Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt X vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 12 September, 2025
Author: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
Bench: Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:26183
1 MCRC-562-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
ON THE 12th OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 562 of 2025
SMT X
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Ajay Bagadia, Senior Advocate with Shri Aditya Verma,
Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Apoorv Joshi, Govt. Advocate for the respondent No.1/State.
Shri Avinash Sirpurkar, Senior Advocate with Shri Yogesh Gupta,
Advocate for the respondent No.2.
ORDER
The present petition is being filed under section 483(3) of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 for cancellation of anticipatory
bail granted to the respondent No.2/applicant vide order dated 10.12.2024,
passed in M.Cr.C. No.50962 of 2024, in connection with FIR/Crime No.400
of 2024 registered at Police Station - Pachor, District Ragarh for the offence
punishable under Sections 376 and 376(2) (n) of IPC.
Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, in addition to the grounds
mentioned in the application, contends that the respondent No.2/applicant
Rajesh Sorate had secured the benefit of anticipatory bail by
misrepresentation of facts with regard to financial transaction between him
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:26183
2 MCRC-562-2025
and the prosecutrix. The applicant in M.Cr.C. No.50962 of 2024 had filed
documents relating to OnLine transfer of the money in favour of P. Sonu
Kala Beta and Basant Sisodiya. However, Basant has submitted an affidavit
to the effect that the money was transferred for treatment of his daughter
Surbhi Sisodiya. The money was not transferred in favour of the prosecutrix.
It goes to show that the applicant Rajesh Sorate has secured the bail
misrepresenting financial transaction between himself and the prosecutrix.
The anticipatory bail granted to applicant Rajesh Sorate vide order dated
10.12.2024, passed in M.Cr.C. No.50962 of 2024 deserves to be set aside.
Per Contra, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent No.2 Rajesh
Sorate submitted that the Coordinate Bench of this Court had granted
anticipatory bail to the applicant on consideration of overall facts and
circumstances of the case, nature of the offence alleged and the period of
offence as well as financial transaction between the applicant and
prosecutrix. The applicant has not misrepresented any fact to secure benefit
of anticipatory bail rather, he has placed the documents showing financial
transaction and loan of Rs.4,50,000/- by the prosecutrix. Learned counsel
referred to the complaint dated 07.11.2024 by the applicant to the Collector,
Rajgarh filed alongwith the application for grant of anticipatory bail in
M.Cr.C. No.50962 of 2024 to buttress his contentions. Learned counsel
further submits that there is no allegation that applicant had misused the
liberty granted vide impugned order dated 10.12.2024. Therefore, no case
for cancellation of anticipatory bail, is made out.
Heard both the parties. Perused the record of present matter as well as
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:26183
3 MCRC-562-2025
the record of M.Cr.C. No.50962 of 2024.
The cancellation of order granting bail can be considered, if the Court
while dealing with application for bail have not taken note of relevant factors
or the order granting bail is founded on irrelevant considerations making it
unjustified, illegal and perverse.
The Coordinate Bench considered the arguments advanced on behalf
of the applicant as under :-
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant is
innocent and has falsely been implicated in the present case. It is further
submitted that in this case, the prosecutrix, aged about 42 was working as
subordinate of the applicant and the alleged offence was initiated firstly on
19.10.2022 whereas the FIR was lodged on 14.11.2024 i.e. after two years of
the incident. The FIR has been lodged by the prosecutrix for the purpose of
blackmailing only. Learned Senior counsel has placed the transactions before
this Court and stated that approximately Rs.4.5Lacs have already been given to
the prosecutrix which clearly shows that there is financial transactions. The
applicant is posted on higher post i.e. Dy. Collector Rank and is having no
criminal records. On these grounds, the applicant is entitled to be released on
bail.
The operative portion of the order under challenge reads as under :-
7. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case and nature of
allegation, period of offence as well as financial transactions between the
applicant and prosecutrix, without commenting upon the merits of the case,
this Court deems appropriate to allow this application filed on behalf of
applicant. Accordingly, the application is allowed.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:26183
4 MCRC-562-2025
It goes to show that the impugned order granting the bail was passed
on consideration of overall facts and circumstances of the case, nature of
allegation and period of offence. The financial transaction was one of the
factors for considering the bail petition. It was not the sole ground for grant
of bail. The complaint dated 07.11.2024 by the applicant to the Collector,
Rajgarh filed alongwith the application for grant of anticipatory bail in
M.Cr.C. No.50962 of 2024 was relied on by the applicant. The veracity of
facts contained in the complaint cannot be determined at the stage of
consideration of bail application. Similarly, the veracity of the affidavit of
Basant Sisodiya, regarding Online payment and the facts contained therein,
also cannot be determined at present stage. There is no allegation with regard
to violation of condition of bail or other supervening circumstance relating to
alleged offence warranting cancellation of bail.
This Court cannot sit in review or appeal over the use of discretion in
granting bail to the accused by the Coordinate Bench. The Supreme Court in
case of Abdul Basit v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Chaudhary , (2014) 10 SCC
754 observed as under-
14. Under Chapter XXXIII, Section 439(1) empowers the High Court as well
as the Court of Session to direct any accused person to be released on bail.
Section 439(2) empowers the High Court to direct any person who has been
released on bail under Chapter XXXIII of the Code be arrested and committed
to custody i.e. the power to cancel the bail granted to an accused person.
Generally the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly, are, ( i) the accused
misuses his liberty by indulging in similar criminal activity, ( ii) interferes with
the course of investigation, ( iii) attempts to tamper with evidence or witnesses,
(iv) threatens witnesses or indulges in similar activities which would hamper
smooth investigation, (v) there is likelihood of his fleeing to another country,
(vi) attempts to make himself scarce by going underground or becoming
unavailable to the investigating agency, ( vii) attempts to place himself beyond
the reach of his surety, etc. These grounds are illustrative and not exhaustive.
Where bail has been granted under the proviso to Section 167(2) for the default
of the prosecution in not completing the investigation in sixty days after the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:26183
5 MCRC-562-2025
defect is cured by the filing of a charge-sheet, the prosecution may seek to
have the bail cancelled on the ground that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence and that it is
necessary to arrest him and commit him to custody. However, in the last
mentioned case, one would expect very strong grounds indeed. (Raghubir
Singh v. State of Bihar (1986) 4 SCC 481 )
15. The scope of this power to the High Court under Section 439(2) has been
considered by this Court in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1978) 1
SCC 118.
16. In Gurcharan Singh case, this Court has succinctly explained the provision
regarding cancellation of bail under the Code, culled out the differences from
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for short "the old Code") and
elucidated the position of law vis-à-vis powers of the courts granting and
cancelling the bail. This Court observed as under:
"16. Section 439 of the new Code confers special powers on the High Court or
Court of Session regarding bail. This was also the position under Section 498
CrPC of the old Code. That is to say, even if a Magistrate refuses to grant bail
to an accused person, the High Court or the Court of Session may order for
grant of bail in appropriate cases. Similarly under Section 439(2) of the new
Code, the High Court or the Court of Session may direct any person who has
been released on bail to be arrested and committed to custody. In the old Code,
Section 498(2) was worded in somewhat different language when it said that a
High Court or Court of Session may cause any person who has been admitted
to bail under sub-section (1) to be arrested and may commit him to custody. In
other words, under Section 498(2) of the old Code, a person who had been
admitted to bail by the High Court could be committed to custody only by the
High Court. Similarly, if a person was admitted to bail by a Court of Session, it
was only the Court of Session that could commit him to custody. This
restriction upon the power of entertainment of an application for committing a
person, already admitted to bail, to custody, is lifted in the new Code under
Section 439(2). Under Section 439(2) of the new Code a High Court may
commit a person released on bail under Chapter XXXIII by any court including
the Court of Session to custody, if it thinks appropriate to do so. It must,
however, be made clear that a Court of Session cannot cancel a bail which has
already been granted by the High Court unless new circumstances arise during
the progress of the trial after an accused person has been admitted to bail by
the High Court. If, however, a Court of Session had admitted an accused
person to bail, the State has two options. It may move the Sessions Judge if
certain new circumstances have arisen which were not earlier known to the
State and necessarily, therefore, to that Court. The State may as well approach
the High Court being the superior court under Section 439(2) to commit the
accused to custody. When, however, the State is aggrieved by the order of the
Sessions Judge granting bail and there are no new circumstances that have
cropped up except those already existed, it is futile for the State to move the
Sessions Judge again and it is competent in law to move the High Court for
cancellation of the bail. This position follows from the subordinate position of
the Court of Session vis-à-vis the High Court." (emphasis supplied)
17. In this context, it is profitable to render reliance upon the decision of this
Court in Puran v. Rambilas (2001) 6 SCC 338. In the said case, this Court held
that the concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order is
absolutely different from cancelling an order of bail on the ground that the
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:26183
6 MCRC-562-2025
accused has misconducted himself or because of some supervening
circumstances warranting such cancellation. In Narendra K. Amin v. State of
Gujarat (2008) 13 SCC 584, the three-Judge Bench of this Court has reiterated
the aforesaid principle and further drawn the distinction between the two in
respect of relief available in review or appeal. In this case, the High Court had
cancelled the bail granted to the appellant in exercise of power under Section
439(2) of the Code. In appeal, it was contended before this Court that the High
Court had erred by not appreciating the distinction between the parameters for
grant of bail and cancellation of bail. The Bench while affirming the principle
laid down in Puran case [(2001) 6 SCC 338 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124] has
observed that when irrelevant materials have been taken into consideration by
the court granting order of bail, the same makes the said order vulnerable and
subject to scrutiny by the appellate court and that no review would lie under
Section 362 of the Code. In essence, this Court has opined that if the order of
grant of bail is perverse, the same can be set at naught only by the superior
court and has left no room for a review by the same court.
18. Reverberating the aforesaid principle, this Court in the recent decision
in Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P. [(2013) 16 SCC 797] has observed that:
"19. ... There is also a distinction between the concept of setting aside
an unjustified, illegal or perverse order and cancellation of an order of
bail on the ground that the accused has misconducted himself or certain
supervening circumstances warrant such cancellation. If the order
granting bail is a perverse one or passed on irrelevant materials, it can be
annulled by the superior court."
19. Therefore, the concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse
order is different from the concept of cancellation of a bail on the ground of
accused's misconduct or new adverse facts having surfaced after the grant of
bail which require such cancellation and a perusal of the aforesaid decisions
would present before us that an order granting bail can only be set aside on
grounds of being illegal or contrary to law by the court superior to the court
which granted the bail and not by the same court.
20. In the instant case, the respondents herein had filed the criminal
miscellaneous petition before the High Court seeking cancellation of bail on
grounds that the bail was obtained by the petitioners herein by gross
misrepresentation of facts, misleading the court and indulging in fraud. Thus,
the petition challenged the legality of the grant of bail and required the bail
order to be set aside on ground of it being perverse in law. Such determination
would entail eventual cancellation of bail. The circumstances brought on
record did not reflect any situation where the bail was misused by the
petitioner-accused. Therefore, the High Court could not have entertained the
said petition and cancelled the bail on grounds of it being perverse in law.
21. It is an accepted principle of law that when a matter has been finally
disposed of by a court, the court is, in the absence of a direct statutory
provision, functus officio and cannot entertain a fresh prayer for relief in the
matter unless and until the previous order of final disposal has been set aside or
modified to that extent. It is also settled law that the judgment and order
granting bail cannot be reviewed by the court passing such judgment and order
in the absence of any express provision in the Code for the same. Section 362
of the Code operates as a bar to any alteration or review of the cases disposed
of by the court. The singular exception to the said statutory bar is correction of
clerical or arithmetical error by the court.
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:26183
7 MCRC-562-2025
*******
26. In the instant case, the order for bail in the bail application preferred by the
accused-petitioners herein finally disposes of the issue in consideration and
grants relief of bail to the applicants therein. Since, no express provision for
review of order granting bail exists under the Code, the High Court becomes
functus officio and Section 362 of the Code applies herein barring the review
of judgment and order of the Court granting bail to the petitioner-accused.
Even though the cancellation of bail rides on the satisfaction and discretion of
the court under Section 439(2) of the Code, it does not vest the power of
review in the court which granted bail. Even in the light of fact of
misrepresentation by the petitioner-accused during the grant of bail, the High
Court could not have entertained the respondent/informant's prayer by sitting in
review of its judgment by entertaining miscellaneous petition.
In view of above discussion, this Court is of considered opinion that
no case is made out for cancellation of bail granted v i d e order dated
10.12.2024, passed in M.Cr.C. No.50962 of 2024. [Also relied
on- Himanshu Sharma v. State of M.P., (2024) 4 SCC 222, Dolat Ram Vs. State
of Haryana reported in 1995(1) SCC 349.]
Consequently, the petition is dismissed.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
pn
