the same day. The appellant No.4 then sent the same to the appellant No.2 on 17.10.2014 for Necessary instruction in the matter, who ultimately submitted the same to the EIC-cum- Secretary to the Government of Odisha. Thereafter the Government of Odisha in Works Department instructed on 1.11.2014 to obtain opinion of the Government Pleader, Sambalpur in the matter. The Government Pleader, Sambalpur on 3.11.2014 opined to prefer appeal before the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa and his

said opinion was intimated to the appellant No.2 by the appellant No.4 on 4.11.2014. The Government of Odisha in Works Department decided to file appeal before the Hon'ble High Court of Orissa and communicated to the appellant No.4 its said decision. In view of the decision of the Government of Odisha, the appellant No.2 authorised the appellant No.4 to file the appeal before the High Court of Orissa on 2.2.2016. Subsequent thereto, after delegation of unlimited power as the First Appellate Authority to the District Judge, the Government Pleader, Sambalpur, again sent his opinion that the appeal shall be filed before the District Judge, Sambalpur. Accordingly, the appellant No.2 though authorised the appellant No.4 to file the appeal before the District Judge, Sambalpur on 30.3.2016, but due to misplacement of case record, the appeal could not be filed in time. Thereafter, when the record was traced, the appellant No.4 moved the higher Authority to get authorisation from Government to file the appeal. Necessary authorisation in that regard has been received by the appellant No.4 from the FA-cum-Additional Secretary to the Government in Works Department as well as from the appellant No.2 and the Superintending Engineer, National Highway Circle, Keonjhar on 21.10.2017, 19.9.2019 & 26.9.2019 respectively. Since the Executive Engineer, R&B Division, Rourkela, who was in charge of NH Division, Rourkela, was busy and hard pressed due to work load, could not approach the Government Pleader for filing of the appeal. However, he visited the Office of the Government Pleader on 5.12.2019 to present the First Appeal and subsequently on 6.12.2019 the instant appeal was filed."

13. From a bare reading, it would firstly be evident

that the impugned judgment was passed on 15.09.2014

whereas the first appeal was filed on 06.12.2019 i.e., after

a gap of more than five years. Secondly, there is an

apparent gap in the explanation between 04.11.2014 and

02.02.2016 on which date the Chief Engineer, National

Highways authorized the Executive Engineer to prefer

appeal. Strangely, the matter remained in limbo for a long

time which is sought to be explained by stating that the

case record had been misplaced.

14. Though, it is stated that the case record was

traced out, when and how it was traced has not been

explained at all. Surprisingly, it is stated that even though

the Executive Engineer was authorized to prefer appeal on

21.10.2017, 19.09.2019 and 26.09.2019, he being 'busy

and hard pressed due to work load' could not approach the

Government pleader for filing of the appeal. This Court

wonders as to why the same authorization was given on

three different occasions. Even then, the matter having

already been grossly delayed, ought to have received

immediate attention. Instead, it is stated that the

Executive Engineer was 'busy and hard pressed due to

work load'.

15. It is needless to mention that such a lethargic

approach while dealing with substantial Government

money can never be condoned. It would be worthwhile to

refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Chief

Post Master General & Others (supra) as quoted with

approval in Shivamma (Supra) ,which read as follows:-

"212. The law as it presently stands, post the decision of Postmaster General (supra), is unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties, must demonstrate bona fide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant.

213. From a combined reading of Bal Kishan Mathur (supra) and Sheo Raj Singh (supra) it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would not only compromise the sanctity of limitation. The earlier view, insofar as it favoured a liberal approach towards the State or any of its instrumentality is no more the correct position of law. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation.

214. What has been conveyed in so many words, by the decision of Postmaster General (supra) is that while excuses premised solely on bureaucratic lethargy cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause, there may nonetheless be circumstances

where the explanation offered, though involving bureaucratic procedures, reflects a genuine and bona fide cause for the delay. In such instances, the true test is whether the explanation demonstrates that the State acted with reasonable diligence and whether the delay occurred despite efforts to act within time.

Where such bona fides are established, the Court retains the discretion to condone the delay.

215. In other words, Postmaster General (supra) does not shut the door on condonation of delay by the State in all cases involving bureaucratic processes. The real distinction lies between a case where delay is the result of gross negligence, inaction, or casual indifference on the part of the State, and a case where delay has occurred despite sincere efforts, owing to the inherent complexities of governmental decision-making. While the former category must necessarily be rejected to uphold the discipline of limitation, the latter can still attract judicial indulgence where public interest is at stake and the cause is shown to be reasonable.

216. In this regard, the vital test that has to be employed, wherever "sufficient cause" is sought to be demonstrated on the ground of bureaucratic inefficiencies is to distinguish between whether the same is an "explanation" or an "excuse". Although the two may appear to be one and the same, yet there exists a fine but pertinent distinction between an "excuse" and an "explanation".

217. As illustrated in Sheo Raj Singh (supra) an "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. An "explanation" on the other hand would demonstrate genuineness in actions and reasons assigned, and would other wise be devoid of any gross negligence, deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, or indifference or casualness in conduct. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts.

218. However, equally important to note is that wherever, any explanation is sought to be given on account of bureaucratic lethargy and inherent

complexities of governmental decision-making, the same more often than not would invariably always is an "excuse", as experience has shown us, depicted from a long line of decisions of this Court. It is at this stage, where the decision of Postmaster General (supra) assumes significance. It seeks to convey the messages, that court should not be agnostic, to how the State or its instrumentalities, often tend to take the recourse of condonation of delay in a casual manner.

219. Which is why, as per the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) and a plethora of other subsequent decision, the ordinary approach of the courts, in cases where delay is sought to be condoned by offering the explanation of bureaucratic lethargy or red-tapism, must be one of circumspection and reluctance. The courts ought to loathe in accepting such explanations as "sufficient cause". They should apply their minds carefully, be slow in condoning delays on such reasons, and exceptional instances, where the explanation is found to be genuine, reflective of reasonable vigilance and promptitude in conduct, and free from gross negligence, deliberate inaction, lack of bona fides, or casual indifference, should such an explanation be accepted

16. In view of the observations of the Supreme

Court above, this Court refrains from saying anything

more on the issue, save and except that the explanation

submitted by the State was hardly sufficient to persuade

the Court to take a lenient view.

17. This Court thus finds that the first appellate

Court has rightly rejected the contentions so advanced and

refused to admit the appeal. In view of the foregoing

narration, this Court fully concurs with the finding and

finds no reason to interfere.

18. Resultantly, this Court is not inclined to admit

the appeal, which is therefore, dismissed.