[Cites 3, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Madhya Pradesh Pashchim Kshetra Vidyut ... vs Anil Kaushal on 5 February, 2026
Author: Vijay Kumar Shukla
Bench: Vijay Kumar Shukla
1 WA-2887-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIJAY KUMAR SHUKLA
&
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ALOK AWASTHI
ON THE 5 th OF FEBRUARY, 2026
WRIT APPEAL No. 2839 of 2025
MADHYA PRADESH PASHCHIM KSHETRA VIDYUT VITARAN
COMPANY LTD. AND OTHERS
Versus
RAMKISHOR SINGH
Appearance:
Shri Madhusudan Dwivedi, Advocate for the appellants.
Shri Vijay Kumar Patwari, Advocate for the respondent.
WITH
WRIT APPEAL No. 2886 of 2025
MADHYA PRADESH KSHETRA VIDYUT VITRAN CO. LTD. AND
OTHERS
Versus
NANDKIRHORE
Appearance:
Shri Madhusudan Dwivedi, Advocate for the appellants.
Shri Kishori Lal Purohit, Advocate for the respondent.
WRIT APPEAL No. 2887 of 2025
MADHYA PRADESH PASHCHIM KSHETRA VIDYUT VITARAN
COMPANY LTD AND OTHERS
Versus
ANIL KAUSHAL
Appearance:
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: GEETA PRAMOD
Signing time: 05-02-2026
18:39:13
2 WA-2887-2025
Shri Madhusudan Dwivedi, Advocate for the appellants.
Shri Kishori Lal Purohit, Advocate for the respondent.
ORDER
Per: Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla
Heard on IA No.9127/2025 (in W.A. No.2839/2025) IA No.9229/2025
(in W.A. No.2886/2025) and IA No.9227/2025 (in W.A. No.2887/2025),
which are applications for condonation of delay. There is a delay of 94 days,
95 days and 95 days respectively in filing the present writ appeals.
2. Learned counsel for the respondents/writ petitioners opposes the
prayer that the delay has not been properly explained and the details, which
are mentioned, the same only indicates the communication from one
department to another. He further relied that on the judgement passed by the
Apex Court in the case of Postmaster General and others Vs. Living Media
India Limited and Another, [(2012) 3 SCC 563], which says that the law of
limitation applies equally to all including the government and its statutory
corporations etc.
3. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we find that the
grounds which are mentioned for the delay may not be sufficiently explained
but however, considering the nature of the directions passed by this Court
and taking into consideration the judgement passed by the Apex Court in the
case of Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [2025 SCC OnLine SC
600], we condone the delay. All the IAs stand closed.
4. Also heard on the question of admission.
5. In the instant appeals filed under Section 2(1) of the Madhya
3 WA-2887-2025
Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam,
2005, the appellants has challenged the common order dated 24.03.2025
passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby three writ petitions have been
disposed of. He argued that the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ
petitions, did not properly considered the contentions raised by the
appellants. He has drawn attention of this Court towards paragraph-9 of the
order dated 24.03.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge where he has
recorded the contentions of counsel for the appellants.
6. The stand of the appellants before the learned Single Judge was that
the IIIrd Time Pay Scale benefit under the policy dated 21.02.2015 is
contingent not only on completion of 30 years of service but also on the
employee meeting the prescribed performance benchmark. Specifically, the
employee must have obtained a minimum 13 marks from ACR grading over
the previous five years and have no adverse entries. Upon examination of
the service records of the writ petitioners, it was found that he failed to meet
these criteria. In particular, it was noted that some petitioners lacked the
minimum score, while others had adverse remarks.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the learned Single
Judge has allowed the writ petitions and directed for grant of benefit of IIIrd
Time Pay Scale from the date of their entitlement only on the ground that the
ACRs of the relevant years of the petitioners were not communicated to
them. He further argued that since the ACRs were not adverse therefore,
they were not communicated by the appellants. He argued that the learned
Single Judge has committed an error while directing for grant of benefit of
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IIIr d Time Pay Scale from the date of their entitlement, though, under the
relevant circulars, the record of the employee is required to be examined by a
Screening Committee and then only entitlement has to be decided.
8. Learned Single Judge, at the most could have sent the matter to the
Screening Committee and as per the recommendations of the Screening
Committee, the writ petitioners would have to be entitled for the claim of
IIIrd Time Pay Scale.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents/writ
petitioners supports the impugned order and held that the ACRs whether it is
adverse or not was to be communicated to the employee. In support of his
contention, he has placed reliance on the judgements passed by the Apex
Court in U. P. Jal Nigam Vs. Prabhat Chandra Jain, [(1996) 2 SCC 363] and
also Dev Dutt Vs. Union of India and Others, [(2008) 8 SCC 725], wherein it
has been held that all grading whether 'Very Good', 'Good', 'Average' or
'Poor' is required to be communicated to employees working in government
offices.
10. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we find that the
learned Single Judge has rightly quashed the impugned communications as
they were based on the ACRs, which were never communicated to the writ
petitioners. The said view is fortified by the judgement of the Apex Court in
U.P. Jal Nigam (supra) and Dev Dutt (supra).
11. We do not find any merit in the contentions of learned counsel for
the appellants that the learned Single Judge has confined only to the ACRs
and did not consider the criteria of obtaining minimum benchmark. It is not
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in dispute that the benchmark is assessed on the basis of the ACRs and since
admittedly, the relevant ACRs were not communicated to the writ petitioners
therefore, the aforesaid ACRs have affected the benchmark of the writ
petitioners.
12. The next contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the
learned Single Judge ought to have not passed the order for grant of IIIrd
Time Pay Scale from the date of their entitlement without therebeing any
screening of the record by the Screening Committee.
13. We find force in the aforesaid contention. Once the learned
Single Judge was of the view that the appellants have not communicated the
relevant ACRs to the writ petitioners, he ought to have directed the
Screening Committee constituted for the said purpose to screen the cases of
the writ petitioners ignoring the aforesaid un-communicated ACRs and
thereafter, to re-assess the benchmark, as per the relevant circulars of the
government, which are admittedly adopted.
14. In view of the aforesaid, present writ appeals are partly allowed
and the directions contained in paragraph-16 of the impugned order is set
aside. It is directed that the Committee constituted for the purpose of
screening of the record of the employee for entitlement of IIIr d Time Pay
Scale shall be convened within a period of 45 days from the date of
communication of the order passed today and shall screen the record of the
writ petitioners ignoring the un-communicated relevant ACRs for the last
five years from the date of their entitlement for the IIIrd Time Pay Scale.
After the screening, if the writ petitioners are found that they have achieved
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the benchmarks as fixed by the appellants, the consequential orders will be
passed within a further period of 30 days from the recommendations of the
Screening Committee.
15. With the aforesaid, present appeals are partly allowed and stand
disposed of.
(VIJAY KUMAR SHUKLA) (ALOK AWASTHI)
JUDGE JUDGE
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