An Application Under Section 482 Of The ... vs State Of Orissa (Vig.) .... Opp. Party
2025 Latest Caselaw 11617 Ori

Orissa High Court

An Application Under Section 482 Of The ... vs State Of Orissa (Vig.) .... Opp. Party on 23 December, 2025

Author: Savitri Ratho

Bench: Savitri Ratho

                    IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                                    CRLMC No. 3628 of 2023

            An application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
            1973.

                Ashok Kumar Sahu                                    ....      Petitioner

                                                 -versus-
                State of Orissa (Vig.)                              ....      Opp. Party

            Advocates appeared in this case through Hybrid Mode :


            For Petitioner                         : Mr. D.P. Pattnaik, Advocate


            For Opp. Party                         : Mr. N. Moharana,
                                                    Additional Standing Counsel
                                                    (Vigilance)

                CORAM:

                            JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO

            ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Date of hearing : 23.04.2025 and 03.09.2025

                         Date of Judgment : 23.12.2025
             ---------------------------------------------------------------------------


Savitri Ratho, J.

This CRLMC has been filed challenging the order dated

20.07.2023 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack

(in short "CJM") in Vig. G.R Case No. 54(A)/1997 rejecting the

submission of the petitioner that as he had faced trial for the offences

under Sections 7 & 9 of the Essential Commodities Act ( in short "EC

Act") and had been acquitted on the same set of facts, he could not

face trial for the offences under Section 468,471,477-A of the Indian

Penal Code (in short "IPC") and for which the proceeding should be

dropped as the provision of under Section 300 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure ,1973 ( in short "Cr.P.C.").

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

2. The prosecution allegations are that on 17.05.2009 at 11.30 am

the then Inspector of Vigilance, Kendrapara along with other staffs of

Vigilance visited the premises of the accused situated at Mangalpur

under Mohakalapada Block for a surprise check. As the godown was

closed, the accused was called and he opened the godown. During

checking, 68 tags of wheat and 197 bags of rice were found inside the

godown and the stock and price declaration board kept inside the

godown did not display the stock position or the rate. The accused

could not produce the stock and issue registers and he stated that he

had taken them to his house for maintenance. He could not produce

the licence and he stated to have submitted it for renewal. The wheat

and rice were weighed and weighment chart and memorandum was

prepared. The wheat came to be 35.0 Kgs and the rice to 189.12 Kgs.

The stock and price declaration board and the stock of wheat and rice

were seized and given in zima of the accused. The accused

subsequently produced the stock and issue registers which were also

seized. When the stock was tallied with the book balance of the stock

and issue registers, it was found that the signatures of the retail

dealers did not tally with the signatures appearing in the issue register

maintained by the accused and hence F.I.R. was lodged by P.W.1 on

26.05.1997 at the Vigilance Police Station, Cuttack leading to

registration of a case at the Cuttack Vigilance Police Station. During

investigation, specimen signatures and handwritings of the retail

dealers were collected and sent to the handwriting expert for

comparison with the signatures appearing in the issue registers and for

opinion. On completion of investigation, charge sheet dated

16.10.1998 was submitted against the petitioner for commission of

offences Sections 7 and 9 of the EC Act for violating Clause 14 of

Orissa Wheat and Wheat Product Control Order, 1988 and Clause 3

of the Orissa Declaration of Stock and Price of Essential

Commodities order, 1973 and u/s.468/471/477-A of I.P.C in the court

of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack. The case was transferred to the

Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kendrapara as Special Court

for taking cognizance. Supplementary chargesheet dated 24.11.1998

was submitted against the petitioner for commission of offences under

Sections 468, 471, 477-A of the IPC.

3. The petitioner faced trial in Vig. G.R. Case No. 54 of 1997 in

the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kendrapara for the

commission of offences under Section 7 and 9 of the EC Act. Charge

was framed against the petitioner under Sections 468,471,477-A of

the IPC on 11.03.2002 in Vig. G.R. Case No. 54(A) of 1997 and

summons directed to be issued to the witnesses fixing 11.04.2022 for

recording of their evidence. Fourteen witnesses had been examined

by the prosecution and thirty five documents had been exhibited by

the prosecution which included the tally register, weighment chart,

opinion of the handwriting expert, signatures and specimen signature

of the witnesses. The learned Additional Sessions Judge had framed

the following points for determination:-

"(i) Whether the accused was selling controlled commodities in

black market by forging the signatures of the retail dealers in the

issue register ? and

(ii) Whether he did not display the stock position and the prices

in the Stock and Price Declaration Board."

4. By judgment dated 18.12.2001, the learned Additional Sessions

Judge acquitted the petitioner under Section 248(1) of the Cr.P.C. of

the charges under Section 7 and 9 of the EC Act. The learned trial

court also declared it as mistake of fact.

5. CRLLP No. 99 of 2023 arising out of GCRLA No. 76 of 2003

filed by the State praying for grant of leave was dismissed by this

Court on 14.11.2007.

6. In the midst of cross-examination of P.W.1, the petitioner filed

an application on 05.07.2023, with a prayer to drop the proceeding as

Section-300 of the Cr.P.C. was violated as he had already been

acquitted on the same set of facts.

IMPUGNED ORDER

7. After hearing the submissions of the counsel, on 20.07.2023 the

learned CJM, Cuttack rejected the application of the petitioner to drop

the proceeding holding that the petitioner had earlier faced trial for

offences under the EC Act. The offences for which he was facing trial

now were under the IPC more specifically offences for manufacturing

forged documents which are distinct and different. So Section-300

Cr.P.C would not be a bar for him to face trial for the offences under

the IPC.

8. While entertaining this CRLMC, by order dated 17.08.2023,

this Court had permitted the petitioner to move an application for

adjournment in the learned trial court in view of the pendency of the

CRLMC before this Court. It has been stated by the learned counsel

that proceedings in the trial court have been stayed since then.

SUBMISSIONS

9. I have heard Mr. D. P. Pattnaik, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Mr. N. Moharana, learned Addl. Standing Counsel

(Vigilance). I have gone through the FIR, the judgment dated

18.12.2001 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge acquitting the

petitioner, impugned order dated 20.07.2023 and the written note of

submissions and the decisions relied on by the learned counsel.

10. Mr. D.P. Pattnaik, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted

that even though the offences may be different but since the factual

matrix in both the cases is the same and the petitioner is the sole

accused, Section 300 of the Cr.P.C. will be attracted for which the

petitioner cannot be made to fresh trial in the subsequent case. He

submitted that chargesheet dated 16.10.1998 and chargesheet dated

24.11.1998 , arise out of the same FIR and the same transaction and

both chargesheets had been submitted in the Court of the learned

Chief Judicial Magistrate prior to 23.03.1999, when Vigilance G.R.

Case No. 54 of 1997 was transferred . Thereafter the petitioner faced

trial in a competent Court and was acquitted. In view of the

provisions of Section 300 of the Cr.P.C, he cannot be made to face

trial after all these years on the same allegations. He relied on the

following decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court in support of

his submissions:-

(i) Santosh Kumar Sahoo vs. State of Orissa in CRLREV No. 164 of

2016 decided on 30.11.2016

(ii) Mitra Sankar Nanda vs. State of Orissa in Criminal Revision No.

252 of 2002 decided on 05.05.2010

(iii) Kolla Veera Raghav Rao vs. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao

reported in AIR 2011 SC 641 : (2011) 2 SCC 703 are taken on record.

11. Mr. Moharana, learned Addl. Standing Counsel (Vig.)

submitted that when the petitioner did not challenge the cognizance

order or the charge nor filed any application for discharge and had

claimed for trial, after all these years he cannot challenge the

proceedings of the ground that the same is barred under Section 300

of the Cr.P.C. He has also submitted that Section 300 of the Cr.P.C.

refers to the same offence(s) and not the same set of facts. As the

ingredients of the offences under Section 7 & 9 of the E.C. Act and

the allegations in the earlier trial are different from the facts and

ingredients of the offences for which he is to be tried in the present

trial, which are under Section 468,471,477-A of the IPC, the case

should not be dropped after all these years.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

12. For convenience, it would be apposite to extract the relevant

statutory provisions.

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973

"Section 300; Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence:-(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under Sub-Section (1) of

section 221, or for which he might have been convicted under Sub-Section (2) thereof.

(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried, with the consent of the State Government for any distinct offence for which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial under Sub-Section (1) of section 220.

(3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing consequences which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for such last-mentioned offence, if the consequences had not happened or were not known to the Court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted.

(4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction be subsequently charged with, and tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged.

(5) A person discharged under section 258 shall not be tried again for the same offence except with the consent of the Court by which he was discharged or of any other Court to which the first-mentioned Court is subordinate.

(6)Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) or of section 188 of this Code."

(Emphasis supplied)

GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897

" Section 26: Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments.--Where an act or omission constitutes an

offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence."

JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS

13. Apart from the decisions relied on by the learned counsel, there

are some other decisions which in my opinion have a bearing on this

case. The relevant portions of all the decisions are extracted below:-

A. SECTION - 300 Cr.P.C.

14. In the case of Santosh Kumar Sahu ( supra ), this Court has

held as follows:-

"...While prosecuting an accused on the same facts, the prosecution cannot be permitted to bring accusations in a piecemeal manner. It will not only cause serious prejudice to the accused but also bring multiplicity of proceedings. Nothing prevented the victim to bring accusations against the petitioner for commission of offence under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code in the previous trial, in the event of which the prosecution could have taken steps for alteration of charge to one under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, I am of the view that this is a case which comes within the purview of "on the same facts for any other offence

for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made" as appears under section 300(1) of the Cr.P.C. although the offences are different but the facts are the same. Hence, section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. applies."

In the case of Mitra Sankar Nanda (supra), this Court has held

as follows:-

"16. It appears from the judgment dated 20.1.2000 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Bonai in G.R. Case No.383 of 1993, i.e., Gurundia P.S. Case No.24 of 1993 and other materials on record that in the said case for alleged occurrence which took place at about 10.00 P.M. on 23.11.1993, case was registered against petitioner as well as informant-P.W.3 for commission of offences under Sections 160, 341, 323, 324 and 294 1.P.C. Both of them faced trial, in course of which as many as seven witnesses were examined, and were acquitted. Allegation, in brief, in the said case was that on hearing some persons abusing him, P. W.3 came out from the Block campus by climbing over the boundary gate and challenged as to why they were abusing him. During challenge, the informant- P.W.3 and petitioner caught hold of each other and rolled on the road. They also assaulted each other by fist blows and the informant bit petitioner's left thumb. Thus, it is evident that occurrence took place on the public road near the Block gate at about 9.30 to 10.00 P.M. Therefore, on the face of clear admission made by P.W.3 that G.R. Case No.383 of 1993 was also registered for the same occurrence, obviously, the

petitioner is found to have been already tried for offences and acquitted thereof on the same fact on the basis of which the present case was registered. In the present case, the petitioner faced prosecution of offences under Sections 341, 323 and 506 (11) of the L.P.C. In the earlier trial in G.R. Case No.383 of 1993 also allegations were made of commission of offences under Sections 341 and 323 as well as 324 and 294 of the I.P.C. Nature of allegations made in the present case as well as the earlier case reveals learned courts below that in the earlier case also charge under Section 506 (II) of the I.P.C. could have been made against the petitioner. Judgments passed by both the suffered from non-consideration of fact involving both the cases more particularly in G.R. Case No.383 of 1993, which resulted in a trial, barred under Section 300 (1) of the Cr.P.C"

In the case of Kolla Veera Raghav Rao (Supra) the Supreme

Court has held as follows:-

"(5). Thus, it can be seen that Section 300(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure, is wider than Article 20(2) of the Constitution. While, Article-20 (2) of the Constitution only states that 'no one can be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once', Section 300(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure, states that no one can be tried and convicted for the same offence or even for a different offence but on the same facts.

(6). In the present case, although the offences are different but the facts are the same. Hence, Section 300(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure, applies. Consequently, the prosecution under Section 420, Indian Penal Code was barred by Section 300(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure.

(7). The Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside."

In the case of State vs Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253 the Supreme

Court has held as follows :

"236. The well-known maxim "nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa" (no person should be twice vexed for the same offence) embodies the well-established common law rule that no one should be put to peril twice for the same offence. The principle which is sought to be incorporated into Section 300 of the Criminal Procedure Code is that no man should be vexed with more than one trial for offences arising out of identical acts committed by him. When an offence has already been the subject of judicial adjudication, whether it ended in acquittal or conviction, it is negation of criminal justice to allow repetition of the adjudication in a separate trial on the same set of facts."

In the case of State of Mizoram vs Dr. C Sangnghina, (2019)

13 SCC 335 the accused had not faced trial at all for lack of valid

sanction. The Supreme Court held as follows:

"15. The whole basis of Section 300 (1) Cr.P.C. is that the person who was tried by a competent court, once acquitted or convicted, cannot be tried for the same offence. As discussed earlier, in the case in hand, the respondent/accused has not been tried nor was there a full-fledged trial. On the other hand, the order of discharge dated 12.09.2013 passed by the Special Court was only due to invalidity attached to the prosecution. When the respondent/accused was so discharged due to lack of proper sanction, the principles of "double jeopardy" will not apply. There was no bar for filing fresh/supplementary charge sheet after obtaining a valid sanction for prosecution. The Special Court once it found that there was no valid sanction, it should have directed the prosecution to do the needful. The Special Court has not given sufficient opportunities to produce valid prosecution sanction from the competent authority. The Special Court erred in refusing to take cognizance of the case even after production of valid prosecution sanction obtained from the competent authority and the High Court was not right in affirming the order of the Special Court. The Special Court and the High Court were not right in holding that the filing of the fresh charge sheet with proper sanction order for prosecution was barred under the principles of "double jeopardy".

B. RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL

15. In the case of Pankaj Kumar vs State of Maharashtra & Ors:

2008 (16) SCC 117, the Supreme Court has held as follows:

"17. It is, therefore, well settled that the right to speedy trial in all criminal persecutions is an inalienable right under Article 21 of the Constitution. This right is applicable not only to the actual proceedings in court but also includes within its sweep the preceding police investigations as well. The right to speedy trial extends equally to all criminal persecutions and is not confined to any particular category of cases. In every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the court has to perform the balancing act upon taking into consideration all the attendant circumstances, enumerated above, and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a given case. Where the court comes to the conclusion that the right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, may be quashed unless the court feels that having regard to the nature of offence and other relevant circumstances, quashing of proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a situation, it is open to the court to make an appropriate order as it may deem just and equitable including fixation of time for conclusion of trial."

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

16. The protection against double jeopardy, known as "autrefois

acquit," provided under Section 300, is not absolute and is subject to

the conditions specified in Sub-sections (2) to (5) of Section 300

CrPC. Sub-section (1) of Section 300 lays down the rule of double

jeopardy and subsections (2) to (5) deal with the exceptions. The

following requirements must be fulfilled for the second trial to be

barred : -

(i) the accused must have been tried by a competent court for the

same offence or one for which he might have been charged or

convicted at a trial, on the same facts,

(ii) he has been convicted or acquitted at the trial, and

(iii) the conviction or acquittal must be in force .

17. From a consideration of the facts of the case the provisions of

Section-300 of the Cr.P.C., the submissions of the counsel, the case

law referred above, it is apparent that the offences for which the

petitioner was tried in the first trial (Section 7 and 9 of the Essential

Commodities Act) was by a competent court and he was acquitted.

The acquittal is still in force. It is a fact that the offences for which he

faced trial earlier are different from the offences for which he is being

tried in the subsequent trial (Section 468,471,477-A of the IPC). But

the facts of the case are the same and investigation had been taken up

on the same FIR Thus, it can be said that the present cases pertain to

the same set of facts, though the offences may be different.

18. Sub-section (2) of Section 300 of the CrPC permits trial when

the charge of the second trial is for a distinct offence. In other words,

even if a person is acquitted or convicted of any offence, he may be

tried for a distinct offence for which he may have been tried in the

former trial, but the consent of the State Government has to be

obtained before such a person could be tried. This has not been done

in this case. Hence this exception does not come to the aid of the State

for proceeding with the trial.

19. That apart, the occurrence took place on 17.05.2009. In the

present trial, only one witness had been examined till November

2023. More than thirteen years have elapsed since then. In the

absence of any material to the contrary, It can be presumed that this

delay is on account of the default of the prosecution. In my

considered opinion, in view of the right of the petitioner to speedy

trial, he should not be made to undergo the rigorous of trial after all

these years especially when he has been acquitted by a competent

court on the same facts, twenty four years ago.

20. In the result, the CRLMC is allowed. The proceedings in Vig.

G.R Case No. 54(A)/1997 pending against the petitioner in the Court

of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack are quashed.

.......................

(Savitri Ratho) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated 23rd December 2025 / Subhalaxmi

Signed by: SUBHALAXMI PRIYADARSHANI

Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 24-Dec-2025 20:00:35