[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ujjawal Mishra vs Smt. Aditi Mishra Divorced on 22 January, 2026
Author: Avanindra Kumar Singh
Bench: Avanindra Kumar Singh
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:6501
1 CRR-4414-2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH
ON THE 22nd OF JANUARY, 2026
CRIMINAL REVISION No. 4414 of 2022
UJJAWAL MISHRA
Versus
SMT. ADITI MISHRA DIVORCED AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Vivek Agrawal - Advocate for the applicant/husband.
Shri Aditya Ahiwasi - Advocate for the respondent/wife.
ORDER
Heard on admission.
This revision is filed against the impugned order dated 14/07/2022
passed by learned Fist Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Bhopal in
MJCR No.1180/2019 whereby learned trial Court has directed to pay
maintenance of Rs.25,000/- per month to the wife in a proceeding under
Section 125(3) of Cr.P.C. holding that the amount of Rs.13,50,000/- is due
and payable by the husband to the respondent/wife.
Learned counsel for the applicant relies on the judgment passed by the
Division Bench of this Court in Nanhi Bai and others vs. Netram, 2001(3)
MPLJ 170, wherein in Para-14 & 15 held as under :-
"14. ............................................................................. The other
side of the coin is, if maintenance is not claimed for one yar it
becomes irrecoverable as husband or other person may not be in a
position to pay it in lump-sum and it appears that law presumes
that for such a right of maintenance a really needy person should
not sit idle and must enforce the order in accordance with its spirit
and purpose for which it is passed, to meet day to day essential
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requirement for very survival.
15. In our opinion first proviso to section 125(3) of the Code
deals only with the limitation aspect. If, a sum has fallen due, it
should be recovered in one year. The person claiming dues has to
approach the Court in one year and set the machinery in motion.
Then there is nothing in the first proviso to section125(3) to put
embargo on Court's power to direct recovery of amount of
monthly maintenance falling due during the pendency of the
recovery proceedings initiated at the first instance for recovery of
past arrears."
Learned counsel for the respondent also relies on the judgment passed
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Poongodi & another vs.
Thangavel, 2013 (10) SCC 618, wherein in Para- 4 to 7, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held as under :-
"4. A reading of the order dated 21.4.2004 passed by the High
Court would go to show that the proviso to Section 125(3) CrPC
has been construed by the High Court to be a fetter on the
entitlement of the claimants to receive arrears of maintenance
beyond a period of one year preceding the date of filing of the
application under Section 125(3) CrPC. Having considered the
said provision of the Code we do not find that the same creates a
bar or in any way effects the entitlement of a claimant to arrears of
maintenance. What the proviso contemplates is that the procedure
for recovery of maintenance under Section 125(3) CrPC, namely,
by construing the same to be a levy of a fine and the detention of
the defaulter in custody would not be available to a claimant who
had slept over his/her rights and has not approached the Court
within a period of one year commencing from the date on which
the entitlement to receive maintenance has accrued. However, in
such a situation the ordinary remedy to recover the amount of
maintenance, namely, a civil action would still be available.
5. The decision of this Court in Kuldip Kaur v. Surinder Singh and
Anr.[1] may be usefully recalled wherein this Court has held the
provision of sentencing under Section 125 (3) to be a "mode of
enforcement" as distinguished from the "mode of satisfaction" of
the liability which can only be by means of actual payment.
Paragraph 6 of the report to the above effect, namely, that the
mode of enforcement i.e. sentencing to custody does not
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extinguish the liability may be extracted below:
"6. A distinction has to be drawn between a mode of enforcing
recovery on the one hand and effecting actual recovery of the
amount of monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears on the
other. Sentencing a person to jail is a "mode of enforcement". It is
not a "mode of satisfaction" of the liability. The liability can be
satisfied only by making actual payment of the arrears. The whole
purpose of sending to jail is to oblige a person liable to pay the
monthly allowance who refuses to comply with the order without
sufficient cause, to obey the order and to make the payment. The
purpose of sending him to jail is not to wipe out the liability which
he has refused to discharge. Be it also realised that a person
ordered to pay monthly allowance can be sent to jail only if he
fails to pay monthly allowance "without sufficient cause" to
comply with the order. It would indeed be strange to hold that a
person who "without reasonable cause" refuses to comply with the
order of the court to maintain his neglected wife or child would be
absolved of his liability merely because he prefers to go to jail. A
sentence of jail is no substitute for the recovery of the amount of
monthly allowance which has fallen in arrears. Monthly allowance
is paid in order to enable the wife and child to live by providing
with the essential economic wherewithal. Neither the neglected
wife nor the neglected child can live without funds for purchasing
food and the essential articles to enable them to live. Instead of
providing them with the funds, no useful purpose would be served
by sending the husband to jail. Sentencing to jail is the means for
achieving the end of enforcing the order by recovering the amount
of arrears. It is not a mode of discharging liability. The section
does not say so. Parliament in its wisdom has not said so.
Commonsense does not support such a construction. From where
does the court draw inspiration for persuading itself that the
liability arising under the order for maintenance would stand
discharged upon an effort being made to recover it? The order for
monthly allowance can be discharged only upon the monthly
allowance being recovered. The liability cannot be taken to have
been discharged by sending the person liable to pay the monthly
allowance, to jail. At the cost of repetition it may be stated that it
is only a mode or method of recovery and not a substitute for
recovery. No other view is possible. That is the reason why we set
aside the order under appeal and passed an order in the following
terms:
.......... ...."
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6. In another decision of this Court in Shantha alias Ushadevi and
Another v. B.G. Shivananjappa[2] it has been held that the liability
to pay maintenance under Section 125 CrPC is in the nature of a
continuing liability. The nature of the right to receive maintenance
and the concomitant liability to pay was also noticed in a decision
of this Court in Shahada Khatoon & Ors. v. Amjad Ali & Ors.[3].
Though in a slightly different context, the remedy to approach the
court by means of successive applications under Section 125(3)
CrPC highlighting the subsequent defaults in payment of
maintenance was acknowledged by this Court in Shahada Khatoon
(supra)."
....................
After hearing learned counsel for the parties and going through the
judgments cited above, it is now clear on the strength of judgment in
Poongoodi & Anr. (supra), that the arrears beyond the period of one year can
be recovered as a civil decree but warrant cannot be issued against defaulting
husband for sending him to the civil jail. It does not mean that wife cannot
recover the amount.
Learned Family Court, Bhopal has considered the factual position and
has already given benefit of installment to the husband then there is no
reason to admit this revision for further hearing.
The revision fails and is hereby dismissed as admission stage itself.
(AVANINDRA KUMAR SINGH)
JUDGE
mc
