[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mausam Nirapure vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 9 February, 2026
Author: Maninder S. Bhatti
Bench: Maninder S. Bhatti
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MANINDER S. BHATTI
ON THE 9 th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 17884 of 2023
MAUSAM NIRAPURE
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Sanjeev Kumar Chansoriya - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Praveen Namdeo - G.A. for the State.
ORDER
This petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
seeking the following reliefs:-
"7.1 That, the petitioner have not knowledge for related
judicially and departmental process for reinstatement,
there is the reason he cannot approach to the Hon'ble
court, so May kindly condition of the petitioner and
situation of the case passed the reinstatement order in
favour of the petitioner.
7.2 That, this Hon'ble court may kindly be pleased to
issue a direction to the respondent no. 3 to grant
pensioner benefit of service during grade of termination
order between dated of filing.
7.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
set aside the order dated 30.006.2017 and 25.08.2017
passed by respondent No. 3 and 2 respectively.
7.4 Any other relief or writ or direction or order which
this Hon'ble court may deem fit and proper looking the
facts and circumstance of the case is awarded to the
petitioner including the cost of the litigation."
2 . The facts as detailed in the body of the petition reflect that the
petitioner was appointed on a compassionate basis vide order dated
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17.11.2011 contained in Annexure P/1. In 2016, an incident took place
pursuant to which a criminal case was registered against the petitioner vide
crime no. 392/2016, and on a similar set of facts, departmental proceedings
were instituted against her. The petitioner was dismissed from the services
vide order dated 30.06.2017, contained in Annexure P/2, finding him guilty
of violation of provisions of the M.P. Police Regulation. Petitioner then
preferred an appeal before the Inspector General of Police, Hoshangabad,
which was dismissed vide order dated 25.08.2017. Thereafter, the petitioner
preferred a mercy appeal, which was also turned down vide order dated
15.01.2018. However, the petitioner was acquitted by the trial court vide
order dated 03.04.2018 contained in Annexure P/4, pursuant to which the
petitioner preferred a representation before the authorities for her
reinstatement in service. Petitioner also approached this Court by way of the
W.P. No. 28143 of 2022, which got disposed of with a direction to consider
the case of the petitioner. The said representation of the petitioner was turned
down vide order dated 02.07.2023 contained in Annexure P/8. Hence,
aggrieved by the same petitioner preferred this appeal.
3 . Counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned orders passed
by the authorities are arbitrary, illegal, and passed in gross violation of
principles of natural justice. It is argued by the counsel that the charges on
which the departmental proceedings were concluded are the same charges on
which the criminal trial was instituted against the petitioner, and in the said
criminal proceedings, the petitioner got a clean acquittal. Hence, the orders
passed by the authorities deserve to be set aside. The counsel in support of
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his arguments relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Captain M. Paul
Antony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines reported in 1999 (3) SCC 679 .
4 . Per Contra, counsel for the State/respondent contends that the
disciplinary enquiry was held in accordance with the law and the impugned
orders were passed after affording proper and sufficient opportunity of
hearing to the petitioner at all stages of the proceedings. It is further argued
that the acquittal of the petitioner due to non-availability of any evidence
before the criminal court would not come to her rescue in the matter of
dismissal on the basis of report of enquiry officer before whom there is
ample evidence, and thus no fault can be found in departmental enquiry
which was concluded prior to the order of acquittal. In support of his
contention, counsel placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of Stanzen Toyotetsu India Private Limited Vs. Girish V. and others
reported in (2014) 3 SCC 636 . Further, the counsel contends that the
representation of the petitioner was turned down by passing well reasoned
and speaking order and does not call for any interference. Hence, this
petition, being misconceived, deserves to be dismissed.
5 . No other point is pressed or argued by any of the counsels.
6 . Heard the submissions and perused the record.
7. So far as the issue of commonality of the charges in criminal cases
and departmental enquiry is concerned, the departmental enquiry against the
present petitioner was initiated on the following charges:-
" 2- िन. आर. 06 मौसम िनरापुरे
आरोप कमांक (1) - थाना टमरनी के अपराध कमांक 392/16 धारा 294, 323,
506, 34 भाद व क सूप अनुसार आ े पत होकर पुिलस क छ व धूिमल कर
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पु.रे . के पैरा 64 क उपकं डका 11 का उ लंघन करना ।
आरोप मांक (2) - आपरािधक वृ के आरा पय के साथ थाना टमरनी के
अपराध मांक 391/16 के आरो पय के सहभािगता होकर सं द ध आचरण
दिशत करना । शासक य वाहन से जाकर कृ य म अ य प से
सहभािगता होकर सं द ध आचरण दिशत करना ।"
8 . A perusal of the aforesaid reveals that the disciplinary proceedings
against the petitioner was issued on two counts, firstly, that she along with
Abhishek Yadav had gone for patrolling on highway and was involved in
Crime No.392/2016 and thus had tarnished the image of the police and had
violated sub clause (11) of Clause 64 of the M.P. Police Regulations, and
secondly, that she had accompanied the accused persons having criminal bent
of mind, in a government vehicle, had indirectly participated in suspicious
act and thus had displayed suspicious conduct. Further, the records reveal
that during the trial in criminal proceedings, as many as four witnesses,
including the complainant Vishal Rajput, were examined and all of them
turned hostile, which resulted in the acquittal of the accused persons,
including the present petitioner. During the disciplinary proceedings, nine
witnesses were examined, and only the complainant, i.e., Vishal Rajput, is
the common witness in both the disciplinary enquiry and the criminal trial. It
is also noteworthy that during the disciplinary enquiry, Vishal Rajput
deposed against the present petitioner, though he had turned hostile during
the criminal trial.
9 . At this juncture, it would be fruitful to discuss the law laid down in
the case of Management of Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited Vs. M.Mani
reported in 2018 (1) SCC 285, wherein the Apex Court held that an
employee can seek automatic reversal of dismissal order upon acquittal in a
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criminal case only in such cases where the dismissal is founded upon
conviction in a criminal case. Where dismissal is not founded upon
conviction in a criminal case but is founded upon independent domestic
inquiry carried out by the management/ employer, there cannot be any
automatic reinstatement. The following has been held therein:-
"32. The answer to the aforementioned submission lies in the law
laid down by this Court in Karnataka SRTC [Karnataka SRTC v.
M.G. Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 171] .
At the cost of repetition, we may say that in the case at hand, the
dismissal orders had not been passed on the basis of employees'
conviction by the criminal court which later stood set aside by the
superior court. Had it been so, then the situation would have been
different because once the conviction order is set aside by the
superior court, the dismissal order which was solely based on
passing of the conviction order also stands set aside. Such was not
the case here.
33. In the case on hand, the appellant employer had conducted the
departmental enquiry in accordance with law independently of the
criminal case wherein the enquiry officer, on the basis of the
appreciation of evidence brought on record in the enquiry
proceedings, came to a conclusion that a charge of theft against
the delinquent employees was proved. This finding was based on
preponderance of probabilities and could be recorded by the
enquiry officer notwithstanding the order of criminal court
acquitting the respondents."
10. Further. the Supreme Court in the case of Shashi Bhushan Prasad
v. CISF, reported in (2019) 7 SCC 797 has held as under :-
"17. The scope of departmental enquiry and judicial proceedings
and the effect of acquittal by a criminal court have been examined
by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in A.P. SRTC v. Mohd.
YousufMiya. The relevant paragraph is as under: (SCC pp. 704-
05, para 8)
"8....The purpose of departmental enquiry and of
prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The
criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for
violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or
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for breach of which law has provided that the offender
shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act
of commission in violation of law or of omission of
public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain
discipline in the service and efficiency of public service.
It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary
proceedings are conducted and completed as
expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable
to lay down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which
the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed
pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent
officer. Each case requires to be considered in the
backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There
would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with
departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless
the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature
involving complicated questions of fact and law.
Offence generally implies infringement of public (sic
duty), as distinguished from mere private rights
punishable under criminal law. When trial for criminal
offence is conducted it should be in accordance with
proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under
the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case
of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental
proceeding relates to conduct or breach of duty of the
delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct
defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That
the strict standard of proof or applicability of the
Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal position.
The enquiry in the departmental proceedings relates to
the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that
behalf is not as high as in an offence in criminal charge.
It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry has to
be conducted expeditiously so as to effectuate
efficiency in public administration and the criminal trial
will take its own course. The nature of evidence in
criminal trial is entirely different from the departmental
proceedings. In the former, prosecution is to prove its
case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone of
human conduct. The standard of proof in the
departmental proceedings is not the same as of the
criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the
standard point of the Evidence Act. The evidence
required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by
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the Evidence Act. Under these circumstances, what is
required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry
would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence
at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of
fact to be considered in each case depending on its own
facts and circumstances. In this case, we have seen that
the charge is failure to anticipate the accident and
prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with the
culpability of the offence under Sections 304-A and 338
IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not
right in staying the proceedings."
(emphasis
supplied)
18. The exposition has been further affirmed by a three Judge
Bench of this Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.
This Court held as under: (SCC p. 776, para 11)
"11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal
court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does
not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it
is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is
fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would
not debar an employer from exercising power in
accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force.
The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are
entirely different. They operate in different fields and
have different objectives. Whereas the object of
criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the
offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal
with the delinquent departmentally and to impose
penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a
criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the
accused in certain circumstances or before certain
officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict
rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to
departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is
necessary to order a conviction is different from the
degree of proof necessary to record the commission of
delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of
evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In
criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and
unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the
accused "beyond reasonable doubt", he cannot be
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convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry,
on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the
delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of
"preponderance of probability". Acquittal of the
appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not
ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are,
therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the
appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal
court, the impugned order dismissing him from service
deserves to be quashed and set aside."
19. We are in full agreement with the exposition of law laid down
by this Court and it is fairly well settled that two proceedings
criminal and departmental are entirely different. They operate in
different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object
of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on an
offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the
delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance
with the service rules. The degree of proof which is necessary to
order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary
to record the commission of delinquency. Even the rule relating to
appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar.
In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless
the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, he cannot be convicted by a court of law
whereas in the departmental enquiry, penalty can be imposed on
the delinquent on a finding recorded on the basis of
"preponderance of probability". Acquittal by the court of
competent jurisdiction in a judicial proceeding does not ipso facto
absolve the delinquent from the liability under the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the authority. This what has been considered by the
High Court in the impugned judgment1 in detail and needs no
interference by this Court.
20. The judgment in M. Paul Anthony case on which the learned
counsel for the appellant has placed reliance was a case where a
question arose for consideration as to whether the departmental
proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case on the basis of
same sets of facts and evidence can be continued simultaneously
and this Court answered in para 22 as under: (SCC p. 691)
"22. The conclusions which are deducible from various
decisions of this Court referred to above are:
(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a
criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no
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bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though
separately.
(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal
case are based on identical and similar set of facts and
the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent
employee is of a grave nature which involves
complicated questions of law and fact, it would be
desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the
conclusion of the criminal case. (iii) Whether the nature
of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether
complicated questions of fact and law are involved in
that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the
nature of the case launched against the employee on the
basis of evidence and material collected against him
during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet.
(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot
be considered in isolation to stay the departmental
proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact
that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly
delayed.
(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal
is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings,
even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of
the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with
so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the
employee is found not guilty his honour may be
vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the
administration may get rid of him at the earliest."
11. A perusal of the aforesaid made it clear that criminal and
disciplinary proceedings can be based on the same set of facts. And though
the criminal proceedings result in the acquittal of the delinquent employee if
the disciplinary authority take decision independently based on the evidence
produced during the enquiry, then there is no need to reverse the same. In the
present case, the disciplinary proceedings were concluded before the criminal
trial, and the decision of the authority was based on the independent evidence
of the witnesses from that of the criminal trial. Also, the penalty passed in
the departmental enquiry was not based on the conviction of the petitioner in
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the criminal trial. Therefore, acquittal in the criminal trial will not come to
the rescue of the present petitioner. Resultantly, the impugned orders do not
call for any interference.
12. Accordingly, the writ petition being sans substance, deserves to be
and is hereby dismissed without any order as to costs.
(MANINDER S. BHATTI)
JUDGE
ROHIT/PB
