[Cites 22, Cited by 0]
Orissa High Court
India) vs M/S.Kalinga Insulation on 3 December, 2025
Author: B.P. Routray
Bench: B.P. Routray
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: BASANTA KUMAR BARIK
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
C.M.P. No.1480 of 2025
(In the matter of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India)
Lumenkai Power Private Limited .... Petitioner
(formerly knows as AES India
Private Limited), Himalaya Palace,
East Delhi
-versus-
M/s.Kalinga Insulation, Udayabhat, .... Opposite Party
Dochhaki, Paradipgarh, Paradip,
Dist.-Jagatsinghpur
Advocate(s) appeared in this case:-
For Petitioner : Mr. A.K. Parija, Senior Advocate
Mr. B.P. Das, Advocate
For Opposite Party : Mr.M.K. Mishra, Senior Advocate
Mr. D. Mishra, Advocate
CORAM: JUSTICE B.P. ROUTRAY
JUDGMENT
rd
3 December 2025
B.P. Routray, J.
1. Heard Mr. A.K. Parija, learned Senior Advocate along with Mr.
B.P. Das, learned Advocate for the Petitioner and Mr. M.K. Mishra,
learned Senior Advocate along with Mr. D. Mishra, learned Advocate
for the Opposite Party.
2. Present C.M.P. is directed against the order dated 09.09.2025 of
the leaned Commercial Court, Cuttack passed in Execution Case No.61
Signed by: BASANTA KUMAR BARIK
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
of 2024, wherein the prayer of the J.Dr. under Order 21 Rule 11,
C.P.C. read with Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act
was rejected.
3. Before entering into the merit of the dispute, a preliminary
objection is raised by the present Opposite Party, who is the D.Hr.,
regarding maintainability of the present C.M.P. under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
4. It is submitted by Mr. M.K. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for
the Opposite Party that as per Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts
Act, 2015 all such judgment or order of the Commercial Court below
the level of District Judge may be appealed before the Commercial
Appellate Court and cannot be tested under exercise of jurisdiction of
the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is
further submitted that since after closure of sub-section (1) of Section
13 a "full stop (.)" is occurring whereas the "colon (:)" is occurring at
the end of sub-section (1-A), the proviso coming after sub-section(1-A)
would not qualify to such provisions mentioned in sub-section (1) of
Section 13.
Signed by: BASANTA KUMAR BARIK
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
5. Conversely, refuting to such objections raised by the Opposite
Party, Mr. A.K. Parija, learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioner
submits that, the provisions of the Act, i.e. the Commercial Courts Act,
cannot be interpreted in such a way that are submitted by the Opposite
Party. Specifically, the proviso contained in Section 13, appearing after
sub-section (1-A) by its plain reading and meaning qualifies to both the
provisions under sub-section (1) and sub-section (1-A). It is also
submitted that putting the "full-stop (.)" or "colon (:)" after the sub-
section (1) and sub-section (1-A) does not make any distinction in the
meaning of the interpretation of the proviso attached to Section 13.
6. In view of the rival contentions raised with regard to
maintainability of the present proceeding before this Court, it needs to
refer the provisions under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015. It reads as follows:-
"13. Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and
Commercial Divisions.--[(1) Any person aggrieved by the
judgment or order of a Commercial Court below the level of
a District Judge may appeal to the Commercial Appellate
Court within a period of sixty days from the date of judgment
or order.
(1-A) Any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a
Commercial Court at the level of District Judge exercising
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Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
original civil jurisdiction or, as the case may be, Commercial
Division of a High Court may appeal to the Commercial
Appellate Division of that High Court within a period of sixty
days from the date of the judgment or order:
Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed
by a Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are
specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) as amended by this Act
and section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(26 of 1996).]
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force or Letters Patent of a High Court,
no appeal shall lie from any order or decree of a Commercial
Division or Commercial Court otherwise than in accordance
with the provisions of this Act."
7. For the purpose of interpretation, the original Gazette
Notification of the amended provision of Section 13 which came as the
Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate
Division of High Court (Amendment) Act 2018 (Act No.28 of 2018)
has been referred to.
8. Mr. Mishra, learned Senior Advocate for the Opposite Party also
takes notice of this Court to the intent and object of bringing such
amendment to the Commercial Courts Act by the Amendment Bill
2018. Here it would be profitable to re-produce the pre-amended
Signed by: BASANTA KUMAR BARIK
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
provisions of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. It reads
as follows:-
"13. Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and
Commercial Divisions.--(1) Any person aggrieved by the
decision of the Commercial Court or Commercial Division of
a High Court may appeal to the Commercial Appellate
Division of that High Court within a period of sixty days
from the date of judgment or order, as the case may be:
Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed
by a Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are
specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) as amended by this Act
and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(26 of 1996).
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force or Letters Patent of a High Court,
no appeal shall lie from any order or decree of a Commercial
Division or Commercial Court otherwise than in accordance
with the provisions of this Act."
9. As seen from the above quoted provisions of Section 13 of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015, as it is after the amendment, that, sub-
section (1) ends with a "full-stop (.)", wherein after end of sub-section
(1-A) a "colon (:)" is used attaching the proviso thereof before writing
sub-section (2). In Indore Development Authority vs. Manoharlal and
others, (2020) 8 SCC 129, in the context of interpretation of the
Signed by: BASANTA KUMAR BARIK
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, it is
explained as follows:
"90.2. The relevant provisions of the 2013 Act are as follows:
"24. Land acquisition process under Act 1 of 1894 shall be
deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.--(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case
of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894,--
(a) where no award under Section 11 of the said Land
Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this
Act relating to the determination of compensation shall
apply; or
(b) where an award under said Section 11 has been made,
then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of
the said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been
repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in
case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the
said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the
commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the
land has not been taken or the compensation has not been
paid, the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and
the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the
proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance
with the provisions of this Act:
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Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
Provided that where an award has been made and
compensation in respect of a majority of landholdings has not
been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all
beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition
under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be
entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.
* * *
114. Repeal and saving.--(1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1
of 1894), is hereby repealed.
(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-
section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general
application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of
1897) with regard to the effect of repeals."
xxx xxx xxx
94. Undoubtedly, the 2013 Act has provided safeguards, in the
form of higher compensation and provisions for rehabilitation,
which are necessary. In that light, the court has to interpret its
provisions, to give full and meaningful effect to the legislative
intent keeping in mind the language and tenor of the provisions, it
is not for the court to legislate. The Court can only iron out creases
to clear ambiguity. The intended benefit should not be taken away.
At the same time, since the 2013 Act, envisages lapse of
acquisitions notified (and in many cases, completed by the issuance
of the award) due to indolence and inaction on the part of the
authorities and therefore, intends acquisition at a fast track, the full
effect has to be given to the provisions contained in Section 24.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Punctuation used in Section 24(2)
Signed by: BASANTA KUMAR BARIK
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
176. Parliament has used the full stop (.) after Section 24(1) and
colon (:) after Section 24(2). It cannot be gainsaid that punctuation
plays a vital role, particularly when an attempt is made to relocate
any part of the provision. The use of the colon is to introduce a sub-
clause that follows logically from the text before it. We are
examining this aspect of the colon, additionally. Though as the
interpretation of the provision of Section 24(2) and its proviso needs
no further deliberation regarding its placement, the same is to be
read as a proviso to Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1)(b). Use of
punctuation colon reinforces our conclusion and punctuation mark
has been an accepted method of statutory interpretation when such a
problem arises. Though sometimes punctuation can be ignored also
but not generally. The full stop after Section 24(1)(b) expresses
deliberate intent to end a particular sentence and detach it from the
next part. With regard to the meaning of the punctuation colon, the
University of Oxford Style Guide states as under:
"Use a colon to introduce a sub-clause which follows logically
from the text before it, is not a new concept and depends logically
on the preceding main clause. Do not use a colon if the two parts of
the sentence are not logically connected." (emphasis supplied)
177. The note of the University of England "Writing Correctly" has
also been relied upon on behalf of the State of Haryana. Following
discussion has been made:
"Colons have a number of functions in a sentence. If you use
colons in your writing, use them sparingly, and never use a
colon more than once in any sentence.
Rule 1 : Colons can be used to introduce a list, but they
must follow a complete sentence (independent clause).
Rule 2 : Colons can be used to explain, summarise or extend
the meaning in a sentence by introducing a word, phrase or
clause that enlarges on the previous statement.
Signed by: BASANTA KUMAR BARIK
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
Rule 3 : Colons are used to separate the title from the
subtitle.
Rule 4 : Colons can be used to introduce a quotation in
formal academic writing." (emphasis supplied)
178. It is clear that the colon ( : ) has a reference to the previous
statement and enlarges the same and extends the meaning of the
sentence. The colon indicates that the text is intrinsically linked to
the previous provision preceding it i.e. Section 24(2) in this case and
not Section 24(1). The colon indicates that what follows. The colon
proves, explains, defines describes or lists elements of what precedes
it. In case the proviso is bodily lifted and placed after Section
24(1)(b), Section 24(2) will end with a "colon", which is never done
to end a provision. Certain decisions have been referred to saying
that importance and weightage are to be given to punctuation marks.
The earlier view was that punctuations were added by the proof
readers, and the Acts passed by Parliament did not contain any
punctuation. However, it was submitted that in the past century, the
English courts realised that the drafts placed before the Parliament
also carry punctuations and, thus, it is important to give meaning to
the same. Bennion on Statutory Interpretation has this to say
regarding punctuation marks:
"16.8. Punctuation is a part of an Act and may be considered
in construing a provision. It is usually of little weight,
however, since the sense of an Act should be the same with
or without its punctuation.
* * *
Although punctuation may be considered, it will generally be
of little use since the sense of an Act should be the same with
or without it. Punctuation is a device not for making
meaning, but for making meaning plain. Its purpose is to
Signed by: BASANTA KUMAR BARIK
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
denote the steps that ought to be made in oral reading and to
point out the sense. The meaning of a well-crafted legislative
proposition should not turn on the presence or absence of a
punctuation mark."
179. In Marshall v. Cottingham [Marshall v. Cottingham, 1982 Ch
82 : (1981) 3 WLR 235 : (1981) 3 All ER 8] , Ch p. 88, at 12 while
referring to the change of position and establishing that punctuation
may be used in interpretation, it was held that : (Ch p. 88)
'... the day is long past when the courts would pay no heed to
punctuation in an Act of Parliament.'
In Hanlon v. Law Society [Hanlon v. Law Society, 1981 AC 124 :
(1980) 2 WLR 756 (HL)] , AC p. 197 it was held as under : (AC p.
198)
"... not to take account of punctuation disregards the reality
that literate people, such as parliamentary draftsmen,
punctuate what they write, if not identically, at least in
accordance with grammatical principles. Why should not
other literate people, such as Judges, look at the punctuation
in order to interpret the meaning of the legislation as accepted
by Parliament?"
Yet again in Houston v. Burns [Houston v. Burns, 1918 AC 337
(HL)] , AC p. 348, it was held that : (AC p. 348)
"... Punctuation is a rational part of English composition
and is sometimes quite significantly employed. I see no
reason for depriving legal documents of such significance as
attaches to punctuation in other writings."
180. Other decisions were also cited. [Dingmar v. Dingmar, 2007
Ch 109 : (2006) 3 WLR 1183 : (2007) 2 All ER 382 (CA), Kennedy
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Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
v. Information Commr., (2012) 1 WLR 3524 (CA)] On similar
lines, the American approach to the interpretation of punctuations
is different.
180.1. In Taylor v. Caribou [Taylor v. Caribou, 102 Me 401 : 67 A
2 (1907)] , it was held as under:
"We are aware that it has been repeatedly asserted by courts
and jurists that punctuation is no part of a statute, and that it
ought not to be regarded in construction. This rule in its
origin was founded upon commonsense, for in England until
1849 statutes were entrolled upon parchment and enacted
without punctuation....Such a rule is not applicable to
conditions where, as in this State, a Bill is printed and is on
the desk of every Member of the Legislature, punctuation and
all, before its final passage. There is no reason why
punctuation, which is intended to and does assist in making
clear and plain the meaning of all things else in the English
language, should be rejected in the case of the interpretation
of statutes. "Cessante ratione legis cessat ipso lex".
Accordingly we find that it has been said that in interpreting
a statute punctuation may be resorted to when other means
fail ...; that it may aid its construction ...; that by it the
meaning may often be determined; that it is one of the means
of discovering the legislative intent ...; that it may be of
material assistance in determining the legislative
intention...." (emphasis supplied)
180.2. In Aswini Kumar Ghose [Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda
Bose, (1952) 2 SCC 237 : 1953 SCR 1 : AIR 1952 SC 369] stated
that : (AIR pp. 383 & 389, paras 57 & 78)
"57. ... Punctuation is after all a minor element in the
construction of a statute, and very little attention is paid to it by
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Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
English courts. Cockburn, C.J. said in Stephenson v. Taylor
[Stephenson v. Taylor, (1861) 1 B&S 101 : 121 ER 652] : (B&S p.
106)
'On the Parliament Roll there is no punctuation and we therefore
are not bound by that in the printed copies.'
It seems, however, that in the Vellum copies printed since 1850
there are some cases of punctuation, and when they occur they can
be looked upon as a sort of contemporanea exposition [ See Craies
on Statute Law, p. 185] . When a statute is carefully punctuated and
there is doubt about its meaning, a weight should undoubtedly be
given to the [Ed. : The word between two asterisks has been
emphasised in original.] punctuation [Ed. : The word between two
asterisks has been emphasised in original.] [Vide Crawford on
Statutory Construction, p. 343.] . I need not deny that punctuation
may have its uses in some cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded
as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain
meaning of a text [ Vide Crawford on Statutory Construction, p.
343.] .
* * *
78. The High Court has rejected [Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabindo
Bose, 1951 SCC OnLine Cal 248 : (1951-52) 56 CWN 145] the
contention of the petitioner Aswini Kumar Ghosh on two grounds.
In the first place, it has been said that the comma was no part of
the Act. That the orthodox view of earlier English Judges was that
punctuation formed no part of the statute appears quite clearly
from the observations of Willes, J. in Claydon v. Green [Claydon v.
Green, (1868) LR 3 CP 511] . Vigorous expression was given to
this view also by Lord Esher, M.R. in Duke of Devonshire v.
Connor [Duke of Devonshire v. Connor, (1890) LR 24 QBD 468
(CA)] where he said:
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Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
'... in an Act of Parliament there are no such things as brackets any
more than there are such things as stops.'
This view was also adopted by the Privy Council in the matter of
interpretation of Indian statutes as will appear from the
observations of Lord Hobhouse in Maharani of Burdwan v.
Murtunjoy Singh [Maharani of Burdwan v. Murtunjoy Singh, 1887
SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1886-87) 14 IA 30] , namely, that 'it is an
error to rely on punctuation in construing Acts of the legislature'.
Same opinion was expressed by the Privy Council in Pugh v.
Ashutosh Sen [Pugh v. Ashutosh Sen, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 93 :
(1928-29) 56 IA 93] .
If, however, the rule regarding the rejection of punctuation for the
purposes of interpretation is to be regarded as of imperfect
obligation and punctuation is to be taken at least as contemporanea
expositio, it will nevertheless have to be disregarded if it is contrary
to the plain meaning of the statute. If punctuation is without sense
or conflicts with the plain meaning of the words, the court will not
allow it to cause a meaning to be placed upon the words which they
otherwise would not have. This leads me to the second ground on
which mainly the High Court rejected the plea of the petitioner
Aswini Kumar Ghosh, namely, that the word "other" in the phrase
"any other law" quite clearly connects the Indian Bar Councils Act
with other laws as alternatives and subjects both to the qualification
contained in the adjectival clause. I find myself in complete
agreement with the High Court on this point. If the intention was
that the adjectival clause should not qualify the Indian Bar Councils
Act, then the use of the word "other" was wholly inapposite and
unnecessary. The use of that word unmistakably leads to the
conclusion that the adjectival clause also qualifies something other
than "other law". If the intention were that the Indian Bar Councils
Act should remain unaffected by the qualifying phrase and should
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Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
be superseded in toto for the purposes of this Act the legislature
would have said 'or in any law regulating the conditions, etc.'
It would have been yet simpler not to refer to the Indian Bar
Councils Act at all and to drop the adjectival clause and to simply
say 'Notwithstanding anything contained in any law'. In the light
of the true meaning of the title of the Act as I have explained above
and having regard to the use of the word "other" I have no
hesitation in holding, in agreement with the High Court, that what
the non obstante clause intended to exclude or supersede was not
the whole of the Indian Bar Councils Act but to exclude or
supersede that Act and any other law only insofar as they or either
of them purported to regulate the conditions subject to which a
person not entered in the roll of advocates of a High Court might be
permitted to practise in that High Court and that the comma, if it
may at all be looked at, must be disregarded as being contrary to
this plain meaning of the statute."
Xxx xxx xxx
183. Aswini Kumar Ghose [Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda
Bose, (1952) 2 SCC 237 : 1953 SCR 1 : AIR 1952 SC 369] also
dealt with full stops and held that as long as punctuation does not
detract from the meaning of the words in the text, it can be a
controlling factor in interpretation. In State of W.B. v. Swapan
Kumar Guha [State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC
561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283] , this Court observed that grammar and
punctuation are hapless victims of the pace of life and sometimes
are used both as a matter of convenience and of meaningfulness.
Besides, how far a clause which follows upon a comma governs
every clause that precedes the comma is a matter not free from
doubt. This Court observed that : (Swapan Kumar Guha case [State
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Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC
(Cri) 283] , SCC p. 568, para 5)
"5. Since the sole question for consideration arising out of the
FIR, as laid, is whether the accused are conducting a money
circulation scheme, it is necessary to understand what is
comprehended within the statutory meaning of that
expression. Section 2(c) of the Act provides:
'2. (c)"money circulation scheme" means any scheme, by
whatever name called, for the making of quick or easy
money, or for the receipt of any money or valuable thing as
the consideration for a promise to pay money, on any event
or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of
members into the scheme, whether or not such money or
thing is derived from the entrance money of the members of
such scheme or periodical subscriptions;'
Grammar and punctuation are hapless victims of the pace of life,
and I prefer in this case not to go merely by the commas used in
clause (c) because, though they seem to me to have been placed
both as a matter of convenience and of meaningfulness, yet, a more
thoughtful use of commas and other gadgets of punctuation would
have helped make the meaning of the clause clear beyond
controversy. Besides, how far a clause which follows upon a
comma governs every clause that precedes the comma is a matter
not free from doubt. I, therefore, consider it more safe and
satisfactory to discover the true meaning of clause (c) by having
regard to the substance of the matter as it emerges from the object
and purpose of the Act, the context in which the expression is used
and the consequences necessarily following upon the acceptance of
any particular interpretation of the provision, the contravention of
which is visited by penal consequences."
Signed by: BASANTA KUMAR BARIK
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
184. The present case involves placement of colon preceding to the
proviso to Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1), which ends with a
full stop, and it makes sense and the true meaning where
Parliament has placed it. The proviso is part of Section 24(2). It is
not permissible to alter the provision and to read it as a proviso to
Section 24(1)(b), mainly when it makes sense where Parliament so
placed it. To read the proviso as part of Section 24(1)(b), will
create repugnancy with the provisions contained in Section
24(1)(b). The window period of 5 years is provided to complete the
acquisition proceedings where the award has been passed, and the
provisions of the 1894 Act shall be applied as if it has not been
repealed. Section 24(2) starts with a non obstante clause; it plainly
is notwithstanding Section 24(1), and the proviso to Section 24(2)
enlarges the scope of Section 24(2). When the window period has
been provided under Section 24(1)(b) i.e. Section 24(2) and its
proviso, higher compensation cannot follow in case of an award
which has been passed within 5 years of the enactment of the 2013
Act otherwise anomalous results shall accrue. In case the proviso is
read as a part of Section 24(1)(b), it would be repugnant to the
consideration of the provision which has been carved out saving
acquisition and providing window period of 5 years to complete the
acquisition proceedings. There were cases under the 1894 Act, in
which award may have been made in December 2013, a few days
before the Act was enforced on 1-1-2014. As the provisions of the
1894 Act are applicable to such awards, obviously notice of the
award has to be given under Section 12 of the said Act. There is no
question of outright deposit. In such event as the deposit is to be
made when the Collector is prevented by the exigencies specified
in Section 31(2) from making payment. The deposit is not
contemplated directly either in the court or the treasury, as the case
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Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
may be as provided in Section 31(2), corresponding to Section
77(2) of the 2013 Act."
10. Thus, from the aforesaid decision as explained by the Hon'ble
Apex Court that use of the punctuations is not that relevant for the
purpose of interpreting the meaning of the provisions under the Act
when the express meaning of the provisions is clear without any
ambiguity. It is said that all the punctuations may be considered but it
will generally be of little use since the sense of an Act should be the
same with or without it.
11. Here, it would be important to refer the pre-amended provisions
for the purpose of interpretation of the proviso appearing in Section 13.
Before its 2018 amendment, it was read as re-produced above and the
difference in the pre-amended provision and sub-section (1) of the
amended provision is clearly spelt out. In the pre-amended provision,
the word, "decision" was used where after amendment the words
"judgment or order" has been used. To see minutely, the difference in
sub-section (1) and sub-section (1-A) appears to be that sub-section (1)
applies for such judgment or order of a Commercial Court below the
level of District Judge and sub-section (1-A) applies for such judgment
or order at the level of District Judge. There is actually no other
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Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
difference in sub-section (1) and sub-section (1-A) of Section 13,
except providing different forums for the purpose of appeal to be
availed by the aggrieved party in respect of the order passed by a court
below the District Judge and at the level of District Judge. Even the
time period for preferring the appeal is also the same as 60 days from
the date of the judgment or order. So, what is submitted on behalf of
the Petitioner that, the proviso appearing in Section 13 is qualifying to
both sub-section (1) and sub-section (1-A) is found support from the
analysis made above that it only classifies two different forums for the
judgment and order passed by two different level of courts. This
proviso as appearing in Section 13 after the amendment was also there
at the pre-amended stage when there was only sub-section (1) was
there before the proviso comes to Section 13. After insertion of sub-
section (1-A), though the entire sub-section (1) under Section 13 was
substituted by way of 2018 Amendment, but the major change seen is
that insertion of sub-section (1-A) after sub-section (1) before the
proviso appears. Thus, in other words, it is that the proviso was there
before the amendment, which would apply to such decision of all the
Commercial Courts or Commercial Division of a High Court to appeal
subject to the provisions contained in Order 43 of the Code of Civil
Signed by: BASANTA KUMAR BARIK
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
Procedure, 1908 as applied to by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and
Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Therefore,
the insertion of new provision under sub-section (1-A) is not meant to
create a sea of difference in the pre-amended and post-amended
provisions, but it is only intended to create two different forums for
appeal for two level of Courts. But at the same time, the limitation of
appeal, in terms of the provisions contained in Order 43 of the C.P.C.,
has been continued to be same. Thus, the intention of the legislation is
not seen with any ambiguity to take further foreign aid for an entirely
different interpretation with regard to punctuations which is of little
consequence as per the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court
in Indore Development Authority (supra).
12. In a case before Delhi High Court, i.e. Delhi Chemical and
Pharmaceutical Works Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. Himgiri Realtors
Pvt. Ltd. and another, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3603, the learned Single
Judge while dealing with same question has observed that, as far as the
interpretation of application of the proviso to sub-section (1) and sub-
section (1-A) is concerned such proviso was there before the
amendment and even after insertion of sub-section (1-A) after the
amendment and is pari materia to the erstwhile proviso to sub-section
Signed by: BASANTA KUMAR BARIK
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
(1) and there is nothing in the proviso specifically to indicate that the
same is applicable only to sub-section (1-A).
13. Having considered the purpose and intention of introduction of
sub-section (1-A) after its amendment in 2018 and the changes in
words from decision to judgment or order, since no major difference is
seen except providing two different forums for preferring appeal by the
aggrieved party, it can be reasonably concluded that the proviso applies
to both sub-section (1) and sub-section (1-A). A bare look to the
Gazette Notification also seems that the provision is meant to apply to
both sub-section (1) and sub-section (1-A). Except the difference in the
marking of the punctuations, i.e. full-stop (.) and colon (:), there is
nothing to support the contention that the proviso is applicable to sub-
section (1-A) alone excluding sub-section (1). In other words, if it is
accepted then it means that the provision for appeal would be
applicable with such restrictions, as per the provisions in Order 43 of
the CPC, in respect of the orders passed by the court at the level of
District Judge, but the restrictions will not be applicable to such other
courts below the level of District Judge. This reasoning is seen
somehow illogical, because the purpose of the proviso would then not
be in conformity with the object of the Act (The Commercial Courts
Signed by: BASANTA KUMAR BARIK
Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
Date: 08-Dec-2025 15:02:03
Act, 2015). The object of the Act is for providing speedy disposal of
high value commercial disputes. Therefore, the conclusion would be
that the proviso is meant to apply to sub-section (1) and sub-section (1-
A) both and its application cannot be limited to such provisions
appearing in sub-section (1-A) only.
14. Thus, considering the submissions of both parties with regard to
interpretation of the proviso clause appearing in Section 13, in the
opinion of this Court, the same applies to both sub-section (1) and sub-
section (1-A) to restrict the scope of appeal within the ambit of Order
43 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Thus, it is held that the present
C.M.P. is maintainable in the present form. The preliminary objection
is answered thus.
15. List the C.M.P. on 12th January 2026.
16. The interim order dated 17.09.2025 shall continue till 12 th
January 2026.
(B.P. Routray)
Judge
B.K. Barik/Secretary
