Mrs. Laimayum Ongbi Sangeeta Devi ... vs The State Of Manipur Represented ...
2022 Latest Caselaw 113 Mani

           Digitally
           signed by
                             IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
  LHAINEI LHAINEICHON
  CHONG GDate:
            HAOKIP

  HAOKIP 2022.03.29
          12:29:19
           +05'30'                            AT IMPHAL
                                            BA No. 32 of 2021
 Mrs. Laimayum Ongbi Sangeeta Devi @ Amubi, aged about 27 years, w/o
 Laimayum Indrajit Sharma of Thangapat, Palace Compound, P.O. & P.S.
 Porompat, Imphal East, District, Manipur-795008.
                                                                              ... Petitioner.
                                                      -Versus -

 1. The State of Manipur represented by Principal Secretary (Home
    Department), Babupara, Imphal West, Manipur-795001.
 2. Officer-in-Charge, Irilbung Police Station, Imphal East District, Manipur-
    795008.
                                                                           ......Respondent.

                                        B E F O R E
                           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AHANTHEMBIMOL SINGH

                       For the petitioner        :   Mr. L. Seityandra, Advocate

                       For the respondents       :   Mr. H. Samarjit, PP
                       Date of Hearing           :   08.03.2022
                       Date of Order             :   29.03.2022

                                                 ORDER

[1] Heard Mr. L. Seityandra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner

and Mr. H. Samarjit, learned PP appearing for the respondents.

The present bail application had been filed under section 439 Cr.P.C.

praying for releasing the petitioner on bail during the pendency of the

Sessions Trial Case No. 16 of 2019 & FIR No. 44 (6) 2019 IBG P.S. U/s

302/34-IPC, 120-C/392/201 IPC before the learned Sessions Judge, Imphal

East, Manipur.

[2] The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner

was arrested along with 3 (three) other accused persons on the allegation of

murder of one Kshetrimayum Ongbi Sumita Devi on 24.06.2019 and she has

been in judicial custody as an under trial prisoner for the last about 3 (three)

years, i.e., since the date of her arrest till today.

[3] The learned counsel also submitted that the petitioner was falsely

implicated and arrested by the Police in connection with the above mentioned

FIR and that the charges level against the petitioner are all concocted and

fabricated one and that the petitioner never committed the offence alleged

against her.

It has also been submitted that charge sheet was filed on 22.10.2019

and charged was framed against the accused persons on 26.11.2020,

however, not a single prosecution witness has been examined till today and

that the trial is likely to take a long time. The learned counsel further

submitted that as the investigation has been completed and charges have

been framed, there is no chance of hampering or tempering the prosecution

of witnesses by the petitioner during the course of the trial.

[4] The learned counsel submitted that the family of the petitioner

consists of only her husband and one 4 (four) years old daughter and that the

said minor child was allowed to stay along with the petitioner in the Manipur

Central Jail, Imphal by the learned Trial Court, however, the said minor child

is now staying with the husband of the petitioner, but the small child needs

constant motherly care. The learned counsel lastly submitted that if the

present bail application is rejected and the petitioner is to be kept under

custody during the trial of the case, which is likely to take a long time, an

injustice and irretrievable injury will be caused to the petitioner.

[5] In support of the contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner

relied on the following judgment of the Apex Court:-

1. "Sanjay Chandra Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation" reported in

(2012) 1 SCC 40 :

"21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.

"22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, "necessity" is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances.

"23. Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson.

"27. This Court, time and again, has stated that bail is the rule and committal to jail an exception. It has also observed that refusal of bail is a restriction on the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

2. "Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors Vs. Public Prosecutor, High

Court of Andhra Pradesh" reported in AIR 1978 SC 429:

"10. The significance and sweep of Art. 21 make the deprivation of liberty a matter of grave concern and permissible only when the law authorising it is reasonable, even-handed and geared to the goals of community good and State necessity spelt out in Art. 19. Indeed, the considerations I have set out as criteria are germane to the constitutional proposition I have deduced. Reasonableness postulates intelligent care and predicates that deprivation of freedom by refusal of bail is not for punitive purpose but for the bi-focal interests of justice - to the individual involved and society affected.

"11. We must weight the contrary factors to answer the test the reasonableness, subject to the need for securing the presence of the bail applicant. It makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to prepare and present his case than one remanded in custody. And if public justice is to be promoted, mechanical detention should be demoted. In the United States, which has a constitutional perspective close to ours, the function of bail is limited, 'community roots' of the applicant are stressed and after the Vera Foundation's Manhattan Bail Project, monetary suretyship is losing ground. The considerable public expense in keeping in custody where no danger of disappearance or disturbance can arise, is not a negligible consideration. Equally important is the deplorable conditions, verging on the inhuman, of our sub-jails, that the unrewarding cruelty and expensive custody of avoidable incarceration makes refusal of bail unreasonable and a policy favouring release justly sensible.

"17. In this jurisprudential setting, I take up each case. Detailed retiocination is not called for, since I have indicated the broad approach. And, for a bail order - once awareness of matters of relevance is assured - the briefer the better, and prolixity may be fraught with unwitting injury. The focus is on personal freedom, barricaded or banned when it turns a menace to the fair administration of justice which is the foundation of a free society."

3. "Bhagirathsinh Judeja Vs. State of Gujarat" reported in

AIR 1984 SC 372:

"5. * * * * * * *

"If there is no prima facie case there is no question of considering other circumstances. But even where a prima facie is

established, the approach of the court in the matter of bail is not that the accused should be detained by way of punishment but whether the presence of the accused would be readily available for trail or that he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence.

"6. * * * * * * * * *

"And the trend today is towards granting bail because it is now well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the power to grant bail is not to be exercised as if the punishment before trial is being imposed. The only material considerations in such a situation are whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with evidence."

[6] Mr. H. Samrjit, learned PP appearing for the respondents submitted

that the petitioner was arrested in connection with the death of one

Kshetrimayum Ongbi Sumita Devi as the involvement of the petitioner has

been established during the investigation of the case and that a prima facie

case has been established against the accused persons. The learned PP

also submitted that keeping in view the seriousness of the charges made

against the petitioner, if the petitioner is released on bail during the pendency

of the trial, there is an apprehension that she will definitely hamper the trial of

the case and also will hamper important prosecution witnesses. The learned

PP accordingly objected strongly the bail application moved by the petitioner

and prayed for rejecting the present bail application.

[7] After hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties and

perusal of the record and keeping in view the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble

Apex Court cited herein above, this Court is of the considered view that even

though the offences alleged against the petitioner are serious, yet this Court

cannot also ignore that the petitioner has been in custody for the last about 3

(three) years since her arrest in connection with the case and that after

investigation of the case, charge sheet had already been submitted and

charges have been framed by the Trial Court, however, no prosecution

witness has been examined by the Trial Court and that the trial is likely to

take some time. This Court also cannot ignore the fact that the petitioner

being a women with a husband and a 4 (four) years old daughter is not likely

to abscond after availing bail or to interfere with the trial or temper with the

evidences. In the result, it is ordered that the petitioner be released on bail on

her executing a bond of Rs. 1,00,000/- (one lakh) with a surety to the

satisfaction of the Trial Court and subject to the following conditions:-

(a) The petitioner shall not directly or indirectly make any

inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts

of the case so as to dissuade him to disclose such facts to the Court

or to any other authority;

(b) The petitioner shall remain present before the Court on the

dates fixed for hearing of the case. If she wants to remain absent,

then, she shall take prior permission of the Court and in case of

unavoidable circumstances for remaining absent, she shall

immediately give intimation to the appropriate Court and request that

she may be permitted to be present through his counsel;

(c) The petitioner shall not leave the country without taking

prior leave from the Trial Court;

(d) Liberty is given to the Police to make an appropriate

application for modification/recalling this order, if for any reason, the

petitioner violates any of the conditions imposed by this Court.

[8] With the above order, the present Bail Application is disposed of.

JUDGE

FR/NRF

Sapana