Chandramani Mahar vs State Of Orissa (Vig) .... Opp. Parties
2025 Latest Caselaw 6477 Ori

Orissa High Court

Chandramani Mahar vs State Of Orissa (Vig) .... Opp. Parties on 26 August, 2025

Author: Chittaranjan Dash

Bench: Chittaranjan Dash

       IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
                    CRLA No. 266 of 2012
  (Arising out of the judgment of conviction dated 11th of April, 2012
  passed by Shri Niranjan Sahu, Special Judge (Vigilance),
  Bhawanipatna, District-Kalahandi in G.R. (Vig.) Case No. 23 of
  2007/T.R. No. 27 of 2011, for the offences under Section 7 and
  Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of
  Corruption Act, 1988)

  Chandramani Mahar              ....                      Petitioner
                                         Mr. H. K. Mund, Advocate
                              -versus-
  State of Orissa (Vig)          ....                    Opp. Parties
                                                  Mr. M. S. Rizvi,
                                           Standing Counsel (Vig.)

                    CORAM:
  THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
                   Date of Judgment: 26.08.2025

Chittaranjan Dash, J.

1. The present Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 11.04.2012 passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Bhawanipatna, District-Kalahandi in G.R. (Vig.) Case No.23 of 2007 corresponding to T.R. Case No.27 of 2011, whereby the Appellant was convicted under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and to pay a fine of ₹1,500/-, in default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 7 of the Act; and further to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and six months and to pay a fine of ₹2,500/-, in default to

undergo further rigorous imprisonment for four months for the offence under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act, with a direction that the substantive sentences shall run concurrently.

2. The factual matrix of the case is that the Appellant, who was working as a Revenue Inspector in the Tahasil Office, Bhawanipatna, was dealing with OLR Case No.12 of 2005, pending in the name of the Complainant. It was alleged that on 05.07.2007, the Appellant demanded a sum of ₹400/- from the Complainant as illegal gratification for processing and issuing necessary orders in connection with the said OLR case. The Complainant, being unwilling to pay the bribe, approached the Vigilance Police and lodged a written report, whereupon a trap was organized. As per the trap arrangement, the Complainant tendered the tainted currency notes of ₹400/- to the Appellant in his office, which the Appellant allegedly accepted and kept inside the case record. Immediately thereafter, the Vigilance team entered, conducted hand-wash and file-wash tests, which turned pink, and seized the tainted notes from the possession of the accused.

3. In course of the investigation, the Vigilance Police seized the relevant documents, prepared the pre-trap and post-trap memoranda, recorded the statements of witnesses, obtained sanction for prosecution from the competent authority, and forwarded the chemical examination report which confirmed the presence of phenolphthalein in the hand-wash and file-wash solutions. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was submitted against the Appellant under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, leading to his trial before the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Bhawanipatna.

4. The prosecution examined eight witnesses in support of its case. P.W.1, the in-charge Tahasildar, proved that the OLR case record was pending with the accused at the relevant time. P.W.2 was the scribe of the written complaint lodged before the Vigilance Police. P.W.3, the Additional District Magistrate, deposed to having granted sanction for prosecution of the accused. P.W.4, the independent witness to the trap, corroborated the pre-trap and post- trap proceedings and stated that the accused had demanded and accepted ₹400/- from the Complainant, which was recovered from the OLR case record maintained by him. P.W.5, the Trap Laying Officer, supported the version of P.W.4 and proved the seizure, recovery, and preparation of memoranda. P.W.6, another independent official witness, also corroborated the recovery of tainted notes and the hand-wash turning pink. P.W.7, the Complainant, however, resiled from his earlier statement and did not support the prosecution on the aspect of demand, though he admitted to having kept the money in the file. P.W.8, the Investigating Officer, spoke about the completion of investigation, seizure of documents, receipt of sanction order, and submission of charge-sheet.

5. Mr. H. K. Mund, learned counsel for the Appellant, submitted that the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational facts of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, which are sine qua non for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. He urged that the Complainant (P.W.7) clearly deposed before the court that the Appellant never

demanded any bribe and that he himself had kept the tainted money in the file in the absence of the Appellant. Thus, the very substratum of the prosecution case is destroyed. Mr. Mund further argued that reliance placed by the prosecution on P.W.4, the so-called shadow witness, is misplaced. P.W.4 admitted in cross-examination that he had acted as a Vigilance witness in three to four cases earlier, thereby showing that he is a "stock witness" and not an independent person. His testimony is also contradicted by P.W.7 and is unsupported by any independent corroboration. The alleged overhearing from the verandah is highly doubtful. In such circumstances, mere recovery of money from the file is insufficient to bring home guilt, as held in State of Kerala Vs. C.P. Rao1 and K. Shanthamma Vs. State of Telangana2.

Learned counsel further submitted that the phenolphthalein test on the Appellant's hand wash was negative, which itself shows that the Appellant never accepted the money. The presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act cannot be invoked in the absence of proof of demand, as reiterated in the Constitution Bench decision of Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi)3. On the issue of sanction, it was urged that P.W.3, who was only in routine charge as ADM, had no authority to remove the Appellant from service and therefore was incompetent to grant sanction. The sanction being invalid, the cognizance itself stands vitiated. This amounts to a failure of justice as contemplated under Section 19(3) of the Act, rendering the trial illegal. Placing reliance on Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi),

(2011) 6 SCC 450

(2022) 4 SCC 574

(2023 SCC OnLine SC 280)

State of Goa Vs. Babu Thomas4, and Sushil Kumar Pati Vs. State of Odisha5, learned counsel submitted that the conviction cannot be sustained merely on recovery, especially when demand is unproved, hand wash is negative, and sanction is defective. He prayed that the impugned judgment be set aside and the Appellant acquitted.

6. Mr. Rizvi, learned counsel for State (Vigilance), submitted that the prosecution has successfully proved the demand, acceptance, and recovery of illegal gratification from the Appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. He contended that the evidence of P.W.4, P.W.5, and P.W.6, consistently established that the accused had demanded and accepted ₹400/- from the Complainant, which was recovered from the file kept on his table. The phenolphthalein test on the hand- wash and file-wash yielded positive results, and the FSL report (Ext.18) further corroborated the prosecution case. It was urged that even though the Complainant (P.W.7) turned partially hostile, he admitted to having kept the money inside the file of the accused, which, coupled with the testimony of the independent witnesses, sufficiently proves acceptance. Reliance was placed on the presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act, as once acceptance of tainted money is proved, the burden shifts to the accused to explain the same, which he has miserably failed to do.

Mr. Rizvi further argued that the defence plea of false implication at the instance of an Advocate is an afterthought, not suggested to any witness during cross-examination, and finds no place in the detection report. He submitted that minor discrepancies

(2005) 8 SCC 130

(2018) 1 ILR (Cuttack) 1118

in trap procedure do not dislodge the core prosecution story. On the issue of sanction, it was submitted that in view of Section 19(3)(a) of the P.C. Act, the Appellant is estopped from challenging its validity in appellate proceedings unless failure of justice is shown, which is absent in the present case. Placing reliance on the decisions in Raghubir Singh Vs. State of Haryana6, Shankar Prasad Vs. State of A.P.7, Vinod Kumar Garg Vs. State (GNCT of Delhi)8, and the recent in Neeraj Dutta Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (Supra), Mr. Rizvi argued that even in the absence of direct support from the Complainant, conviction can be sustained if other reliable evidence proves demand and acceptance. He contended that the trial court has meticulously appreciated the evidence and returned well-reasoned findings, and no perversity or illegality warrants interference by this Court.

7. On perusal of the case record and hearing learned counsels for both the parties, this Court finds it pertinent to bring its own analysis.

8. It is by now trite law that proof of demand of illegal gratification is the gravamen of the offences under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The Constitution Bench in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731, has reiterated the following -

"68. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under:

(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish

(1974) 4 SCC 560

(2004) 3 SCC 753

(2020) 77 OCR (SC) 310

the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) (i) and(ii) of the Act.

(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.

(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.

(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act.

Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.

(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

(f) In the event the Complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.

(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) (i) and (ii) of the Act.

(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.

Earlier precedents such as P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of Police9 and B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P.10 have also consistently held to the same effect and relied on in Neeraj Dutta (Supra). Thus, the primary question before this Court is whether the prosecution has been able to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, that the Appellant had made a demand of ₹400/- from the Complainant.

9. Turning to the evidence, the Complainant (P.W.7) did not support the prosecution on the crucial aspect of demand. In his testimony before the trial court, he categorically stated that the Appellant never demanded any bribe and that he had placed the tainted money inside the case record on his own, at the instance of his Advocate. The prosecution declared him hostile, and he was confronted with his previous statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., wherein he had spoken about demand. However, it is well settled that a prior statement under Section 164 is not substantive evidence unless duly proved by examining the Magistrate who recorded it. In the present case, the Magistrate was not examined, and therefore the alleged statement under Section 164 cannot be relied upon substantively. What remains is only the testimony in court, where P.W.7 resiled from his earlier version.

(2015) 10 SCC 152

(2014) 13 SCC 55

The prosecution has sought to prove demand through P.W.4, the shadow witness. P.W.4 stated that he overheard the Appellant ask the Complainant about the demanded amount and that the Complainant replied affirmatively. However, his testimony suffers from inherent infirmities. He admitted in cross-examination that he had earlier acted as a witness in three to four Vigilance cases, thereby branding himself as a "stock witness," and diminishing the credibility of his independence. Moreover, P.W.4 himself stated that he was standing in the verandah adjacent to the Revenue Section at the relevant time, which makes it doubtful whether he could have either heard the conversation or seen the Complainant placing the notes inside the file. This renders his version vulnerable. The other so-called independent witness (P.W.6) does not speak directly to the demand, but only corroborates the recovery and post-trap proceedings.

It is also significant to mention that the Complainant, while turning hostile on demand, has at least admitted that he kept the money in the file himself. If his version is accepted, it completely negates the prosecution story of any demand having been made by the Appellant. On the other hand, the version of P.W.4, standing alone without corroboration, is unsafe to be relied upon, more so when the Complainant himself has exonerated the Appellant. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Kerala Vs. C.P. Rao (Supra) held that when the Complainant does not support the case of demand, and there is no other reliable evidence, conviction cannot be sustained. Similarly, in K. Shanthamma Vs. State of Telangana (Supra), it was

reiterated that proof of demand cannot rest on suspicion or doubtful testimony.

10. In the present case, therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish the foundational fact of demand. The Complainant has not supported the case; his prior statement is legally inadmissible; the testimony of P.W.4 is unreliable and stands contradicted by the Complainant; and there is no other independent corroboration of demand. In such circumstances, this Court is constrained to hold that the charge of demand of illegal gratification has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

11. On the question of acceptance and recovery, the prosecution has strongly relied on the fact that the tainted currency notes were recovered from inside the OLR case record kept on the Appellant's table, and that the file wash turned pink, which, according to learned counsel for Vigilance, clearly establishes that the Appellant had accepted the bribe money and kept it in his file. Mr. Rizvi, learned counsel for State (Vigilance), argued that once recovery of tainted notes is established, and the chemical test corroborates the presence of phenolphthalein, the presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act comes into play, shifting the burden on the accused to explain the recovery. He emphasised that the Appellant has not offered any plausible explanation for the presence of money in his file and that the defence plea of planting at the instance of the Complainant's Advocate is an afterthought, not put to the witnesses during cross- examination. On the other hand, Mr. Mund, learned counsel for the Appellant contended that the Complainant has categorically stated that he himself kept the money inside the file without the knowledge

of the Appellant, and the very fact that the phenolphthalein test on the Appellant's hand wash yielded a negative result establishes that the Appellant never touched the money and therefore did not accept it. He urged that when the Complainant's version rules out acceptance, and the recovery is capable of being explained as a planting of money, the presumption under Section 20 does not arise.

12. It is noted that the testimony of P.W.4 and P.W.6 is of limited assistance in this regard. P.W.4 stated that he saw the Complainant place the money inside the file, but his statement does not specifically establish that the Appellant himself accepted the money. His evidence in fact tends to corroborate the Complainant's version that the money was placed by P.W.7 himself. P.W.6, the other official witness, corroborates the post-trap recovery, tally of numbers, and chemical test but likewise does not speak to the Appellant physically accepting the money. The trap officer (P.W.5) proved the recovery of notes from the file and the positive test on the file wash, but he too admits that the hand wash of the accused was negative.

Thus, the prosecution's case on acceptance hinges on whether keeping of the money inside the Appellant's file by the Complainant can be treated as acceptance by the Appellant. The trial court reasoned that since the file belonged to the Appellant and the money was found in it, acceptance was proved. However, as urged by learned counsel for the Appellant, the absence of phenolphthalein on the Appellant's hands weakens this inference, because if he had actually handled the tainted notes, traces ought to have been found. Furthermore, the Complainant himself testified that the Appellant

was absent when he placed the money, thereby rendering the theory of voluntary acceptance by the accused doubtful.

13. The next issue is whether the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act can be invoked in the facts of this case. Section 20 provides that where it is proved that an accused has accepted or obtained any gratification other than legal remuneration, the Court shall presume that such gratification was accepted as a motive or reward, unless the contrary is proved. The sine qua non for drawing this presumption, however, is proof of the foundational fact of voluntary acceptance by the accused. As clarified in B. Jayaraj Vs. State of A.P. (Supra), P. Satyanarayana Murthy Vs. D.I. of Police (Supra), and reiterated in Neeraj Dutta (Supra), mere recovery of tainted currency notes does not suffice; the prosecution must first prove beyond doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money.

14. Learned counsel for the State (Vigilance) urged that since the tainted notes were admittedly recovered from the file belonging to the accused and the file wash tested positive, the factum of acceptance must be taken as established. He submitted that once recovery is proved, the presumption arises automatically, and the burden shifts to the accused to explain how the tainted money reached his possession. Learned counsel for the Appellant, however, countered that the very premise for drawing the presumption is missing in this case. He submitted that the Complainant (P.W.7) has denied any demand or voluntary acceptance by the Appellant, and has instead deposed that he placed the money inside the file without the accused's knowledge. He highlighted that the phenolphthalein

test on the Appellant's hands was negative, which conclusively shows that the Appellant never touched the tainted notes.

15. On a careful scrutiny of the evidence, this Court finds that while recovery from the Appellant's file is undisputed, the evidence of acceptance is contested and doubtful. The Complainant has denied that the Appellant ever accepted the money; P.W.4 and P.W.6 do not speak to actual handling by the Appellant; and the hand wash being negative fortifies the defence stand. In such a factual backdrop, the foundational requirement for raising the presumption of voluntary acceptance by the accused remains unproved. Consequently, the statutory presumption under Section 20 cannot automatically be drawn on the basis of recovery alone. The burden, therefore, cannot be said to have shifted to the Appellant, and the prosecution must stand or fall on the strength of its own evidence.

16. On the testimony of the Complainant and reliability of trap witnesses, a pivotal feature of the present case is that the Complainant (P.W.7), who was the star witness for the prosecution, turned hostile during trial. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that the accused never demanded money from him and that he himself had placed the tainted notes inside the file at the instance of his Advocate, even asserting that the accused was not present in the office at that time. This version, if accepted, strikes at the very root of the prosecution case. The learned counsel for the Appellant has urged that in corruption cases, when the Complainant does not support the allegation of demand and acceptance, the foundation of the prosecution collapses. Learned counsel for Vigilance, however, argued that P.W.7's testimony cannot be read in isolation. He

pointed out that the Complainant had earlier given a consistent version in his written report and his statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate, wherein he had categorically stated about the demand and acceptance.

17. In this context, the prosecution has leaned heavily on P.W.4 and P.W.6. P.W.4, the shadow witness, stated that he overheard the accused asking the Complainant about the demanded amount and saw the Complainant keep the notes inside the file. P.W.6 corroborated the post-trap proceedings, including tally of the notes and positive chemical tests. However, learned counsel for the Appellant contended that P.W.4 admitted in cross-examination that he had acted as a Vigilance witness in three to four earlier cases, thereby rendering him a "stock witness" whose independence is doubtful. Further, P.W.4's position in the verandah makes it questionable whether he could have overheard the alleged conversation inside the office. P.W.6, on the other hand, did not speak to any demand or acceptance but only to the recovery, which by itself, in the absence of proof of demand, cannot establish the offence.

18. It is true that a hostile witness can still be relied upon to the extent his testimony finds corroboration from other evidence. Yet, in the present case, P.W.7's admission is limited to his own act of placing the money in the file, which supports recovery but simultaneously negates acceptance by the accused. P.W.4's evidence on demand is weakened by his status as a repeated Vigilance witness, and P.W.6's evidence is confined to recovery and chemical wash. However, the absence of direct testimony from the Complainant on

demand, coupled with the infirmities in P.W.4 and the limited scope of P.W.6, makes the prosecution version doubtful.

19. Furthermore, the sanction for prosecution in the present case was accorded by P.W.3, who was then functioning as the Additional District Magistrate, Kalahandi. P.W.3 deposed that he had verified the materials placed before him and was satisfied that a prima facie case was made out against the accused, whereafter he accorded sanction under Section 19 of the P.C. Act. The defence, however, has seriously challenged the validity of this sanction. Learned counsel for the Appellant contended that the Appellant was serving as a Revenue Inspector and the appointing and removing authority was the Collector, not the ADM. Since P.W.3 was only in routine charge and did not possess the power of removal, he was incompetent to grant sanction, and as such the cognizance itself is vitiated. Learned counsel for Vigilance, on the other hand, submitted that sanction is an administrative act and not a quasi-judicial function. He argued that P.W.3, as ADM, was duly authorized to exercise the powers of the Collector in his absence, and therefore the sanction cannot be termed invalid. Moreover, Section 19(3)(a) of the P.C. Act makes it clear that any irregularity in sanction will not ipso facto vitiate the proceedings unless it has resulted in a failure of justice.

20. On a careful appreciation of the record, it emerges that P.W.3 did not produce any specific order of delegation showing that he was empowered to remove the Appellant from service. While the law permits reliance on Section 19(3) to cure irregularities, the absence of clear proof of competence, as highlighted by defence, does cast doubt on the validity of sanction. Nevertheless, this Court also

cannot ignore that the trial proceeded to conclusion and no specific prejudice has been established by the accused in his defence. Thus, the issue of sanction, though debatable, may not by itself be sufficient to vitiate the trial unless coupled with other infirmities in the prosecution case.

21. Learned counsel for the Appellant has also pointed to several infirmities in the trap proceedings. Mr. Rizvi, learned counsel for Vigilance, countered that minor discrepancies in trap procedure cannot be elevated to the level of fatal contradictions.

22. On consideration, while it is correct that not every procedural lapse is fatal, certain lapses in the present case appear to be substantive. The non-examination of the Magistrate weakens reliance on the Complainant's Section 164 statement; the negative hand wash undermines the inference of physical handling by the accused and contradictions among the trap witnesses make the exact sequence of events uncertain. These infirmities must be weighed along with the central question of demand and acceptance while assessing the overall strength of the prosecution case.

23. Upon a careful consideration of the rival submissions and the evidence on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish the essential ingredient of demand of illegal gratification by the Appellant. The Complainant (P.W.7), who was the best person to speak on the alleged demand, has categorically denied it in his testimony, and his prior statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. remains unproved for want of examination of the Magistrate, which could not have been taken as substantive evidence otherwise. The evidence of P.W.4, the shadow witness, is weakened by his admitted status as a

repeated Vigilance witness and by doubts about his capacity to overhear the conversation from the verandah. P.W.6 speaks only to recovery and chemical test, not to demand. The recovery of tainted notes from the file of the Appellant, coupled with a positive file wash, does establish that the tainted money was present in his office file, however, the negative hand wash and the Complainant's testimony that he himself placed the money in the file create serious doubt about voluntary acceptance by the Appellant. In such circumstances, the presumption under Section 20 of the P.C. Act does not arise. The sanction for prosecution is itself open to question, as P.W.3 did not demonstrate clear competence as the removing authority, though by virtue of Section 19(3), this irregularity may not by itself vitiate the trial in the absence of prejudice. Nonetheless, when seen cumulatively with the failure to prove demand, the infirmities in acceptance, and procedural lapses in trap proceedings, the prosecution case falls short of the stringent standard of proof required in criminal jurisprudence. The finding of guilt recorded by the learned trial court thus cannot be sustained.

24. In view of the foregoing analysis and findings, the Appeal succeeds. The judgment and order dated 11.04.2012 passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Bhawanipatna, District-Kalahandi in G.R. (Vig.) Case No.23 of 2007 corresponding to T.R. Case No.27 of 2011 convicting the Appellant under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 and sentencing him thereunder, is hereby set aside. The Appellant is acquitted of all the charges.

The Appellant, who is on bail, be discharged from the liabilities of his bail bonds. A copy of this judgment be sent to the Court concerned for information and necessary action.

(Chittaranjan Dash) Judge A.K.Pradhan/Bijau/Sarbani

Signed by: ANANTA KUMAR PRADHAN

Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA Date: 26-Aug-2025 15:28:06