Madhya Pradesh High Court
Ajay Kumar vs Jaswant Singh on 27 October, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:26991
1 CR-94-2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 27th OF OCTOBER, 2025
CIVIL REVISION No. 94 of 2023
AJAY KUMAR
Versus
JASWANT SINGH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Anand V. Bhardwaj - Advocate for applicant.
None for respondents.
ORDER
Heard through video conferencing.
2. This civil revision under Section 115 of CPC has been filed against
the order dated 12/1/2023 passed by Second Civil Judge, Junior Division,
Dabra, District Gwalior, in Civil Suit No.21A/2021, by which an application
filed by the applicant under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC has been rejected.
3. Challenging the order passed by the Court below, it is submitted by
counsel for applicant that the respondents/plaintiffs filed a suit for
declaration of title and permanent injunction as well as for declaration of sale
deed dated 22/1/1990 and sale deed dated 10/5/1995 as null and void. It is
submitted that it was the case of the plaintiffs that the property in dispute is
their ancestral property. On 22/1/1990, a sale deed was executed by way
of security of loan, and it was also agreed that a deed of reconveyance shall
be executed. Similarly, another sale deed dated 10/5/1995 was executed with
an oral agreement that defendant No.1 shall execute a deed of reconveyance
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and will re-transfer the land to the father and the brother of the plaintiffs.
However, with the increase in the price of agricultural lands, the intention of
defendant No.1 became dishonest, and accordingly, in order to grab the
property belonging to the plaintiffs, he started picking up quarrels with the
plaintiffs, and ultimately, on 27/11/2003, he lodged a false report of
kidnapping against the plaintiffs. As a result, the plaintiffs were compelled to
remain in Central Jail, Gwalior, for a period of 14 long years. The appellants
were convicted by the trial Court by judgment and decree dated 8/11/2004,
and in an appeal filed by the plaintiffs, the High Court, by judgment dated
25/9/2017 passed in Criminal Appeal No.840/2004, acquitted the plaintiffs.
Accordingly, the suit was filed.
4. An application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was filed on the ground
that since the plaintiffs have filed a suit for setting aside the sale deeds
executed in the year 1990 and 1995 respectively, whereas the suit was filed
in the year 2021, therefore, the suit is barred by time.
5. The trial Court, by the impugned order, dismissed the application
filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC mainly on the ground that the father of the
plaintiffs had expired in the year 2002, whereas the plaintiffs were in jail for
13 long years, and therefore it cannot be said that the suit is barred by time.
6. Challenging the order passed by the Court below, it is submitted by
counsel for the applicant that incarceration cannot be said to be a legal
disability as defined under Section 6 of the Limitation Act, and therefore, the
trial Court committed a material illegality by treating the suit within a period
of limitation.
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7. Considered the submissions made by counsel for the applicant.
8. The counsel for the applicant is right in submitting that incarceration
has not been defined as a legal disability under Section 6 of the Limitation
Act. However, it is a well-established principle of law that the period of
limitation is a mixed question of fact and law, and unless and until it is clear
from the pleadings as noon day that the suit is barred by time, generally the
plaint should not be rejected on the ground of limitation.
9 . The Supreme Court, in the case of P. Kumarakurubaran vs. P.
Narayanan & Ors., decided on 29.04.2025 in Civil Appeal No.5622/2025 ,
has held as under:
"12.1. However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to
whether the appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the
transaction at an earlier point of time, or whether the plea
regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that
necessarily require appreciation of evidence. At this preliminary
stage, the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face
value and assumed to be true. Once the date of knowledge is
specifically pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action, the
issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily. It becomes a
mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the
threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection
of the plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the
parties to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable.
12.2. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the following
decisions of this Court, which have consistently held that when the
question of limitation involves disputed facts or hinges on the date
of knowledge, such issues cannot be decided at the stage of Order
VII Rule 11 CPC:
(i) Daliben Valjibhai & Others v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai
& Another
"10. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion
that the defendants made an application for correcting
the revenue records only in the year 2017 and on the
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said application the Deputy Collector issued notice to
the plaintiffs in March 2017 and that was the time when
the plaintiffs came to know about the execution of the
sale deed. It is under these circumstances that the suit
was instituted in the year 2017. While the High Court
came to the correct conclusion that under Article 59 of
the Limitation Act, a suit can be instituted within 3
years of the knowledge, it proceeded to return a finding
that in cases where the document is registered, the
knowledge must be presumed from the date of
registration.
12. Further, in Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai Jalkrushnabhai
Thakkar where again a suit for cancellation of sale deed
was opposed through an application under Order 7 Rule
11, on ground of limitation, this Court specifically held
that limitation in all such cases will arise from date of
knowledge. The relevant portion is as follows: "15.
What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in the
context of the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d)
CPC, is to examine the averments in the plaint. The
plaint is required to be read as a whole. The defence
available to the defendants or the plea taken by them in
the written statement or any application filed by them,
cannot be the basis to decide the application under
Order 7 Rule 11(d). Only the averments in the plaint are
germane. It is common ground that the registered sale
deed is dated 18-10-1996. The limitation to challenge
the registered sale deed ordinarily would start running
from the date on which the sale deed was registered.
However, the specific case of the appellant-plaintiffs is
that until 2013 they had no knowledge whatsoever
regarding execution of such sale deed by their brothers,
original Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of Jaikrishnabhai
Prabhudas Thakkar or Defendants 3 to 6. They acquired
that knowledge on 26-12-2012 and immediately took
steps to obtain a certified copy of the registered sale
deed and on receipt thereof they realised the fraud
played on them by their brothers concerning the
ancestral property and two days prior to the filing of the
suit, had approached their brothers (original Defendants
1 and 2) calling upon them to stop interfering with their
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possession and to partition the property and provide
exclusive possession of half (½) portion of the land so
designated towards their share. However, when they
realised that the original Defendants 1 and 2 would not
pay any heed to their request, they had no other option
but to approach the court of law and filed the subject
suit within two days therefrom. According to the
appellants, the suit has been filed within time after
acquiring the knowledge about the execution of the
registered sale deed. In this context, the trial court
opined that it was a triable issue and declined to accept
the application filed by Respondent 1-Defendant 5 for
rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That
view commends to us.
...
1 9 . In the present case, we find that the appellant-
plaintiffs have asserted that the suit was filed
immediately after getting knowledge about the
fraudulent sale deed executed by original Defendants 1
and 2 by keeping them in the dark about such execution
and within two days from the refusal by the original
Defendants 1 and 2 to refrain from obstructing the
peaceful enjoyment of use and possession of the
ancestral property of the appellants. We affirm the view
taken by the trial court that the issue regarding the suit
being barred by limitation in the facts of the present
case, is a triable issue and for which reason the plaint
cannot be rejected at the threshold in exercise of the
power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC."
(emphasis supplied)
13. In view of the above, there was no justification for
the High Court in allowing the application under Order
7 Rule 11, on issues that were not evident from the
plaint averments itself. The High Court was also not
justified in holding that the limitation period
commences from the date of registration itself. In this
view of the matter the judgment of the High Court is
unsustainable."
(ii) Salim D. Agboatwala & Others v. Shamalji Oddhavji Thakkar
& Others
"11. As observed by this Court in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy
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v. P. Neeradha Reddy [(2015) 8 SCC 331: (2015) 4
SCC (Civ) 100], the rejection of plaint under Order 7
Rule 11 is a drastic power conferred on the court to
terminate a civil action at the threshold. Therefore, the
conditions precedent to the exercise of the power are
stringent and it is especially so when rejection of plaint
is sought on the ground of limitation. When a plaintiff
claims that he gained knowledge of the essential facts
giving rise to the cause of action only at a particular
point of time, the same has to be accepted at the stage
of considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11.
12. Again as pointed out by a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in Chhotanben v. Kiritbhai Jalkrushnabhai
Thakkar [(2018) 6 SCC 422 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 524],
the plea regarding the date on which the plaintiffs
gained knowledge of the essential facts, is crucial for
deciding the question whether the suit is barred by
limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence
the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold.
13 ...
14. But a defendant in a suit cannot pick up a few
sentences here and there from the plaint and contend
that the plaintiffs had constructive notice of the
proceedings and that therefore limitation started running
from the date of constructive notice. In fact, the plea of
constructive notice is raised by the respondents, after
asserting positively that the plaintiffs had real
knowledge as well as actual notice of the proceedings.
In any case, the plea of constructive notice appears to
be a subsequent invention."
(iii) Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India &
Another
"6. The central question is: whether the plaint as filed
by the appellant could have been rejected by invoking
Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC?
7. Indeed, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC gives ample power to
the court to reject the plaint, if from the averments in
the plaint, it is evident that the suit is barred by any law
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including the law of limitation. This position is no more
res integra. We may usefully refer to the decision of this
Court in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta
[(2007) 10 SCC 59]. In paras 13 to 20, the Court
observed as follows: (SCC pp. 65-66)
"13. As per Order 7 Rule 11, the plaint is liable to be
rejected in the following cases:
'(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the
plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the
valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to
do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the
plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and
the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply
the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by
the court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the
plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the
provisions of Rule 9;'
14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [Saleem
Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, [(2003) 1 SCC 557] it was
held with reference to Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code that:
'9. ... the relevant facts which need to be looked into
for deciding an application thereunder are the averments
in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power ... at
any stage of the suit -- before registering the plaint or
after issuing summons to the defendant at any time
before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of
deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of
Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are
germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written
statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage....'
(SCC p. 560, para 9).
15. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal
[ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998)
2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question to be
decided while dealing with an application filed under
Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of
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action has been set out in the plaint or something purely
illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order
7 Rule 11 of the Code.
16. "The trial court must remember that if on a
meaningful--not formal--reading of the plaint it is
manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not
disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise its
power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see
that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever
drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, [it
has to be nipped] in the bud at the first hearing by
examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC."
(See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC
467] , SCC p. 468.)
17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be
considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As was
observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar
Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC 487], only a part of the plaint
cannot be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed,
the plaint as a whole must be rejected.
18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property
[(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that the averments
in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out
whether clause (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 was applicable.
19. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr. [(2004)
3 SCC 137] this Court held thus: (SCC pp. 146-47, para
15)
'15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation,
dissection, segregation and inversions of the language
of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is
adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of
interpretation according to which a pleading has to be
read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not
permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to
read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the
substance and not merely the form that has to be looked
into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands
without addition or subtraction or words or change of
its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the
party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the
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tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At
the same time it should be borne in mind that no
pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice
on hair-splitting technicalities.'
20. For our purpose, clause (d) is relevant. It makes it
clear that if the plaint does not contain necessary
averments relating to limitation, the same is liable to be
rejected. For the said purpose, it is the duty of the
person who files such an application to satisfy the court
that the plaint does not disclose how the same is in time.
In order to answer the said question, it is incumbent on
the part of the court to verify the entire plaint. Order 7
Rule 12 mandates where a plaint is rejected, the court
has to record the order to that effect with the reasons for
such order."
8. On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ
Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v.
Ponniamman Educational Trust [(2012) 8 SCC 706:
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612], observed as follows: (SCC
pp. 713-15, paras 10-12) "10. ... It is clear from the
above that where the plaint does not disclose a cause of
action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not
corrected within the time allowed by the court,
insufficiently stamped and not rectified within the time
fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose
the required copies and the plaintiff fails to comply with
the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option
except to reject the same. A reading of the above
provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7
Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the
suit either before registering the plaint or after the
issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time
before the conclusion of the trial.
11. This position was explained by this Court in Saleem
Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1 SCC 557], in
which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code,
it was held as under: (SCC p. 560, para 9) '9. A perusal
of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant
facts which need to be looked into for deciding an
application thereunder are the averments in the plaint.
The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7
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Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit -- before
registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the
defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial.
For the purposes of deciding an application under
clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the
averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by
the defendant in the written statement would be wholly
irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the
written statement without deciding the application under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural
irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the
trial court.'
It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the
court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the
same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of
the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written
statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the court
to scrutinise the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other
words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an
application are the averments in the plaint. At that
stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written
statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be
decided only on the plaint averments. These principles
have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v.
Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] and Mayar (H.K.)
Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express [(2006) 3 SCC
100].
12. It is also useful to refer the judgment in T.
Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467],
wherein while considering the very same provision i.e.
Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial court in
considering such application, this Court has reminded
the trial Judges with the following observation: (SCC p.
470, para 5) '5. ... The learned Munsif must remember
that if on a meaningful -- not formal -- reading of the
plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the
sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should
exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking
care to see that the ground mentioned therein is
fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion
of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing
by examining the party searchingly under Order 10
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CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible
law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on
examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus
litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage. The
Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such
men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them.'
It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and
meritless and not disclosing a clear right or material(s)
to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his
power under Order 7 Rule 11. If clever drafting has
created the illusion of a cause of action as observed by
Krishna Iyer, J. in the abovereferred decision [T.
Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467], it
should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by
examining the parties under Order 10 of the Code."
14. All these events have been reiterated in Para 28 of
the plaint, dealing with the cause of action for filing of
the suit. Indeed, the said para opens with the expression
"the cause of action to file the suit accrued in favour of
the plaintiff and against the defendants when the illegal
recoveries were noticed and letter dated 21-7-2000 was
sent to the defendants to clarify as to how the interest
was being calculated". This averment cannot be read in
isolation.
....
2 2 . It is well-established position that the cause of
action for filing a suit would consist of bundle of facts.
Further, the factum of the suit being barred by
limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact
and law. Even for that reason, invoking Order 7 Rule 11
CPC is ruled out. In the present case, the assertion in
the plaint is that the appellant verily believed that its
claim was being processed by the regional office and
the regional office would be taking appropriate decision
at the earliest. That belief was shaken after receipt of
letter from the Senior Manager of the Bank, dated 8-5-
2002 followed by another letter dated 19-9-2002 to the
effect that the action taken by the Bank was in
accordance with the rules and the appellant need not
correspond with the Bank in that regard any further.
This firm response from the respondent Bank could
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trigger the right of the appellant to sue the respondent
Bank. Moreover, the fact that the appellant had
eventually sent a legal notice on 28-11-2003 and again
on 7-1-2005 and then filed the suit on 23-2- 2005, is
also invoked as giving rise to cause of action. Whether
this plea taken by the appellant is genuine and
legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law,
depending on the response of the respondents."
10. In the present case, it was the case of the plaintiffs that in the years
1990 and 1995, two sale deeds were executed with an understanding that a
deed of reconveyance shall be executed by defendant No.1, but with an
escalation in the price of agricultural land, the intention of defendant No.1
became dishonest, and he started creating all sorts of trouble for the
plaintiffs. He also started picking up quarrels with them, and accordingly, in
the year 2003, he lodged a false report, as a result, the plaintiffs remained in
jail for 13 long years, and only in the year 2017, they were acquitted by the
High Court.
11. It is the case of the plaintiffs that they were falsely implicated. This
Court, by judgment dated 25/9/2017 passed in Criminal Appeal
No.840/2004, had held that the plaintiffs were falsely framed in order to grab
their property, and accordingly, it was held by this Court as under:
"Before parting with this judgment, this Court cannot
lose sight of the fact that the appellants have been
falsely implicated with an oblique motive to grab their
land. They have remained in jail for the last near about
13 long years without there being any fault on their
part. In fact the appellants Jaswant, Ramratan, Ramras,
Ballu, Kallu and Navla appear to be a member of
downtrodden society who not only lost their lands but
have also remained in jail for 13 long years, without
there being any fault on their part, except that they
might have asked Vijay Choudhary (P.W.3) to return
their land. The manner in which the allegations were
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made by the witnesses, and the manner in which the
investigation was conducted by the police, it is clear
that Vijay Choudhary (P.W.3) had strong motive to
falsely implicate the appellants Jaswant, Ramras and
Ramratan. This Court is of the view that Shanti
Swaroop Sharma (P.W.2), Vijay Choudhary (P.W.3),
Ajay Choudhary (P.W.4), Jaishanker @ Vicky (P.W.5),
Atal Bihari (P.W.6), Purshottam Bajpai (P.W.7), Vikas
@ Vijay (P.W.8) as well as S.S. Sikarwar (P.W.12),
S.S. Chouhan (P.W.13), Manoj Sharma (P.W.14) and
Ramesh Dande (P.W. 15) have given false evidence
before the Court.
Therefore, the Trial Court is directed to initiate
proceedings against these witnesses for giving false
evidence before the Court of law.
An amount of Rs.5,45,000/- is alleged to have been
recovered in the matter. As this Court has already held
that the prosecution has failed to prove that any ransom
amount was given by Vijay Choudhary (P.W.3) and the
appellants Jaswant, Ramras and Kallu have also not
claimed that the said amount belongs to them, therefore,
the amount of Rs.5,45,000/- is directed to be
confiscated.
The appeals succeed and are hereby allowed."
12. It is not out of place to mention here that the judgment passed by
this Court in Criminal Appeal No.840/2004 was assailed before the Supreme
Court by filing multiple SLPs as well as review petitions, and all the SLPs
and review petitions have already been dismissed, and the judgment passed
by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.840/2004 has been affirmed.
13. Thus, it is clear that the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case
to show that they were falsely implicated in a criminal case in order to grab
their property, and as a result, they were compelled to remain in jail for 13
long years.
14. Be that whatever it may be.
15. Whether the suit is barred by time or not is a mixed question of fact
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and law, and on the basis of the pleadings, it cannot be said that no other
conclusion can be drawn with regard to the period of limitation.
16. It is the case of the plaintiffs that although the sale deeds were
executed in the years 1990 and 1995, but it was with a clear understanding
that defendant No.1 shall later on execute the deed of reconveyance, and in
fact, the sale deeds were by way of security of loan and in order to avoid the
return of the land, the plaintiffs were wrongly framed in a wrong case. The
aforesaid pleadings of the plaintiffs find full corroboration from the findings
recorded by this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 840/2004.
17. Therefore, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the
question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law, which cannot be
decided at the stage of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
18. Under these circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the trial Court did not commit any mistake by rejecting the application
filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC.
19. Accordingly, the order dated 12/1/2023 passed by Second Civil
Judge, Junior Division, Dabra, District Gwalior, in Civil Suit No.21A/2021,
is hereby affirmed, although on additional grounds.
20. The Civil Revision fails and is hereby dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
Aman
