Madras High Court
Padmalakshmi vs Valliammal (Died) on 21 March, 2023
SA.No.594 of 2008
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 21.03.2023
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.LAKSHMINARAYANAN
SA.No.594 of 2008
Padmalakshmi ... Appellant
Vs.
1. Valliammal (Died)
2.Padma Vathy ... Respondents
[R.2 brought on record as LRs of the deceased sole respondent Viz;
Valliammal vide Court Order dated 16.09.2021 made in
CMP.No.8613/2021 in SA.No.594/2004 (RHJ)]
PRAYER: Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of the CPC, against the
judgement and decree dated 17.09.2003 passed in A.S.No.7 of the 1998 on
the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Ponneri confirming the judgement
and decree dated 24.02.1992 passed in OS.No.548/1985 on the file of the
learned District Munsif, Ponneri.
For Petitioner : Mr.J.R.K.Bhavanantham
For Respondent : Mr.G.Mohanraj [R.2]
: R.1 [Died]
1/29
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JUDGEMENT
This is an interesting appeal which arises from proceedings initiated
under the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act.
2. O.S.No.548 of 1995, on the file of the learned District Munsif at
Ponneri was initiated by two persons, namely, Ravanammal and
Padmalakshmi. It was their case that they are the owners of the suit schedule
property and one Kamalammal, the 1st defendant was their tenant. The
monthly rent was Rs.8/- and the tenancy was oral. The 2nd defendant
Valliammal is said to be the sub-tenant to the suit property. The property
had been sub-let according to the plaintiff without their knowledge and
consent.
3. The plaintiff further pleaded that the rent for over a period of 36
months had not been paid prior to the presentation of the plaint i.e. on
06.04.1985. The plaintiff further pleaded that the 1st defendant seem to have
sold the superstructure to the 2nd defendant along with the leasehold rights
and as such that the 2nd defendant was not entitled to the protection of
Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act of 1921 [Hereinafter referred to as
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(CTP Act)]. Prior to the presentation of the plaint, a notice had been issued
on 03.05.1984 to the defendants terminating the tenancy. In the said notice,
3 months time was granted to vacate and hand over possession. The plaintiff
sought for the following reliefs:-
"1. direct the defendants to quit and deliver vacant
possession of the property described in the schedule
hereunder to the plaintiff after the removal of the
superstructure thereon.
2. direct the defendant to pay a sum of Rs.288/- to the
plaintiffs.
3. direct the defendants to pay the cost of the suit."
4. The 1st defendant, the tenant, remained exparte. The 2nd defendant
alleged sub-tenant, entered appearance. She stated that the suit property
belonged to the 1st plaintiff’s husband and the 2nd plaintiff’s father, late
Ramakrishnan Naidu. The 2nd defendant admitted that the 1st defendant
was the tenant under him. She denied the alleged sub-letting of the property.
It was the clear and categorical case of the 2 nd defendant that she had
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purchased the superstructure from the 1st defendant on 10 of July 1967
through a registered sale deed in Document No.1140 of 1967.
5. The 2nd defendant further pleaded that she had remitted the ground
rent of Rs.3.50/- through money order and the same was refused by the
aforesaid Ramakrishnan Naidu. The 2nd defendant further stated that the
said Ramakrishnan Naidu had voluntarily attorned her tenancy and had been
receiving rent of Rs.3.50/- till his life time. The 2nd defendant further
pleaded that she substantially modified the superstructure and had spent
huge amount of Rs.20,000/-. It was further pleaded that on the death of
Ramakrishnan Naidu, the 2nd defendant sent the ground rent of Rs.63/- from
December, 1962 till March 1967 but it was not received by the plaintiff.
6. The 2nd defendant further claimed the benefit of the CTP Act and
pleaded that there was attornment in tenancy by the said Ramakrishnan, the
original owner. Subsequently, on the basis of this written statement, on
20.02.1986, a petition was filed under the provision of Section 9 of the
CTP Act, and the same was numbered as I.A.No.2286 of 1986. This
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application was returned stating an application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 has been returned. Subsequently, the condone delay
application was numbered as I.A.No.1105 of 1986. This was an application
to condone the delay of 133 days in filing the petition under Section 9 of the
CTP Act.
7. In order to satisfy myself, if these applications had been ordered, I
have called for the records from the Trial Court. No orders seem to have
been passed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in (IA.No.1105 of 1986)
or in the application filed under Section 9 of the CTP Act. The Trial Court
had, in a very unique procedure and in contravention of the CTP Act as well
as settled procedures, instead of taking up Section 5 of the Limitation Act
first and then the application under Section 9 of the CTP Act later and on its
disposal, taking up the suit, had curiously enough kept these applications
pending and recorded the evidence in the suit.
8. Noticing the manner in which the case had proceeded, my
predecessor had framed the following Substantial Questions of law:-
1. Whether the sub tenant with whom the appellant
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had no privity of contract was entitled to protection under
Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act?
2. Whether failure to consider the application in
IA.No.2286 of 1986 filed by the 2nd defendant forfeits the
right of the first defendant to purchase the suit site?
3.Whether the tenant, who is seeking protection
under Section 9 of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act,
should satisfy conditions prescribed under Section 9 of the
said Act?
4. Whether there is no estoppel against statute since
the appellant made a gesture and offered that if the first
defendant could pay the sum of Rs.1,75,000/- within one
month, the site can be sold to the first defendant in default
the first defendant should deliver vacant possession of the
site, which is contrary to the statutory provisions? "
9. I heard Mr.J.R.K.Bhavanantham, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant and Mr.G.Mohanraj, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent.
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Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 9 of the CTP Act
10. At the very outset, I should state that the procedure followed by
the Trial Court and as confirmed by the lower Appellate Court is surprising.
Until and unless, the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
is taken up and disposed of, the application filed under Section 9 of the
Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act could not have been taken on file.
Only on the application under Section 5 being allowed, the application
under Section 9 of the CTP Act could have been numbered. The records do
not show any orders being passed in any of the Interlocutory Applications.
11. The relevant adjudication for the case on hand are as follows:-
i) “Petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the
petitioner/defendant to excuse the delay of 133 days in filing the enclosed
petition under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act.”
Notice to other side given, counter by 10.09.1986.
ii) On 10.09.1986, counter finally by 01.10.1986.
iii) On 01.10.1986, counter by 20.11.1986.
iv) On 20.11.1986, counter filed. Post along with case.
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12. On 20.11.1986, it is seen that a counter had been filed but no
order had been passed by the Court on the application filed under Section 5
of the Limitation Act. If this is the lacunae with respect to Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, even more, serious lacunae is noticed with respect to the
application filed under the provisions of Section 9 of the CTP Act.
13. The following are the adjudications with respect to the petition
filed under Section 9 of the CTP Act.
i) Deficit Court fee of Rs.0.25 to be affixed.
ii) Since, Section 5 application is returned as defective, this petition
is also returned, time 10 days.
Signed
iii) Complied with and represented that is the endorsement made by
the counsel.
Office endorsement, returned.
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Previous return not complied with. Fresh docket sheet to be affixed,
time 10 days.
Signed
District Munsif, dated 27.03.1986.
Complied with and represented
Counsel for the petitioner.
Petition filed under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants
Protection Act by the petitioner/2nd defendant to direct the
respondent/plaintiff to sell the schedule mentioned property to her at a
price fixed by the Court.
i) I.A.No.1105 of 1986 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is
pending, call on 10.09.1986.
ii) On 10.09.1986, call on 01.10.1986.
iii) On 01.10.1986, call on 20.11.1986
iv) On 20.11.1986, Court endorsement is petition under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act is pending. Counter filed, for enquiry on 13.11.1987.
v) From 13.11.1987 the case was adjourned for enquiry on the
following dates:-
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"12.03.1987, 07.07.1989, 28.07.1989, 11.08.1989, 07.09.1989, 06.10.1989,
14.12.1989, 19.01.1990, 23.03.1990,22.06.1990, 12.09.1990 02.01.1991,
30.01.1992, 03.02.1992, 06.02.1992, 12,02,1992, 21.02.1992, 24.02.1992."
xiii) On 24.02.1992, the petition seems to have been disposed of
without any adjudication.
14. I have gone through the original bundles searched for the orders. I
could not find the fair and decreetal order either in the application disposing
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu
City Tenants Protection Act. This aspect looms large with respect to the
manner of disposal because of the categorical views taken by this Court and
the Supreme Court. In M.Arasan Chettiar Vs. Narasimhalu Naidu Trust
Estate, Coimbatore - 1993 LW 392 : AIR 1980 MAD 305 the Court was
pleased to deal with a matter under the provisions of the CTP Act. It held :-
"13. From the above conclusion of ours on the
interpretation and scope of Section 9, the following
consequences will follow:-
1. If a controversy arises whether a particular tenant
is entitled to the benefits of the Act or not in the sense that
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he is a tenant complying with the definition of the term
"tenant" in Section 2 (4), that question has necessarily to
be considered by the Court, because, an affirmative
decision in favour of the ,tenant alone will enable the Court
to proceed further with the application made under Section
9 (1) (a) of the Act and a negative decision against the
tenant will render any application filed by the tenant, under
Section 9 (1) (a) as not maintainable and such an order is
not an order, under Section 9, and the date of that order
has no relevancy to the fixation of the price of the land to
be sold by the landlord to the tenant;
2. When once the Court has decided that the tenant is
entitled to the benefits of the Act or there is no controversy
that the tenant is entitled to the benefits of the Act, the-
Court will have to dispose of the application filed by the
tenant under Section 9 (1) (a);
3. For the purpose of disposing of this application,
the Court, must first decide upon the minimum extent of the
land which may be necessary for the convenient enjoyment
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by the tenant Any such decision of the Court, from the very
nature of the case, can only be by means of an order and
the date of that order will be the relevant date for the
purpose of fixing the price mentioned in the third sentence
in Section 9 (1) (b). If the decision of the Court on the
minimum extent is, taken up further by way of appeal or
revision and that decision is either affirmed or modified
and if there had been a stay of further proceedings during
the pendency of such appeal or revision, naturally, the date
of the order contemplated in the third sentence in Section 9
(1) (b) will be the date of the order of the appellate or
revisional Court;
4. After having determined the minimum extent of the
land or if such determination had been the subject matter of
further proceedings and those proceedings have concluded
the Court will then proceed to fix the price of the land;
5. For the purpose of deciding upon the minimum
extent of the land or for the purpose of fixing the price of
the land certainly it is open to the Court to appoint a
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Commissioner to record evidence and submit a report to
the Court;
6. After the price to be paid by the tenant to the
landlord for the purchase the land has been determined, the
Court will have to pass an order directing the tenant,
within a period to be determined by the Court, not being
less than three months and not more than three years from
the date of such order, to Pay into Court or otherwise as
directed by it, the price so fixed in one or more instalments
with or without interest,
7. If the tenant complies with such a direction, then
the Court will pass a final order under Section R (3) (a)of
the Act directing the landlord to convey the extent of the
land decided to the tenant for the price so fixed and in the
same order directing the tenant to put the landlord into
possession of the remaining extent of the land, if any;
8. If on the other hand the tenant commits default in
the payment of the amount as directed and the Court itself
had not excused the delay by giving further opportunity, the
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application filed by the tenant under Section 9 (1) (a) shall
stand dismissed; and
9. If the tenant has fulfilled the directions given by
the Court and the Court has passed the order under Sec. 9
(3) (a), then the suit or proceeding shall stand dismissed
and any decree or order in ejectment that might have been
passed therein but which has not been executed shall be
vacated. If, on the other hand, the tenant has committed
default and the application filed by him under Section 9 (1)
(a) stands dismissed under Section 9 (2), then the suit or
proceedings will proceed or any decree or order in
ejectment that may have been passed therein shall stand."
15. Following this principle in Pudukkulam alias Kuttikulam
Vaharaya Trust, Pattukottai by its Managing Trustees V.Veerasami
Chettiar Vs. T.Kamalambal 1988 1 MLJ 353, the Hon’ble Mr.Justice, M.
Srinivasan, (As His Lordship then was) held that as long as an application
under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act is pending,
the suit should be kept pending. This view of Justice M.Srinivasan has been
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followed in the case of V.M. Subramania Mudaliar & Sons a Joint Family
partnership by its Managing Partner and two others Vs. Sri
Bhavasarakshriya Seva Samaj rep. by its Managing Trustee Rejamant
Rao - 1997 (1) CTC 102 : 1997 (1) MLJ page 414. The Hon'ble Mr.Justice
P.Sathasivam, as his lordship then was, pleased to hold as follows:-
“ In the light of the factual position in our case,
namely, 'the tenant has filed the proper application
under Section 9 of the Act in the suit in view of the law
laid down by this Court in the above referred to decision
which in turn refers to the Division Bench judgment of
this Court, I am of the opinion that the application filed
under Section 9 of the Act has to be disposed of prior to
the disposal of the main suit. Since after passing the
order under Section 9 of the Act the successful tenant
has to comply with some conditions as per the statute
and as construed by the above decision, it is better that
the said application has to be disposed of initially and
thereafter depending on the outcome of the order in the
said application, the main suit has to be disposed of.”
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16. The binding verdict of this Court has been given a go by and as
pointed out above, the Court has not passed an order either under Section 5
of the Limitation Act (whether it is maintainable or not is another issue) or
under Section 9 of the CTP Act. When a statute prescribes a particular
manner of disposal of an application, the case has to be disposed off in that
way and in no other manner. The right under Section 9 of the CTP Act is a
right given to a tenant by virtue of the said statute. When that statute
prescribes a particular manner of disposal of the application, it is the duty of
the Court to strictly adhere to the said manner. Surprisingly, it has not been
followed in this particular case. I feel this is not a mere procedural lapse. In
this case, an issue has been raised by the appellant that the respondent is not
a tenant. Without dealing with that issue, the Court ought not to have
disposed off the suit. It should have decided if the 2 nd defendant is a
“tenant” entitled to the benefits of the CTP Act. As pointed out earlier, it is
a right conferred by a special statute. Without deciding that issue, the
question of proceeding further does not arise at all.
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ADMISSION BY PLAINTIFF :-
17. The learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the
appellant/plaintiff had conceded that on receipt of Rs.40,000/-, she has no
objection for the suit being dismissed and the superstructure being
purchased by his client. In this particular case, that plea cannot be heard and
accepted for the reason, the landlord filed a detailed counter questioning the
maintainability of the CTP application filed by the tenant. It is the clear and
categorical case in the plaint as well as in the counter filed under Section 9
of the CTP Act, that there was no tenancy between the plaintiff and the 2nd
defendant. The parties proceeded before the Court that it was only the 1st
defendant Kamalammal, who was the tenant and she had unauthorisedly
sold the property to the 2nd defendant, Valliammal. Nonetheless, in order to
satisfy myself, I went through the evidence of P.W.1 wherein she has stated
as follows:-
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This shows that the plaintiff out of frustration, that her suit for ejectment has
been pending for more than 6 years without any progress had said that if the
amount of Rs.40,000/- has paid, she will execute a sale deed. This does not
mean and cannot be read that she had agreed to her suit being dismissed.
The Court cannot abdicate its statutory duty to the parties before it.
18. The right conferred on the tenant to obtain a compulsory sale from
his land lord is subject to an application filed under Section 9 of the CTP
Act being held maintainable and then allowed on merits. As would seen in
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the later paragraph, there are several steps which have to be gone through
before an order of sale is made.
19. Proceeding on the basis of an admission is as if the Court skirts
the requirements of Section 9 of the CTP Act and short-circuits the entire
substantive law. The right under CTP Act is an exception to the rights and
obligations between the land-lord and the tenant under the Transfer of
Property Act. If not for the order under the CTP Act, the tenant, who puts up
the structure on the land-lord's property, might have to dis-mantle it and
take it away, if the landlord sues for the possession of his land.
20. The Legislature in its wisdom amended the Law and enabled the
tenant to purchase the land. Prior to such purchase, it imposed sufficient
conditions for enforcement of that right. In order to confer that right on the
tenant, it imposed certain duties on the Court which is found under Section
9. The Court cannot as stated above abdicate its duties and proceed purely
on the basis of an alleged "admission" of a party.
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21. In this case as already premised, the Court did not deal with
Section 9 at all. If the Court to deal with the ejectment, the suit simplicitor,
it cannot order sale of the super-sturcture. It can either dismiss or decree the
suit. This power of the Court interferred with by an order under Section 9.
That been absent in the present case, the Court could not have proceeded
further on the basis of the alleged admission and ordered sale of the land.
22. The Court under Section 9 of the CTP Act has several steps to be
completed:-
i. The Court has come to the conclusion that the person making a
claim is a tenant under the Act.
ii. The Court would have to decide the minimum extent of land
necessary for convenient enjoyment by the tenant.
iii. The Court has to fix the price for the minimum extent of land
decided as aforesaid.
iv. The price has to be arrived at on the basis of average market value
of 3 years immediately preceding the date of the order.
v. The Court then has to determine the period within which the
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amount has to be paid and this period should be not less than 3 months and
not more than 3 years from the date of the order and the amount also could
be in one or more installments with or without interest.
23. None of these steps have been adhered to. Section 9 of the CTP
Act is not for asking because it is the duty of the Court to come to the
conclusion that the person making the claim is a “tenant” and also fix the
minimum extent of land necessary for the purpose of convenient enjoyment
by the tenant. None of these procedures, which confer a right on the tenant,
while depriving the right of the landlord to have a decree for ejectment have
been followed.
24. Mr.G.Mohanraj, learned counsel for the respondent would argue
that both the Courts below have read it to be a compromise and therefore it
will operate against the appellant. I have to point out that the appellant is a
landlord and the words used by her in evidence cannot be read as an
admission. She was frustrated with the pendency of the legal proceedings
and wanted to see an end to the same. Such a statement on affairs would not
have arisen if the Court had taken up the application under Section 9 of the
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CTP Act and Section 5 of the Limitation Act and had disposed of the same
one way or the other. Instead, as seen from the above, the Interlocutory
Applications had suffered adjournments for a period of nearly 6 years. Apart
from this, as pointed out above, when the statute has fixed a particular
manner of disposal of the suit & application, neither party can confer
jurisdiction on the Court to bypass that procedure.
25. The learned counsel for the respondent would vehemently
contend that the evidence extracted above would go to show that the
plaintiff had admitted that she will execute the sale deed in favour of the 2nd
defendant. The portion extracted above would go to show that it cannot be
treated as an admission but only as a challenge to the 2nd defendant for the
purpose of having dragged on the litigation for more than 6 years before the
evidence was recorded.
26. It is well settled position of law that admissions are conclusive
proof with respect to the matter admitted. The evidence of P.W.1 does not
admit to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the
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2nd defendant. On the contrary, she has denied the relationship of landlord
and tenant. Under Section 9 of the CTP Act, if and only if, a person proves
himself to be a tenant, the question of purchasing the property would arise
and that too, to the extent which the Court determines. To reiterate, none of
these procedures had been followed in the case.
27. I would buttress my conclusion on the matter of admission by
referring to Paragraph No.10 of the Judgement reported in – - M.Manohara
Chetti and Others Vs. M/s.C.Coomaraswamy Naidu and Sons, Madras -
AIR 1980 Madras 212.
"10. The law by no means regards admission as
conclusive proof of the matters admitted. This is because to
a Court of law admissions are but statements which do no
more then suggest an inference as to some fact or facts in
issue. (See Section 31 and 17 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872). It is, therefore, important that the Court should
examine any given admission inside out to see if it suggests
any clear inference on the fact in issue against the party
making it. For a Court to draw an adverse inference
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against a party on the basis of what he is stated to have
admitted, the admission must be unequivocal. It must also
be comprehensive. It must go the whole-hog, as it were, on
the point at issue. If a party's admission falls short of the
totality of the requisite evidence needed for legal proof of a
fact in issue, such an admission would be only a truncated
admission. It follows that in such a case it cannot support a
valid judicial determination, unless it be that the Court is in
a position to find other evidence before it to make up for
the deficiencies in the admission."
28. Following this Judgement, I would conclude that the so called
admission does not go the whole-hog and therefore, the Courts below erred
in treating it as one. In any event, there cannot be an estoppel against a
statute. The statute enjoins the Court as to what should be done, under
Section 9(ii)(b) of the CTP Act. As pointed out earlier, none of the
procedures had been followed. Hence, I am not inclined to agree with the
submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent.
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29. Mr.J.R.K.Bhavanantham, learned counsel for the appellant
wanted me to give a finding that the 2nd defendant is not entitled to the
benefit of CTP Act as the tenancy was never attorned or accepted, and
further on the ground that a purchaser of the superstructure from a tenant is
not entitled to the benefits of the CTP Act.
30. He relied upon the following judgments for the said propositions:-
1. P.Ananthakrishan Nair & Anr. Vs. Dr.G.Ramakrishan and Anr.
– 100 LW page 095 (SC).
2. J. Lease & Co. and 2 Others Vs. M.S.A. Mohamed Farooq –
2000(3) CTC 423 (Mad)
3. P.N.Chockalingam Pillai Vs. A. Natarajan and others – 2002 -1-
.L.W.373.
4. S.R.Radhakrishan and Others VS. Neelamegam – (2003) 10 SCC
31. I am not persuaded to go into those submissions because it will
cause prejudice to the case of the respondent/2 nd defendant. It is the duty of
the Trial Court to first satisfy itself that the application under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act has to be allowed and thereafter it has to take up the
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application under Section 9 of the CTP Act and then, determine the rights
of parties. If it finds that the 2nd defendant entitled to the benefits of CTP
Act, it shall proceed in accordance with Section 9 of the CTP Act and fix
the minimum extent of land. If it finds that the application filed by the 2 nd
defendant is not maintainable, it should dismiss the application and proceed
with the suit. Till the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and
Section 9 of the CTP Act are decided, the suit should be kept pending. It is
left open to either parties to agitate the correctness of the orders under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act and Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City
Tenants Protection Act, if so advised. Both the Courts below not having
followed the special procedure under Section 9 of the CTP Act and also the
binding judgement of this Court and Supreme Court, constraint to interpret
with the same. I am aware that remanding the matter will only prolong the
litigation. However, as there is no other way that is available to dispose of
Section 9 of the CTP Act and I am constrained to remit the matter to the
Trial Court. I feel that interest of Justice would be served, if a time bound
direction is given and monitored by this Court. I find the judgement
perverse. They have thrown the CTP Act to the winds and have abdicated
their duties. It has resulted in jeopardising the rights of the appellant as well
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as that of the respondent. Having taken this view I pass the following
orders:-
i) The Second Appeal is allowed. The judgement and decree of the
Sub-Court, Ponneri in A.S.No.7 of 1998 dated 17.09.2003 in confirming the
judgement and decree of the Court of the District Munsif, Ponneri in
OS.No.548 of 1985 dated 24.02.1992 are set aside.
ii) The suit and the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act
and Section 9 of the CTP Act are remanded to the file of the Trial Court for
fresh disposal.
iii) The Trial Court shall take up I.A.No.1105 of 1986 first and
dispose of the same. On the basis of the said order; If the application is
allowed, it shall take up IA.No.2286 of 1986 and dispose of the same
strictly in accordance with Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants
Protection Act.
iv) The above-said exercise shall be completed within a period of 5
months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.
v) The Registry is directed to send entire records to the Trial Court on
or before 31.03.2023.
vi) The parties shall be directed to appear before the Trial Court on
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SA.No.594 of 2008
06.04.2023.
32. The learned District Munsif is directed to give priority to this
case, as it is a matter pending from the year 1985 and dispose of the same on
or before 30.09.2023. It shall submit a report of disposal of the applications
immediately thereafter. The parties are requested to cooperate with the
disposal of the case and not seek any adjournment. Full discretion is given
to the Trial Court to refuse adjournment if it feels that the same is
unnecessary or an attempt to prolong the litigation. At no cost should the
Court keep the applications and suit pending beyond 30.09.2023. As the
parties have been litigating for the past 30 years, I am not ordering any cost
in this appeal.
21.03.2023
Index : Yes/No
Internet : Yes/No
Neutral Citation :Yes/No
shr
To
1. The Subordinate Judge, Ponneri.
2. The District Munsif, Ponneri.
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
SA.No.594 of 2008
V.LAKSHMINARAYANAN. J,
shr
SA.No.594 of 2008
21.03.2023
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis
