Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 333 Meg
Judgement Date : 4 July, 2022
Serial No.01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl.A.No.1/2022
Date of Order: 04.07.2022
Albad Phawa Vs. State of Meghalaya
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellant : Mr. M.F. Qureshi, Adv with
Ms. K. Chisa, Adv
For the Respondent : Mr. N.D. Chullai, AAG with
Mr. S. Sengupta, Addl.PP
i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication in press: Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon'ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral) The short case of the appellant here, who has been convicted
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by the impugned
judgment and sentence of November 18, 2021, is that the trial court
completely failed to appreciate the circumstances in which the perceived
offence was committed and gave no credence to the evidence that it was
the victim who had attacked the son of the appellant quite brutally that
provoked the appellant to chase him down and deal a blow to him.
2. The incident occurred at or about 7 pm on January15, 2006. The
first information report was lodged at the Nartiang Outpost covered by the
Jowai Police Station on the following day by a villager. The FIR merely
indicated that the victim had been killed by the appellant herein. There was
no indication as to how the FIR-maker came to know of the incident. The
FIR-maker died before the trial could be taken up. There were two key
witnesses: the son of the appellant who was apparently attacked by the
victim; and, a relative who happened to be nearby and rushed to the place
of occurrence. Such relative of the appellant was examined as PW1 in
course of the trial.
3. The relevant witness claimed that he was at a place some 10 or
15m away from his residence when he heard screaming and quarrelling at
a distance and he rushed to investigate what was happening. When he
reached the place of occurrence, PW1 claimed that he found the son of the
appellant injured in the eye and the son later indicated that he had been
attacked for no apparent reason by the victim. At the time that PW1
reached the spot, the son of the appellant was crying in pain and PW1
testified that he saw the appellant chasing the victim.
4. PW1 went on to say that he waited at the spot with the son of the
appellant for the appellant to return and the appellant came back and said
that he had beaten up the assailant of his son. In the testimony of PW1, he
did not indicate how severely the victim had been beaten up nor did PW1
at the relevant time perceive that the assailant had been killed. It appears
that even the appellant may not have been aware as to whether his son's
assailant had been killed by the blow that the appellant dealt to him. PW1
went on to say that it was only on the next day that he heard in the village
that the victim had died and the dead body had been found when he realised
that it must be have been the appellant who was responsible for it.
5. In his rather terse deposition, the son of the appellant, who was
examined as PW2, claimed that he was returning from the fields when he
met his father and the two of them were walking back home when the
victim, for no apparent reason, struck PW2 with a Khasi dao (wait bnoh).
There is nothing else of note in the testimony of PW2 apart from the fact
that the appellant may have gone after his son's assailant when PW1
arrived at the scene and helped PW2 get up on his feet.
6. There was no eye-witness who saw the appellant assaulting the
victim. There was an earlier incident to which PW1 was attracted by the
accompanying screaming and upon PW1 reaching the place of occurrence,
he found PW2 injured and the appellant chasing the assailant. It does not
appear that PW2 was officially medically examined, though it appears
from the evidence that he was taken to the healthcare centre the following
day. The exact nature of the injuries suffered by PW2 is not evident.
7. Yet, what is undeniable on the basis of the evidence of PW1 and
PW2 is that PW2 suffered a bleeding injury in the eye caused by a Khasi
dao and the appellant, as the father of PW1 was impelled, at such sudden
and grave provocation by the victim, to chase the victim down and strike
him a blow.
8. The post-mortem report revealed that there was one injury to the
head of the victim caused by a sharp and heavy weapon. In the sequence
of events that emanates from the apparently believable evidence is that the
victim hit the appellant's son with a dangerous weapon and dropped the
weapon which the appellant picked up while chasing the victim and the
sudden and grave provocation of the victim assaulting the appellant's son
led to the appellant taking a solitary strike at the victim, which turned to
be fatal. No case of premeditation was made out. The first Exception in
Section 300 of the Penal Code speaks of the loss of self-control as a result
of grave and sudden provocation with the caveat that the provocation is
not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender. In this case, the
evidence does not suggest that the provocation was sought by the offender
or that the appellant's son was assaulted by the victim as a reaction to any
action of the appellant.
9. It is true that the appellant chased the victim down, but the act
must be seen to be part of the reaction to the sudden and grave provocation
presented by the victim upon the victim striking a severe blow on the head
of the appellant's son. The mere fact that the appellant chased the victim
down and the act of chasing would have involved some time, would not
take the appellant's reaction to the sudden and grave provocation beyond
the purview of the first Exception in Section 300 of the Penal Code. If the
appellant had sometime later gone and struck the victim, there would have
been motive and an element of premeditation. However, the evidence
reveals that both the appellant and his son were surprised and taken aback
by the sudden assault of his son and the appellant, reacted to the serious
injury inflicted on his son's head by chasing the assailant and striking him
a solitary blow.
10. It is apparent that the appellant surrendered the day that it was
discovered that the victim had died and the appellant even carried the wait
bnoh to the police station. The appellant made a confessional statement
under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which was
not exhibited in course of the trial or relied upon by the prosecution. The
appellant was remorseful for having lost his self-control and committing
the act and begged for forgiveness even in course of his examination under
Section 313 of the Code. The appellant candidly answered all the questions
put to him by the trial judge, including that he surrendered and had
produced the murder weapon at the time of his surrender.
11. On an overall appreciation of what may have happened on that
January evening, it is evident that the suddenness and the gravity of
provocation by the victim resulted in the appellant losing self-control as he
saw his son had been seriously struck on his head, whereupon the appellant
chased his son's assailant and with the same weapon as the assailant had
used at the appellant's son, he struck him a ferocious blow that resulted in
his death. This would be a case squarely covered by the first Exception in
Section 300 of the Penal Code.
12. As a consequence, the punishment that the appellant has to suffer
is one under Section 304 of the Penal Code. There is no evidence that the
act in this case which caused the death of the victim was done with the
intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as would lead to
the death of the victim. The appellant was understandably angry and dealt
a solitary blow. It does not appear that the appellant was even aware at that
time that the blow had killed the victim or was fatal. According to the
evidence of PW2, the appellant merely stated that he had beaten up his
son's assailant. In such circumstances, the punishment that the appellant
receives would be covered by the second part of Section 304 of the Penal
Code.
13. Accordingly, the appellant is sentenced to 10 years' rigorous
imprisonment together with the same fine of Rs.10,000/- as imposed by
the trial court. The period of detention already suffered will be reckoned
as a part of the sentence. In default of payment of the fine, the appellant
will suffer a further month's simple imprisonment.
14. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed on November
18, 2021 are modified accordingly.
15. Crl.A.No.1 of 2022 is allowed in part as indicated above.
16. Let an authenticated copy of this judgment and order be
immediately made available to the appellant free of cost.
(W. Diengdoh) (Sanjib Banerjee)
Judge Chief Justice
Meghalaya
04.07.2022
"Lam DR-PS"
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