[Cites 45, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Dr.Devendra Swami vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 2 February, 2026
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
1
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:3265
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT Indore
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 2nd OF FEBRUARY, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 14959 of 2024
DR.DEVENDRA SWAMI
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Prakash Chandra Shrivas - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Tarun Pagare - Govt. Advocate for the respondent/State.
ORDER
This petition u/S 482 of Cr.P.C. has been filed assailing the impugned
FIR bearing Crime No. 359/2022 registered for offence punishable u/Ss. 409,
406, 34 of IPC which has been registered at P.S. Badnagar Distt. Ujjain on the
basis of FIR bearing Crime No. 85/2021 for offence punishable u/S 376(2)(j),
294 and 506 of IPC.
2. The exposition of facts, in brief, is as under:
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a. The complainant - Sweety Patil submitted a written complaint to
the Superintendent of Police, Distt. Ujjain inter-alia alleging that she has
lodged an FIR at Crime No. 185/2021 for offence punishable u/S
376(2)(n) and 376(2)(j), 294, and 506 of IPC against Karan Morwal, a
resident of Badnagar Distt. Ujjain. Karan Morwal had filed certificate
issued by Dr. Devendra Swami showing his admission at Govt. Hospital
Badnagar from 13.02.2021 to 15.02.2021 to secure anticipatory bail
from the High Court and the Supreme Court. She had complained about
forgery of the admission document before the District Magistrate, Ujjain.
It was revealed in inquiry that Dr. Devendra Swami forged the
admission register to show admission and treatment of Karan Morwal at
the relevant time. Accordingly, the Police Station, M.G. Road, Indore
registered FIR at Crime No. 180/2022 against Karan Morwal and Dr.
Devendra Swami for offence punishable u/S 420, 120B, 465, 467, 468,
471, 201, 193 and 34 of IPC. The final report was submitted in the
concerned matter.
b. During inquiry, it was further revealed that Dr. Devendra Swami
had requisitioned the record relating to admission of Karan Morwal from
Staff Nurse Ms. Varsha Shinde on 18.09.2021. Dr. Devendra Swami did
not return the official admission record of Govt. Hospital, Badnagar.
Therefore, he has committed criminal breach of trust by not returning the
official record. On such allegations, the P.S. Badnagar, Distt. Ujjain
registered FIR at Crime No. 359/2022 for offence punishable under
Sections 409 and 406 of IPC. The statements of Staff Nurse Varsha
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Shinde and Sonam Bodkhe were recorded. The prosecution for offence
punishable under Sections 211 and 477 of IPC was added. Investigation
is almost complete.
3. Feeling aggrieved by registration of impugned FIR, present petition u/S
482 of Cr.P.C. is filed for quashing of FIR and subsequent proceedings on the
following grounds:
1. Petitioner has been implicated on the basis of complaint lodged on
false and fabricated facts.
2. The alleged offence has been registered against the petitioner under
the pressure of complainant.
3. No such complaint has been made by any officer/employee of the
Government Hospital, Badnagar that petitioner was handed over any
record and he did not return the said record.
4. The complainant is habitual of making complaints. In past, the
complainant has lodged complaint against other accused Abhishek alias
Mikku Thakur and Raunak registered at Crime No. 201/2020 for offence
punishable u/S 376(2)(n), 294, 323, 506 and 34 of IPC.
On these grounds, it is prayed that the impugned FIR be quashed.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in addition to the grounds mentioned
in the petition, contended that the petitioner is prosecuted at Crime no. 18/2022
registered at the P.S. M.G. Road on similar allegation of forging the admission
register to benefit the accused Karan Morwal. Second prosecution on similar
allegation is not maintainable in view of Section 300 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the
impugned FIR deserves to be quashed. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied
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upon the case of T.P. Gopalakrishnan Vs. State of Kerala reported in 2023(4)
MPLC 353(SC); (2022) 14 SCC 323 to buttress his contentions.
5. Per contra, learned counsel for the State submitted that the earlier
prosecution at Crime No. 18/2022 was registered at the Police Station, M.G.
Road for offence punishable u/Ss. 420, 465, 467, 468, 471, 201, 193 and 34 of
IPC, for forgery of admission register and facilitating forged admission
certificate to wrongfully benefit Karan Porwal in securing bail. However, the
later prosecution i.e. present FIR at Crime No. 359/2022 is registered at the
P.S. Badnagar for offence punishable u/Ss 406 and 409 of IPC for criminal
breach of trust and Criminal misappropriation of the government records by the
petitioner Dr. Devendra Swami. Both the prosecutions are substantially
different in allegations. Therefore, no case is made out for quashing of present
FIR.
6. Heard learned counsel for both the parties and perused the record.
7. The Supreme Court in case of State of Haryana & Others vs. Bhajan Lal
& Others, reported in AIR 1992 SC 604 after an elaborate consideration of the
matter and after referring to various earlier decisions, has observed in para 102 as
under:-
''102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the
Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a
series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article
226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted
and reproduced above,we give the following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:3265
inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds
of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion
that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6)Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code
or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where
the proceeding is maliciously Instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal
grudge.''
8. Relying on the judgment in the case of Bhajanlal (supra), the Apex Court in
the case of Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Mohd. Sharaful
Haque & Ors. reported in (2005) 1 SCC 122 and held as under:
11. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very
wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court
must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound
principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
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prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally
refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are
incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and
produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of
magnitude and can-not be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material.
Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the
High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at
any stage. (See: Janata Dal v. H. S.Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305), and Raghubir
Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC 1). It would not be proper for the High
Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order
to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive
at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to
assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded
with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to
quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not
disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out
in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by
the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that
there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the
case would end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If
it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement made
on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are
disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous
or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High
Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is
registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It
is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which
decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the
informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing
the proceedings. (See: Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar (1990 Supp SCC 686),
State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma (AIR 1996 SC 309), Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal
Singh Gill (1995 (6) SCC 194), State of Kerala v. O. C. Kuttan (AIR 1999 SC 1044),
State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma (1996 (7) SCC 705), Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar
Bhada (1997 (2) SCC 397), Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (AIR
1996 SC 2983) and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi (1999 (3) SCC 259.
9. In the case of Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia Vs Sambhajirao
Chanrojirao Angre reported in 1988 (1) SCC 692, the Supreme Court has held
as under:
"The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed,
the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:3265
establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into considerations any special features which
appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a
prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilized for any oblique
purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and,
therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the
Court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even
though it may be at a preliminary stage."
10. Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides that-
300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.
(1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an
offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or
acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor
on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one
made against him might have been made under sub-section (1) of Section 221, or
for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2) thereof.
(2) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried, with
the consent of the State Government, for any distinct offence for which a separate
charge might have been made against him at the former trial under sub-section (1)
of Section 220.
(3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing
consequences which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from
that of which he was convicted, may be afterwards tried for such last-mentioned
offence, if the consequences had not happened, or were not known to the Court to
have happened, at the time when he was convicted.
(4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may,
notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, and
tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have
committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the
offence with which he is subsequently charged.
(5) A person discharged under Section 258 shall not be tried again for the same
offence except with the consent of the Court by which he was discharged or of any
Court to which the first mentioned Court is subordinate.
(6) Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of Section 26 of the General
Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) or of Section 188 of this Code.
11. The Supreme Court in matter of T.P. Gopalakrishnan (supra), observed
as under-
24. Section 300CrPC embodies the general rule which affirms the validity of the
pleas of autrefois acquit (previously acquitted) and autrefois convict (previously
convicted). Sub-section (1) of Section 300 lays down the rule of double jeopardy and
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:3265
sub-sections (2) to (5) deal with the exceptions. Accordingly, so long as an order of
acquittal or conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction remains in force, the
person cannot be tried for the same offence for which he was tried earlier or for any
other offence arising from the same fact situation, except the cases dealt in with
under sub-sections (2) to (5) of the section.
25. Section 300CrPC is based on the maxim nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiae
quod sit pro una et eadem causa which means that a person cannot be tried a second
time for an offence which is involved in an offence with which he was previously
charged. As per the decision of this Court in Vijayalakshmi v. Vasudevan, (1994) 4
SCC 656, in order to bar the trial of any person already tried, it must be shown that:
(i) he has been tried by a competent court for the same offence or one for which
he might have been charged or convicted at a trial, on the same facts,
(ii) he has been convicted or acquitted at the trial, and
(iii) such conviction or acquittal is in force.
26. The whole basis for this provision is that the first trial should have been before
court of competent jurisdiction. There must have been a trial of the accused, that is to
say, that there should have been a hearing and determination or adjudication of the
case on merits. Where the accused has not been tried and as such convicted or
acquitted, Section 300(1) shall not be applicable.
27. Section 300CrPC bars the trial of a person not only for the same offence but also
for any other offence on the same facts, vide Thakur Ram v. State of Bihar [Thakur
Ram v. State of Bihar, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 14 : AIR 1966 SC 911] .
Article 20 of the Constitution
28. Under clause (2) of Article 20, no person shall be prosecuted and punished for
the same offence more than once. Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India
incorporates within its scope, the plea of autrefois convict, meaning, previously
convicted as known to British jurisprudence, or the plea of double jeopardy known to
the American Constitution. However, the said concepts are circumscribed in Article
20(2) which provides that there should be not only a prosecution but also punishment
in the first instance in order to operate as a bar to a second prosecution and
punishment for the same offence. On a plain reading of clause (2) of Article 20, it is
clear that the said provision bars a second prosecution only where the accused has
been both prosecutedandpunished for the same offence previously vide S.A.
Venkataraman v. Union of India [S.A. Venkataraman v. Union of India, 1954 SCC
OnLine SC 26 : AIR 1954 SC 375] ("S.A. Venkataraman"). But this clause does not
bar subsequent trial if the ingredients of the offences in the previous and subsequent
trials are distinct. In MaqboolHussain v. State of Bombay [Maqbool Hussain v. State
of Bombay, (1953) 1 SCC 736 : (1953) 1 SCC 736 : AIR 1953 SC 325] , this Court
has held that clause (2) is not applicable unless the person has been both prosecuted
and punished.
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29. There are three conditions for the application of the clause. Firstly, there must
have been previous proceeding before a court of law or a judicial tribunal of
competent jurisdiction in which the person must have been prosecuted. The said
prosecution must be valid and not null and void or abortive. Secondly, the conviction
or acquittal in the previous proceeding must be in force at the time of the second
proceeding in relation to the same offence and same set of facts, for which he was
prosecuted and punished in the first proceeding. Thirdly, the subsequent proceeding
must be a fresh proceeding, where he is, for the second time, sought to be prosecuted
and punished for the same offence and same set of facts. In other words, the clause
has no application when the subsequent proceeding is a mere continuation of the
previous proceeding, for example, where an appeal arises out of such acquittal or
conviction. In order to sustain a plea of double jeopardy, it must be shown that all the
aforesaid conditions of this clause are satisfied, vide S.A. Venkataraman [S.A.
Venkataraman v. Union of India, 1954 SCC OnLine SC 26 : AIR 1954 SC 375] .
31. Before dealing with the issue at hand, it is necessary to understand what the term
"same offence" means and includes. The term "same offence" in simple language
means, where the offences are not distinct and the ingredients of the offences are
identical. Where there are two distinct offences made up of different ingredients, the
embargo under Article 20 of the Constitution of India, has no application, though the
offences may have some overlapping features. The crucial requirement of Article 20
is that the offences are the same and identical in all respects, vide State (NCT of
Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu [State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600
: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1715] .
44. Sub-section (2) of Section 300CrPC states that when the charge of the second
trial is for a distinct offence, the trial is not barred. This means that if a person is
acquitted or convicted of any offence, he may be tried for a distinct offence for
which a separate charge might have been made against him at the former trial under
sub-section (1) of Section 220CrPC but the same is subject to a condition precedent
being, that the consent of the State Government is sought before such a person could
be tried.
12. The Petitioner was not tried and acquitted or convicted by a competent
Court for earlier offence registered at Crime No. 18/2022, therefore, the
provision of Section 300 Cr.P.C. would not apply. Both the prosecutions relate
to same series of acts but they are not identical in nature. The petitioner was
earlier prosecuted for forgery of the record to facilitate release of accused on
bail whereas, the later prosecution relate to criminal misappropriation and
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-IND:3265
breach of trust regarding the official record entrusted to him.Thus, the
petitioner was not convicted or acquitted for earlier offence and he is not
sought to be prosecuted and punished for the same offence and on the same set
of facts. Hence, the benefit of provision contained in Section 300 of Cr.P. C.
and the law laid down in T.P. Gopalakrishnan (supra) is not available to the
petitioner.
13. Complainant - Sweety Patil submitted a written complaint to the
Superintendent of Police, Distt Ujjain alleging that Karan Morwal in association
with Dr. Devendra Swami had forged Indoor Patient Admission Register at Govt.
Hospital Badnagar showing his admission for treatment from 13.02.2021 to
15.02.2021, to secure bail. During inquiry into this complaint, the Indoor Patient
Admission Register of Govt. Hospital, Badnagar was found missing. It was
revealed in the inquiry that petitioner Dr. Devendra Swami had taken the Indoor
Patient Admission Register from Staff Nurse - Varsha Shinde. Thereafter, the
Indoor Patient Admission Register of the Government Hospital, Badnagar is
missing. The statement of Staff Nurse - Varsha Shinde and Sonam Borkhe were
recorded, wherein they specifically alleged that Dr. Devendra Swami manipulated
and forged admission related entry of Karan Morwal dated 12.02.2021. Varsha
Shinde had given the register and other relevant documents to Dr. Devendra
Swami on 18.09.2021. Thereafter, the Indoor Patient Admission Register is
missing. Certain audio communications between petitioner - Dr. Devendra Swami
and Staff Nurse Varsha Shinde and Sonam Borkhe were recovered and seized
from the mobile phone of Sonam Borkhe to substantiate the allegations of
criminal misappropriation of official record by Dr. Devendra Swami. On the basis
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of inquiry, P.S. Badnagar registered impugned FIR at Crime No. 359/2022 for
offence punishable u/Ss 406 and 409 of IPC against the petitioner - Dr. Devendra
Swami.
14. The material on the case diary reveals that the accusation against the
petitioner is not baseless. It is substantiated by the statement of Staff Nurse
Varsha Shinde and Sonam Borkhe and the audio recording seized during
investigation. Thus, the impugned FIR cannot be said to be malafide and
lodged by the complainant with an ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance with
Dr. Devendra Swami. The investigation prima- facie reveals an intention to
manipulate the official record to benefit Karan Morwal. Therefore, the
investigation cannot be said to be absurd, malafide, vindictive or inherently
improper. To scuttle the investigation and the prosecution, in aforestated scenario,
would itself be an abuse of process of Court. Therefore, in the considered opinion
of this Court, no case is made out to exercise of inherent jurisdiction u/S 482 of
Cr.P.C. to quash impugned FIR and consequential proceedings.
15. Consequently, the petition, being meritless, is dismissed.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
sh/-
SEHA
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Date: 2026.02.02 18:39:00
+05'30'
