[Cites 22, Cited by 0]
Madhya Pradesh High Court
Gurudwara Shri Sindh Sabha, Guna vs Rajendra Kumar And Anr. on 2 April, 2026
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 2 nd OF APRIL, 2026
SECOND APPEAL No. 938 of 2005
GURUDWARA SHRI SINGH SABHA, GUNA
Versus
RAJENDRA KUMAR AND ANR.
Appearance:
Shri N.K.Gupta Senior Advocate with Shri Saket Sharma- Advocate for the
appellant.
Shri Siddharth Sharma and Shri Yashwant Rao Dixit- Advocate for the LRs of
respondent No.1.
Shri Tej Singh Mahadik and Shri Nitin Sharma- Advocate for the LRs of
respondent No.2.
ORDER
This second appeal under Section 100 of C.P.C. has been filed against
judgment and decree dated 07/03/2005 passed by Second Additional Judge to the
Court of First Additional District Judge, Guna (although mentioned as Additional
Second Additional District Judge Guna to the Court of First Additional District
Judge, Guna in the judgment and decree) in Civil Appeal No.28-A/2003 as well
as judgment and decree dated 25/07/2002 passed by Third Civil Judge, Class-I,
Guna in Civil Suit No.72-A/2002.
2. Appellants are the plaintiffs, who have lost their case from both the
Courts below.
3. Facts necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short, are that
appellant filed a suit against respondents for eviction and arrears of rent under
Section 12(1)(a), (b), (h) and (m) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act. Facts
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necessary for disposal of present appeal, in short, are that plaintiff filed a suit
claiming itself to be registered society under M.P. Society Registrikaran
Adhiniyam, 1973, and a resolution was passed to file a suit through its President
and Secretary. It was the case of plaintiffs that respondents were inducted as a
tenant on monthly rent of Rs.325/- where they were running a business of hotel
and restaurant. Defendants had paid the rent upto April, 1994 and from May,
1994 rent was outstanding. It was further pleaded that defendants have
constructed a brick wall inside the shop in spite of the fact that construction was
opposed by plaintiff, and have constructed another shop inside the shop. It was
further pleaded that defendants have sub-let the shop to another person who is
running STD PCO from the shop, which has been constructed inside the shop in
question. It was further pleaded that eviction of defendants from the suit shop is
necessary for construction of a road to control the traffic of followers who are
visiting the Gurudwara. Plaintiff has also taken permission from the Municipal
Council, Guna and estimate has also been prepared. The fund, which will be
required for construction of road is available with the plaintiff. Defendants were
requested verbally to vacate the suit premises, but they have not done so and
accordingly, by registered notice dated 13/05/1994, the tenancy of defendants was
terminated with effect from 30/06/1994. The defendants refused to accept the
notice. Thus, the suit was filed for eviction under Section 12(1)(a), (b), (h) and
(m) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act.
4. Defendants filed their written statement and admitted that they are
tenants on the monthly rent of Rs.325/-. It was admitted by defendants that they
have constructed an STD PCO inside the shop, but it was claimed by defendants
that defendant No.1 has constructed the STD PCO inside the shop for the use of
his son Vivek. It was claimed that Vivek is a member of Joint Hindu Family. It
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was further claimed that Vivek apart from running his STD PCO also look after
the hotel business of the defendants.
5. So far as other grounds are concerned, they were also opposed by
defendants.
6. Defendant No.2 also filed his separate written statement and also took
same defence.
7. The trial court after framing issues and recording evidence, dismissed
the suit.
8. Being aggrieved by judgment and decree passed by Trial Court,
appellant preferred an appeal, which too has been dismissed by the Appellate
Court.
9. It appears that defendants committed default in payment of rent during
pendency of civil appeal. The final arguments were heard on 02/02/2005, and the
case was fixed for delivery of judgment on 09/02/2005. On 05/02/2005, an
application under Section 13(1) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act was filed
by defendants, and time was granted to appellant to file reply to the said
application. Thereafter, on 23/02/2005, once again the case was fixed for
03/03/2005 for final arguments as well as for hearing on the
applications. Arguments on the application was heard as well as final argument
were also heard, and it was also observed that defendants should also file the
details of deposit of rent by them, and the case was fixed for 05/03/2005. On
05/03/2005, the details of rent deposited by defendants were filed, and
accordingly, the case was fixed for delivery of judgment on 07/03/2005, and on
07/03/2005, appeal filed by appellant was dismissed.
10. By order dated 23/08/2016, this appeal was admitted on the following
substantial questions of law:-
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"i) Whether the plaintiff was entitled to a decree of eviction on the
ground under Section 12(1)(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control
Act, inasmuch as defendants have been defaulter in paying the rent
regularly.
ii) Whether the plaintiff shall be entitled for a decree of eviction on the
ground under Section 12(1)(b) of the M.P. Accommodation Control
Act."
11. In view of substantial questions of law, which have been framed, it is
clear that this Court has to confine its judgment only in respect of ground of
eviction under Section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(b) of M.P. Accommodation Control
Act and not in respect of other grounds which were claimed by appellant in the
suit.
12. Challenging the judgment and decree passed by Courts below, it is
submitted by counsel for appellant that defendants had committed multiple
defaults in depositing the rent even during the pendency of civil appeal. Final
arguments were heard and case was listed for delivery of judgment, therefore, no
proceedings were pending. At that time respondents filed an application under
Section 13(1) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act seeking extention of time in
depositing rent, and by the impugned judgment and decree, late deposit of rent by
respondents was condoned, which was erroneous. It is further submitted that even
during the pendency of this appeal, respondents were highly irregular in
depositing the rent.
13. Per contra, the counsel for defendants did not controvert the
submission that defendants were irregular in depositing rent during the pendency
of this appeal.
14. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
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Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of eviction on the ground of
under Section 12(1)(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, arrears of rent,
as defendants have been defaulters in payment of rent regularly ?
15. By referring to information given by CCD of Trial Court on
16/01/2023, it is submitted that respondents were defaulter in depositing the rent
by 15 th of every succeeding month. They never moved any application before this
Court for extention of time.
16. The details given by CCD of Trial Court reads as under:-
"A"
Receipt No. Date of Deposit Amount (Rs.)
64-F 23/04/2007 1950
246-E 03/08/2009 8450
152-C 10/09/2015 24050
12-C 12/04/2016 2925
116-C 24/08/2016 1300
300-C 24/03/2017 1625
238-H 17/01/2018 1625
253-G 16/03/2020 8775
17. On 01/04/2026, a dispute was raised to the effect that respondents have
not deposited the entire rent, therefore, respondents were granted a day's time to
file details of their rent deposited by them.
18. Accordingly, today respondents have furnished the details of rent
which reads as under:-
The details of rent deposited by defendants as furnished by CCD of
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Trial Court was not disputed but it was submitted that in addition to that the
defendants have deposited the following rent also:-
"B"
Receipt Period for which rent was Amount Date of
No. deposited (Rs.) Deposit
2830 May 2020 to July 2023 12675 29/05/2023
27651/59 August 2023 to December 2023 1625 16/10/2023
2761/61 January 2024 to June 2028 17550 25/10/2023
19. If the total rent deposited by defendants during the pendency of
this appeal is calculated, then it is clear that they have deposited total amount
of Rs.85,475/-. Since the monthly rent is Rs.325/-, then it is clear that
defendants have deposited rent of 263 months. The impugned judgment and
decree was passed on 07/03/2005. Therefore, as on today, the defendants
were required to deposit rent for 252 months, against which they have
deposited the rent for 263 months, i.e., upto February 2027 and not June
2028 as claimed by them.
20. From plain reading of details furnished by respondents themselves, it is
clear that they never deposited rent regularly as required under Section 13(1) of
M.P. Accommodation Control Act. On 03/08/2009, they deposited Rs.8,450/-
towards the rent from June, 2007 to July 2009 i.e., after 13 months. Thereafter,
they again committed default in depositing the rent and on 10/09/2015, they
deposited a rent of Rs.24,050/- starting from August, 2009 to September, 2015,
i.e. after six years. Thereafter, on 16/03/2020, they deposited Rs.8,775/- towards
rent for the month of February, 2018 to April, 2020, i.e. after two years and two
months, then again they did not deposit the rent and deposited the rent of
Rs.12,675/- on 25/09/2023 i.e., month of May, 2020 to July, 2023 i.e. after three
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years and two months. Thereafter, again on 25/10/2023, they deposited a rent of
Rs.17,550/- i.e. from January, 2024 to June, 2028.
21. Although, it is being projected by respondents that they had already
deposited the rent in advance upto month June, 2028, but the Calculation, which
is being projected by respondents is erroneous.
22. Now, the only question for consideration is that when
respondents/tenant have failed to deposit the rent by 15th of every succeeding,
then whether in absence of any application, time can be extended as required
under Section 13(1) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act or not and whether they
are liable to be evicted under Section 12(1)(a) of M.P. Accommodation Control
Act or not?
23. The Supreme Court in the case of Prakash Bhalotiya (D) through his
LRS Vs. Indra Chandra Goyal (D) through LRS decided on 25/09/2024 in Civil
Appeal No.10855/2024 has held as under:-
"25. Coming to the case in hand, the agreement of tenancy has been
admitted with effect from 01.07.1985, on month-to-month basis and
rent had to be paid against receipt. The said tenancy was for a period of
five years. Clause 14 depicts that on expiry of five-year, it may be
extendable by consent of landlord with enhancement @ 15% rent per
month (claimed to be per annum). Indeed, it is true that no agreed
lease agreement was entered into after 30.06.1990, but as per the
provisions of the UP Rent Act, the tenancy would become statutory
and subject to payment of the enhanced rent, the suit can be
maintained. But, in case of consecutive default of monthly payment of
rent and continuous non-payment as specified under the UP Rent Act,
it may be a ground to grant decree of eviction.
26. In view of our foregoing discussions, it can safely be concluded
that the respondent - tenant was in default in regular payment of
monthly rent during pendency of the suit, revision before the High
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Court and also before this Court. He has deposited the amount deficit
towards rent payment and house tax totaling to Rs. 50,048.56/- after
the direction of this Court in one-go as specified above. The findings
recorded by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court are
completely perverse and without appreciating the real intent of
provisions of Sections 20 and 30 of UP Rent Act, therefore, liable to
be set-aside."
24. The Supreme Court in the case of R.C.Tamrakar and Another Vs. Nidi
Lekha reported in 2002 (2) JLJ 69 has held as under:-
"8. Reading both the sub-sections together we are of the opinion that
the benefit of sub-section (5) shall be available to a tenant provided he
tenders the arrears of rent or deposit it in the Court within one month
of service of writ of summons or notice of appeal or any other
proceeding or within one month of the institution of the appeal or any
other proceeding by the tenant or within such further time as the Court
may on an application made to it allow in this behalf. In the case in
hand the tenant did not deposit the arrears, rent either prior to filing of
the suit or during its pendency before the trial Court. In the first
appellate Court rent was deposited and it was not clear whether he
continued to deposit the rent as per sub-section (1) of section 13. The
first appellate Court set aside the findings of defaulter on the ground
that the rent was deposited in the appellate Court. The High Court was
of opinion that after the trial Court passed the decree holding that the
tenant was in the arrears of rent, mere depositing the amount without
filing an application for extension of time for payment of all the arrears
of rent due, the finding of the appellate Court that tenant was not a
defaulter is not sustainable. The High Court further recorded that the
first appellate Court did not give any finding that entire amount of
arrears of rent was paid. This finding of the High Court cannot be
faulted in view of clear provision of sub-section (1) of section 13 and,
therefore, tenant is not entitled to get protection under sub-section
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(5)."
25. The Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar Mishra Vs. Goverdhan
Bhai (Dead Through LRs) and Anr. , reported in (2018) 12 SCC 533 , has held as
under:-
8. According to the appellants, the tenant did pay rent
intermittently. However, what is of consequence is whether the
tenant paid rent as required by Sections 13(1) and 13(2) of the Act
which read as follows:
"13. When tenant can get benefit of protection against eviction .--
(1) On a suit or any other proceeding being instituted by a landlord
on any of the grounds referred to in Section 12 or in any appeal or
any other proceeding by a tenant against any decree or order for
his eviction, the tenant shall, within one month of the service of
writ of summons or notice of appeal or of any other proceeding,
or within one month of institution of appeal or any other
proceeding by the tenant, as the case may be, or within such
further time as the Court may on an application made to it allow in
this behalf, deposit in the Court or pay to the landlord, an amount
calculated at the rate of rent at which it was paid, for the period for
which the tenant may have made default including the period
subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in
which the deposit or payment is made; and shall thereafter
continue to deposit or pay, month by month by the 15th of each
succeeding month a sum equivalent to the rent at that rate till the
decision of the suit, appeal or proceeding, as the case may be."
9. It is obvious from the aforesaid provisions that the tenant must
during the pendency of the suit/appeal make payment of rent
within one month of the service of writ of summons or notice of
appeal or within such further time such Court may allow in this
behalf. Further, he must thereafter, continue to deposit or pay rent
by 15th of each succeeding month till the decision of the suit,
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appeal or proceedings, as the case may be.
12. In the circumstances, we find no merit in the contention that
the respondents had paid rent regularly. The learned counsel for
the respondents also contended that the respondents are willing to
pay arrears of rent now before this Court and this Court may
condone such delay. The learned counsel for the respondents
relied on Section 13(5) of the Act which reads as follows:
"13. (5) If a tenant makes deposit or payment as required by sub-
section (1) or sub-section (2), no decree or order shall be made by
the Court for the recovery of possession of the accommodation on
the ground of default in the payment of rent by the tenant, but the
Court may allow such cost as it may deem fit to the landlord."
13. We are of the view that on a plain reading, this provision
protects a tenant from eviction if a tenant makes deposit/payment
as required by Section 13(1) or 13(2) of the Act. In other words, if
the tenant has complied with the provisions of Sections 13(1) and
13(2) in the matter of making payment, he is protected from
eviction. It must be remembered that the provisions of Section 13
of the Act shied a tenant from eviction if the tenant regularly pay
rent after the suit is filed.
14. Accordingly, it provides a locus poenitentiae to the tenant.
Section 13(5) of the Act reiterates the protection by stating that if
the tenant makes payment post-suit in accordance with the
provisions of Sections 13(1) and 13(2) of the Act, he shall not be
liable for eviction. This section does not confer the power on the
court to condone the defaults in payment of rent after the suit is
filed. It is, therefore, not possible for us to accept this contention.
In the circumstances, the impugned judgment [Ashok Kumar
Mishra v. Gowardhan Bhai , Second Appeal No. 167 of 1995,
decided on 14-12-2011 (Chh)] of the High Court is set aside.
(underline supplied)
26. Thus, it is clear that where tenant/respondents have committed
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default in depositing the rent and did not deposit the rent for years together,
then in the light of judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of Prakash
Bhalotiya (supra) as well as in the case of R.C. Tamrakar (supra) and Ashok
Kumar Mishra (supra), this Court is of considered opinion that in absence of
any application for extention of time, it cannot be said that respondents have
deposited the rent in accordance Section 13(1) of M.P. Accommodation
Control Act, and even otherwise by causing delay in depositing the rent
during the pendency of appeal, the respondents have made themselves liable
to be evicted on the ground of arrears of rent, and accordingly, substantial
question of law No.1 is decided in favour of appellant and against
respondents.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of eviction under Section
12(1)(b) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act.
27. It was the case of appellant that respondents have constructed a
brick wall and have constructed a new shop inside the shop, and has sublet
the same to some unknown person. The defendants by filing their written
statement, have admitted that they have constructed a STD PCO booth inside
the shop, and in written statement, it was claimed that his son is running STD
PCO apart from helping him out in the business of hotel, but in cross-
examination, he said that his nephew is running STD PCO shop.
28. Vivek @ Vikram (D.W.2) has admitted that he had taken a license
to run STD PCO shop in the name of Vivek Kumar, i.e., the son of
defendant No.1. He has further admitted that STD PCO cabin has been
constructed inside the shop in question and he is running the same. He
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further admitted that the license to run STD PCO shop was obtained in the
year 1997-98. He further admitted that the cabin is not used for offering
refreshment to the persons visiting hotel, but customers who want to use
STD PCO, are allowed to sit inside STD PCO cabin. Thus, it is clear that
tenant has allowed the construction of a STD PCO cabin inside the shop
without the consent and permission of landlord and has allowed another
person to use the said premises for a purpose other than the business which
the tenant is running.
29. Thus, there is a categorical admission by Vivek @ Vikram
(D.W.2) that in the STD PCO shop the customers who visit the hotel for
having refreshment are never offered any refreshment, but only those
persons are allowed to sit in the STD PCO cabin who visit the STD PCO
cabin to use the same. Thus, in view of the admitted factual matrix of the
case, it is clear that respondents/defendants have constructed a STD PCO
shop inside the shop in question and have allowed other person to use the
said premises for the business other than the business, which was being done
by the defendants/tenant. Therefore, it is held that respondents/tenant, who is
running a hotel, has completely removed his control and legal possession
from the place where the STD PCO cabin has been constructed.
30. Section 12(1)(c) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act reads as
under:-
"(c) that the tenant or any person residing with him has created a
nuisance or has done any act which is inconsistent with the
purpose for which he was admitted to the tenancy of the
accommodation, or which is likely to affect adversely and
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substantially the interest of the landlord therein:
Provided that the use by a tenant of a portion of the
accommodation as his office shall not be deemed to be an act
inconsistent with the purpose for which he was admitted to the
tenancy;"
31. Thus, it is clear that if tenant unlawfully sub-let, assign, or
otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the
accommodation for consideration or otherwise, would be covered by the
definition of subletting. Subletting means parting away with legal
possession, with a clear intention to leave his possession over the said
property.
32. Thus this act of respondents would certainly come within the
definition of subletting as held by Supreme Court in the case of Joginder
Singh Sodhi Vs. Amar Kaur reported in (2005) 1 SCC 31 has held as under:-
"12. Two questions were raised by the learned counsel for the
appellant. Firstly, whether an order of eviction passed by the Rent
Controller, confirmed by the Appellate Authority and also by the
High Court is in accordance with law. Secondly, the effect of
death of Mukand Singh, original tenant against whom proceedings
were initiated and failure to bring his heirs and legal
representatives on record in revision petition before the High
Court.
13. Regarding sub-letting, in our opinion, the law is well settled. It
is observed in the leading case of Associated Hotels of India
Ltd. v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh [(1968) 2 SCR 548 : AIR 1968
SC 933] that in a suit by the landlord for eviction of tenant on the
ground of sub-letting, the landlord has to prove by leading
evidence that (i) a third party was found to be in exclusive
possession of the rented property, and ( ii) parting of possession
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thereof was for monetary consideration.
14. The above principle was reiterated by this Court from time to
time. In Shama Prashant Raje v. Ganpatrao [(2000) 7 SCC 522]
the Court stated that on sub-letting, there is no dispute with the
proposition that the two ingredients, namely, parting with
possession and monetary consideration therefor have to be
established.
15. In the instant case, a finding of fact has been recorded by the
Rent Controller, confirmed by the Appellate Authority as also by
the High Court that the property was let out to deceased Mukand
Singh and he was the tenant. A rent note executed by the tenant
also proves that fact. It was stated in the rent note that the property
was rented to him for his business. The tenant had also given an
undertaking that he would neither part with possession of the
property nor would permit anyone else to occupy it. A further
finding was also recorded that Respondent 2, appellant herein, was
found in exclusive possession of the property. The authorities have
also held that father and son were staying separately. In the light
of these facts, therefore, it can be concluded that it was proved that
the tenant had parted with possession in favour of his son who was
found to be in exclusive possession though he was staying
separately.
16. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant,
however, is that even if it is assumed that one of the ingredients of
sub-letting was established, the second ingredient, namely, parting
of possession with "monetary consideration" was not established.
The counsel urged that there is no evidence on record that any
amount was paid either in cash or in kind by Respondent 2 to
Respondent 1. In the absence of such evidence sub-tenancy cannot
be said to be established and the landlady was not entitled to get
an order of eviction against the tenant.
17. We are unable to appreciate the contention. As observed by
this Court in Bharat Sales Ltd. v. LIC of India [(1998) 3 SCC 1]
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sub-tenancy or sub-letting comes into existence when the tenant
gives up possession of the tenanted accommodation, wholly or in
part, and puts another person in exclusive possession thereof. This
arrangement comes about obviously under a mutual agreement or
understanding between the tenant and the person to whom the
possession is so delivered. In this process, the landlord is kept out
of the scene. Rather, the scene is enacted behind the back of the
landlord, concealing the overt acts and transferring possession
clandestinely to a person who is an utter stranger to the landlord,
in the sense that the landlord had not let out the premises to that
person nor had he allowed or consented to his entering into
possession of that person, instead of the tenant, which ultimately
reveals to the landlord that the tenant to whom the property was let
out has put some other person in possession of that property. In
such a situation, it would be difficult for the landlord to prove, by
direct evidence, the contract or agreement or understanding
between the tenant and the sub-tenant. It would also be difficult for
the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, that the person to whom
the property had been sub-let had paid monetary consideration to
the tenant. Payment of rent, undoubtedly, is an essential element
of lease or sub-lease. It may be paid in cash or in kind or may
have been paid or promised to be paid. It may have been paid in
lump sum in advance covering the period for which the premises is
let out or sub-let or it may have been paid or promised to be paid
periodically. Since payment of rent or monetary consideration may
have been made secretly, the law does not require such payment to
be proved by affirmative evidence and the court is permitted to
draw its own inference upon the facts of the case proved at the
trial, including the delivery of exclusive possession to infer that
the premises were sub-let.
18. In Rajbir Kaur v. S. Chokesiri & Co. [(1989) 1 SCC 19] this
Court, speaking through Venkatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then
was) stated : (SCC p. 43, para 59)
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"If exclusive possession is established, and the version of the
respondent as to the particulars and the incidents of the transaction
is found acceptable in the particular facts and circumstances of the
case, it may not be impermissible for the court to draw an
inference that the transaction was entered into with monetary
consideration in mind. It is open to the respondent to rebut this.
Such transactions of sub-letting in the guise of licences are, in
their very nature, clandestine arrangements between the tenant and
the sub-tenant and there cannot be direct evidence got. It is not,
unoften, a matter for legitimate inference. The burden of making
good a case of sub-letting is, of course, on the appellants. The
burden of establishing facts and contentions which support the
party's case is on the party who takes the risk of non-persuasion. If
at the conclusion of the trial, a party has failed to establish these to
the appropriate standard, he will lose. Though the burden of proof
as a matter of law remains constant throughout a trial, the
evidential burden which rests initially upon a party bearing the
legal burden, shifts according as the weight of the evidence
adduced by the party during the trial. In the circumstance of the
case, we think, that, appellants having been forced by the courts
below to have established exclusive possession of the ice cream
vendor of a part of the demised premises and the explanation of
the transaction offered by the respondent having been found by the
courts below to be unsatisfactory and unacceptable, it was not
impermissible for the courts to draw an inference, having regard to
the ordinary course of human conduct, that the transaction must
have been entered into for monetary considerations. There is no
explanation forthcoming from the respondent appropriate to the
situation as found."
19. Again in Kala v. Madho Parshad Vaidya [(1998) 6 SCC 573]
this Court reiterated the same principle. It was observed that the
burden of proof of sub-letting is on the landlord but once he
establishes parting of possession by the tenant to a third party, the
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onus would shift on the tenant to explain his possession. If he is
unable to discharge that onus, it is permissible for the court to
raise an inference that such possession was for monetary
consideration.
20. We are in agreement with the observations in the above cases.
In our considered opinion, proof of monetary consideration by the
sub-tenant to the tenant is not a sine qua non to establish sub-
letting.
21. In the case on hand, a finding is recorded by the authorities
under the Act that Respondent 2, appellant herein was found to be
in exclusive possession of the property. He was staying separately
and not with his father. He was doing his independent business of
photography. The explanation by the tenant, Respondent 1 as to
how Respondent 2, appellant herein came to occupy the shop was
that the lease was obtained by Respondent 1 (father) for
Respondent 2 (son), which was not believed by the authorities. In
view thereof, by drawing an inference that Respondent 1 had sub-
let the suit property to Respondent 2, no illegality had been
committed by the authorities.
22. It was then contended by the learned counsel for the appellant
that Respondent 2 was the son of Respondent 1 and since he was
not a stranger, no presumption could be raised that he was a sub-
tenant. We are unable to uphold even that contention. In our
judgment, for deciding the question whether the tenant had created
sub-tenancy, the relationship between the tenant and sub-tenant is
not material. There is no privity of contract between the landlady
and Respondent 2. He was, therefore, a "stranger" to the landlady.
She let the property to Respondent 1 who was the tenant.
Respondent 1 was bound to occupy the property as per the rent
note executed by him wherein even undertaking was given by him
that he would not part with possession or allow any other person
to occupy the property. In spite of the rent note and undertaking, if
without the written consent of the landlady, Respondent 1 had
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18 SA-938-2005
inducted Respondent 2 as his tenant or had parted with possession
in favour of Respondent 2, who was staying separately and yet
found to be in exclusive possession of the shop, sub-tenancy was
established."
33. Under these circumstances, this Court is of considered opinion that
since the respondents/tenant have also sublet the suit premises although
partially, but in view of Section 12(1)(b) of M.P. Accommodation Control
Act, which also includes parting away with possession of any part of the
accommodation, accordingly, the defendants/respondents/tenant are liable to
be evicted on the ground of subletting also.
34. Accordingly, the substantial question of law No.2 is also decided
against defendants/respondents/tenant.
35. No other argument was advanced by counsel for the parties.
36. Ex consequenti , the judgment and decree dated 07/03/2005 passed by
Second Additional Judge to the Court of First Additional District Judge, Guna
(although mentioned as Additional Second Additional District Judge Guna to the
Court of First Additional District Judge, Guna in the judgment and decree) in
Civil Appeal No.28-A/2003 as well as judgment and decree dated 25/07/2002
passed by Third Civil Judge, Class-I, Guna in Civil Suit No.72-A/2002 are
hereby set aside. The suit filed by appellant for eviction of respondents under
Section 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(b) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act is hereby
decreed.
37. Appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed to the extent mentioned
above.
38. Decree be drawn accordingly.
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19 SA-938-2005
39. Before parting away with this judgment, this Court would like to
clarify that in the light of the judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case
o f Periyammal (dead) through LRs and Ors. Vs. Rajamani & Anr. Etc.
reported decided on 06/03/2025 in Civil Appeal Nos.3640-3642 of 2025 , if
an application for execution of decree is filed, then the same shall be decided
by the executing Court within a period of six months from the date of
institution of the execution proceedings.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
PjS/-
