Orissa High Court
Dr. Randall Sequeira vs Collector And District Magistrate on 18 July, 2025
Author: S.K. Panigrahi
Bench: S.K. Panigrahi
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR
Reason: Authentication
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
Date: 18-Jul-2025 16:55:05
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.16753 of 2025
(In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950).
Dr. Randall Sequeira .... Petitioner(s)
-versus-
Collector and District Magistrate, .... Opposite Party (s)
Rayagada and Ors.
Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode:
For Petitioner(s) : Afraaz Suhail, Adv.
For Opposite Party (s) : Mr. Debasish Nayak, AGA
CORAM:
DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI
DATE OF HEARING:-24.06.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT:-18.07.2025
Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J.
1. In this Writ Petition, the Petitioner seeks a direction from this Court
to quash the exclusion order dated 05.06.2025 issued under Section
163 of the BNSS, which barred him from entering Rayagada district,
alleging it violates his constitutional rights under Article 19.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE:
2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:
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(i) The petitioner, Dr. Randall Sequeira, is a registered medical
practitioner originally from Mangalore, Karnataka, currently residing
in Hill Town, Bhawanipatna, Odisha. He has been working in tribal-
dominated areas of Kalahandi and Rayagada districts, where he is
known to have offered voluntary medical services. He was
previously associated with NGOs such as DApRA and Swasthya
Swaraj, which operated in Kerpai village under Kalahandi district,
though he is no longer affiliated with them.
(ii) On 30.09.2023, the petitioner was allegedly found circulating
pamphlets, maps, and anti-mining materials in villages around the
Sijimali Hills, which are the proposed site of a bauxite mining project.
This incident was recorded in Kashipur Police Station GD Entry No.
09 dated 30.09.2023, and was later cited in official communications as
indicative of his involvement in ongoing anti-mining activities.
(iii) On 04.06.2025, the Superintendent of Police, Rayagada, sent a report
to the Collector and District Magistrate, Rayagada, warning of a
proposed large gathering at Sunger Hatapada on 05.06.2025,
coinciding with World Environment Day. The gathering was
reportedly being organized by Maa Mati Mali Suraksha Samiti, an
anti-mining group, and included a list of 24 individuals, among them
the petitioner, said to be involved in mobilizing attendance.
(iv) Based on the police communication and inputs suggesting a possible
breach of public order, the Collector and District Magistrate,
Rayagada, issued Order No. 1556 dated 04.06.2025 under Section
163(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, prohibiting
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the petitioner and 23 others from entering the district of Rayagada for
a period of two months. The order was passed ex parte under Section
163(2) BNSS, citing urgency and risk to public tranquillity.
(v) The planned event at Sunger was scheduled on the local weekly
market day, which draws significant footfall from surrounding
villages. Intelligence inputs anticipated a gathering of 6,000 to 7,000
people, and local residents submitted a written complaint expressing
concern about potential law-and-order issues due to the timing and
scale of the meeting.
(vi) Authorities cited several prior incidents in support of their action,
including Kashipur PS Case Nos. 202/2024, 728/2025, and 110/2025,
all of which are under investigation and involve allegations of
violence, obstruction of official duties, and damage to public
property during protests linked to the anti-mining movement. Some
of the individuals allegedly involved in those cases were reported to
be associated with the petitioner.
(vii) The petitioner subsequently filed an objection under Section 163(5) of
BNSS, 2023, challenging the prohibitory order. The objection, sent by
post from Cuttack, was received by the district administration and is
currently stated to be under consideration, with further proceedings
under Section 163(7) pending.
II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner earnestly made the following
submissions in support of his contentions:
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
(i) The impugned order was passed without affording the petitioner a
hearing, either before or after its issuance, despite the mandatory
requirement under Section 163(7) of BNSS. This is a gross violation of
principles of natural justice.
(ii) The restriction imposed for two months is grossly disproportionate to
the alleged one-day protest event scheduled on 05.06.2025,
suggesting non-application of mind and arbitrariness in the
Collector's decision.
(iii) The order amounts to an unconstitutional restriction on the
petitioner's rights under Article 19, specifically the freedom of
movement, freedom of speech and expression, and right to peaceful
assembly, in the absence of any demonstrable threat or misconduct.
(iv) The prohibition on entry into Rayagada district directly impacts the
petitioner's ability to discharge his professional duties and voluntary
healthcare services, thereby affecting the tribal population's access to
medical care.
(v) The impugned order equates peaceful environmental protest in a
Scheduled Area with a law and order threat, which is an unfounded
and dangerous precedent. It reflects a superficial understanding of
constitutional dissent, indigenous rights, and environmental justice.
(vi) The petitioner was neither involved in nor aware of the protest, and
the inclusion of his name in the police communication appears
arbitrary and without factual basis.
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(vii) The order was never formally served upon the petitioner; he became
aware of it through social media, which is procedurally improper and
defeats the purpose of due notice.
(viii) The Collector's observation that environmental protest obstructs
development is untenable, particularly when unchecked
environmental degradation poses a greater long-term threat to
sustainable development.
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES:
4. Learned counsel for the Opposite Parties earnestly made the
following submissions in support of his contentions:
(i) The prohibitory order was issued in accordance with Sections 163(1)
to (4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023. Given the
perceived urgency and potential threat to public order, the ex-parte
nature of the order was invoked under Section 163(2), which permits
such action in emergent situations. The petitioner has since submitted
an objection under Section 163(5), which, according to the authorities,
is currently under consideration, and the process mandated under
Section 163(7) for providing an opportunity of hearing is stated to be
underway.
(ii) The petitioner is perceived to pose a threat to public peace and order
owing to his alleged consistent efforts to instigate tribal communities
against government initiatives, particularly in connection with the
Sijimali mining project. Authorities apprehended that the planned
protest on 05.06.2025, if permitted to proceed, could have led to
significant congestion, economic disruption, and potential violence,
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especially as it was scheduled to coincide with the weekly market
day at Sunger, which typically witnesses high public footfall.
(iii) The petitioner is alleged to have a "chequered past" involving anti-
mining activities, including the distribution of pamphlets,
participation in undisclosed meetings, and encouragement of
unauthorized assemblies. It is further claimed that he has mobilized
individuals to disrupt official functions, obstruct government-
conducted surveys, and in certain instances, incite actions leading to
attacks on police stations and interference with law enforcement
operations.
(iv) Intelligence inputs received by the authorities indicated possible
linkages between the planned gathering and extremist or Naxalite
elements active in the region. The protest was reportedly expected to
be attended by several known external activists, who were allegedly
involved in efforts to provoke tribal communities into adopting
unlawful means of resistance against the Sijimali mining project.
(v) Petitioner's claim that his participation was for environmental
awareness is characterized as misleading, since pamphlets and
intelligence reports indicate an explicit anti-mining and anti-
government agenda.
IV. COURT'S REASONING AND ANALYSIS:
5. Heard Learned Counsel for parties and perused the documents
placed before this Court.
6. The material facts are largely undisputed. Dr. Sequeira, known for
advocating environmental and tribal rights, had publicized plans to
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hold a peaceful demonstration on 5th June 2025, World Environment
Day, at a weekly market near Sijimali Hills. The purpose was to voice
opposition to mining projects perceived to threaten the local ecology
and tribal communities. It appears no violent incidents from the
petitioner's past protests were reported, and the June 5 gathering was
intended as a peaceful assembly. However, on the morning of
05.06.2025, the District Magistrate, acting under Section 163 BNSS,
issued an order directing Dr. Sequeira's exclusion from Rayagada
district for two month. The order cited an "urgent need to prevent
danger to public peace and tranquility," referring to intelligence
reports of a large congregation and potential law and order problems.
The order was passed ex parte without prior notice or opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner. The petitioner alleges he came to know of
the ban only when he was restrained by police at the district border
on that day, effectively stifling the planned protest. He was not
served the order immediately, allegedly undermining his ability to
challenge it promptly.
7. At this juncture, following key issues arise for determination: (i)
Whether the situation on 05.06.2025 presented a "clear and present
danger" or imminent threat to public order justifying the drastic step
of banning the petitioner's entry into the district; (ii) Whether the
impugned order meets the test of necessity and proportionality in
restricting the petitioner's fundamental rights; and (iii) Whether due
process, including the opportunity of hearing and proper service, as
followed in issuing the order. These issues are addressed in turn,
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keeping in mind the constitutional framework and precedents
governing the right to protest vis-à-vis public order.
8. On facts, the Court finds no material indicating that Dr. Sequeira's
proposed peaceful protest posed an immediate and grave threat of
violence or public disorder. It is notable that the protest was planned
as a one-day, peaceful gathering to coincide with World Environment
Day, lacking any suggestion of arms or inflammatory agenda. The
State's concerns were admittedly based on a generalized
apprehension that any large protest might attract miscreants or
degenerate into clashes, especially with limited police presence on
that day. However, our constitutional jurisprudence demands a fairly
high threshold of actual risk before fundamental rights can be
curtailed. The U.S. Supreme Court's classic formulation in Whitney v.
California1 reminds us the following:
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared
witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free
men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify
suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground
to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced.
There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable
ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a
serious one. Every denunciation of existing law tends in
some measure to increase the probability that there will be
violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the
probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability.
Propagation of the criminal state of mind by teaching
71 L. Ed. 1095.
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
syndicalism increases it. Advocacy of lawbreaking heightens
it still further. But even advocacy of violation, however
reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free
speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement and
there is nothing to indicate that the advocacy would be
immediately acted on. The wide difference between advocacy
and incitement, between preparation and attempt, between
assembling and conspiracy, must be borne in mind. In order
to support a finding of clear and present danger it must be
shown either that immediate serious violence was to be
expected or was advocated, or that the past conduct
furnished reason to believe that such advocacy was then
contemplated." (Emphasis Supplied)
9. The "clear and present danger" test, as understood in our law,
essentially requires that the State has to show a close proximity
between the expression or assembly and likelihood of a substantive
evil, like violence or public disorder, such that the evil is almost
certain to occur unless the restriction is imposed. In the present case,
the opposite parties have not demonstrated any specific acts of the
petitioner inciting violence, nor any concrete incident in the past
where his involvement led to public disorder.
10. Mere conjecture or surmise that a protest on a market day could turn
unruly is not enough. In this context, the Supreme Court in Rakesh
Vaishnav v. Union of India2 dealing with the farmers' protests,
observed the following:
"We clarify that this Court will not interfere with the
protest in question. Indeed the right to protest is part of a
fundamental right and can as a matter of fact, be exercised
WP(C) No. 1118 of 2020.
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
subject to public order. There can certainly be no
impediment in the exercise of such rights as long as it is
non-violent and does not result in damage to the life and
properties of other citizens and is in accordance with law."
11. Here, there was no allegation that the petitioner intended anything
but a non-violent demonstration, nor any evidence of likely harm to
life or property. Absent a clear and immediate threat of disorder, the
extreme step of banishing a citizen from a whole district cannot find
justification. Such exclusions order invert the clear and present
danger test by treating peaceful political engagement as the danger
itself, whereas in reality, the real danger is not posed by the protestor,
but by an executive impulse that seeks to insulate industrial power
from public accountability. This Court is inclined to agree that the
record reveals an overreaction by the administration, effectively
branding a peaceful protestor as a public safety threat without
concrete basis.
12. The duty of the State to maintain order is undeniable, particularly
during periods of heightened logistical demand. The Court notes
that, at the relevant time, the Ratha Yatra festivities in Puri had
necessitated substantial police deployment across the State, including
the diversion of personnel from districts such as Rayagada. This had
temporarily constrained the district's capacity to manage large
gatherings. While such exigencies required careful administrative
balancing, the temporary unavailability of adequate police force due
to statewide festival duties could not, by itself, justify a blanket
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
prohibition on peaceful protest. The Constitution does not permit a
scenario where civil liberties become negotiable each time
enforcement capacity is stretched. In such instances, the State's
obligation is to innovate, coordinate, and regulate. It is not permitted
to suppress. The difficulty of governance cannot be the basis for pre-
emptive censorship of constitutional rights.
13. Even assuming some public order concerns existed, the next inquiry
is whether the action taken was proportionate to the threat. The
principle of proportionality has firmly taken roots in Indian
constitutional law as a measure of evaluating restrictions on
fundamental rights. In the nine-judge Bench of Justice K.S.
Puttaswamy v. Union of India3, the Supreme Court applied a four-
pronged test for proportionality and held as follows:
"...a measure restricting a right must, first, serve a
legitimate goal (legitimate goal stage); it must, secondly, be
a suitable means of furthering this goal (suitability or
rational connection stage); thirdly, there must not be any
less restrictive but equally effective alternative (necessity
stage); and fourthly, the measure must not have a
disproportionate impact on the right-holder (balancing
stage)."
14. There is little doubt that preventing public disorder is a legitimate
aim under our Constitution under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b). The
impugned order was rationally connected to that aim in the sense
that removing a perceived instigator could, in theory, reduce the
2019 (1) SCC 1.
Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK
chance of crowds gathering or clashing. However, the State's action
falters on the necessity and balancing steps of the test.
15. This Court finds that the authorities had less drastic alternatives at
hand. For instance, the police could have engaged with the petitioner
and imposed reasonable conditions on the conduct of the protest,
such as limiting it to a particular venue or time, ensuring it remained
peaceful, etc. rather than flatly prohibiting his presence. Section 163
BNSS itself allows orders to direct any person to abstain from certain
acts; it does not inherently mandate complete territorial exile unless
absolutely unavoidable. Here, a tailored order could have addressed
the apprehensions. Banning the petitioner from the entire district for
two months overshoots the professed goal. It targets the petitioner in
a manner that appears more punitive than preventive, effectively
punishing him for his viewpoint.
16. The Supreme Court in the case of Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of
India4 highlighting the perils of restrictions that are disproportionate
held as follows:
"To consider the immediate impact of restrictions upon the
realization of the fundamental rights, the decision maker
must prioritize the various factors at stake. Such attribution
of relative importance is what constitutes proportionality. It
ought to be noted that a decision which curtails
fundamental rights without appropriate justification will be
classified as disproportionate. The concept of proportionality
requires a restriction to be tailored in accordance with the
territorial extent of the restriction, the stage of emergency,
nature of urgency, duration of such restrictive measure and
AIR 2020 SUPREME COURT 1308.
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nature of such restriction. The triangulation of a restriction
requires the consideration of appropriateness, necessity and
the least restrictive measure before being imposed."
17. Likewise, the necessity of extending the ban for a full two months
was not demonstrated with any cogent reason. If the concern was the
protest around 05.06.2025, an order narrowly covering that date or a
few days around it might possibly be debated as necessary; but
extending it to 60 days suggests an intent to quell ongoing dissent
rather than meet an immediate exigency.
18. The fundamental right to movement granted under (Article 19(1)(d))
can be curtailed in the interest of the general public, but here the
general public's interest in order could have been protected by far
less intrusive means. The freedoms of speech and assembly, at the
core of this case, were curtailed without "appropriate justification"
and thus the action falls foul of the proportionality doctrine as
reaffirmed in Anuradha Bhasin (supra).
19. Lastly, the manner in which the order was issued raises concerns of
procedural unreasonableness. It is true that Section 163 of the BNSS
permits ex parte orders in urgent cases. The law recognizes that a
pre-decisional hearing may not always be feasible in crisis situations.
However, even in such cases, the affected person is ordinarily
entitled to a prompt post-decisional hearing or at least a chance to
object soon after the immediate urgency passes. In the present case,
the petitioner was not heard before the order, and from the records it
appears he was not even effectively communicated the grounds
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immediately after. The order itself must disclose the material facts
and reasons; this is a statutory requirement to enable judicial review
and to inform the person concerned of why the drastic step was
taken. The exclusion order as produced before this Court contains
only very generic recitals of "apprehended danger to public peace"
without specific facts. This perfunctory approach does not inspire
confidence that the decision was made after carefully balancing the
petitioner's rights against the public interest.
20. The State's argument that the petitioner could have approached the
magistrate or Government for rescinding the order is noted.
However, such an opportunity is meaningful only if the person
knows the content and grounds of the order in time. Denial of proper
service and lack of communication of reasons are classic markers of
arbitrariness. Transparency is a component of procedural
reasonableness. In the instant case, the non-service of the order and
failure to hear the petitioner even after passing the order, during two-
month span, led this Court to conclude that the action suffered from
administrative unreasonableness and violated the principles of
natural justice. The rule of law demands that executive measures that
infringe fundamental rights are not only substantively justifiable but
also arrived at through a fair process. Both these aspects are deficient
here.
21. A recurring theme in our constitutional scheme is balancing security
and liberty. The State is justified in curbing violent or seditious
activities. Article 19 itself was amended (in 1951) to add "public
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order" as a ground for restricting speech and assembly, recognizing
the need to deal with threats to tranquility. Yet, the judiciary has
consistently drawn a line between public order and mere
inconvenience or annoyance. In Superintendent, Central Prison v. Dr.
Ram Manohar Lohia5, the Supreme famously propounded that there
must be a proximate nexus between the speech/act and public
disorder; a very remote or fanciful connection will not do. The
relevant excerpts are produced below:
"The limitation imposed in the interests of public order to be
a reasonable restriction, should be one which has a
proximate connection or nexus with public order, but not
one far- fetched, hypothetical or problematical or too remote
in the chain of its relation with the public order."
22. Here, the State's fear that a protest could lead to unrest is, at best, a
distant possibility rather than an imminent reality. If such reasoning
were accepted, virtually any protest could be banned on the
speculation that "something might go wrong." That would render the
fundamental right to protest nugatory. As the petitioner rightly
pointed out, treating lawful protest as a security threat signals not the
protection of order, but a breakdown of democratic confidence. A
government confident in its legitimacy and support of law will
engage with protesters, not banish them. The constitutional
protection of dissent is not a mere idealistic slogan; it has been
acknowledged by courts as essential to the democratic fabric of the
nation. Dissent, especially on environmental and livelihood issues
1960 AIR 633.
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affecting the community, often furthers the public interest by holding
authorities accountable.
23. The public trust doctrine invoked from M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath6
serves as a reminder that the State's allegiance should lie with
protecting common resources for the people, not siding with private
commercial interests against the people. While the State in the
present case may not explicitly be taking sides, the effect of its action
was to quell opposition to a project, thereby indirectly according
preference to the mining activity over the voices of those concerned
about its fallout.
24. That said, this Court is mindful that the right to protest, though
fundamental, must be exercised peacefully and within the bounds of
law. Nothing in this judgment should be read as condoning violent
demonstrations or allowing protesters to infringe the rights of others.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Rakesh Vaishnav (Supra) underscored
that protests can continue "without impediment" only so long as they
remain non-violent and in accord with law. Thus, if Dr. Sequeira's
protest had been shown to be a cover for incitement or riot, the State
could legitimately take action including arrest of troublemakers or
dispersal of the gathering under appropriate laws. However,
preventively criminalizing the act of protest itself by way of a broad
order is a step too far. Our constitutional ethos does not permit a
slide into a police state mentality where executive convenience
trumps citizen liberty.
AIR ONLINE 1996 SC 711.
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25. In many democracies, courts have played an important role in
protecting the right to protest while also recognizing the need for
public order. In the United Kingdom, courts applying the Human
Rights Act use proportionality to judge police restrictions on protests.
In the United States, courts require that any limits on protests in
public spaces be specific and limited to time, place, and manner.
Similarly, in India, the High Courts and the Supreme Court have held
that when protests may cause inconvenience or disorder, the right
approach is to regulate them reasonably. This could mean setting
alternate locations or routes rather than banning protests entirely.
This principle is clear: in a constitutional democracy, the government
should focus on dialogue and management rather than exclusion.
V. CONCLUSION:
26. In view of the above analysis, this Court holds that the exclusion
order dated 05.06.2025 issued under Section 163 BNSS against Dr.
Randall Sequeira is hereby quashed. The petitioner is free to enter
Rayagada district forthwith. Any consequential criminal proceedings
or entries in records arising solely from the enforcement of that order
shall stand expunged.
27. The State authorities, particularly the Superintendent of Police and
the District Magistrate of Rayagada, are directed to facilitate the
petitioner's right to organize and participate in peaceful protests, as
guaranteed by law. This Court notes that, at the relevant time, a large
contingent of Odisha's police force had been deployed in Puri for the
Ratha Yatra and Bahuda Yatra festivities, which had temporarily
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reduced the police presence in other districts, including Rayagada.
The State's concerns regarding crowd control and public safety
during that period were therefore not unfounded. However, with the
conclusion of these festivities, such constraints no longer persist, and
the State is expected to provide the necessary support to ensure the
petitioner's constitutional rights are upheld without further delay.
28. Hence, in light of the circumstances outlined above, the following
operational guidelines shall govern the petitioner's exercise of the
right to protest and the State's corresponding duties:
a) Prior Notification: The petitioner or any group intending to
organize a protest shall provide the District Administration
with prior written notice specifying the date, time, venue,
estimated attendance, and purpose of the demonstration.
b) Duty to Cooperate: The petitioner and his associates shall fully
cooperate with the local authorities to ensure coordination,
lawful conduct, and minimization of public inconvenience.
c) State Facilitation: The District Magistrate and Superintendent of
Police, Rayagada, shall designate a suitable time, place, and
manner for holding the protest. This must be done in
consultation with the organizers and in a manner that ensures
the balance between public order and freedom of expression.
d) Reasonable Restrictions: The authorities may impose lawful
and proportionate restrictions to maintain peace and order.
These may include, but not limited to:
i. Limitation on the duration and timing of the event
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ii. Restrictions on sound amplification
iii. Regulation of crowd size
iv. Measures for traffic and access management
e) Protestor Responsibility: The petitioner, through his counsel,
shall undertake to comply with all conditions imposed by the
administration. He shall ensure that any demonstration
conducted is peaceful, non-violent, and non-obstructive.
f) Post-Protest Review: After any such protest, the administration
my conduct a brief post-event review to assess compliance and
identify any issues for future coordination.
29. This Court reiterates that these guidelines are specific to the present
case and are framed in light of the unique facts and administrative
concerns raised before the Court. They are not intended to dilute or
substitute the constitutional protections available to citizens at large
under Article 19 of the Constitution.
30. Any violation of the above terms by the Petitioner or his associates
shall entitle the authorities to take action strictly in accordance with
law. Conversely, arbitrary denial of protest rights without just cause
will be subject to judicial scrutiny.
31. Accordingly, the Writ Petition stands allowed.
32. Interim order, if any, passed earlier stands vacated.
(Dr.S.K. Panigrahi)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack,
Dated the 18th July, 2025/
