Orissa High Court
Deepak Kumar Singh @ vs ) State Of Odisha . Opposite Parties on 7 November, 2025
Author: A.K. Mohapatra
Bench: A.K.Mohapatra
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLMC No.3347 of 2025
Deepak Kumar Singh @ . Petitioner
Ghanashyam Singh
Represented By Adv.
Mr.Pravat Kumar Muduli
-versus-
1) State of Odisha . Opposite Parties
2) Victim
Represented By Adv.
Ms.Babita Kumari Sahu, AGA
Mr.Bishnu Prasad Pradhan,
Advocate for the Opposite Party No.2
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K.MOHAPATRA
Date of hearing : 09.09.2025 | Date of Judgment : 07.11.2025
A.K. Mohapatra, J. :
1. The present application has been filed by the Petitioner, invoking
the inherent powers of this Court under section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, with
a prayer to quash the instant criminal proceeding bearing S.T. Case
No.64/222 of 2025/23 (arising out of Sarat P.S. Case No.45 of 2022, dated
28.05.2022) pending in the Court of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge,
Udala.
FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE PRESENT CASE
2. The brief outline of the factual background in which the present
CRLMC application has been filed, is as follows; initially, a written report,
dated 28.05.2022, was lodged by the Opposite Party No.2, who happens to
be the victim and informant in the present case, before the Officer-in-
Charge, Sarat Police Station. Basing upon such written report, Sarat P.S.
Case No.45 of 2022, which corresponds to C.T. Case No.488 of 2022 before
the learned S.D.J.M., Udala, was registered against the present Petitioner for
commission of alleged offences under Sections 417, 493, and 376(2)(n) of
the IPC. Pursuant to registration of the FIR, a copy whereof has been
produced as Annexure-1 to the present CRLMC application, the Petitioner
was arrested on 21.06.2022 and forwarded to Court.
3. Thereafter, at first, a preliminary Charge-Sheet No.60 dated
26.07.2022 was filed before completion of the investigation. Then, after
completion of the investigation, the final Charge-sheet No.70 dated
20.09.2022, provided under Annexure-2 to the present application, was filed
against the present Petitioner for commission of offences under sections
417/ 376(2)(n) of the IPC. After receipt of the Charge-sheet, the case was
committed to the court of the learned Sessions Judge, Mayurbhanj and
numbered as S.T. Case No.222 of 2023. However, later on in the course of
the trial, the records of the case were transferred to the Court of Learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Udala and re-numbered as S.T. Case No.64/222
of 2025/23.
4. In the meantime, the Petitioner and the Opposite Party No.2-
informant have married each other and are leading a conjugal life. They
have also been blessed with a female child subsequently. A copy of the
marriage certificate of the parties, and a copy of the birth certificate of their
daughter have been appended to the present CRLMC application as
Annexure-3 and Annexure-4 respectively. Basing upon the aforesaid
subsequent development the Petitioner has approached this Court invoking
its inherent powers under Section 528 of the BNSS for quashing of the
entire criminal proceeding.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER
5. Heard Mr.Pravat Kumar Muduli, the learned Counsel appearing for
the Petitioner. The learned Counsel, at the outset, states before this court
that the FIR alleging commission of the offences as stated hereinabove was
lodged by the Opposite Party No.2 due to a misunderstanding between the
parties. It is the contention of the learned counsel that such
misunderstanding has now been cleared and the dispute between the parties
has been amicably settled. In fact, after the FIR was lodged in the present
case, the Petitioner and the Opposite Party No.2 got married. In this regard,
the learned counsel for the Petitioner points to the marriage certificate at
Annexure-3 to the present application. Additionally, it was also contended
before the Court that the Petitioner and the Opposite Party No.2 have in the
meantime been blessed with a daughter borne out of their wedlock and, they
are currently leading a happy conjugal life, with the informant presently
residing at the Petitioner's house with their daughter. To substantiate his
arguments, learned counsel for the Petitioner has referred to the birth
certificate of the daughter of the parties, under Annexure-4.
6. Thereafter, the learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that in
the course of the trial the Opposite Party No.2 was examined as the PW
No.1 by the Prosecution and then cross-examined by the defence. Referring
to Annexure-5 to the CRLMC application, specifically the "further cross-
examination" of PW No.1 on recall on 30.01.2025, the learned counsel for
the Petitioner contended that the Opposite Party No.2-Informant has stated
in her cross-examination that the instant case was filed against the accused-
Petitioner on a misunderstanding between the parties. She has further stated
therein that the she has married the Petitioner in the meantime and she is
staying at her in-law's house with the Petitioner, as his wife, and they have
been blessed with a daughter. Learned counsel further contended that the
Opposite Party No.2-Informant has also stated in her further cross-
examination that the dispute with the Petitioner has been amicably settled
and that she does not wish to proceed further in the instant case against the
Petitioner.
7. Next, the learned counsel for the Petitioner, drawing the attention
of this Court to the copy of the FIR at Annexure-1, contended that the
Petitioner and the Opposite Party No.2 had a love affair prior to the
registration of the FIR. The learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that
no offence under section 376(2)(n) is actually made out against the
Petitioner since there was a consensual relationship between the parties,
who had a love affair between them. He further submitted that merely
because the physical relationship between the parties was established on a
promise to marry, the same would not amount to commission of the offence
of Rape. To lead further credence to his contentions, the learned counsel for
the Petitioner has relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court dated
29.07.2025 in Kunal Chatterjee v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.
(Special Leave Petition(Crl.) No.7004 of 2025), and the order dated
20.01.2025 in Prithivirajan v. The State Rep. by the Inspector of Police &
Anr. (Special Leave Petition(Crl.) No.12633 of 2022).
8. In such view of the matter, the learned counsel for the Petitioner
contended that the Petitioner and the Opposite Party No.2 have now
resolved the dispute among themselves, as such, any further continuance of
the instant criminal proceeding would be nothing but an abuse of the
judicial process. Accordingly, it was prayed that the instant criminal
proceeding involving the Petitioner be quashed.
CONTENTIONS OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY NO.2-INFORMANT
9. Heard Mr.Bibhu Prasad Pradhan, learned counsel for the Opposite
party No.2-Informant. The learned Counsel, at the outset, has supported the
contention of the Petitioner. It was submitted that the FIR against the
Petitioner was instituted on a misunderstanding. He further contended that
the Opposite Party No.2-Informant was a major at the time of the incident,
and, as of now, the parties are residing together as husband and wife, and,
they have been blessed with a child in the meantime. Learned counsel for
the Opposite Party No.2-Informant lastly submitted that letting the present
criminal proceeding continue would not in any way be in the interest of the
parties and that the Opposite Party No.2-Informant does not want to proceed
further in the matter at hand.
CONTENTIONS OF THE STATE-PROSECUTION
10. Heard Ms.Babita Kumari Sahu, Additional Government Advocate
appearing for the State-prosecution. First and foremost, the learned AGA
has opposed the prayer of the Petitioner on the primary ground that the
offences alleged against the Petitioner are grave and heinous in nature. She
further contended that even though the Informant-Opposite Party No.2 is
currently married to the Petitioner, that does not erase the fact of the heinous
crime committed by the Petitioner. She further stated that the fact as to
whether there actually was any false promise to marry leading to the
commission of the aforesaid offence can only be determined during trial.
Lastly, it was submitted that since the trial in the matter has already begun,
it should be allowed to reach its natural conclusion. In such view of the
matter, the learned AGA submitted that the present application of the
Petitioner is devoid of merit, and, as such, it is liable to be dismissed.
ANALYSIS
11. Heard the learned counsel for the respective parties. Perused the
record and the documents annexed thereto. The gravamen of the factual
quandary before this Court is that, the Opposite Party No.2, who is the
informant as well as the victim in the present case, had initially lodged an
FIR against the Petitioner for alleged commission of offences under sections
Sections 417, 493, and 376(2)(n) of the IPC. After the FIR was registered,
the Petitioner and the Opposite Party No.2 have gotten married and also
have a child out of their wedlock. Now, the Petitioner has approached this
Court with a prayer to quash the entire criminal proceeding on the ground
that the Opposite Party No.2 has stated in her cross-examination, on recall,
that she had filed the FIR on a misunderstanding and, she is currently
staying at her in-law's house with the Petitioner, as his wife, and they have a
daughter in the meantime. She has also stated that the dispute between the
parties has now been amicably resolved and she does not wish to proceed
further in the instant case against the accused-Petitioner. It is in the
aforesaid background that this Court must determine if the present matter is
a fit case to exercise the inherent powers of this Court under section 528 of
the BNSS.
12. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now
more or less well settled as regards the fundamental principles to be applied
by this Court while exercising its inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C.
In this regard, one may first refer to the decision of the Apex Court in State
of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335,
wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has summarised the principles
governing the quashing of FIR/ complaints/ criminal cases, in the following
words;
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of
law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way
of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise,
clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines
or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of
cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in
their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a
case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable
offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against
the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable
offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation
is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd
and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can
ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal
proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or
the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide
and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to a private and personal grudge."
13. The aforesaid principles have time and again been reiterated by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions, more recently, in B.N.
John v. State of U.P., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 and in Ajay
Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185.
Relevant paragraphs of the judgement in Ajay Malik's case (supra) are
reproduced hereinbelow;
"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue
orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends
of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited
by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and
profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded
within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act
only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is
essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several
decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High
Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the
threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its
case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,
contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has
been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the
legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the
dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and
omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and
compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Similarly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State
(NCT of Delhi), reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, has laid down that
the High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under section 482
Cr.P.C, has to take the allegations in the FIR at the face value. The Hon'ble
Apex Court has observed that;
"29. It is settled law that power of quashing of a complaint/FIR
should be exercised sparingly with circumspection and while
exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and
allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been
repeatedly held that save in exceptional cases where non-interference
would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial
process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences.
Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used in
a routine manner according to its whims or caprice."
15. Furthermore, in addition to the aforesaid basic principles which are
to be followed by this Court while evaluating whether a criminal proceeding
is fit for being quashed, certain additional clarifications/ restrictions have
also been enumerated by the Apex Court in many of its decisions. Recently,
in Abhishek Singh v. Ajay Kumar & Ors., bearing 2025 INSC 807, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has further clarified that the well-settled principle
regarding the High Court's power to quash criminal proceedings under
Section 482 of the CrPC. It was observed that the High Court while
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482, is not intended to conduct a
mini-trial. Instead, the High Court is required to restrict its inquiry to
whether the allegations made in the complaint or FIR, if accepted as true on
their face, constitute a prima facie offence (reference, in this regard, may
also be had to the Apex Court's dictum in CBI vs Aryan Singh, reported in
2023 SCC Online SC 379). In a similar vein, in Dhruvaram Murlidhar
Sonar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2019) 18 SCC 191, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has once again observed that;
"it is clear that for quashing the proceedings, meticulous analysis of
factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not
called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in
exercise of its inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the
complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been
taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of
its inherent powers."
16. Furthermore, in Abhishek Singh's case (supra), the Hon'ble Apex
Court, relying on its prior dictum in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, reported in
(2020) 3 SCC 317, also stressed that this limited scope prevents the High
Court from delving into the sufficiency or reliability of the material, or from
evaluating the likelihood of conviction. Such matters are squarely within the
domain of the trial court. The underlying rationale is to ensure that genuine
prosecutions are not stifled at the very outset, while at the same time
guarding against abuse of the judicial process through frivolous or vexatious
proceedings. Similar sentiments were also reflected by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Naresh Aneja v. State of U.P, reported in (2025) 2 SCC 604,
wherein it was observed that;
"18. It is well settled that when considering an application under
Section 482CrPC, the court cannot conduct a mini-trial but instead
is to be satisfied that prima facie the offences as alleged are made
out. To put it differently, it is to be seen, without undertaking a
minute examination of the record, that there is some substance in the
allegations made which could meet the threshold of statutory
language."
17. Now, in the instant case at hand, the offences that have been
alleged against the Petitioner are non-compoundable offences. With regard
to the quashing of proceedings involving non-compoundable offences, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, reported in (2003) 4
SCC 675, has observed that Section 320 Cr.P.C does not limit or control the
powers vested in High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C, and the High Court
is empowered to quash criminal proceedings/FIR, even if non-
compoundable offences are involved. The aforesaid view has also been
reiterated in Nikhil Merchant v. CBI &Anr., reported in (2008) 9 SCC 677
and also in Manoj Sharma v. State & Ors., reported in (2008) 16 SCC 1. In
fact in Shiji @ Pappu & Ors. v. Radhika & Anr., reported in (2011) 10
SCC 705, the Hon'ble Apex Court has made the following observations;
"17. It is manifest that simply because an offence is not
compoundable under Section 320 IPC is by itself no reason for the
High Court to refuse exercise of its power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. That power can in our opinion be exercised in cases where
there is no chance of recording a conviction against the accused
and the entire exercise of a trial is destined to be an exercise in
futility. There is a subtle distinction between compounding of an
offence by the parties before the trial court or in appeal on one hand
and the exercise of power by the High Court to quash the
prosecution under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the other. While a Court
trying an accused or hearing an appeal against conviction, may not
be competent to permit compounding of an offences based on a
settlement arrived at between the parties in cases where the offences
are non-compoundable under Section 320, the High Court may
quash the prosecution even in cases where the offences with which
the accused stand charged are non-compoundable. The inherent
powers of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are not for that
purpose controlled by Section 320 Cr.P.C."
(Emphasis supplied)
18. Additionally, in Shiji's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has cautioned regarding the exercise of the profusion of power at the
disposal of the High Courts under Section 482 Cr.P.C (in paragraph 18
thereof) and enumerated that that although Section 482 Cr.P.C confers wide
inherent powers on the High Court, such powers must be exercised with
great care and circumspection. Use of such power should remain
exceptional and confined to situations where continuing the prosecution
would amount to an abuse of the legal process. The Court stressed that it is
neither feasible nor appropriate to provide an exhaustive list of
circumstances justifying interference; rather, the guiding test is whether
intervention is necessary to secure the ends of justice and to prevent misuse
of judicial proceedings. At the same time, the High Court must refrain from
evaluating the merits of the evidence, since it cannot act as an appellate
court at this stage. Ultimately, the decision to invoke Section 482 Cr.P.C
depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, and reasons for its
exercise must be clearly recorded.
19. In view of the abovenoted guiding principles for the quashing of
criminal proceeding, this Court can shift focus to the distinctive attributes of
the matter at hand. On a perusal of the FIR, at Annexure-1, and the charge-
sheet, at Annexure-2, it can be seen that initially, prior to the registration of
the FIR, the Opposite Party No.2-informant and the Petitioner developed a
love relationship between each other. It then developed into physical
relationship between the two which resulted in the Opposite Party No.2
becoming pregnant. It must be noted here that at the time the aforesaid
incidents took place, the Opposite Party No.2 was a major. By the time the
Opposite Party No.2 was six months pregnant, she had asked the Petitioner
to marry her, which the Petitioner avoided for some reason or the other. It is
at this point that the FIR was lodged against the Petitioner on an allegation
of commission of offences under sections 417, 493, 376(2)(n) of the IPC.
Thereafter, the chargesheet was filed against the Petitioner under sections
417 and 376(2)(n) of the IPC.
20. Additionally, another peculiar development that has taken place in
the present case is that during the cross-examination on recall of the
Opposite Party No.2, she has stated that she had lodged the FIR against the
Petitioner out of a misunderstanding between the two. She has also stated
that the Petitioner and the Opposite Party No.2 have married each other in
the meantime, that they have a two-year old daughter borne out of the
wedlock, and that she is presently happily staying with her Husband-
Petitioner at her in-law's place. In fact, she has also stated during her cross-
examination on recall that the parties have amicably settled their dispute and
that she does not want to proceed against the Petitioner any further in the
present matter. The fact of the marriage between the parties is also borne out
of the marriage certificate at Annexure-3, which, as per the instruction
obtained by the learned AGA from the IIC, Baranga Police Station, appears
to be genuine. Moreover, there is also a birth certificate of their daughter at
Annexure-4.
21. As has been discussed previously, to determine whether the present
FIR and the criminal proceeding emanating therefrom are apt for
quashment, this Court has to first determine whether a prima facie case is
made out on the face of the FIR. As has been discussed earlier and as is
evident from the FIR and the Charge-sheet on record, the Informant-
Opposite Party No.2 and the Petitioner had a love relationship
approximately one year before the date of registration of the FIR.
Subsequently, a consensual physical relationship developed on the basis of
the aforesaid love affair between the two. Though it is the Informant-
Opposite Party No.2's allegation that the Petitioner kept physical
relationships with the Informant-Opposite Party No.2 without her consent.
After the informant became pregnant, she sought marriage with the
Petitioner, which was declined. Consequently, Opposite Party No.2
instituted an FIR against the Petitioner alleging commission of sexual
assault under a false pretext of marriage.
22. Before proceeding further with the adjudication of the matter, on
an analysis at this stage, it is glaringly apparent that the offences involved in
the present case, i.e. under section 417 and 376(2)(n), are serious and
heinous offences. It hardly requires reiteration that while considering an
application to quash criminal proceedings involving offences of the
aforesaid nature, it is paramount upon this Court to exercise utmost caution
and circumspection. In such circumstances, especially in the present case
where the victim informant has stated that the dispute between the parties
has been amicably settled, it becomes all the more imperative to bear in
mind that the inherent powers vested in this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C
are to be invoked sparingly, with the twin objectives of preventing abuse of
the process of law and for securing the ends of justice.
23. In more than one instance the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
cautioned against quashment of criminal proceedings/ FIR where serious
offences of the aforesaid nature were involved. In this regard, the Hon'ble
Apex Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab &Anr., reported in (2012) 10
SCC 303, has observed that;
"61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a
criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a
criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of
the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline
engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii)
to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power
to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be
exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no
category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such
power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be
fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the
offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in
nature and have serious impact on society...."
(Emphasis supplied)
24. In Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab &Anr., reported in
(2014) 6 SCC 466, the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with a matter
involving sections 307, 324, 341, 148, and 149 of the IPC, relating to an
incident involving physical assault and injuries. During the pendency of the
trial, the parties had reached a compromise and jointly approached the High
Court to quash the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court
declined to quash the case, citing the seriousness of the offence. Although
the Hon'ble Supreme Court allowed the quashing, holding that the offence
was not heinous and the compromise was genuine, certain guidelines were
also issued in paragraph-29 thereof cautioning that such power under section
482 Cr.P.C is not to be exercised in instances where "heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc."
were involved.
25. Likewise, in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, reported in
(2017) 9 SCC 641, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has had an occasion to
consider whether the High Court can quash the FIR/complaint/criminal
proceedings, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. Here, the case involved offence under sections 302, 307, 323, 324,
504, 506(2), and 114 of the IPC and, although a compromise was reached
between the accused and the complainant, the High Court refused to quash
the FIR, citing the gravity of the offence. In the end, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court upheld the High Court's decision and refused to quash the
proceedings due to the serious nature of the offence. In Parbatibhai's case
(supra), cconsidering a catena of decisions on the point of law, the Hon'ble
Apex Court laid down a set of guidelines, in paragraph 16 thereof,
observing that while exercising powers under Section 482 and considering a
plea that the dispute has been amicably settled, the High Court must
carefully consider the nature and seriousness of the offence. Heinous crimes
or offences involving moral turpitude, such as murder, rape, or dacoity,
cannot be quashed merely because the victim or their family has reached a
settlement. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed that these
offences are not purely private matters since they have significant societal
implications and that the decision to proceed with the trial in such cases is
guided by the overarching public interest in ensuring that serious offenders
are held accountable.
26. Admittedly, while the above-mentioned decisions put forth the
view that Section 376 IPC being a serious and heinous offence cannot be
quashed based upon settlement arrived at between the parties, however, the
same is not set in stone. In appropriate cases, considering the facts of a
particular case, the Supreme Court as well as various constitutional Courts
of this country have exercised the power to quash the proceedings involving
Section 376 IPC. Reference, in this regard, may be made to the decision of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jatin Agarwal v. State of Telangana &Anr.,
reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1969, wherein while quashing an FIR
registered under Section 417, 420 and 376 IPC, it was stated;
"5. Considering the aforesaid facts and keeping in view that the
respondent no.2/complainant has herself made a statement before us
that she has married the appellant and now living happily, we
exercise our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India
and to do complete justice in the matter, we quash the FIR dated
16.08.2020 lodged by the respondent no.2 against the appellant
under Sections 417, 420 and 376 IPC."
27. In much the same way, in Kapil Gupta v. State (NCT of Delhi)
&Anr., reported in (2022) 15 SCC 44, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while
dealing with a case wherein a petition for quashing an FIR registered under
Section 376 was dismissed by the High Court, and after due consideration of
its previous decision in Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab &Anr.,
reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466, quashed the impugned criminal proceeding
on the primary ground that the charges were not yet framed in the case and
that the respondent was not supporting the case, therefore, the proceeding
was bound to culminate in nothing more than an acquittal. Furthermore,
denying the request of the parties to quash the impugned proceeding would
only overburden the courts and subject the Respondent to agony. While
doing so, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also made the following observations;
"12. It can thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that
though the Court should be slow in quashing the proceedings
wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the High Court
is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists
material for incorporation of such an offence or as to whether
there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving
the charge for the offence charged with. The Court has also to take
into consideration as to whether the settlement between the parties
is going to result into harmony between them which may improve
their mutual relationship.
13. The Court has further held that it is also relevant to consider as
to what is the stage of the proceedings. It has been observed that if
an application is made at a belated stage wherein the evidence has
been led and the matter is at the stage of arguments or judgment, the
Court should be slow to exercise the power to quash the proceedings.
However, if such an application is made at an initial stage before
commencement of trial, the said factor will weigh with the court in
exercising its power."
(Emphasis supplied)
28. Along the same lines, very recently in Madhukar v. State of
Maharashtra, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1415, appeals were filed
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court arraying the common order wherein the
High Court had dismissed petitions filed under section 482 Cr.P.C for
quashing of criminal proceedings involving 376 IPC, where an affidavit was
filed by complainant that the matter has been amicably resolved and she
does not wish to continue with the proceeding. The primary reason for the
High Court to refuse quashing of the criminal proceeding was that section
376 IPC is a serious offence that is non-compoundable in nature, and as
such, it cannot be quashed merely on the basis of settlement or monetary
compensation. The Hon'ble Apex Court made the following observation
while allowing the appeals and setting-aside the impugned order of the High
Court;
"6. At the outset, we recognise that the offence under
Section 376 IPC is undoubtedly of a grave and heinous nature.
Ordinarily, quashing of proceedings involving such offences on the
ground of settlement between the parties is discouraged and should
not be permitted lightly. However, the power of the Court under
Section 482 CrPC to secure the ends of justice is not constrained by
a rigid formula and must be exercised with reference to the
facts of each case.
7. In the present matter, we are confronted with an unusual situation
where the FIR invoking serious charges, including Section 376 IPC,
was filed immediately following an earlier FIR lodged by the
opposing side. This sequence of events lends a certain context to the
allegations and suggests that the second FIR may have been a
reactionary step. More importantly, the complainant in the second
FIR has unequivocally expressed her desire not to pursue the case.
She has submitted that she is now married, settled in her personal
life, and continuing with the criminal proceedings would only
disturb her peace and stability. Her stand is neither tentative nor
ambiguous, she has consistently maintained, including through an
affidavit on record, that she does not support the prosecution and
wants the matter to end. The parties have also amicably resolved
their differences and arrived at a mutual understanding. In these
circumstances, the continuation of the trial would not serve any
meaningful purpose. It would only prolong distress for all
concerned, especially the complainant, and burden the Courts
without the likelihood of a productive outcome."
(Emphasis supplied)
29. The criminal jurisprudence on the scope of 'consent' in cases where
sexual intercourse took place on the promise of marriage has been well
established through a catena of judgments by this Court. Earlier, in Uday v.
State of Karnataka, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 46, the Hon'ble Apex Court
acquitted the accused based on the reasoning that the prosecutrix, a mature
college student, consented to sexual intercourse with the accused of her own
free will. The Court found that she was fully aware of the consequences of
her actions and held that her consent was not based on any misconception of
fact. In Uday (supra), the Court noted that;
"It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in
favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to
sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love
on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be
said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is
not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree
with this view, but we must add that there is no straitjacket formula
for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual
intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a
misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down
by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while
considering a question of consent, but the court must, in each case,
consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances,
before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own
peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether
the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of
fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the
burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of
the offence, absence of consent being one of them."
(Emphasis supplied)
30. Similarly, in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana, reported in
(2013) 7 SCC 675, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the nature of
the 'consent' in cases where there is sexual intercourse on the promise of
marriage, and laid down a distinction between a mere 'breach of promise'
and 'not fulfilling a false promise'. It was observed that;
"21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason,
accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,
the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between
rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very
carefully examine whether the accused had actually wanted to marry
the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise
to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit
of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere
breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the
court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a
false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent
involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and
consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the
prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her
love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of
misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused
on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or
which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite
having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated
differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court
reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala
fide, and that he had clandestine motives.
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to
show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the
accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to
marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a
person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim
owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a
promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to
reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does
not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come
within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact
must have an immediate relevance". Section 90 IPC cannot be
called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in
entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is
assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had
never really intended to marry her."
(Emphasis supplied)
31. In Deelip Singh v. State of Bihar, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 88, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court once again differentiated between a breach of a
promise to marry and a false promise of marriage. In doing so, the
conviction of the accused was set aside while holding that while there was a
breach of promise to marry, it was not a case of false promise to marry. In
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2019) 9
SCC 608, the High Court had originally dismissed an application under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) for quashing
of an FIR registered against the appellant for commission of offences
punishable under Sections 376, 417, 504 and 506(2) of the IPC and Sections
3(1)(u), (w) and 3(2)(vii) of The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities Act, 1989 (as amended by the Amendment Act,
2015). The High Court had rejected the application for quashing of the FIR
on the ground that although the relationship between the parties was with
consent, it appears that there was a promise to marry and statement shows
that later on, giving reason of caste of Complainant, promise was not kept.
The Hon'ble Apex Court, taking a conspectus of the surrounding facts,
analysed the scope of section 482 Cr.P.C and the definition of "consent"
under sections 375 and 90 of the IPC along with a catena of decisions on the
issue, allowed the appeal by setting aside the impugned order of the High
Court and, summarized the position in the following words;
"16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the
maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it
but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual
relations, there is a "misconception of fact" that vitiates the
woman's "consent". On the other hand, a breach of a promise
cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise,
the maker of the promise should have had no intention of
upholding his word at the time of giving it. The "consent" of a
woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a
"misconception of fact" where such misconception was the basis
for her choosing to engage in the said act...
***
18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the above
cases, the "consent" of a woman with respect to Section 375 must
involve an active and reasoned deliberation towards the proposed
act. To establish whether the "consent" was vitiated by a
"misconception of fact" arising out of a promise to marry, two
propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must
have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention
of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself
must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the
woman's decision to engage in the sexual act."
(Emphasis supplied)
32. Lastly, in Prithivirajan v. State, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC
696, the Apex Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order of the
High Court and quashed the criminal proceeding instituted against the
appellant, under sections 417, 376 and 506 of IPC. In doing so, the Supreme
Court clarified the scenario where an offence of rape on false promise to
marry would be made out. It was observed that;
"6. This Court has time and again reiterated that only because
physical relations were established based on a promise to marry, it
will not amount to rape. For the offence of rape to be attracted, the
following conditions need to be satisfied: first, the accused promised
to marry the prosecutrix solely to secure consent for sexual relations
without having any intention of fulfilling said promise from the very
beginning; second, that the prosecutrix gave her consent for sexual
relations by being directly influenced by such false promise of
marriage. [See: Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. The State of
Maharashtra and Ors. (2019) 9 SCC 608; Mahesh Damu Khare v.
The State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 347]"
33. From the aforesaid analysis, we can safely outline the following
principles which can aid in determining whether the consent by the victim
for engaging in sexual intercourse was vitiated by a false promise to marry
made by the accused; Firstly, consent given on the basis of love or
emotional involvement, where the woman is fully aware of the
consequences of her actions, cannot be said to be vitiated by a false promise
to marry and is deemed voluntary and valid. Secondly, a "false promise of
marriage" involves deception from the outset with the intent to seduce the
woman whereas a mere "breach of promise" arises when the accused
genuinely intended to marry but was subsequently unable to do so due to
unforeseen or uncontrollable circumstances. Thirdly, to constitute a false
promise, it must be established that the accused never intended to marry the
prosecutrix at the time the promise was made, thereby demonstrating mala
fide intention at the very inception. Fourthly, the false promise must be of
immediate relevance to the prosecutrix's decision, i.e., there must be a direct
nexus between the false assurance of marriage and the prosecutrix's consent
to engage in sexual relations. Fifthly, "consent" under Section 375 IPC must
involve an active and reasoned deliberation by the woman. Such consent is
vitiated only if it can be shown that her decision to engage in sexual
intercourse was based solely upon a false promise of marriage given in bad
faith. Sixthly, there can be no straitjacket formula for determining whether
consent was voluntary or obtained under a misconception of fact. Instead,
there can be a few guiding principles (like the ones enumerated herein and
in other decisions mentioned above) which must be applied to the case at
hand which must then be assessed on its own peculiar facts and
circumstances, with a careful evaluation of the surrounding circumstances.
34. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, it can be seen that
the parties had a love relationship prior to the incident in question.
Moreover, at the time when the FIR was lodged, the Informant-Opposite
Party No.2 had approached the Petitioner to marry her, which he had denied.
More importantly, from a perusal of the FIR and the Charge-sheet, it does
not appear that there ever was any promise to marry from the side of the
Petitioner which would have induced the Informant-Opposite Party No.2 to
indulge in physical intimacy with the Petitioner. Since there appears to be
no promise to marry at all, there does not arise a question of it being a false
promise to marry. It appears that once the Informant-Opposite Party No.2
discovered that she was pregnant she approached the Petitioner proposing a
marriage, which the Petitioner denied and it was in this background that a
complaint was lodged against the Petitioner for commission of offences
under sections 417, 493 and 376(2)(n) of the IPC. Nevertheless, one
distinctive development in the present matter is that after the FIR was
lodged, the Informant-Opposite Party No.2 and the Petitioner got married
and presently have a child born out of the wedlock. Furthermore, as is
evident from the cross-examination on re-call of the Informant-Opposite
Party No.1, it can be seen that informant is no more interested in pursuing
the matter since the dispute between the parties has been settled amicably.
Also, the informant has stated that she is currently leading a happy married
life with the Petitioner and residing at her in-laws.
35. Furthermore, with regard to the scope of exercise of this Court's
inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C (i.e. section 528 of the BNSS), it is
clear from the analysis made hereinabove that the primary consideration to
be had while exercising the inherent powers under section 482 Cr.P.C (i.e.
section 528 of the BNSS) is that securing the ends of justice must be of the
paramount importance. In the instant case, on a conspectus of the factual
background, it is clear that the Informant-Opposite Party No.2 is no more
interested in pursuing the matter anymore, as such, the proceeding is bound
to culminate in nothing more than an acquittal. Additionally, the parties
have amicably resolved their differences and arrived at a mutual
understanding. They are leading a peaceful domestic life and have a child
out of their wedlock. In these circumstances, the continuation of the trial
would not serve any meaningful purpose. It would only prolong distress for
all the concerned parties, burden the Courts and lead to wastage of the
Court's valuable time without there being any likelihood of a productive
outcome.
36. In such view of the matter, this Court has no hesitation in arriving
at the conclusion that the present matter is a fit case for the exercise of the
inherent power under section 528 of the BNSS (erstwhile section 482
Cr.P.C). Accordingly, the present criminal proceeding bearing S.T. Case
No.64/222 of 2025/23 pending in the Court of the learned Addl. Sessions
Judge, Udala (arising out of Sarat P.S. Case No.45 of 2022, dated
28.05.2022) is hereby quashed.
37. The CRLMC application is allowed. However, there shall be no
order as to costs.
(A. K. Mohapatra)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
The 7th November, 2025/Debasis Aech, Secretary
