Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 10342 Ori
Judgement Date : 24 November, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.A. No.1732 of 2025
Sidhanta Dalai .... Appellant
-Versus-
State of Odisha and others .... Respondents
Advocates appeared in this case:
For Appellant : Mr. Sukanta Kumar Dalai,
Advocate
For Respondent : Mr. Debasish Tripathy,
Nos.1 to 6 Additional Government Advocate
For Respondent : Mr. Hrudananda Mohapatra,
Nos.7 to 23 Advocate
CORAM:
HON' BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN
JUDGMENT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date of hearing and judgment: 24th November, 2025
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HARISH TANDON, CJ.
1. The instant writ appeal arises from a judgment dated 13 th
October, 2025 passed by the Single Bench in dismissing the writ
petition bearing WP(C) No.29708 of 2024 having held that the
points raised in the writ petition as well as the arguments advanced
on behalf of the writ petitioner are not justified and/or sustainable
in the eye of law.
2. Admittedly, the writ petitioner-appellant was elected as
Sarpanch of a Grama Panchayat in the month of February, 2022
and suffered the motion of no confidence against him by the
majority of the members of the Grama Panchayat. The proceeding
was initiated by the competent authority as mandated under
Section 24 of the Odisha Grama Panchayats Act, 1964 (for short,
"the OGP Act") and date was fixed for counting the votes of the
elected members of the Grama Panchayat whether the motion of no
confidence succeeds or not. The next date is fixed day-after-
tomorrow (26th November, 2025). However, the writ petition was
filed challenging not only the requisition but also the notice issued
by the competent authority under sub-section (2) and meeting was
convened under sub-section (3) of Section 24 of the OGP Act on
multiple grounds including that the time limit between the
requisition and the proposed resolution, as mandated therein, has
not been strictly adhered to. It is the specific stand of the appellant
that the procedures provided under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of
the OGP Act has not been followed. Apart from the same, a further
plea was taken that the requisition and/or the meeting to be
convened on the basis thereof falls within the mischief period as
provided under sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the OGP Act and,
therefore, the entire proceeding is liable to be quashed and set
aside.
3. After considering the stand taken by the appellant, the
Single Bench held that the requisition made by the majority of the
members of the Grama Panchayat with regard to no confidence
against the appellant cannot be invalidated. The notice having
received by him, the clear fifteen days cannot be said to be causing
any prejudice to the appellant. Therefore, the process is saved by
Section 24(2)(e) of the OGP Act.
4. Mr. Sukanta Kumar Dalai, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant in his usual manner forcefully argued and
vociferously submitted before us that the Single Bench has not
considered the case in proper perspective and proceeded on the
basis of the submission advanced by the other side. According to
him, the requisition was in fact made on 8 th February, 2024, which
being the foundation for issuance of the notice for convening the
meeting comes within the mischief period of two years and six
months and in view of a complete embargo created under Section
24(4) of the OGP Act, the entire exercise taken by the competent
authority is per se illegal.
4.1. He arduously submits that the Court did not take into
consideration the spirit of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the OGP
Act, which provides that no such meeting shall be convened except
on a requisition signed by one-third of the total members of the
Grama Panchayat which in fact was made in the month of the
February, 2024 and not in the month of September, 2024 as it was
signed by only one member and, therefore, it is not in conformity
with the said provision. He, thus, submits that the Single Bench
has not considered the case in proper perspective, more particularly
the implication of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the OGP Act
and, therefore, warrants interference in the instant appeal.
4.2. As a last gasping resort, he submits that though the hearing
of the impugned judgment was concluded on 16 th July, 2025, the
judgment was delivered on 13th October, 2025, which is just at the
advent of the expiration of three months and in view of the
judgment rendered by the apex Court in Anil Rai Vs. State of Bihar
(2001) 7 SCC 318, the same is liable to be set aside and the matter
be remanded to the Single Bench to rehear the same. In support of
the aforesaid contention, he further relies upon a recent judgment
of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Ratilal Jhaverbhai
Parmer and others Vs. State of Gujarat and others, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 2985.
5. Per contra, Mr. Hrudananda Mohapatra, learned counsel
appearing for the contenting respondents submits that, in fact, the
competent authority convened the meeting on the basis of a
requisition dated 1st October, 2024, which contains the resolution
of the majority of the members in a meeting convened on 24 th
September, 2024 and, therefore, the contention of the appellant that
the meeting was called by the authority on the basis of the
requisition dated 8th February, 2024 is factually incorrect and not
sustainable.
5.1. He further submits that apart from the appellant, all the
members of the Grama Panchayat have showed their no confidence
in the functioning of the appellant and, therefore, the majority
decision, which is practically an absolute one, should not be
interfered by the Court. According to him, out of eighteen
members, which constitute the Grama Panchayat, seventeen
members have taken a resolution and, therefore, there is no
illegality and/or infirmity in the decision of the authority in
conducting the meeting. He, however, submits that the counting
was delayed as the appellant approached this Court and is fixed
day-after-tomorrow (26th November, 2025), which by all
probability would yield result of no confidence against the
appellant.
6. On the conspectus of the aforesaid facts, it is undisputed
that the appellant was elected as Sarpanch in the office of Grama
Panchayat in the month of February, 2022 presently consisting of
eighteen ward-members. A requisition was initially submitted on
9th February, 2024 to the concerned Sub-Collector by post, which
according to the appellant laid a foundation for a meeting to be
held in relation to no confidence. Sub-section (2) of Section 24 of
the OGP Act not only prescribes the procedure but also the
conduct of the business at the meeting exhaustively, subject to sub-
section (4) of the Section 24 of the OGP Act. It admits no
ambiguity that some of the clauses contained in sub-section (2) of
Section 24 starts with the negative language percolating sense that
it is of a mandatory character. Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of
Section 24 of the OGP Act is one of such provision, which creates
an embargo in convening a meeting except on a requisition signed
by at least one-third of the total membership of the Grama
Panchayat and also the resolution proposed to be moved at the
meeting. Clause (c) of sub-section (2) of the Section 24 of the OGP
Act postulates fifteen clear days to be given before the date fixed
for the meeting on receipt of requisition and other formalities, to
which we do not find any ambiguity in it.
6.1. The appellant argued before the Single Bench that the
notice under clause(c) of sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the OGP
Act is invalid as clear fifteen days' time was not given. The Single
Bench did not find such argument to have any substance, more
particularly in the perspective of the fact that the requisition
contained the resolution passed by all the members of the Grama
Panchayat except the appellant, who holds the post of Sarpanch.
The Single Bench further noticed the facts emanating from the
record and held that the notices were issued on 16 th November,
2024 to all the members indicating that the date for convening the
meeting is fixed on 6th December, 2024, which is much beyond
fifteen days therefrom. The Single Bench further found that the
appellant received the said notice, which was sent by post on 20 th
November, 2024, which would be evident from the postal tracking
report and, therefore, it cannot be said that there is a violation of
the mandatory period provided under clause (c) of sub-section (2)
of Section 24 of the OGP Act.
6.2. If we count the clear fifteen days from the date of receipt
of the notice, it cannot be said that the time period, as provided in
the said clause, is attracted. Even if the fifteen days falls on the
date of the meeting, yet the technicalities should not overweigh the
substantive compliance of the provision. The purpose of providing
the period before the notice is received and the date of holding the
meeting is to give sufficient opportunity to the Sarpanch or Naib
Sarpanch, against whom no confidence is moved. This is one of
the facets of the principles of the natural justice. Mere technical
lapses should not be projected rigidly to negate the object and the
purpose underlying the incorporation of the provisions relating to
the no confidence motion, but the Court should adopt such
interpretative tools, which would navigate the legislative intention
behind the incorporation thereof.
6.3. We, thus, cannot take a dissenting view with the findings
of the Single Bench in this regard, which needs interference. So far
as the requisition dated 8th February, 2024 is concerned, the Single
Bench has found from the stand of the authorities that in fact the
resolution was taken on 24th September, 2024 and requisition was
made on 1st October, 2024 and based upon the said resolution and
the requisition, the authority fixed the date for conducting the
meeting as provided in Section 24 (2) of the OGP Act. We, thus,
do not find any factual dissent in this regard.
7. So far as the applicability of sub-section (4) of Section 24
of the OGP Act is concerned, undeniably the appellant entered into
the office of the Grama Panchayat in the month of February, 2022
and if the resolution and/or requisition is accepted to have been
made on 24th September, 2024 and 1st October, 2024, it goes
beyond the period of two years and six months and, therefore, sub-
section (4) of Section 24 of the OGP Act by no stretch of
imagination can be made applicable herein. Since the Single Bench
did not accept the stand of the appellant that the requisition was
made on 8th February, 2024, we do not find any incongruity and/or
illegality in the said finding returned by the Single Bench.
8. So far as the delayed delivery of the impugned judgment is
concerned, the period suggested in the judgment rendered in the
case of Anil Rai (supra) is that the Court may make an endeavor to
deliver judgment within a period of three months. It further held
that in the event the Court is unable to deliver the judgment within
the said time, the procedure suggested therein should be followed,
but it does not in absolute terms hold that the judgment is liable to
be set aside by the appellate forum. Even in a recent judgment
being Ratilal Jhaverbhai Parmer (supra), the procedure suggested
in the case of Anil Rai (supra) has been accepted, to which we do
not feel to take any departure therefrom. Though in the case Ram
Bali Vs. State of U.P., (2004) 10 SCC 598, the apex Court opined
that the judgment in the case of Anil Rai (supra) should not be read
in the sense that any judgment delivered after three months are
liable to be set aside but the proper procedures and/or suggestions,
which have been provided therein should be ensured in the
following:-
"18. We also find that the plea of delayed delivery of judgment and the same rendering it vulnerable is without any substance. In Anil Rai case [(2001) 7 SCC 318 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1009] this Court has only stressed upon the desirability of early delivery of judgments. In fact, the judgment impugned before this Court in the said case was not set aside on the ground of delayed delivery of judgment and was dealt on merits. In paras 10 and 45 of the judgment this Court had indicated options to a party in case judgment is not delivered for a considerably long time. We are unable to appreciate that any detriment as such was caused to the appellant on that account alone, on the peculiar facts of the case, as well."
8.1. In the instant case, the hearing was concluded on 16 th July,
2025 and the impugned judgment was delivered on 13 th October,
2025 much before the expiration of three months from the date of
conclusion of the hearing and, therefore, the aid or assistance to the
judgment rendered in the case of Anil Rai (supra) does not appear
to be proper and, in our opinion, is misplaced.
9. From whatever angle the matter is looked at, we do not
find any substance. The writ appeal is hereby dismissed. As a
result of the disposal of the writ appeal, pending Interlocutory
Application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of, but in the
circumstances there shall be no order as to costs.
(Harish Tandon) Chief Justice
(M.S. Raman) Judge MRS/Laxmikant
Signed by: LAXMIKANT MOHAPATRA Designation: Senior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 27-Nov-2025 10:37:16
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