Madras High Court
The Management Of Gem Granites vs The Presiding Officer on 1 October, 2024
Author: M.S.Ramesh
Bench: M.S. Ramesh
2024:MHC:3503
W.A.Nos.2417 of 2011 & 1193 of 2012
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on 04.09.2024
Pronounced on 01.10.2024
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE M.S. RAMESH
AND
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE C.KUMARAPPAN
W.A.Nos.2417 of 2011 & 1193 of 2012
and M.P.No.1 of 2012
W.A.No.2417 of 2011
The Management of GEM Granites,
146, Injambakkam,
Chennai – 600 041.
Rep. by its General Manager ...Appellant
Vs.
1.The Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal,
City Civil Court Buildings,
Chennai – 600 104.
2.V.K.Prakasam
3.N.Sankar
4.P.Baskaran
5.S.Jacob
6.T.V.Shanmugham
7.M.Selvaraj
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W.A.Nos.2417 of 2011 & 1193 of 2012
8.K.Rajendran
9.R.Varadhan
(Rep. by the Gem Granites and
Group Workers Union (Regd)
7xMC Lean Street,
Chennai – 1. ...Respondents
Prayer: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act, to
set aside the order dated 09.11.2011 made in W.P.No.17664 of 2001.
For Appellant : Mr.A.L.Somayaji
senior counsel
for Mr.R.Dharanichander
For R1 : Court
For R2 to R9 : Mr.K.M.Ramesh
senior counsel
for Mr.V.Subramani and Mr.S.Apunu
W.A.No.1193 of 2012
The Workmen,
Rep. by the General Secretary,
Bharathiya Employees Mazdoor Sangh,
(Gem Granites Unit)
5/76, Dr.Nanjunda Rao Salai,
Injambakkam,
Chennai – 600 041. ...Appellant
Vs.
1.The Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal,
City Civil Court Buildings,
Chennai – 600 104.
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W.A.Nos.2417 of 2011 & 1193 of 2012
2.The Management of GEM Granites,
146, Injambakkam,
Chennai – 600 041. ...Respondents
Prayer: Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act, to
set aside the order of the learned Judge made in W.P.No.16139 of 2000
dated 09.11.2011.
For Appellant : Mr.K.M.Ramesh
senior counsel
for Mr.V.Subramani and Mr.S.Apunu
For R1 : Court
For R2 : Mr.A.L.Somayaji
senior counsel
for Mr.R.Dharanichander
COMMON JUDGMENT
M.S.RAMESH, J.
Since the issue involved in both these Writ Appeals are inter-
connected, they are heard together and disposed of through this common
judgment.
2. The brief and relevant facts involved in the two appeals are as
follows:-
2.1. On 02.09.1997, when eight workers of M/s.Gem Granites
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(hereinafter referred to as 'the Management') were transferred to a branch
factory in Karnataka from Chennai, they had raised Industrial Disputes
before the Conciliation Officers, which ultimately ended in a failure and
through G.O.Ms.No.472, Labour and Employment Department, dated
02.07.1998, the State Government had referred the dispute for
adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal at Chennai (hereinafter referred to
as 'the Tribunal').
2.2. The order of reference made to the Tribunal was “whether the
action of the Management in transferring eight workers from Chennai to
the branch factory at Karnataka was justified and if not, to what relief
they are entitled to”. The said reference was taken by the Tribunal on file
as Industrial Dispute in I.D.No.100 of 1998.
2.3. Thereafter, when the Management intended to dismiss these
eight workmen, who had disregarded the transfer order, they had filed
petitions under Section 33(1)(b) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on 06.11.1998, seeking permission to
dismiss the eight workmen. These petitions were taken on file as
A.P.Nos.61 of 1998 to 68 of 1998.
2.4. On 04.04.2000, the Management had, however, withdrawn all
the eight approval petitions, in view of the then prevailing law set forth by
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a Three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
M/s.Punjab Beverages Pvt.Ltd., Chandigarh Vs. Suresh Chand and
Another reported in 1978 (2) SCC 144 (hereinafter referred to as 'Punjab
Beverages case'), holding that non-approval of the order of dismissal or
failure to make application under Section 33(2)(b) would not render the
order of dismissal inoperative and failure to apply for approval under
Section 33(2)(b) would only render the employer liable to punishment
under Section 31 of the Act and the remedy of the employee is either by
way of a complaint under Section 33-A or by way of a reference under
Section 10(1)(d) of the Act.
2.5. After such withdrawal, the Management had dismissed these
workmen, through orders dated 28.11.1998. Challenging the order of
dismissal, the Trade Union representing the eight workmen filed
Complaint No.1 of 2000 on 08.04.2000 before the Tribunal under Section
33-A of the Act.
2.6. On 26.05.2000, an award came to be passed in I.D.No.100 of
1998, holding that the transfer orders were justified. Challenging this
award, the Union had preferred W.P.No.16139 of 2000 before a learned
Single Judge of this Court.
2.7. Thereafter, the Tribunal had passed another award in
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Complaint No.1 of 2000 dated 26.06.2001, setting aside the order of
dismissal, and by directing for reinstatement of these eight workmen with
backwages, by holding that the domestic inquiry conducted by the
Management was not fair and proper.
2.8. This award dated 26.06.2001 was put under challenge in a
Writ Petition in W.P.No.17664 of 2001. On 09.11.2011, the learned
Single Judge of this Court had placed reliance on the decision of the Five
Judge Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Vs. Ram Gopal Sharma and
Others (hereinafter referred to as 'Jaipur Zila case') reported in 2002 (2)
SCC 244 and held that since the workmen were dismissed by the
Management without seeking for express permission by the Tribunal,
before which the Industrial Dispute relating to the dispute regarding
transfer was still pending, their orders of dismissal cannot be sustained
and accordingly dismissed W.P.No.17664 of 2001. Likewise, the learned
Single Judge had also dismissed W.P.No.16139 of 2000 on 09.11.2011,
holding that, in both the Awards, as well as the subsequent complaint, the
Tribunal had recorded that there was no mala fide and the Management
had the power to transfer the workmen from one station to another.
Challenging both the orders of dismissal in the Writ Petitions, the
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Management, as well as the aggrieved workmen, have preferred these
intra-Court Writ Appeals.
3. Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel appearing for the
Management submitted that prior to Jaipur Zila case, the legal position
with regard to the scope of Section 33 of the Act were delineated in
Punjab Beverages case, by holding that the remedy of the employee in
cases where the Management fails to make an application for approval of
order of discharge or dismissal or withdrawal of such application after
making it, is either under Section 33-A or Section 10(1)(d) of the Act and
therefore, they were constrained to withdraw the approval petitions
preferred by them. In this background, he would submit that, though
Punjab Beverages case was subsequently overruled by the Constitutional
Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila case, the subsequent
decisions in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another
Vs. Satya Prakash reported in (2013) 9 SCC 232 (two Judges Bench)
(hereinafter referred to as 'Rajasthan SRTC case'); The Management of
Karur Vysya Bank Vs. S.Balakrishnan reported in (2016) 12 SCC 221
(two Judges Bench) and Managing Director, North-East Karnataka
Road Transport Corporation Vs. Shivasharanappa reported in (2017)
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16 SCC 540 (three Judges Bench), have considered and interpreted
Jaipur Zila case and hence submitted that while Jaipur Zila case deals
with scope of Section 33 and the consequences of its contravention,
Rajasthan SRTC case deals with scope of Section 33-A, vis-a-vis
contravention of Section 33 and therefore submitted that, as held in
Rajasthan SRTC case, when a complaint is made under Section 33-A,
the Tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint, as if it were dispute
referred to it and submit its award to the appropriate Government. He
would further submit that the withdrawal of the application under Section
33(1)(b) of the Act would be immaterial, in view of the law laid down in
Rajasthan SRTC case. With regard to the binding nature of a decision of
the Smaller Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, vis-a-vis a Larger
Bench, the learned senior counsel placed reliance on the decisions of the
High Court of Gujarat in the cases of Nizamuddin Suleman Vs. The
New Shorrock and Another reported in 1978 SCC OnLine Guj 115;
Commissioner of Gift Tax Vs. Arunbhai Hargovandas Patel reported in
2001 SCC OnLine Guj 413 and a decision of the High Court of Calcutta
in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Oberoi Hotels Pvt.
Ltd., reported in 2011 SCC OnLine Cal 718 and submitted that even if
the views expressed by the Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
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have been referred to and explained by a Smaller Bench in a subsequent
decision, the decision by the Smaller Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, would also be binding on the High Courts before whom the earlier
decision of the Larger Bench and the subsequent explanation of the same
judgment by the Smaller Bench are cited.
4. Mr.K.M.Ramesh, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
the workmen submitted that the decision in Jaipur Zila case was
rendered by a Constitutional Bench of Five Hon'ble Judges laying down
the object and procedure to be adopted under Section 33 of the Act, as
per which the failure to make an application for approval or withdrawal
of an application for permission would render the order of discharge or
dismissal void and inoperative. With regard to the subsequent decisions of
the Smaller Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajasthan SRTC
case, Karur Vysya Bank's case (supra) and North-East Karnataka
Road Transport Corporation's case (supra) are concerned, the learned
senior counsel submitted that all these three judgments will have no
binding effect on the High Court and the decision of the Larger
Constitutional Bench alone would prevail, as clarified by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Sundeep Kumar Bafna Vs. State of
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Maharashtra and Another reported in 2014 (16) SCC 623.
5. We have given our careful consideration to the submissions
made by the respective senior counsels.
6. The decision in Jaipur Zila case was rendered by the Hon'ble
Five Judges Constitutional Bench on 17.01.2002, holding that the failure
to make an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, seeking for
approval of an order of discharge or dismissal or withdrawal of such
application after making it, would render the order of discharge or
dismissal void and inoperative. While holding so, the contrary view of the
earlier decision in Punjab Beverages case was overruled.
7. The endeavour of Mr.A.L.Somayaji, learned senior counsel
appearing for the Management is that in view of Rajasthan SRTC case
and the subsequent two other decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
referring and interpreting Jaipur Zila case, the orders of the learned
Single Judge may require interference. He also submitted that he did not
have the benefit of these subsequent judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, when the orders of the learned Single Judge in the two Writ
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Petitions were made on 09.11.2011.
8. The scope, authority and procedure regulating the proceedings
under Section 33 of the Act has been well settled by the Constitutional
Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaipur Zila case, by holding that
the failure to make an application or withdrawal of an application under
Section 33 would ipso facto be fatal to the order of discharge or
dismissal. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:-
“13. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b), as can
be seen from its very unambiguous and clear
language, is mandatory. This apart, from the object
of Section 33 and in the context of the proviso to
Section 33(2)(b), it is obvious that the conditions
contained in the said proviso are to be essentially
complied with. Further, any employer who
contravenes the provisions of Section 33 invites a
punishment under Section 31(1) with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to six months or with
fine which may extend to Rs 1000 or with both. This
penal provision is again a pointer of the mandatory
nature of the proviso to comply with the conditions
stated therein. To put it in another way, the said
conditions being mandatory, are to be satisfied if
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an order of discharge or dismissal passed under
Section 33(2)(b) is to be operative. If an employer
desires to take benefit of the said provision for
passing an order of discharge or dismissal of an
employee, he has also to take the burden of
discharging the statutory obligation placed on him
in the said proviso. Taking a contrary view that an
order of discharge or dismissal passed by an
employer in contravention of the mandatory
conditions contained in the proviso does not render
such an order inoperative or void, defeats the very
purpose of the proviso and it becomes meaningless.
It is well-settled rule of interpretation that no part
of statute shall be construed as unnecessary or
superfluous. The proviso cannot be diluted or
disobeyed by an employer. He cannot disobey the
mandatory provision and then say that the order of
discharge or dismissal made in contravention of
Section 33(2)(b) is not void or inoperative. He
cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own
wrong. The interpretation of statute must be such
that it should advance the legislative intent and
serve the purpose for which it is made rather than
to frustrate it. The proviso to Section 33(2)(b)
affords protection to a workman to safeguard his
interest and it is a shield against victimization and
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unfair labour practice by the employer during the
pendency of industrial dispute when the
relationship between them is already strained. An
employer cannot be permitted to use the provision
of Section 33(2)(b) to ease out a workman without
complying with the conditions contained in the said
proviso for any alleged misconduct said to be
unconnected with the already pending industrial
dispute. The protection afforded to a workman
under the said provision cannot be taken away. If it
is to be held that an order of discharge or dismissal
passed by the employer without complying with the
requirements of the said proviso is not void or
inoperative, the employer may with impunity
discharge or dismiss a workman.
14. Where an application is made under
Section 33(2)(b) proviso, the authority before which
the proceeding is pending for approval of the
action taken by the employer has to examine
whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona
fide; whether it was by way of victimization or
unfair labour practice; whether the conditions
contained in the proviso were complied with or not
etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval
obviously it follows that the employee continues to
be in service as if the order of discharge or
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dismissal never had been passed. The order of
dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section
33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee
brings an end of relationship of the employer and
employee from the date of his dismissal or
discharge but that order remains incomplete and
remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the
authority under the said provision. In other words,
this relationship comes to an end de jure only when
the authority grants approval. If approval is not
given, nothing more is required to be done by the
employee, as it will have to be deemed that the
order of discharge or dismissal had never been
passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is
deemed to have continued in service entitling him
to all the benefits available. This being the position
there is no need of a separate or specific order for
his reinstatement. But on the other hand, if
approval is given by the authority and if the
employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is
entitled to make a complaint under Section 33-A
challenging the order granting approval on any of
the grounds available to him. Section 33-A is
available only to an employee and is intended to
save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can
straightaway make a complaint before the very
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authority where the industrial dispute is already
pending between the parties challenging the order
of approval instead of making efforts to raise an
industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter
adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say
that even though where the order of discharge or
dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the
mandatory conditions contained in the proviso or
where the approval is refused, a workman should
still make a complaint under Section 33-A and that
the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid
or void only when it is set aside under Section 33-A
and that till such time he should suffer misery of
unemployment in spite of the statutory protection
given to him by the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). It is
not correct to say that where the order of discharge
or dismissal becomes inoperative because of
contravention of proviso to Section 33(2)(b),
Section 33-A would be meaningless and futile. The
said section has a definite purpose to serve, as
already stated above, enabling an employee to
make a complaint, if aggrieved by the order of the
approval granted.
15. The view that when no application is
made or the one made is withdrawn, there is no
order of refusal of such application on merit and as
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such the order of dismissal or discharge does not
become void or inoperative unless such an order is
set aside under Section 33-A, cannot be accepted.
In our view, not making an application under
Section 33(2)(b) seeking approval or withdrawing
an application once made before any order is made
thereon, is a clear case of contravention of the
proviso to Section 33(2)(b). An employer who does
not make an application under Section 33(2)(b) or
withdraws the one made, cannot be rewarded by
relieving him of the statutory obligation created on
him to make such an application. If it is so done, he
will be happier or more comfortable than an
employer who obeys the command of law and
makes an application inviting scrutiny of the
authority in the matter of granting approval of the
action taken by him. Adherence to and obedience of
law should be obvious and necessary in a system
governed by rule of law. An employer by design can
avoid to make an application after dismissing or
discharging an employee or file it and withdraw
before any order is passed on it, on its merits, to
take a position that such order is not inoperative or
void till it is set aside under Section 33-A
notwithstanding the contravention of Section
33(2)(b) proviso, driving the employee to have
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recourse to one or more proceedings by making a
complaint under Section 33-A or to raise another
industrial dispute or to make a complaint under
Section 31(1). Such an approach destroys the
protection specifically and expressly given to an
employee under the said proviso as against
possible victimization, unfair labour practice or
harassment because of pendency of industrial
dispute so that an employee can be saved from
hardship of unemployment.
16. Section 31 speaks of penalty in respect of
the offences stated therein. This provision is not
intended to give any remedy to an aggrieved
employee. It is only to punish the offender. The
argument that Section 31 provides a remedy to an
employee for contravention of Section 33 is
unacceptable. Merely because penal provision is
available or a workman has a further remedy under
Section 33-A to challenge the approval granted, it
cannot be said that the order of discharge or
dismissal does not become inoperative or invalid
unless set aside under Section 33-A. There is
nothing in Sections 31, 33 and 33-A to suggest
otherwise even reading them together in the
context. These sections are intended to serve
different purposes.
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17. As already noticed above, the
Constitution Bench of this Court in P.H. Kalyani v.
Air France, Calcutta [AIR 1963 SC 1756 : (1964) 2
SCR 104] has referred to Strawboard Mfg. Co. v.
Govind [1962 Supp (3) SCR 618 : AIR 1962 SC
1500] and approved the view taken in the said
decision as regards the requirements of the proviso
to Section 33(2)(b). Unfortunately in Punjab
Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand [(1978) 2 SCC
144 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 165 : (1978) 3 SCR 370] the
earlier two cases of Strawboard [1962 Supp (3)
SCR 618 : AIR 1962 SC 1500] and Tata Iron &
Steel Co. [AIR 1966 SC 380 : (1965) 3 SCR 411]
were not noticed touching the question. It is true
that in S. Ganapathy v. Air India [(1993) 3 SCC
429 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 796 : JT (1993) 4 SC 10]
there is no reference to Punjab Beverages [(1978) 2
SCC 144 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 165 : (1978) 3 SCR
370] . But the view taken in two earlier decisions of
Strawboard [1962 Supp (3) SCR 618 : AIR 1962 SC
1500] and Tata Iron & Steel Co. [AIR 1966 SC 380
: (1965) 3 SCR 411] is followed on the question
and rightly so in our opinion.
18. In view of what is stated above, we
respectfully agree with and endorse the view taken
in the case of Strawboard [1962 Supp (3) SCR 618
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: AIR 1962 SC 1500] and Tata Iron & Steel Co.
[AIR 1966 SC 380 : (1965) 3 SCR 411] and further
state that the view expressed in Punjab Beverages
[(1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 165 : (1978)
3 SCR 370] on the question is not the correct view.
The question raised in the beginning of this
judgment is answered accordingly.”
9. The aforesaid extract is self explanatory. Thus, as held by the
Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the procedure to be
adopted by the Management, as provided under the Proviso to Section
33(2)(b) of the Act, while dismissing or discharging a workman, is
mandatory and therefore, failure to make an application either for
permission to discharge or dismiss a workman under Section 33(1) or
failure to make an application for approval under Section 33(2)(b), would
render the order of dismissal or discharge, ab initio void and inoperative.
Thus, we are unable to ratify or endorse the first ground raised by the
learned senior counsel for the appellant/Management in this regard.
10. This leads us to the second limb of his arguments as to the
binding nature of the decisions of a Smaller Bench of the Hon'ble
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Supreme Court, vis-a-vis the Larger Bench, on the High Courts of the
Country. It is the submission of the learned senior counsel for the
Management that even though the subsequent decisions are rendered by a
Smaller Bench, where explanations and interpretations are rendered, the
High Court is bound to follow the subsequent decisions by the Smaller
Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and cannot give a different
interpretation than the one made in the subsequent decision. Apparently,
the learned senior counsel is referring to the mandate under Article 141 of
the Constitution of India, which enshrines that the law declared by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court is binding on all Courts within the territory of
India. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the decisions of
the Full Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Nizamuddin Suleman's
case (supra); a Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Arunbhai
Hargovandas Patel's case (supra) and a Division Bench of the High
Court of Calcutta in Oberoi Hotels' case (supra), on the presidential
value of Judge-made laws.
11. The learned senior counsel appearing for the workmen had
relied upon the decision in Sundeep Kumar Bafna's case (supra), which
answers the ground raised by the Management, wherein it was held inter
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alia that when decisions of the Larger Benches and contrary views of the
Smaller Benches of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are cited before the High
Courts, the only option available to the High Courts is to apply the
earliest view. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:
“19. It cannot be overemphasised that the
discipline demanded by a precedent or the
disqualification or diminution of a decision on the
application of the per incuriam rule is of great
importance, since without it, certainty of law,
consistency of rulings and comity of courts would
become a costly casualty. A decision or judgment
can be per incuriam any provision in a statute, rule
or regulation, which was not brought to the notice
of the court. A decision or judgment can also be per
incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio
with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a
co-equal or larger Bench; or if the decision of a
High Court is not in consonance with the views of
this Court. It must immediately be clarified that the
per incuriam rule is strictly and correctly
applicable to the ratio decidendi and not to obiter
dicta. It is often encountered in High Courts that
two or more mutually irreconcilable decisions of
the Supreme Court are cited at the Bar. We think
that the inviolable recourse is to apply the earliest
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view as the succeeding ones would fall in the
category of per incuriam.”
(Emphasis supplied by us)
12. The aforesaid extract squarely covers the predicament when
decisions of the Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as well as
the Smaller Benches with interpretations and further explanations on the
ratio decedendi are produced before the High Courts, or when two
different views on a ratio decedendi by the Hon'ble Supreme Court are
relied upon. In line with the decision in Sundeep Kumar Bafna's case
(supra), the High Court would be obligated to follow the earliest view of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
13. For the proposition on binding nature under the law of
precedence, the learned senior counsel appearing for the management had
placed reliance on the decisions of the High Courts of Gujarat and
Calcutta in the cases of Nizamuddin Suleman (supra); Arunbhai
Hargovandas Patel (supra) and Oberoi Hotels (supra). We are not in a
position to adhere to the dictum laid down in those decisions, in view of
the categorical pronouncement on the procedure to be adopted in such
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situations in the case of Sundeep Kumar Bafna (supra), which decision
is also later in time, after the aforesaid three decisions of the High Courts.
14. As already observed by us, the law has been well established in
Jaipur Zila case with regard to the procedure to be adopted by the
Management, while discharging or dismissing a workman, wherein it has
been inter alia held that it is for the Management to mandatorily comply
with the requirements of the Proviso to Section 33 of the Act and
therefore, the contrary claim of the Management in this regard, stands
rejected.
15. For all the foregoing reasons, the orders of the learned Single
Judge in both the Writ Petitions in W.P.Nos.16139 of 2000 and 17664 of
2001 does not require interference. Accordingly, both the Writ Appeals
stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous
petition is closed.
[M.S.R., J] [C.K., J]
01.10.2024
Index:Yes
Neutral Citation:Yes
Speaking order
hvk
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M.S.RAMESH, J.
and
C.KUMARAPPAN, J.
hvk
To
The Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal,
Civil Court Buildings,
Chennai – 600 104.
Pre-delivery judgment made in
W.A.Nos.2417 of 2011 & 1193 of 2012
01.10.2024
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
