Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bheru Singh vs Smt. Seemabai on 6 October, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:28971
1 CR-620-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT INDORE
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ALOK AWASTHI
CIVIL REVISION No. 620 of 2024
BHERU SINGH
Versus
SMT. SEEMABAI
Appearance:
Shri Sachin Subnis - learned counsel for the petitioner.
Shri Jitendra Kumar Agral, learned counsel for the respondent.
Heard on : 03.09.2025
Pronounced on : 06.10.2025
ORDER
With the consent of parties, matter was heard finally.
2. This civil revision has been filed on behalf of the petitioner under
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short "CPC") read with
Section 23-E of M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter
referred to as the "Act of 1961") being aggrieved by the order dated
16.07.2024 passed by learned Sub Divisional Officer, Shujalpur, District
Shajapur in case No.0024/B 121/2024-25 whereby the application filed
under Section 23(A) of the Act, 1961 for vacating the rented premises and
recovery of arrears of rent, against the respondent, has been allowed.
3. Brief facts of the case is that the respondent's house is situated at
Krishnanagar Colony, Village Kamalya, Shujalpur, District Shajapur,
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Madhya Pradesh, Survey No. 175 area is 500 sq.ft. The respondent's husband
acquired possession of the said house by purchasing it from the previous
owner through a registered sale deed No. 623 dated 17.06.1997. The
respondent's husband decided to shift to Shajapur in the year 2004 and the
said house was rented for residential purposes at the rate of Rs.1,000 per
month to the petitioner.
4. Further, on 14.10.2013, after the death of respondent's husband, due
to her helpless situation of having minor children, the respondent requested
the petitioner to vacate the said house, but the petitioner, with the malicious
intention of taking advantage of the respondent's difficult circumstances and
usurping the house, refused to let her stay and started showing people
fraudulently prepared unregistered fake documents for selling the house.
Consequently, respondent, through her lawyer, sent a notice to the petitioner
tenant on 18.11.2013, requesting him to vacate the tenancy. The tenant sent a
false reply to the said notice. After which, the respondent filed a suit against
the respondent tenant for the house to be vacated. In which the tenant had
stated in his counter-claim that he was the owner of the house. The
respondent's civil suit was partially accepted vide judgment dated
16.03.2018. Subsequently, the petitioner/defendant filed an appeal in the first
Appellate Court, the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal vide judgment
dated 21.03.2023. Thereafter, a Second Appeal No. 1216/2023 has also been
filed by the petitioner, which is pending for consideration before this Court.
The learned authority, after taking the evidence available on record has
allowed the application of the respondent and directed the petitioner to hand
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over the possession of the vacant house in question to the petitioner within
15 days months. Hence, being aggrieved by the said order, the present
revision has been filed.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the learned
Court below has failed to consider the factual aspects of the matter while
passing the impugned order and not considered the fact that there is no
relation between the petitioner and respondent as tenant and owner. The
petitioner has not pay any amount to the respondent as rent, in spite of that,
he purchased the suit house from the husband of respondent on 29.04.2004
in consideration of Rs.45,000/-. He has also contended that the impugned
order has been passed without hearing the other party. A Second Appeal No.
1216/2023 with regard to the same suit, is also pending before this Court and
having knowledge of the same, impugned order has been passed. The
respondent has not filed any document on record to establish the ownership
and even not stepped into the witness box to prove his case. Hence, prays for
setting aside the impugned order and present petition be allowed.
7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has opposed the
prayer and prays for dismissal of the petition.
8. I have heard the counsel for the parties and perused the record.
9. Before dwelling upon the issue involved in this revision petition, it
is poignant to narrate here that a civil suit No. 125A/2017 for specific
performance of agreement was filed by the petitioner/Seembai against the
respondent/Bhairusingh, which was partly allowed and petitioner was
declared as owner of the suit property. Being disgruntled by the said order,
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an appeal No. RCA/11/2018 was preferred before Appellate Court/ 2 nd
District Judge, Shujalpur, District Shajapur, which was also dismissed by
affirming the order passed in Civil Suit No. 125A/2017. Against which, a
Second Appeal No. 1216/2023 has been filed by the petitioner/Bhairusingh
before this Court, which is pending for adjudication.
10. From the bare reading of pleadings of petition, the main contention
of the petitioner is that the respondent is not coming in purview of owner to
file the application for eviction of the suit premises. Prior to conclude the
matter, this Court has to consider whether the respondent is entitled and
covered under the said provision to file such application or not? For the sake
of convenience, the provisions of Section 23-J of the Act of 1961 are
produced as under :-
23J. [ Definition of landlord for the purposes of Chapter III-A.
[Inserted by MP Act 7 of 1985 (w.e.f. 16-1-1985).]
- For the purpose of this Chapter 'landlord' means a landlord who is-
(i) a retired servant of any Government including a retired member of
Defence Services; or
(ii) a retired servant of a company owned or controlled either by the
Central or State Government; or
(iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or
(iv) physically handicapped person; or
(v) a servant of any Government including a member of defence
services who, according to his service conditions, is not entitled to
Government accommodation on his posting to a place where he owns a
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:28971
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house or is entitled to such accommodation only on payment of a penal rent
on his posting to such a place.]
11. From the bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions as well as
looking to the fact that in the impugned order, it has been observed that the
respondent being a widow lady is purely covered under the Section 23(J) (iii)
of the Act of 1961. Since, the finding of widow and death of the respondent's
husband has not been challenged by the petitioner, therefore, the learned
Sub-Divisional Authority has not committed any error of law in considering
the fact that she is entitled for eviction of the suit property.
12. So far as the contention of requirement of the premises is
concerned, since the husband of the respondent is already expired and their
financial condition is not well and she is also having responsibility of
children, then the respondent's need in this regard cannot be discarded in any
manner. Further, nowadays, for a widow lady aged about 50 years, it is not
easy for her to provide business space for all of them. Therefore, the
requirement of the respondent cannot be turned down.
13. For the purpose and right of eviction of suit property of a landlord,
the provisions of Section 23-A of the Act is important to produce here as
under:-
"23A. Special provision for eviction of tenant on
ground of bonafide requirement.
- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law
for the time being in force or contract to the contrary, a
landlord may submit an application, signed and verified
in a manner provided in Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of
the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(V of 1908) as if it were a plaint to the Rent Controlling
Authority on one or more of the following grounds for
an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in
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possession of the accommodation, namely :-
(a) that the accommodation let for residential purposes
is required "bonafide" by the landlord for occupation as
residence for himself or for any member of his family,
or for any person for whose benefit, the accommodation
is held and that the landlord or such person has no other
reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his
own in his occupation in the city or town concerned.
Explanation. - For the purposes of this clause,
"accommodation let for residential purposes" includes-
any accommodation which having been let for use as a
residence is without the express consent of the landlord,
used wholly or partly for any non-residential purpose;
(ii) any accommodation which has not been
let under an express provision of contract for
non-residential purpose;
(b) that the accommodation let for non-
residential purposes is required "bonafide" by
the landlord for the purpose of continuing or
starting his business or that of any of his
major sons or unmarried daughters, if he is
the owner thereof or for any person for whose
benefit the accommodation is held and that
the landlord or such person has no other
reasonably suitable non-residential
accommodation of his own in his occupation
in the city or town concerned:
Provided that where a person who is a landlord has
acquired any accommodation or any interest therein by
transfer, no application for eviction of tenant of such
accommodation shall be maintainable at the instance of
such person unless a period of one year has elapsed
from the date of such acquisition."
14. On this aspect, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dhannalal
vs. Kalawatibai and Others reported in [(2002) 6 SCC 16] in para nos.8 and 9
are important to quote here as under :-
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"Such a landlord seeking eviction of his or her tenant on
the ground of bona fide requirement of residential or
non residential accommodation, the ground as defined
in Section 23A of the Act, must have recourse to
Chapter III-A only. Section 11-A of the Act provides
that the provisions of Chapter III so far as they relate to
matter specially provided in Chapter III-A shall not
apply to the landlord defined in Section 23-J. Section
45 of the Act also provides that as to the matters which
the Rent Controlling Authority is empowered by or
under the Act to decide are not entertainable by Civil
Court. The effect of these provisions is that a landlord
as defined in Section 23-J of the Act cannot have
recourse to the forum of Civil Court.
9. Broadly speaking, the main features of Chapter III-A
are that it provides a summary procedure for the hearing
of applications on the lines similar to those contained in
Order 37 of the CPC. The tenant cannot contest the
prayer for eviction from accommodation unless leave to
defend is sought for by moving an application within
the prescribed period of time and allowed. Default in
appearance or refusal of leave results in the statement
made by the landlord in the application for eviction
being deemed to have been admitted by the tenant
obliging the Rent Controlling Authority to pass an order
of eviction. Where leave is granted to the tenant to
contest the application, the Rent Controlling Authority
shall hold an enquiry consistently with the practice and
procedure of a Court of Small Causes. The requirement
of the landlord is presumed to be bonafide unless the
contrary is proved, that is to say, the burden of proof is
placed on the tenant to rebut the case of the landlord
contrary to the ordinary procedure in a Civil Court
where the burden of proof lies on the landlord. As
against an order of eviction passed by the RCA, a
revision lies to the High Court and the remedy of appeal
is excluded."
15. So far as the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner that
the petitioner has shown himself as owner of the suit property, while, the
respondent has narrated herself as the owner of the suit property. In such
circumstances, the question of ownership is required to be decided by
leading evidence. On this issue, a sale deed has been produced by the
respondent which is clearly showing that the land survey No. 175 Area 0.005
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in favour of husband of respondent Seemabai and the same has not been
challenged by the petitioner.
16. In this regard, Section 58 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short
"IEA, 1872") (Now, Section 53 of Bharatiya Shakshya Adhiniya, 2023)
provides as under :-
"No fact need be proved in any proceeding which
the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at
the hearing, or which, before the hearing, they agree
to admit by any writing under their hands, or which
by any rule or pleading in force at the time they are
deemed to have admitted by their pleadings:
Provided that the Court may, in its discretion,
require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise
than by such admissions."
17. In view of the aforesaid provision, there is no need to be proven of
the facts, which have already been admitted. In the instant case, the sale deed
submitted by the respondent has not been questioned in any manner.
Therefore, in view of the aforesaid factual aspect as well as documentary
evidence, the submissions regarding ownership has no force and the Court
below has rightly discussed about ownership of the house.
18. Actually, the respondent has filed the application under Section
23-A of the Act for her bonafide need. She has also pleaded that she has no
alternative accommodation. The aforesaid pleading has not been
controverted by the petitioner. Hence, in respect of ownership, the impugned
order does not warrant any interference regarding eviction of the petitioner.
19. Apart that, it is worth mentioning that this revision petition has
been filed under Section 115 of CPC read with Section 23 of the Act of
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1961. The principle of revisionary power of this Court are applicable in the
present revision also. The power of revision conferred on the High Court is
wider than Section 115 of CPC. The High Court, while exercising its
revisional jurisdiction, has the power to look into the correctness of the
finding regarding bonafide need of the landlord. But, while examining the
correctness of the findings, the High Court could not act as a court of Appeal
and re-appreciate evidence to come to its own conclusion. [See:
Gangadharan vs. Shantaram Lokre, 1994 JLJ 408].
20. Similarly, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that "The power of
revision is not restricted to the narrow limits of Section 115, CPC but it is not
as wide as that of an appeal and the indication is that an attempt should be
made to keep as near as possible to the limits of the power of revision under
Section 115, CPC exceeding the same only to the extent necessary for
preventing miscarriage of justice. [See; B. Johnson vs. C.S. Naidu AIR 1986
MP 72].
22. In view of the aforesaid law, since the provisions of Section 23-J
of the Act is applied in the present case, the Sub-Divisional Officer was
justified in deciding the application of the respondent. Further, the aforesaid
finding that "The requirement of the landlord is presumed to be bona fide
unless the contrary is proved, that is to say, the burden of proof is placed on
the tenant to rebut the case of the landlord contrary to the ordinary procedure
in a Civil Court where the burden of proof lies on the landlord", are
sufficient to consider the bonafide requirement of the landlord. The
landlord/landlady is legally entitled to get the possession back. Hence, in
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view of the aforesaid settled position of law as well as the findings of Courts
below, this Court does not find any illegality, impropriety and perversity in
the findings of learned trial Court, therefore, the same is upheld. Since, no
interference is called for, the revision petition deserves and is liable to be
dismissed.
23. Consequently, present Civil Revision No. 620/2024 is hereby
dismissed.
24. Pending application, if any, stands closed.
(ALOK AWASTHI)
JUDGE
Vindesh
