[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Madras High Court
M.Raja vs The Managing Director on 10 March, 2026
Author: G.R.Swaminathan
Bench: G.R.Swaminathan
W.A(MD)No.647 of 2021
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
DATED : 10.03.2026
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.R.SWAMINATHAN
AND
THE HONOURABLE MS.JUSTICE R.POORNIMA
W.A(MD)No.647 of 2021
and
C.M.P(MD)No.2860 of 2021
M.Raja ... Appellant /
Petitioner
Vs.
1.The Managing Director,
Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation,
Bypass Road, Madurai.
2.The General Manager,
Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation,
Bypass Road, Dindigul. ... Respondents /
Respondents
Prayer: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act to
set aside the order dated 03.09.2020 passed in W.P(MD)No.10835 of
2020 on the file of this Court.
For Appellant : Mr.R.Jothiraj
For Respondents : Mr.J.Senthil Kumaraiah
Standing Counsel
1/14
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W.A(MD)No.647 of 2021
JUDGMENT
(Judgment of the Court was made by G.R.Swaminathan J.)
The unsuccessful writ petitioner is the appellant before us. The
appellant joined the respondent corporation as driver. On 05.05.2017,
the bus driven by him met with a fatal accident. As many as 7 passengers
travelling in the bus died and 14 others suffered grievous injuries. The
bus also sustained damage to the tune of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty
Thousand only).
2.The appellant was placed under suspension vide order dated
05.05.2017. Charge memo dated 19.05.2017 was also issued. The
appellant submitted his explanation on 30.05.2017. Domestic enquiry
was conducted and the enquiry report was adverse to the appellant. The
charge of negligent driving framed against the appellant was held to have
been proved. After issuing second show cause notice dated 20.11.2017,
and obtaining further representation from the appellant, the appellant was
imposed with the punishment of stoppage of 5 increments with
cumulative effect. The appellant was also directed to pay a sum of Rs.
50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) towards recouping the cost of
damage caused to the vehicle driven by him. Challenging the said
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punishment order dated 19.07.2018, the petitioner filed W.P(MD)No.
15106 of 2019. This Court relegated the appellant herein to avail the
appeal remedy. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the
appellate authority vide order dated 19.03.2020. Challenging the said
orders, the appellant filed W.P(MD)No.10835 of 2020. The learned
single Judge dismissed the writ petition vide order dated 03.09.2020.
Assailing the same, this Writ Appeal has been filed.
3.The learned counsel appearing for the appellant points out that
following the accident, proceedings were initiated before the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Madurai. The respondent
corporation filed counter in the said proceedings taking the stand that the
entire occurrence took place on account of the negligence on the part of
the driver of the other vehicle (lorry) and not on the part of the appellant
herein. The specific contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is
that, having taken such a stand before the Tribunal in MACT
proceedings, the management cannot be allowed to resile from the said
stand. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on the
recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 2025 INSC
218 (Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs Mahadeo
Krishna Naik).
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4.Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the
corporation submitted that the order of the learned single Judge is well
reasoned and that it does not call for interference.
5.We carefully considered the rival contentions and went through
the materials on record.
6.It is true that the management had taken a plea before the
Tribunal in the claim proceedings that its driver was not at fault. The
Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.2399 of 2003 (Tamil Nadu
State Transport Corporation (Kumbakonam Dn-II) Limited & another
Vs P.Karuppusamy) dated 23.11.2007 had held that once the
management has taken such a stand before the Tribunal in the claim
proceedings, it cannot take a U-turn and initiate disciplinary action
against its driver. But this decision was specifically overruled by a Full
Bench of this Court vide order dated 01.04.2024 in W.P.No.39563 of
2004 (V.Syril Sundararaj Vs The Presiding Officer, Labour Court,
Thirunelveli & Others). The question of law referred to the Full Bench
was formulated in the following terms:
“Whether the Management is precluded from initiating
disciplinary proceedings against its driver on the
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allegation that he had caused the accident due to his
rashness and negligence in driving the vehicle, in view
of the contrary stand taken before the Motor Accident
Claims Tribunal, wherein the Management had taken a
plea that the driver was neither negligent nor rash in
driving the vehicle?”
7.The Hon'ble Full Bench headed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice
answered the question as follows:
“31. In the light of the above discussion we would
answer the question as follows:
(i) That the Management having filed a counter in
the MACT proceedings defending its driver, it does not
preclude it from initiating disciplinary proceedings
against the driver.
(ii) The position to the contra as laid down in
TNSTC vs. Karuppusamy stands over ruled.”
When we were about to dismiss this writ appeal by applying the
aforesaid Full Bench ruling, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant submitted that the Full Bench ruling should be taken as having
been overruled in view of the Supreme Court decision reported in 2025
INSC 218. We were therefore called upon to test the correctness of the
said submission. To be precise, the question that calls for consideration
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is whether the Full Bench decision rendered in V.Syril Sundararaj still
holds good.
8.It is well settled that the ratio of any decision has to be culled out
only in the light of the factual matrix obtaining in that case. The facts in
Mahadeo Krishna Naik are as follows:
Mahadeo Krishna Naik, who was the respondent, was a driver
employed by the Maharashtra Road Transport Corporation. The bus
driven by him collided with a lorry leading to loss of lives. Proceedings
were initiated by the aggrieved parties before the Claims Tribunal.
Before the Tribunal, the management of the corporation contended that
the lorry driver was at fault and not Mahadeo Krishna Naik. The said
defence was accepted by the Tribunal and the entire liability was fastened
on the lorry owner and the lorry driver. In other words, Maharashtra
State Road Transport Corporation was absolved of any liability. After
tasting success before the Tribunal, the State Transport Corporation
wanted to throw out Mahadeo Krishna Naik from service. This was
probably because Mahadeo Krishna Naik had previously been involved
in as many as 7 accidents. When the employee challenged the decision
of the management before the High Court, the management conveniently
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suppressed the proceedings that took place before the Claims Tribunal.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court took serious exception to this conduct of the
management. Such deliberate withholding of relevant material and
suppression of material facts were frowned upon by the Supreme Court.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court noted that if corporation had not deemed it
fit to throw him out earlier, it could not have done so after the latest
occurrence and that too after succeeding before the Tribunal.
9.The facts of the present case are entirely different. It is not the
case of the appellant that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT)
accepted the defence of the management and exonerated him from
liability. We are, therefore, of the view that the decision reported in 2025
INSC 218 (Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Vs
Mahadeo Krishna Naik) is factually distinguishable. It is also relevant
to note that Crime No.116 of 2007 was also registered under Sections
279, 337, 338, 304 of IPC against the appellant herein for negligent and
reckless driving.
10.The issue can be approached from another perspective also.
Proceedings pertaining to an employee can take place in three ways. He
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could be departmentally dealt with. He could be prosecuted. He could
be a respondent / defendant in civil proceedings. Let us take the case of
a driver such as the appellant. If he is guilty of negligent driving, he can
be hauled up by initiating disciplinary action. The affected parties may
initiate claim proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal
and along with the management, the driver concerned also will be a
respondent. The driver can be prosecuted for reckless and negligent
driving. Even though the driver can be subject matter of all the three
proceedings, the standard of proof applicable to them will not be one and
the same. The varying standards are: a) proof beyond reasonable doubt,
b) proof on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and c) some
evidence rule. It is well settled that in criminal cases, the standard of
proof is “proof beyond reasonable doubt”. “Preponderance of
probabilities” is the civil law standard. The former constitutes a higher
threshold compared to the latter. Some evidence rule ranks below the
rigour of preponderance of probabilities standard.
11.If the Claims Tribunal had come to the conclusion that the
driver in question had been negligent and reckless, the driver has to
necessarily get the said finding vacated by filing an appeal before the
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High Court. So long as the said finding is holding good, it is binding on
the management. As already mentioned, the standard governing a civil
proceeding is higher compared to a disciplinary action. If by applying a
higher standard, a person is found guilty, disciplinary action has to follow
as a consequence. This is notwithstanding the defence that might have
been taken by the management before the Tribunal. The Hon'ble Full
Bench in the aforesaid decision had explicitly held that the management
is not precluded from initiating action against its employee even if it had
taken a plea before the Tribunal that its employee is not at fault.
12.A person can be found guilty in a departmental proceeding but
acquitted by the criminal court because of the varying standards of proof.
But the converse can never be true. Acquittal by the criminal Court need
not bar the employer from taking action. Nor a judgment of acquittal can
automatically dislodge the adverse findings rendered in disciplinary
proceedings. On the other hand, if the criminal Court had convicted the
driver, disciplinary action would follow like a calf following the cow.
Likewise, if the Tribunal had held that the driver is at fault, the
management cannot hold otherwise. Of course, the management is at
liberty to take action or not in such cases. But if it decides to take action,
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it cannot exonerate its employee when the Tribunal had found him to be
at fault. This is subject to one exception. If the driver was not made a
party to the claim proceedings or he was not even examined before the
Tribunal, then the field is left open and the enquiry officer can arrive at
any appropriate conclusion based on the evidence adduced during
enquiry. The enquiry officer need not feel bound by the findings of the
Tribunal. But where the Tribunal had exonerated the driver by accepting
the plea of the management, then the management cannot proceed against
its employee. This would be against the principle of fair play. What
matters is the outcome of the proceedings before the Tribunal and not the
defence taken by the management.
13.A note on the applicable standard in departmental proceedings
may be in order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decision reported in
(2005) 7 SCC 764 (Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd) held as
follows:
“The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are
entirely different. They operate in different fields and have
different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to
inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of
enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent
departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the
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service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement
made by the accused in certain circumstances or before
certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict
rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to
departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is
necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of
proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The
rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two
proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of
proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able
to prove the guilt of the accused “beyond reasonable doubt”,
he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental
enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the
delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of
“preponderance of probability”.
14.It is interesting to note that a three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 (B.C.Chaturvedi v. UOI)
held that when an enquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a
public servant, the court is concerned to determine whether the findings
or conclusions are based on “some evidence”. Neither the technical
rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein
apply to a disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that
evidence and the conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary
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authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the
charge. Of course, if the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable
person would have ever reached, the court may interfere with the
conclusion or the finding. This decision has been followed recently in
Syndicate Bank v. B.S.N.Prasad (2025) 3 SCC 601. In State of
Haryana v. Rattan Singh (1997) 2 SCC 491, Justice V.R.Krishna Iyer
speaking for the Three Judge Bench, put it this way “The simple point is,
was there some evidence” or was there no evidence – not in the sense of
the technical rules governing regular court proceedings but in a fair
commonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdom will
accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proof of the
finding by a domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court in State of Goa v. Maria Julieta D'souza (2024) 3 SCC 523 while
clarifying the distinction between burden of proof and standard of proof,
observed that while enquiring into whether a fact is proved, the
sufficiency of evidence is to be seen in the context of standard of proof,
which in civil cases is by preponderance of probability. Rattan Singh
forbids the writ court from going into the sufficiency of evidence. What
has to be seen is only whether there is some evidence in support of the
finding. We are tempted to opine that when the Hon'ble Supreme Court
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held that preponderance of probability is the standard applicable to
domestic enquiry/departmental proceedings, it should be understood in
the light of Rattan Singh and B.C.Chaturvedi.
15.The Hon'ble Supreme Court had not adverted to the Full Bench
ruling in Syril Sundararaj. We hold that the Full Bench ruling has not
been overruled as argued by the appellant's counsel. It holds the field
and binds us.
16.This Writ Appeal stands dismissed. No costs. Consequently,
connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
[G.R.S., J.] [R.P, J.]
10.03.2026
NCC : Yes / No
Index : Yes / No
Internet : Yes/ No
MGA
To
1.The Managing Director,
Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation,
Bypass Road,
Madurai.
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G.R.SWAMINATHAN, J.
AND
R.POORNIMA, J.
MGA
2.The General Manager,
Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation,
Bypass Road,
Dindigul.
10.03.2026
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