Orissa High Court
Rajendra Jain vs State Of Odisha on 29 April, 2025
Author: Chittaranjan Dash
Bench: S. K. Sahoo, Chittaranjan Dash
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
JCRLA No. 23 of 2007
(Arising out of the Judgment and Order of Conviction dated 28th
of November, 2006 passed by Shri A. K. Patnaik, Addl. Sessions
Judge, Jharsuguda, in Sessions Trial No.41 of 2006, for the
offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860)
Rajendra Jain ... Appellant
Mr. B.C. Parija,
Advocate
-versus-
State of Odisha ... Respondent
Mr. G Tripathy,
AGA
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. K. SAHOO
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH
Date of Judgment: 29.04.2025
Chittaranjan Dash, J.
1. The Appellant, namely Rajendra Jain, faced the trial on the
charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (in short,
hereinafter referred to as "IPC") before the learned Addl. Sessions
Judge, Jharsuguda, in Sessions Trial No.41 of 2006, wherein, the
learned Court found him guilty for the offence under Section 302 IPC
and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine
of Rs.5,000/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two
years.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 27.12.2005, the
informant (P.W.10), who is the husband of the deceased, Pinky Jain,
lodged a written report at Belpahar Police Station. He stated that after
their marriage, he and his newly-wed wife had been residing with the
Appellant and one Manju, who were the foster father and mother of
the deceased. The family earned their livelihood by collecting scrap
iron and discarded materials such as polythene and tins from dustbins.
On the date of occurrence, the Informant had left for Lakhanpur in the
morning to transport some materials in his rickshaw for a Congress
Rally. As usual, his mother-in-law had gone out to collect scrap
materials, leaving the deceased and the Appellant alone in the house.
When the Informant returned at around 5:00 p.m., he found the house
locked. On peeping through the gap of the door, he noticed blood
stains inside. Being alarmed, he called nearby shopkeepers and with
their help, broke open the lock. Inside, they discovered the deceased
lying in a pool of blood with severe injuries. A screw driver, an iron
hammer, a small iron spade, and knives were found lying near the
dead body. A brown-coloured full pant belonging to the Appellant
was also found at the scene. Suspecting the Appellant to be
responsible for the murder particularly as he was known to have a
lustful eye on the victim, the Informant accused the Appellant in the
written report. Consequently, Belpahar P.S. Case No. 161 dated
27.12.2005 was registered under Sections 302 of the IPC, and the
investigation commenced.
3. In course of the investigation, P.W.11, the Investigating
Officer, registered the FIR on 27.12.2005 vide Ext.1/3 and 1/4 based
on the written complaint lodged by P.W.10. He visited the spot on the
same evening, secured the area, and made requisitions for the
scientific team and an Executive Magistrate. On 28.12.2005, inquest
was conducted in the presence of witnesses and the Magistrate, an
inquest report was prepared (Ext.2). The I.O. seized blood stained
weapons and articles from near the dead body, including a hammer
(M.O.VI), a spade (M.O.IX), an iron slab (M.O.VIII), two knives
(M.O.X and XI), and a screw driver (M.O.VII). These were sealed by
the scientific team and seized under the seizure list marked as Ext.3.
Medical opinion was sought for regarding these weapons, and it was
opined that the injuries found on the deceased were possible by such
weapons. Biological samples of the Appellant, including hair
clippings and blood, were collected and seized under Ext.4. The
Accused-Appellant, who had allegedly consumed poison, was later
traced, identified, hospitalised, and formally arrested. Upon
conclusion of the investigation, the charge sheet was submitted vide
Ext.18, to face trial.
4. The case of the defence is one of complete denial.
5. To bring home the charge, the prosecution examined 12
witnesses in all. P.W.1 is the scribe of the F.I.R., P.W.2 is the landlord
of the Appellant, P.W.3 is a neighbour, P.Ws.4 and 9 are the inquest
witnesses, P.Ws.5 and 6 are seizure witnesses, P.W.7 is a medical
officer, P.W.8 is the doctor who conducted the P.M. examination,
P.W.10 is the Informant, P.W.11 is the I.O. and P.W.12 is the
scientific officer.
6. The defence, on the other hand, examined one witness, D.W.1,
who is the foster mother of the deceased.
7. The learned trial Court leaning to the side of prosecution,
found the prosecution to have proved its case beyond all reasonable
doubt and held the Appellant guilty and convicted him awarding
sentence as described above.
8. Mr. B. C. Parija, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Appellant, argues that the prosecution has failed to establish a
complete and unbroken chain of circumstances to prove the guilt of
the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It was argued that the last
seen theory is weak and inconclusive, as no independent witness had
seen the deceased in the exclusive company of the Appellant at the
relevant time. The testimonies of P.Ws.2, 3, and 4 did not support this
theory, and there was no precise evidence indicating the time of death
to link it with the Appellant's presence. Mr. Parija further submits that
the house was jointly occupied by the deceased, her husband
(P.W.10), her foster mother, and the Appellant, and as such, the
recovery of a blood stained brown pant from the room could not be
conclusively attributed to the Appellant. He adds that the motive
alleged by the prosecution as to the inappropriate behaviour of the
Appellant towards the deceased is also insufficient to establish the
motive for murder, especially when P.W.8, the doctor who conducted
the post-mortem, clearly stated that there were no signs of sexual
assault. Mr. Parija emphasises that suspicion, however strong, cannot
substitute proof, and that the evidence on record lacked the cogency
and conclusiveness required for a conviction in a case based purely on
circumstantial evidence, and the Appellant is hence liable to be
acquitted.
9. Mr. Gautam Tripathy, learned Additional Government
Advocate, on the other hand, contends that the prosecution had
successfully established a strong chain of circumstantial evidence
pointing to the guilt of the Appellant. It was contended that the
deceased was last seen alive in the company of the Appellant, who
was residing in the same house, and that he had no plausible
explanation for his absence and subsequent conduct, including his
alleged attempt to commit suicide by consuming poison. Mr. Tripathy
emphasised that the recovery of blood stained weapons and a brown-
coloured pant from the spot, linked to the Appellant, corroborated the
sequence of events narrated by the prosecution witnesses. He further
submitted that the motive behind the crime was rooted in the
Appellant's inappropriate conduct towards the deceased, which had
caused tensions in the household and provided a compelling reason for
the Appellant to eliminate her. The statements of key witnesses,
particularly P.W.10, the husband of the deceased, gave a detailed
account of the strained relationship between the deceased and the
Appellant. As the case was based on circumstantial evidence, Mr.
Tripathy asserts that the cumulative effect of the circumstances
formed a complete chain unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the
Appellant, warranting his conviction.
10. Needless to mention that in a case where the offence charged
is one under section 302 IPC, the nature of death of the deceased has
to be decided first. Accordingly, we find it right to evaluate the
evidence vide Ext.7 in this issue.
External Injuries:
(i) Lacerated wound on the left side of the head in front of the
face 4" × 1 and 1/2" × muscle and vessels are exposed
(ii) Lacerated wound on left side below left mastoid (behind left
ear) which is 2" × 3/4" × muscle deep
(iii) Lacerated wound on the left side of mandible area 4" × 1 ½" ×
bone deep
(iv) Lacerated wound 1" below the left ear of size 1" × 1/2" ×
muscle deep
(v) Lacerated wound on the left side of the frontal area of size 1"
× 1/2" × muscle deep
(vi) Lacerated wound on the left side of the frontal area 1" a part of
the injury no. (v) of size 1" × 1/2" × muscle deep
(vii) Lacerated wound on the left side of left eye brow of size 1" ×
1/2" × muscle deep
(viii) Lacerated wound on the upper part of left ear, upper 1/4th of
Pina was detached and not found on the body
(ix) Lacerated wound on right cheek of size 1" × 1/2" × muscle
deep
(x) Lacerated cut injury below the right side of mandibular area on
the neck of size 4 ½" × 1 ½" × deep in the trachea vessels.
Vessel's trachea and oesophagus were exposed
(xi) Two bruises on the lower part of the neck towards right of size
1" × 1/2"
(xii) Lacerated wound on the lower lip of size 1/2" × 1/4"
(xiii) Lacerated wound on the back side of neck on the left in
horizontal direction of size 2 ½" × 1" × muscle deep
(xiv) Bruise on the medial side of right elbow joint of size 1" × 1/4"
On dissection, it was found that the corresponding injury to
no.(x) i.e. vessels, trachea, and oesophagus were cut. The deceased
was not sexually assaulted.
11. The medical evidence on record by P.W.8, clearly establishes
that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. The deceased
had sustained multiple lacerated wounds and bruises across her head,
neck, face, and body, including a grievous injury (Injury No. x) that
cut through the trachea, major vessels, and oesophagus, an injury
which P.W.8 opined was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. All injuries were noted to be antemortem, indicating they
were inflicted during the lifetime of the deceased. Notably, there were
no signs of sexual assault, and the cause of death was consistent with
deliberate, forceful violence. This finding has not been disputed by
either party, and it conclusively supports that the death was indeed
homicidal in nature.
12. Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned
counsel for the respective parties, it is incumbent to deal with the
testimonies of the relevant witnesses for better appreciation of the
case.
P.W.2 stated that more than a year prior to the incident, he had
purchased a house from one Kishori Mohan Sahu in the name of his
son. At that time, Rajendra Jain (the Appellant), his wife, daughter,
and son-in-law were residing in that house as tenants. He stated that
the Appellant used to collect scrap materials and sell them in the
market. He also confirmed that Rajkumar Rout was the Appellant's
son-in-law. On the evening of the incident, around 5:30 p.m., P.W.2
heard about the murder of Pinky. In his sworn testimony, he denied
having seen the dead body or the injuries on the deceased. He further
denied having told the Investigating Officer that on 27.12.2005,
Rajkumar Rout and his mother-in-law had left the house for work, and
upon their return, found the bedroom locked and later discovered the
deceased inside. He also denied suppressing the truth or seeing any
specific injuries on the deceased's body. In his cross-examination,
P.W.2 stated that he was not called by Rajkumar Rout. His house was
located about a five-minute walk from the house of the Appellant. He
admitted that he did not know the character or nature of the Appellant
and clarified that he had not given any statement to the police.
P.W.3 deposed that he knew the Appellant and his family, who
were residing in a house adjacent to his shop. On 27.12.2005, in the
evening, Rajkumar Rout approached him and, in a distressed state,
informed him that his wife had been killed by the Appellant. P.W.3
and others advised him to report the matter to the police. When the
police arrived, P.W.3 accompanied them to the house of the
Appellant. In their presence, Rajkumar broke the lock of the room.
Inside, they discovered the body of the deceased, lying in a pool of
blood with severe injuries. A hammer, screwdriver, two knives (one
iron, one steel), a thick iron plate, and a brown-coloured pant, all
stained with blood, were found near the body. These were seized by
the police under seizure list marked Ext.3. The police took
photographs, made inquiries, and prepared documents, which were
explained to P.W.3. He also identified his signature on the inquest
report (Ext.2), which had been prepared in his presence, along with
Kartik Sahu and the informant. In cross-examination, P.W.3 stated
that his shop remained open from 6 a.m. to 12 noon and again from 4
p.m. to 9 p.m. He confirmed not hearing any abnormal sound between
6 a.m. and 12 noon. The police arrived within 10-15 minutes of
Rajkumar lodging the complaint. The lock was broken in the presence
of the police, and about 4-5 other persons were also present. He noted
that Rajkumar did not approach him before 5 p.m. and that he returned
to his shop around 6-6:15 p.m., then again went back to the spot after
20 minutes and stayed until the end. His statement was recorded the
following morning around 9-10 a.m., and he was called after a week
to sign Ext.3.
P.W.4 stated that he went to the house of the Appellant after
hearing some commotion and, by then, the door lock had already been
broken. He saw the body of the deceased, Pinky, with a cut injury on
the neck and a bleeding head injury. He could not remain inside the
room for long due to discomfort and was asked to step out. He further
stated that he accompanied the police to Raigarh in search of the
Appellant but returned that night around 2 a.m. On the following day,
the inquest was held, and the inquest report (Ext.2) was prepared. An
ambulance was called, and the dead body was sent for post-mortem
examination. In cross-examination, P.W.4 stated that he had reached
the scene about 15-20 minutes after the arrival of the police. On the
night of the incident, the police did not take photographs or prepare
any paperwork. He confirmed accompanying the police to Raigarh
and signing 3-4 documents, though he could not specify which ones.
He also mentioned that photographs were taken simultaneously.
P.W.10 (Informant and Husband of the Deceased) stated that
on the morning of 27.12.2005, around 8 a.m., he left the house for
work, pulling a rickshaw. His mother-in-law, a rag picker, also left
after him. His wife and the Appellant remained inside the house. He
clarified that the Appellant was not married to his mother-in-law and
that his wife had been fostered by them. P.W.10 returned home at
around 5 p.m. and noticed the house locked. He usually kept the house
key on the window pan, but that day the key was missing. Peering
through the door gap, he saw a body inside. He broke the lock and
entered, discovering the dead body of his wife with cut injuries on the
left ear, right cheek, neck, and back, and heavy bleeding. Her saree,
saya, and blouse were soaked in blood. He found a hammer (M.O.VI),
a spade (M.O.IX), an iron slab with a hole (M.O.VIII), two knives
(M.O.X, M.O.XI), and a screwdriver (M.O.VII), all blood stained,
near the body. He immediately called nearby shopkeeper Rahamat and
one K. Sahu. His mother-in-law was sitting outside the house at the
time. Despite her objections, he went to the police station and lodged a
written report, which was scribed by one Kishore Tanty under his
instructions. The FIR was marked Ext.1. Police took photographs the
next day. He stated that he married the deceased on 09.11.2005 and
resided at Pipilimal before moving to Ahmad Nagar about a month
prior to the incident, upon the Appellant's invitation promising him a
job. While they lived happily for about 15 days, the Appellant later
began assaulting the deceased. When P.W.10 objected, he was also
threatened. His wife had expressed fear and only agreed to disclose
details if they lived separately. When he found a rented house, the
Appellant did not allow them to leave. After the incident, the
Appellant was found lying on a bridge at Brajarajnagar after
consuming poison. He was admitted to a hospital and subsequently
arrested. P.W.10 further stated that the deceased had confided that the
Appellant used to call her at night to massage him, including his
private parts, and that he would peep through the door whenever the
couple was intimate. In cross-examination, P.W.10 stated that he had
studied up to Class VII. He confirmed asking Kishore to write the
FIR. He was working as an apprentice in a hotel at the time and was a
trolley rickshaw puller. He denied keeping any tools like hooks or
hammers used for work. He reiterated that the Appellant had informed
them on the morning of the incident that he would keep the items they
needed to carry for relocation. He also denied the suggestion that he
killed his wife instead of the Appellant.
13. D.W.1, the foster mother of the deceased, deposed that on the
day of the incident, her husband (the Appellant) had left the house
early in the morning for work. She stated that by the time she also left
the house, the deceased and her husband (P.W.10) were still present
inside. On the way, the Appellant informed her that he was going to
Calcutta. According to her, two days after the occurrence, the
Appellant returned from Calcutta. She then informed him about the
deceased's murder and that P.W.10 is accusing Appellant not only of
the murder but also of having had an illicit relationship with the
deceased. Upon hearing this, the Appellant was shocked and
expressed that he would not show his face again, and walked away
towards Brajarajnagar, saying he would commit suicide.
In her cross-examination, D.W.1 clarified that the deceased
was not her biological daughter. She stated that she had adopted Pinky
as an infant after finding her abandoned by her mentally ill biological
mother near Rourkela railway bridge. She also described her personal
history, stating that she was originally from Howrah, had left her first
husband Ramu Rao, and had been living with the Appellant as his
partner for over 20 years. D.W.1 stated that on the evening of the
incident, she was sitting in the verandah when her son-in-law returned.
The house was locked and the Appellant was not present. The lock
was broken open after the police arrived. She stated that the Appellant
was brought to the police station four days later. She further
confirmed that the room where the deceased was found dead was
shared by the deceased and her husband, while she and the Appellant
used to sleep in the verandah. D.W.1 denied all suggestions made in
cross-examination about the Appellant being sexually exploitative
towards the deceased, or that he had assaulted the deceased or herself.
She also denied the suggestion that her testimony was false or that she
was deposing under the influence of the Appellant.
14. Coming to the culpability of the Accused-Respondents, the
case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence, and it is
trite law that in a case of circumstantial evidence, before reaching a
conclusion, the Court is required to examine the evidence on the
touchstone of the decision reported in the matter of Sharad Birdhi
Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1984 SC
1622 -
"3:3. Before a case against an accused vesting on
circumstantial evidence can be said to be fully
established the following conditions must be fulfilled
as laid down in Hanumant's v. State of M.P. [1953]
SCR 1091.
1. The circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be fully established;
2. The facts so established should be consistent with
the hypothesis of guilt and the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;
3. The circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency;
4. They should exclude every possible hypothesis
except the one to be proved; and
5. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for the
conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all human probability
the act must have been done by the accused.
These five golden principles constitute the
panchsheel of the proof of a case based on
circumstantial evidence and in the absence of a
corpus deliciti.
Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1952]
SCR 1091; Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar
Pradesh [1969] 3 SCC 198; Ramgopal v. State of
Maharashtra AIR 1972 SC 656; and Shivaji
Sahabrao Babode & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra
[1973] 2 SCC 793 referred to.
3:4. The cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence
is that a case can be said to be proved only when
there is certain and explicit evidence and no pure
moral conviction."
15. One of the circumstances appearing in the prosecution case is
with regard to the last-seen theory. While appreciating the prosecution
case, in this regard, reference may be made to the decision of the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Satpal vs. State of Haryana
reported in (2018) 6SCC 610, para 6, as under: -
"Criminal jurisprudence and the plethora of judicial
precedents leave little room for reconsideration of
the basic principles for invocation of the last seen
theory as a facet of circumstantial evidence.
Succinctly stated, it may be a weak kind of evidence
by itself to found conviction upon the same
singularly. But when it is coupled with other
circumstances such as the time when the deceased
was last seen with the accused and the recovery of
the corpse being in very close proximity of time, the
accused owes an explanation under Section 106 of
the Evidence Act with regard to the circumstances
under which death may have been taken place. If the
accused offers no explanation, or furnishes a wrong
explanation, absconds, motive is established and
there is corroborative evidence available inter alia in
the form of recovery or otherwise forming a chain of
circumstances leading to the only inference for guilt
of the accused, incompatible with any possible
hypothesis of innocence, conviction can be based on
the same. If there be any doubt or break in the link of
chain of circumstance, the benefit of doubt must go
to the accused. Each case will therefore have to be
examined on its own facts for invocation of the
doctrine"
16. In the instant case, a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses reveals significant gaps and inconsistencies that
weaken the evidentiary value of this theory. P.W.10, the husband of
the deceased, stated that on the morning of 27.12.2005, he had left the
house around 8:00 a.m. for work, and his mother-in-law also left soon
after for rag picking, leaving the deceased and the accused alone in the
house. While this assertion attempts to place the Appellant in the
exclusive company of the deceased at the relevant time, it is
unsupported by any independent or corroborative testimony. None of
the neighbouring witnesses, including P.W.2, P.W.3, or P.W.4, have
categorically deposed to having seen the deceased and the Appellant
together on the morning of the incident. P.W.2, whose house is a five-
minute walk from the scene, explicitly denied having seen the
deceased that day. P.W.3, a shopkeeper situated adjacent to the house,
did not witness any unusual activity or interaction between the
Appellant and the deceased during the day and only came to know of
the incident after being informed by P.W.10 in the evening. P.W.4
arrived at the scene only after the door was broken open and also did
not support the last seen theory. Moreover, there is no evidence
indicating the exact time of death of the deceased to narrow the
window of occurrence and connect it definitively with the Appellant's
presence. The prosecution has also failed to establish whether the
Appellant was continuously present in the house until the discovery of
the dead body. In the absence of any clear and unblemished chain of
circumstances to prove that the Appellant was the last person seen
with the deceased in proximity to the time of death, the "last seen"
theory loses its probative force. It remains a mere suspicion and
cannot, by itself, form the basis of conviction unless corroborated by
other clinching evidence, which, in this case, is lacking.
17. The second circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the
recovery of a brown coloured pant, allegedly stained with blood,
found near the dead body at the scene of occurrence. It is contended
that this pant belonged to the Appellant and thereby links him to the
offence. However, this piece of evidence fails to advance the
prosecution's case in any meaningful way due to the absence of
conclusive proof regarding its ownership. None of the prosecution
witnesses have deposed with certainty that the said pant belonged to
the Appellant. No witness has stated that they had ever seen the
Appellant wearing that particular pant, nor has the prosecution
adduced any material evidence such as prior photographs,
identification, or any statement by the Appellant acknowledging
ownership. The mere presence of the pant at the scene, even if stained
with blood, cannot by itself establish a nexus with the Appellant in the
absence of such proof.
Furthermore, it is an admitted fact that the house in which the
offence took place was not exclusively occupied by the Appellant.
The deceased was residing there with her husband, the informant
(P.W.10), as well as her foster parents, including the Appellant. In
such a shared domestic setup, it is entirely plausible and even
expected that clothing and other personal effects of different
individuals would be found in common areas. This dilutes the
evidentiary value of the pant being found near the body, as a different
and more plausible hypothesis, such as the pant belonging to the
informant himself or another family member cannot be ruled out. The
prosecution has failed to exclude these reasonable alternatives. In a
case based purely on circumstantial evidence, where every link in the
chain must be firmly established and lead only to the guilt of the
Appellant, the ambiguity surrounding the ownership of the brown pant
renders this circumstance inconclusive and insufficient to support the
prosecution's narrative.
18. The prosecution has further sought to establish motive by
suggesting that the Appellant, being the foster father of the deceased,
harboured inappropriate intentions towards her, which ultimately led
to her murder. This allegation is primarily based on the testimony of
P.W.10, the husband of the deceased, who stated that the Appellant
used to call the deceased at night to massage him, including his
private parts, and that he would peep through the door when the
couple was intimate. He further alleged that the deceased had confided
in him about the Appellant's behaviour and had expressed a desire to
live separately.
However, even assuming that there was some discord or
discomfort within the household, mere allegations of improper
conduct, without any supporting evidence, are not sufficient to
establish motive strong enough to impel the Appellant to commit
murder. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the prosecution
has succeeded in establishing a motive of sexual misconduct on the
part of the Appellant towards the deceased, that by itself cannot
suffice to establish a motive for committing murder. The motive to
commit sexual assault and the motive to commit homicide are distinct,
each requiring its own set of circumstances and evidentiary support.
Moreover, P.W.10 and the deceased had only recently moved into the
house and were residing there for barely a month prior to the incident.
During that short span, there is no evidence of any formal complaint
or effort to distance themselves from the Appellant despite the alleged
advances. No neighbour or third party has testified about any tension,
quarrels, or observable discomfort between the deceased and the
Appellant. The prosecution has also not explained why the Appellant,
if truly driven by such a motive, would act in broad daylight in a
shared home, and leave behind multiple incriminating objects without
making any attempt to conceal the evidence.
In cases resting on circumstantial evidence, motive assumes
particular significance. It must be clear, cogent, and supported by the
overall factual matrix. In the present case, the prosecution's assertion
of motive appears speculative and fails to inspire confidence. The
testimony of P.W.10, being uncorroborated and delayed, does not rise
above the threshold of suspicion. In the absence of independent
verification or prior consistent statements, the alleged motive remains
weak and unconvincing, further loosening the chain of circumstances
necessary for establishing the guilt of the Appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.
19. It is further noted that the prosecution's own medical evidence
undercuts the possibility of any sexual assault being the reason or
trigger for the homicidal act. P.W.8, the doctor who conducted the
post-mortem examination, has clearly stated that the deceased was not
subjected to sexual assault. When specifically questioned on this
aspect, he categorically ruled out any signs of sexual violence. The
injuries found on the deceased though undoubtedly homicidal in
nature and caused by sharp and blunt weapons, do not indicate any
struggle or resistance typically associated with sexual violence. This
medical opinion significantly weakens the prosecution's narrative of
motive, leaving a wide evidentiary gap. When the alleged motive itself
is neither established convincingly nor supported by objective medical
evidence, it would be unsafe to draw adverse inferences against the
Appellant solely on the basis of suspicion. As such, the prosecution's
case in respect of motive remains speculative and unsubstantiated.
20. Furthermore, in considering the defence version, the testimony
of D.W.1, the foster mother of the deceased, also merits attention.
While the version of D.W.1, if true, could potentially displace the
prosecution's suggestion of the Appellant being present at the scene of
the crime, her testimony does not conclusively establish his absence
during the critical window of time. Her statement stands
uncorroborated by any independent evidence such as travel details,
witness accounts from Calcutta, or any proof of his location during the
alleged period of absence. Further, being the long-time partner of the
Appellant, her testimony cannot be viewed as wholly disinterested.
Although her narrative offers an alternative possibility, it does not, by
itself, firmly rebut the prosecution's case or sufficiently establish an
alibi. At best, it adds to the uncertainties already present in the
prosecution's version, reinforcing the existence of reasonable doubt
rather than providing a definitive exoneration.
21. It is also relevant to note that the Appellant was later found
lying unconscious on a bridge at Brajarajnagar, having allegedly
consumed poison. While the prosecution seeks to attribute this act as a
sign of guilt, the defence submits that such conduct, in isolation,
cannot be treated as conclusive proof of involvement in the crime. The
circumstances surrounding the alleged suicide attempt remain unclear,
and no medical or forensic evidence has been placed on record to
definitively establish that the Appellant's act was directly linked to the
incident in question. In the absence of corroborative evidence, such
conduct may at best raise suspicion, but falls short of the standard
required to infer guilt.
22. While the death of the deceased is undeniably tragic and the
cause of death clearly homicidal in nature, the settled principles of
criminal law require that the prosecution must prove its case against
the Appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. As reiterated by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of
Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116, in a case based solely on
circumstantial evidence, the chain of circumstances must be complete,
each link must be established with clarity, and the entire sequence
must point unerringly to the guilt of the Appellant, ruling out every
possible hypothesis of innocence. In the present case, the prosecution
has failed to meet this threshold. The last seen theory is not
established by consistent or corroborated evidence, the blood-stained
pant allegedly recovered from the spot is not proven to be one
belonging to the Appellant, the motive remains speculative in light of
the post-mortem findings which rule out sexual assault, and the
recovery of weapons is also doubtful. These glaring gaps and
inconsistencies render the prosecution's case insufficient to establish
the guilt of the Appellant with the degree of certainty the law requires,
and thereby entails a benefit of doubt in favour of the Appellant.
23. In view of the above discussion, we are of the considered view
that the prosecution has not been able to prove the charge against the
Appellant beyond all reasonable doubt, and the evidence on record
falls short of the standard required to fasten criminal liability.
24. Accordingly, the judgment and order of conviction dated
28.11.2006 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Jharsuguda, is hereby set aside. The Appeal is allowed. The Appellant,
is acquitted of the charge under section 302 of IPC, who is in jail
custody be released forthwith unless required in connection with any
other case.
(Chittaranjan Dash)
Judge
(S. K. Sahoo)
Judge
A.K.Pradhan/Bijay
Reason: Authentication
Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
Date: 29-Apr-2025 17:18:03
