[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Orissa High Court
Gitanjali Panigrahi vs State O Odisha & Another .... Opposite ... on 15 December, 2025
Author: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy
Bench: Biraja Prasanna Satapathy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.1154 of 2021
In the matter of an application under Article 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India, 1950.
..................
Gitanjali Panigrahi Petitioner
....
-versus-
State o Odisha & Another .... Opposite Parties
For Petitioner : M/s. B.S. Tripathy-1, Sr.
Adv.,A.Tripathy, A. Sahoo, Adv.
For Opp. Parties : M/s. P.K. Panda,
Addl. Govt. Advocate
PRESENT:
THE HONBLE MR.JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date of Hearing: 15.12.2025 and Date of Judgment: 15.12.2025
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J.
1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Mode.
2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.
3. The present Writ Petition has been filed inter alia
challenging order dt.11.01.2021 so issued under
Annexure-11, basing on the letter issued by the
// 2 //
Government-Opp. Party No.1 on 06.01.2021 under
Annexure-12.
4. It is contended that pursuant to the Advertisement
issued under Annexure-1 by Opp.Party No.2, Petitioner
after coming out successful in the interview, was
selected and appointed as a Staff Nurse on contractual
basis vide order dt.14.11.2011 under Anenxure-2. It is
contended that Petitioner was so appointed basing on
the decision taken by the Government with due creation
of the posts vide letter dt.25.10.2012 under Annexure-3
and proceeding of the Selection Committee held on
07.03.2013 under Annexure-4. It is further contended
that in the Proceeding of the meeting under Anenxure-4,
it was clearly observed that provisions of ORV Act has
been followed, while recommending the names of
selected candidates for their appointment against the
post so advertised under Annexure-1.
4.1. It is contended that while so continuing as a
contractual Staff Nurse in the establishment of Opp.
Party No.2 pursuant to order dt.14.11.2011 under
Anenxure-2, basing on the G.A. Department Resolution
// 3 //
issued on 17.09.2013 under Annexure-7 and the
decision taken by the high power Committee in its
proceeding dt.29.06.2020 under Annexure-9, Petitioner
vide Office order dt.19.08.2020 under Annexure-10 was
regularised as a Staff Nurse in the establishment of
Opp. Party No.2.
4.2. However, subsequent to such extension of the
benefit of regularisation vide order under Annexure-10
and consequential joining of the Petitioner in the regular
establishment, benefit of order under Annexure-10, was
cancelled vide the impugned order dt.11.01.2021 under
Annexure-11, basing on the letter issued by the
Government-Opp. party No.1 on 06.01.2021 under
Anenxure-12.
4.3. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner
contended that since Petitioner was engaged as a
Contractual Staff Nurse in the establishment of Opp.
Party No.2 vide order dt.14.11.2011 and she was
allowed to continue without any break, in view of the
resolution issued by the G.A.& P.G Department on
17.09.2013 under Annexure-17 and subsequent
// 4 //
resolution issued on 14.01.2014, Petitioner became
eligible and entitled to get the benefit of regularisation
after continuing as a contractual employee for a period
extending more than 6 years.
4.4. It is contended that such claim of the Petitioner in
the light of the resolution issued by the G.A.
Department was recommended by the High Power
Committee in its proceeding dt.29.06.2020 under
Annexure-9 and in the said proceeding, Petitioner was
recommended to get the benefit of regularisation w.e.f
23.11.2017, her initial date of joining being 23.11.2011.
Recommendation of the Committee was accepted by
extending the benefit of regularisation vide Order
dt.19.08.2020, under Annexure-10.
4.5. However, such benefit was cancelled vide the
impugned order dt.11.01.2021 under Annexure-11
basing on the letter issued under Annexure-12. It is
contended that since there is no dispute that Petitioner
is continuing all through as a Contractual Staff Nurse
w.e.f 23.11.2011 in terms of the order of engagement
issued under Annexure-2, the same could not have been
// 5 //
cancelled after extending the benefit vide order under
Annexure-10 basing on the decision taken by the High
Power Committee in its proceeding dt.29.06.2020
under Annexure-9, vide the impugned order under
Annexure-11 relying on Annexure-12 and that too
without following the principle of natural justice. It is
accordingly contended that the impugned order under
Annexure-11 relying on the letter issued under
Annexure-12 are not sustainable in the eye of law and
requires interference of this Court.
4.6. A further contention was also made that on the face
of the interim order passed by this court on 15.1.2021
and continuance of the Petitioner as a regular Staff
Nurse, salary as due and admissible was never released
and accordingly Petitioner has filed I.A. No.16129 of
2023, claiming extension of the benefit of salary.
5. Learned Addl. Standing Counsel on the other hand
made his submission basing on the counter affidavit so
filed by Opp. party No.2. It is contended that since in
terms of the advertisement issued under Annexure-1,
Petitioner only faced a walk-in-interview to get the
// 6 //
benefit of appointment vide order dt.14.11.2011 under
Annexure-2 and while making such selection process,
provisions of ORV Act was never followed, petitioner in
terms of resolution dt.17.09.2013 under Annexure-7
was not eligible and entitled to get the benefit of
regularisation.
5.1. However, basing on a wrong recommendation
made by the High Power Committee in its proceeding
dt. 29.06.2020 under Annexure-9, Petitioner was
regularised vide order dt.19.08.2020 under Annexure-
10. When the same came to the knowledge of Opp.
party No.1, letter dt.06.01.2021 was issued by the
Government-Opp. party No.1, directing Opp. party No.2
to cancel the order, so issued under Annexure-10.
Accordingly, while cancelling the benefit so issued vide
order under Annexure-10, Annexure-11 was passed on
11.01.2021.
5.2. It is contended that since Petitioner when was
appointed, provisions of ORV Act was never followed
and Petitioner was so appointed only by facing a walk-
in interview, even though Petitioner continued as a
// 7 //
Contractual Staff Nurse in the establishment of Opp.
party No.2 w.e.f 23.11.2011, she is not eligible and
entitled to get the benefit which was wrongly extended
vide order under Annexure-10. Stand taken in Para-10
of the counter affidavit reads as follows:
10. That, in reply to the averments made in Para-6
of the writ petition, it is humbly submitted that,
the service of the petitioner was inadvertently
regularized on completion of six year as per G.A.
Deptt. Resolution No.26108/Gen Dtd. 17.09.2013.
However, Govt. Health & F.W. Deptt., Odisha vide
letter No.PT2-HFW-MSIII-MSNG3M-0004-2019-
356/H&FW Dtd.06.01.2021 issued instruction
that the regularization of services of the
employees of Regional Spinal Injury Centre (RSIC)
including the petitioner were engaged/appointed
on pick and choose basis without observance of
required recruitment formalities and without
concurrence of Finance Department against a
Centrally Sponsored Planned Scheme funded by
Govt. of India and State Govt. on 90:10 basis
hence could not be regularized. Thus, the
impugned order of cancellation under Annexure-
11 was issued.
6. To the submission made by the learned Addl.
Standing Counsel, Mr. B.S.Tripathy, learned Sr.
Counsel appearing for the Petitioner basing on
Annexure-4, made his submission contending inter alia
that while providing appointment to the Petitioner vide
order under Anexure-2 basing on Annexure-1
advertisement, provisions of ORV Act was duly followed
// 8 //
and the same is clearly reflected in Annexur-4. It is
accordingly contended that the ground taken by the
State that ORV Act was not followed when Petitioner
was appointed is not sustainable, in view of the decision
taken by the Selection Committee in its proceeding
dt.07.03.2013 under Annexure-4.
6.1. It is also contended that since Petitioner pursuant
to Annexure-2 order, continued as a Contractual Staff
Nurse in the establishment of Opp. party No.2, she
became eligible and entitled to get the benefit of
regularisation on completion of 6 years of continuous
engagement and her claim was duly recommended by
the High Power Committee in its proceeding dt.
29.06.2020 under Annexure-9, with extension of the
benefit of regularisation vide order dt. 19.08.2020 under
Annexure-10. It is also contended that once the benefit
of regularisation was extended; the same could not have
been withdrawn/cancelled without following the
principle of natural justice.
6.2. Learned counsel for the Petitioner in support of his
aforesaid submission relied on the decisions of the
// 9 //
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Menaka Gandhi vs.
Union of India, AIR 1978 SC-597, State of Orissa vs.
Binapani Das, AIR 1967 SC-1269, State Bank of
India And Others Vs. Rajesh Agarwal & Ors., (2023)
6 SCC 1, Dushyant Mainali Vs.Diwan Singh Bora &
Another, SLP (C ) No.15191 of 2022 and
Krishnadatt Awasthy Vs. State of M.P & Others,
Civil Appeal NO(s) 4806 of 2011 (2025 INSC 126).
6.3. In Menaka Gandhi (supra), Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Paragraphs-57, 58 and 61 has held as under:-
"57. The question immediately arises : does the
procedure prescribed by the Passports Act, 1967 for
impounding a passport meet the, test of this
requirement ? Is it 'right or fair or just' ? The argument
of the petitioner was that it is not, because it provides
for impounding of a passport without affording
reasonable opportunity to the holder of the passport to
be heard in defence. To impound the passport of a
person, said the petitioner, is a serious matter, since it
prevents him from exercising his constitutional right to
go abroad and such a drastic consequence cannot in
fairness be visited without observing the principle of
audi alteram partem. Any procedure which permits
impairment of the constitutional right to go abroad
without giving reasonable opportunity to show cause
cannot but be condemned as unfair and unjust and
hence, there is in the present case clear infringement
of the requirement of Article 21. Now, it is true that
there is no express provision in the Passports Act,
1967 which requires that the audi alteram partem rule
should be followed before impounding a passport, but
that is not conclusive of the question. If the statute
makes itself clear on this point, then no more question
arises. But even when the statute is silent, the law
may in a given case make an implication and apply
the principle stated by Byles, J., in Cooper v.
Wandsworth Maneka Gandhi vs Union Of India on 25
// 10 //
January, 1978 Indian Kanoon -
http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1766147/ 57 Board of
Works(2). "A long course of decision---, beginning with
Dr. Bentley's case and ending with some very recent
cases, establish that, although there are no positive
words in the statute requiring that the party shall be
heard, yet-the justice of the common law will supply
the omission of (1) [1974]2S.C.R.348. (2)
[1863]14C.B.N.S.180. the legislature". The principle of
audi alteram partem, which mandates that no one
shall be condemned unheard, part of the rules of
natural justice. In fact, there are two main principles in
which the rules of natural justice are manifested,
namely, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and audi alteram
partem. We are not concerned here with the former,
since there is no case of bias urged here. The question
is only in regard to the right of hearing which involves
the audi alteram partem rule. Can it be imported in the
procedure for impounding a passport ?
58. We may commence the discussion of this question
with a few general observations to emphasise the
increasing importance of natural justice in the field of
administrative law. Natural justice is a great
humanising principle intended to invest law with'
fairness and to secure justice and over the years it has
grown into a widely pervasive rule affecting large
areas of administrative action. Lord Morris of Borth- y-
Gest spoke of this rule in eloquent terms in his address
before the Bentham Club : "We can, I think, take pride
in what has been done in recent periods and
particularly in the field of administrative law by
invoking and by applying these principles which we
broadly classify under the designation of natural
justice. Many testing problems as to their application
yet remain to be solved. But I affirm that the area of
administrative action is but one area in which the
principles are to be deployed. Nor are they to be
invoked only when procedural failures are shown.
Does natural justice qualify to be described as a
"majestic" conception ? I believe it does. Is it just a
rhetorical but vague phrase which can be employed,
when needed, to give a gloss of assurance ? I believe
that it is very much more. If it can be summarised as
being fair play in action-who could wish that it would
ever be out of action ? It denotes that the law is not
only to be guided by reason and by logic but that its
purpose %, will not be fulfilled; it lacks more exalted
inspiration." (Current Legal Problems, 1973, Vol. 26, p.
16) And then again, in his speech in the House of
Lords in Wiseman v. Borneman(1), the learned Law
Lord said in words of inspired felicity: "that the
conception of natural justice should at all stages guide
those who discharge judicial functions is not merely an
// 11 //
acceptable but is an essential part of the philosophy of
the law. We often speak of the rules of natural justice.
But there is nothing rigid or mechanical about them.
What they comprehend has been analysed and
described in many authorities. But any analysis must
bring into relief rather their spirit and their inspiration
than any precision of definition or precision as to
application. We do not search for prescriptions which
will lay down exactly what must, in various divergent
situations, be done. The principles and procedures are
to be applied which, in any particular situation or set
of circumstances, are right and just and fair. Natural
justice, it has been said, is only "fair play in action."
Nor do we wait for directions from Parliament. The
common law has abundant riches : there we may find
what Byles, J., called "the justice of the common law".
Thus, the soul of natural justice is fair play in action'
and that is why it has received the widest recognition
throughout the democratic world. In the United States,
the right to an administrative hearing is regarded as
essential requirement of fundamental fairness. And in
England too it has been held that 'fair play in action'
demands that before any prejudicial or adverse action
is taken against a person, he must be given an
opportunity to be heard. The rule was stated by Lord
Henning, M.R. in these terms in Schmidt v. Secretary
of State for Home Affairs(1) :-where a public officer has
power to deprive a person of his liberty or his property,
the general principle is that it has not to be done
without his being given an opportunity of being heard
and of making representations on his own behalf". The
same rule also prevails in other Commonwealth
countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It
has even gained access to the United Nations. Vide
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 67, page
479. Magarry, J., describes natural justice "as a
distillate of due process of law". Vide Fontaine v.
Chesterton(2). It is the quintessence of the process of
justice inspired and guided by fair play in action'. If
we look at the speeches of the various law Lords in
Wiseman's case, it will be seen that each one of them
asked the question "whether in the particular
circumstances of the case, the Tribunal acted unfairly
so that it could be said that their procedure did not
match with what justice demanded", ,or, was the
procedure adopted by the Tribunal 'in all the
circumstances unfair'? The test adopted by every law
Lord was whether the procedure followed was "fair in
all the circumstances" and 'fair play in action' required
that an opportunity should be given to the tax payer
"to see and reply to the counter-statement of the
Commissioners" before reaching the conclusion that
"there is a prima facie case against him." The inquiry
must, therefore, always be : does fairness in action
// 12 //
demand that an opportunity to be heard should be
given to the person affected?.
XXX XXX XXX
61. This Court, speaking through Hegde, J., in ,I. K.
Kraipak's case quoted with approval the above
passage from the judgment of Lord Parker, C.J., and
proceeded to add : "The aim of the rules of natural
justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to
prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate
only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In
other words they do not supplant the law of the land
but supplement it-Till very recently it was the opinion
of the courts that unless the authority concerned was
required by the law under which it functioned to act
judicially there was no room for the, application of the
rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is
now questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural
justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice One fails to
see why those rules should be made inapplicable, to
administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to
draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries
from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were
considered administrative at one time are now being
considered as quasi-.judicial in character. Arriving at a
just decision is the aim of both quasi- judicial enquiries
as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision
in an administrative enquiry may have more far
reaching effect than a decision in a quasi- judicial
enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy
George v. The University of Kerala and Ors. (1969)1
S.C.R. 317 the rules of natural justice are not
embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice
should apply to a given case must depend to a great
extent on the facts and circumstances of that case the
framework of the law under which the enquiry is held
and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons
appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is
made before a court that some principles of natural
justice had been contravened the court has to decide
whether the observance of that rule was necessary for
a just decision on the facts of the case." This view was
reiterated and re-affirmed in a subsequent decision of
this Court in D.F.O. South Khari v. Ram Sanehi
Singh(1). The law must, therefore, now be taken to be
well settled that even in an administrative proceeding,
which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of
natural justice must be held to be applicable.
6.4. In State of Orissa vs. Binapani Das, Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Paragraph-12 has held as under:-
// 13 //
"12. It is true that some preliminary enquiry was
made by Dr. S, Mitra. But the report of that Enquiry
Officer was never disclosed to the first respondent.
'The rafter the first respondent was required to show
cause why April 16, 1907, should not be accept das
the date of birth and without recording any evidence
the order was passed. We think that such an enquiry
and decision were contrary to the basic concept of
justice and cannot have any value. It is true that the
order is administrative in character, but even an
administrative order which involves civil
consequences as already stated must be made
consistently with the rules of natural justice after
informing the first respondent of the case of the State,
the evidence in support thereof and after giving an
opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and
meeting or explaining the evidence. No such steps
were admittedly taken; the High Court was, in our
judgment, right in setting aside the order of the
State."
6.5. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Agarwal
in Para 41 & 42 has held as follows:-
"41. In State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei [State of
Orissa v. Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269], a two-
Judge Bench of this Court held that every authority
which has the power to take punitive or damaging
action has a duty to give a reasonable opportunity
to be heard. This Court further held that an
administrative action which involves civil
consequences must be made consistent with the
rules of natural justice : (AIR p. 1271, para 9)
"9. ... The rule that a party to
whose prejudice an order is
intended to be passed is entitled
to a hearing applies alike to
judicial tribunals and bodies of
persons invested with authority
to adjudicate upon matters
involving civil consequences. It is
one of the fundamental rules of
our constitutional set-up that
// 14 //
every citizen is protected against
exercise of arbitrary authority by
the State or its officers. Duty to
act judicially would therefore
arise from the very nature of the
function intended to be
performed : it need not be shown
to be super-added. If there is
power to decide and determine to
the prejudice of a person, duty to
act judicially is implicit in the
exercise of such power. If the
essentials of justice be ignored
and an order to the prejudice of a
person is made, the order is a
nullity. That is a basic concept of
the rule of law and importance
thereof transcends the
significance of a decision in any
particular case."
42. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] , a
seven-Judge Bench of this Court held that any person
prejudicially affected by a decision of the authority
entailing civil consequences must be given an
opportunity of being heard. This has been reiterated
in a catena of decisions of this Court."
6.6. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dushyant
Mainali, in para-5 of the said judgment held as
follows:
5. There is no necessity to reiterate that
even the Courts, including a highest court of
the Country, are bound by principle of
natural justice. Nobody can be condemned
unheard.
// 15 //
6.7. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnadatt
Awasthy in para-68 of the said judgment held as
follows:
68. The principle of audi alteram partem is
the cornerstone of justice, ensuring that no
person is condemned unheard. This principle
transforms justice from a mere technical
formality into a humane pursuit. It
safeguards against arbitrary decision-
making, and is needed more so in cases of
unequal power dynamics.
7. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the
parties and considering the submission, this Court
finds that pursuant to the advertisement issued by
Opp. party No.2 on 14.01.2011 under Annexure-1,
Petitioner by facing due selection process was engaged
as a Contractual Staff Nurse vide order dt.14.11.2011
under Annexure-2. Pursuant to the said order,
Petitioner joined in the establishment of Opp. party
No.2 on 23.11.2011.
7.1. Placing reliance on the stipulation contained in
Resolution dt.17.09.2013 so issued by the G.A. Deptt.
under Anenxure-7 and the fact that Petitioner
continued as a Contractual Staff Nurse for a period
exceeding 6 years, High Power Committee in its
// 16 //
proceeding dt. 29.06.2020 under Annexure-9
recommended the claim of the Petitioner to get the
benefit of regularisation. Basing on such
recommendation of the High Power Committee,
Petitioner was regularised vide order dt.19.08.2020
under Annexure-10.
7.2. However, such benefit was cancelled vide the
impugned order dt.11.01.2021 under Annexure-11,
placing reliance on the direction issued by the
Government-Opp. party No.1 in its letter dt.06.01.2021
under Anenxure-12. This Court taking into account the
order of appointment issued in favour of Petitioner
under Annexure-2 and the proceeding of the Selection
Committee so available under Anenxure-4, is of the
view that Petitioner was appointed as a Contractual
Staff Nurse by facing due selection process initiated
pursuant to Annexure-1 and provisions of ORV Act
was adhered to.
7.3. Since it is not disputed that Petitioner continued
as a Contractual Staff Nurse pursuant to order under
Annexure-2 w.e.f 23.11.2011, this Court is of the view
// 17 //
that Petitioner basing on the resolution issued by the
G.A & P.G. Deptt. on 17.09.2013 under Annexure-7
and subsequent resolution issued on 14.1.2014 was
duly recommended by the High Power Committee for
her regularisation vide proceeding dt.29.06.2020
under Annexure-9. Petitioner as per the considered
view of this Court was duly regularised vide order
dt.19.08.2020 under Annexure-10.
7.4. Since Petitioner was duly regularised after
completion of 6 years of continuous engagement as a
Contractual Staff Nurse and the impugned order under
Annexure-11, basing on the impugned letter under
Annexure-12, has been issued without following the
principle of natural justice, placing reliance on the
decisions as cited supra, this Court is of the view
that letter under Annexure-12 and consequential order
impugned under Annexure-11 could not have been
issued/passed.
7.5. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court is
inclined to quash order dt.11.01.2021 so issued by
Opp. party No.2 under Annexure-11 and so also the
// 18 //
letter issued by the Government-Opp. party No.1 on
06.01.2021 under Annexure-12. While quashing the
order under Annexure-11 and the communication
issued under Anenxure-12, this Court upheld the order
issued in favour of the Petitioner on 19.08.2020 under
Annexure-10.
7.6. While disposing the Writ Petition with
quashing of the order under Annexure-11 and
communication issued under Annexure-12, this Court
directs Opp. party No.2 to extend all the benefits as
due and admissible in terms of order under Annexure-
10 in favour of the Petitioner within a period of 4(four)
months from the date of receipt of this order.
7.7. The Writ Petition accordingly stands disposed of.
(Biraja Prasanna Satapathy)
Judge
Orissa High Court, Cuttack
Dated the 15th December, 2025 /Sangita
Reason: authenticaton of order
Location: high court of orissa, cuttack
Date: 19-Dec-2025 16:44:59
