The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Madhukar on 17 February, 2026

1 FA-540-2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
FA No. 540 of 2017
(THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS Vs MADHUKAR )

Dated : 17-02-2026
Shri R.K. Kesharwani - G.A. for the appellant/State.
None for the respondents despite service of notice.

Heard on I.A. No.10536/2017, an application for condonation of delay
in filing the present appeal.
It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant/State that the

Reference Court has passed an award on 03.03.2016. Thereafter, the opinion
of the Government Advocate was sought on 21.01.2017 and permission has
been sought vide proposal dated 25.06.2017 which was received on
29.06.2017. Thereafter, OIC was appointed on 10.07.2017. It is submitted
that the permission was granted to file the appeal before the Indore Bench.
However, as the territorial jurisdiction lies with this Court, again permission
was granted to file the first appeal before the Principal Seat at Jabalpur and
thus, the delay caused is based on bonafide. It is further submitted that
additional affidavit to explain the delay has also been filed.

From perusal of the record it is found that the certified copy of the
impugned award/judgment was applied on 22.07.2017 and the same was
received on 27.07.2017 and thereafter, the appeal was filed on 31.07.2017.
The impugned judgment/award was passed on 03.03.2016 and the appeal
was filed with a delay of 418 days. As it is submitted in the application that
the opinion was sought on 21.01.2017 thereafter, the proposal for permission

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PRIYANKA
PITHAWE
Signing time: 28-02-2026
14:05:18
2 FA-540-2017
was sought on 25.06.2017 which was received on 29.06.2017 and thereafter,
the OIC was appointed on 10.07.2017.
The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of State of Haryana vs. Chandra
Mani and others reported in (1996) 3 SCC 132 in para-11 has held as under
-

"11. ........ . It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay -- intentional or otherwise -- is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red- tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à- vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. ....."

The Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO and others reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 in paras - 8 to 15 has held as under -

"8. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction (sic discretion) vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the

3 FA-540-2017 sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy [(1998) 7 SCC 123 : AIR 1998 SC 3222] it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels.

9. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard- and-fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC 840] this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram [ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 : AIR 1917 PC 156] it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [(1969) 1 SCR 1006 : AIR 1969 SC 575] a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.

10. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi [(1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996] which is a case of negligence of the counsel which misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the default in delay was condoned. In Lala Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770] this Court had held that there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that the mistake committed by the counsel was bona fide and it was not tainted by any mala fide motive.

11. In State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe [1981 Supp SCC 72] it was held that whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath [(1982) 3 SCC 366] it was held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. This Court under Article 136 can reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the order made by the High Court or the Tribunal and remit the matter for hearing on merits. It was accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and the case was remitted for decision on merits.

4 FA-540-2017

12. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh [(1984) 4 SCC 66] a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. I n Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107] a Bench of two Judges considered the question of limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause"

is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice -- that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common-sense, pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice- oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.

13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file- pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter

5 FA-540-2017 was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra [1987 Supp SCC 339] this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law.

14. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer [(1988) 2 SCC 142] it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning -- of course, within reasonable limits -- is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned.

15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay -- intentional or otherwise -- is a

6 FA-540-2017 routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants."

Further in the case of Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat vs. G. Arumugam (Dead) by Legal Representatives reported in (2015) 3 SCC 569 the Hon'ble Apex Court in para - 4 has held as under:

"4. As held by this Court in State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao [(2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906] , the court must always take a justice-oriented approach while considering an application for condonation of delay. If the court is convinced that there had been an attempt on the part of the government officials or public servants to defeat justice by causing delay, the court, in view of the larger public interest, should take a lenient view in such situations, condone the delay, howsoever huge may be the delay, and have the matter decided on merits."

From the above factual backdrops, it is clear that efforts have been

taken by the Department to file the appeal in time, but the delay caused because of bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file- pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, the appeal could not be filed in

7 FA-540-2017

time. Therefore, taking into consideration the systematic delay and also in view of the principle laid down by the Apex Court in the cases cited hereinabove, the delay in filing the appeal is hereby condoned. However, looking to the period of delay, the same is condoned subject to payment of cost of Rs.10,000/- to be deposited with the State Legal Services Authority within 15 days from today.

Accordingly, I.A. No.10536/2017 is allowed and disposed of. The appeal is admitted.

Interim relief granted on 16.08.2017 is made absolute. Let record be requisitioned.

List for final hearing as per its turn.

(DEEPAK KHOT) JUDGE

Priya.P